INURA

URBAN
STRATEGIES
AT THE END
OF THE
20th CENTURY

POSSIBLE
URBAN
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

BY RICHARD WOLFF

Global restructuring confronts cities of today with innumerable challenges. At the same time, people in all sorts of places are probing new concepts of local action, implementing urban projects and developing new ideas for a sustainable and just urban development. Activism occurs in areas as diverse as urban ecology, social exclusion, local economics and community development, public space, urban culture and participatory planning. All of these activities explore 'possible urban worlds' and open horizons for the renewal of the most important urban qualities: the creation of places which offer the possibility of mutual encounters and where the most diverse experiences and social projects can flourish.

This reader explores some of the possible urban worlds at the end of the 20th century in order to discern possible common strategies among communities in different cities. Oscillating between concrete urban experiences and theoretical considerations, it assembles contributions by distinguished, well-known academics and some of today's most innovative urban-movement groups and projects. We are convinced that these experiences – in addition to their local and historical relevance – open pathways towards a solidary, democratic and sustainable urban life.

The book is the result of the 7th INURA conference held in Zurich in the summer of 1997. It continues a debate which has been going on for years among people of diverse social and professional backgrounds who have come together in the International Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA) by fortuitous encounters, or as a result of deliberate search. This network has developed a deep mutual understanding among its members, always attempting to link theoretical and practical knowledge in a common act of learning.

The book is divided into 7 sections. The first section introduces the backgrounds, the methods and the approaches INURA is committed to. It reports on the diversity of theoretical and practical concepts, traditions, politics and forms of action which are specific to the various localities. It also indicates how closely the reflections and theoretisation of urban issues are inter-related with concrete experiences, local problems and struggles. One of the most rewarding experiences of those involved in the INURA network has undoubtedly been the long and often difficult search for a common language in order to understand our different urban worlds. This process has seen its share of strategic and theoretical debate.

Sections 2 to 6 focus on various topical aspects of urban life. Each section starts with an introduction by members of the editorial group, and then presents a theoretical contribution as a base for a productive confrontation with the following reports and analyses of urban experiences and actions. The allocation of contributions to specific sections is meant to serve as a guideline for the diversity of the urban worlds assembled in this reader. However, the multi-dimensionality of these worlds cannot be pressed into a simple mould. Alternative readings and allocations of texts are just as possible as most contributions combine a variety of topics.

We start with a reflection upon work and the city. Departing from the widest possible span between the body and the globe, the city is an intermediate and mediating level of social reality, whose future is significantly shaped by the forms and conditions of work. The section 'Local Economy, Solidarity and Environmental Justice' presents new initiatives which link self-help with the social and ecological aspects of work.

'Building Local Places in a Global World' is an important feature of those housing and work projects which develop in the empty spaces of the metropolis, in derelict areas, abandoned harbours and even in office buildings. All of these projects are embedded in a specific local history as well as in world-wide social and economic change. By reappropriating places which are devalued by global processes, they build new bases for self-governed and solidary social networks.

The section 'Reclaiming History for Urban Action' shows that the territory, produced by social forces over centuries, is an important material and social resource for a prudent and sustainable urban development. Memories inscribed into the landscape offer inspiration for participatory urban strategies which are sensitive to the people living there. As a consequence of ongoing globalisation and urbanisation, many local initiatives are increasingly threatened by developments seemingly beyond their reach.

The section 'The Politics of Urbanisation' analyses the various lines of conflict which emerge as a result of these processes in different metropoles, and highlights the importance of alternative social projects at the local-regional level that connect different social milieus and multiple scales of social interaction.

Finally, the section ' The City as a Contested Terrain' reports on the struggles which are fought around access to the material and immaterial wealth of the city. Those urban movements which, in their daily practices and in the realm of representations and discourses, envisage another way of producing the city are at the centre of these considerations.

As one possible conclusion of the iridescent multiplicity of the contributions, the section 'Horizons of Possible Urban Worlds' presents excerpts from the final panel discussion of the conference. It is a testimony to one of INURA's central beliefs: that the dividing line between theory and action often does not run between 'academics' and 'activists' but right through individuals. This concluding discussion is also meant to lead beyond the historical and contextual limits of the book and to nourish possible future debates.

We have paid utmost attention to a clear and easily understandable language. As many contributions stem from non-English speakers, you may discover some curious and foreign expressions which English speakers will hopefully accept as a tribute and an enrichment to a language, which is just as global as the process of urbanisation.

5

THEORY

AND

NURA
ACTION
1

INURA — THEORY AND ACTION

WRITTEN BY | BOB COLENUTT, ROGER KEIL, ARIE VAN WIJNGAARDEN, GIANCARLO PABA, RAFFAELE PALOSCIA, ANDREAS HOFER

CHAPTER

1

THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR URBAN RESEARCH AND ACTION (INURA)

INURA is a network of people involved in action and research in localities and cities.

The Network consists of activists and researchers from community and environmental groups, universities, and local administrations, who wish to share experiences and to participate in common research.

Examples of the issues that Network members are involved in include: major urban renewal projects, the urban periphery, community-led environmental schemes, urban traffic and transport, inner city labour markets, do-it-yourself culture, and social housing provision. In each case, the research is closely tied to, and is a product of, local action and initiative.

INURA is a non-governmental and non-profit organization with a self-organizing, non-hierarchical, decentralized structure. There are currently 9 regional INURA offices in Zurich, Rostock, London, Amsterdam, Florence, Brussels, Toronto, Los Angeles, and Mexico City. Regional offices take turns annually in organizing the conference and publishing the INURA Bulletin.

AIMS

The basic purpose of the Network is to develop and promote the interaction of social and environmental urban movements with research and theoretical analysis. INURA brings together theorists and practitioners sharing a common, critical attitude towards contemporary urban development. The Network wishes to maintain an informal and committed approach to its work.

ACTIVITIES

Annual meetings are held in alternating locations: 1991 Zurich/Salecina; 1992 Prerow auf dem Darss/Rostock/Hamburg; 1993 London/Durham; 1994 Florence/Tuscany; 1995 Amsterdam/Beneden-Leeuwen; 1996 London/Luton; 1997 Zurich/Amden; 1998 Toronto/Huntsville.

Information on activities of the Network and its members are published regularly in the INURA Bulletin.

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MESSAGE TO INURA
Bob Colenutt

I first made contact with community action in other European cities when I was working with community groups in London Docklands. Such is the parochialism of UK local politics it was not until the mid 1980's that we met up with activists from similar Docklands cities – in Antwerp, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and similar finance capital cities such as Frankfurt and Zurich.

The much lamented GLC (Greater London Council) had something to do with that. Joint Docklands Action Group and the Docklands Consultative Committee were funded by the GLC. The GLC encouraged us to look to Europe to see how other countries ran their ports and organised their planning and development systems. At the same time, students and community activists in other European cities were by the early 1980's becoming very interested in London, both in Ken Livingstone's radical GLC and on the other side, with Margaret Thatcher's experiments with property led regeneration in Docklands.

This curiosity was not just comparative urban geography. The realisation that other European centres had their Docklands areas, and expanding financial centres, urban motorway networks and luxury housing developments was both reassuring and alarming. The comparisons were remarkable enough. Even more significant were the similarities in the political and planning processes making these changes come about. For example, nation states and city government across Europe were following each other in creating urban development corporations and public/private sector development partnerships. Many were excluding local residents and workers from any real influence over planning and development, with strategic planning founded upon economic imperatives rather than the needs or the wishes of local communities. Local authorities were both disempowered and yet even more eager to sit at the table with the powerful private sector and government interests.

INURA helped us to understand and enabled us to observe this on the ground. INURA came about because urban left movements across Europe had much in common (and yet there are important differences to learn from). INURA also offered a special mix of research and action – with the emphasis on changing cities through political action not just through studying them. In fact, it is the people-base of INURA, relating everything back to social and cultural movements, to community, and to action groups which makes it always refreshing and relevant.

9

RESEARCH AND ACTION:
THE INURA AGENDA
Roger Keil

"The identification of theory and practice is a critical act, through which practice is demonstrated rational and necessary, and theory realistic and rational."
Antonio Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1971:

There are real and undeniable tensions between action and research. Much of this tension has to do with a social division of labour which slots individuals into either 'academic' or 'real world' life paths and careers. The divergent logics of these experiences make it subsequently rather difficult to build bridges between them. Specialized languages, practices, communication networks, class and gender divisions, etc. create different urban worlds that exist like parallel unequal universes. Anyone who has worked on either side of the divide with a critically open mind towards the other side knows about these dilemmas. For INURA-members, these dilemmas occupy the central space of our interest and activity. In this paper, I 'speak' as an academic/theoretician across the dividing line. A few typical problems arise when intellectuals speak about movements, specifically those that they have participated in.

1. Trained in academia with its specific demands, these individuals tend to analyze and theorize before presenting the actual narrative. There is always a problem on the side of activist intellectuals in presenting the work of political or social movements, of which they may be a part, in abstract terms. Theory building, terminology and abstractions rather than the substantive goals of the movement groups are the main interest. Intellectual discourse in general and academic discourse in particular make it necessary to follow norms of publication and presentation which tend to incorporate political praxis into refereed papers and individual résumés. This is potentially an act of depoliticization. If presenting such material, one needs to be aware of this problem of different practices of intellectuals and activists. Being aware of the problem, however, must not lead to creating false dichotomies between 'academics' and 'activists'; the real contradictions inherent in different practices can be resolved productively if they are given some attention and care.

2. There is what I will call the 'legitimacy problematic' which is linked to the question: 'do I belong?'. Can I speak as an activist or is there an unbridgeable gap between movement intellectuals and movements themselves? I have always thought that one should not overemphasize this gap but rather recognize that there is often much overlap between activist communities and intellectuals who theorize, analyze and write about them. For many intellectuals, their practice as academics – teaching and research – represents only one dimension of their lives. For many intellectuals and academics in Toronto, for example, activist and academic pursuits have suffered a near collapse into one entity since the onset of the conservative provincial government of Mike Harris who came to power in Ontario in June 1995. Over the past two years, Toronto has been turned into a hotbed of social movement activism, and as a consequence, our lives have been turned into a cauldron of front line activities.

3. And there is, related to this legitimacy problematic, the issue of authenticity and appropriation of voice. It is always difficult to represent an organization with meandering and conflicting positions and tendencies. This problematic goes beyond the academic/activist divide and reflects larger social contradictions of identity and meaning.

With these general remarks in mind, let me now look briefly at the record of INURA in connecting research and action.

INURA: THE RECORD
Seven years of praxis in urban research and action have created a remarkable body of written work and a history of activism in individual chapters of INURA and in co-operation among INURA-members. We have collaborated on publishing projects. Particularly a series of writings on Frankfurt and Zurich have explored global city formation in those two European financial metropoles (Hitz et al., 1995; Kommune, 1993; DISP, 1993; Society and Space, 1994). It was the explicit goal of this collective project to find at least tentative answers to the following questions: will globalization force upon us a common reflection about cities and border-crossing urban praxis? And: does the current phase of urbanization lead to new forms of praxis? These questions were approached with the assumption that urban practice is part of theory building. Theory and practice need to be intertwined in order to be relevant (Keil and Lehrer, 1995: 18).

Mutual visits and collaboration at international conferences have accompanied these publications. Shows of solidarity across borders for local struggles in INURA cities have occurred on a regular basis. In many cases – at and between conferences – INURA has been a forum of exchange among various activists involved in a variety of projects, resistances and fights. These formal and informal exchanges of situated knowledge on conflicts, politics, and struggles have raised the overall awareness of all INURA members of cross-cultural and transnational communication of local experience in an age of globalization and restructuring.

At individual places, there have been impressive examples of comprehensive projects which tie sophisticated theory and ideology into programs of practical socio-ecological change. One series of projects stands out in this regard: the continuing efforts of INURA members from Florence, Italy to create links between the theory of the territory and ecological planning and governance projects in central Italy (see chapter 4, in this book). Others, such as members from London have been involved in long social struggles over particular neighborhoods like the Isle of Dogs or Hammersmith.

In the end, what INURA has been about is not the deepening of the conceptual rift between the global and the local. We have also gone beyond what some have called 'Glocalization' (Swyngedouw, 1997). The INURA-project is not about the importance of the – allegedly concrete and tangible – local versus the equalizing force of the – idealized and reified, abstract – global. It is about the meaning of the urban (Hitz et al., 1995). It has been our intention throughout our various projects to critically redefine the urban under the current pressures of globalization. And it has been our goal to tie urban social movements and progressive politics into the narrative of place-making in the age of the global city. In an exemplary way, this connection has recently been demonstrated by Christian Schmid and Marvi Maggio: both have examined the historical geography of movement milieus in Swiss and Italian cities since the 1960s. Schmid shows how at each step in Zurich's development into a global financial center, urban social movements have pushed hegemonic forces into a position of territorial compromise (Schmid, in this book). Maggio relates the story of how proletarian circles and centri sociali in Italian towns changed the perception and uses of public spaces in their cities during the period between the 1970s and the 1990s (Maggio, in this book).

CONCLUSION

Where will INURA go from here? Globalization has forced upon individual communities and urban centers the need for more sophistication in theoretical analysis and development of counter-hegemonic practices. INURA has been an organization for people who believe one needs to simultaneously embark on both projects: the refinement of our theoretical, and the sharpening of our practical weapons in myriad political and social struggles in cities around the world. For academics, the choices become clearer as we move into the 21st century: the corporate university forces critical minds to forge alliances with subaltern groups in civil society. The ivory tower is leaning and threatening to fall. Activists will gain little political relevance if parochialism and tunnel vision replace a critical universalism based on theoretical analysis of global change. Globalization demands that research and action be done together. INURA has been an important place for the development of a philosophy of praxis and a theory of critical social change in cities.

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ON THE WAVES OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT?
Arie van Wijngaarden

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE STATE

In most European countries the role of the state has changed in recent years. The so-called welfare state was established in the period after W.W.II, after post-war reconstruction and the increase of productivity enabled income to be set aside for redistribution by the state. The welfare state was intended to guarantee a decent level of income, education, and housing, and provided medical, social and cultural services. It was intended to give assistance to those who could not pay for these services by themselves. This system, based on solidarity, started to give way to a less comprehensive state concept, characterised by the market system, i.e. individual choice, based on purchasing power, by the privatisation of state enterprises and limiting state support to the very poor. The new model was more economically than politically orientated. People could vote with their purse by purchasing goods, or even with their feet by migrating to other regions or countries.

Of course the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom pioneered this concept, though in other European countries governments of a different political colour were also inspired by the British example. Who could imagine twenty years ago that railways, post and telecommunications, water works, harbour pilots and health services would become private enterprises?

PHYSICAL PLANNING

In the field of urban policy these changes meant that the power of the state as a regulator of economic and social life diminished. The state had to follow the rules of the market. In the eighties the Dutch physical planning agency, once famous for comprehensive planning in a capitalist state, declared that a more or less equal distribution of labour and population could no longer be the aim of state intervention in the field of physical planning. Investments should be located where the economic return was the highest, i.e. near concentrations of transport facilities (ports, airports) and sources of qualified labour. Thus the growth of the Netherlands should take place in the already congested western part of the country.

An example: at the end of the sixties the Dutch postal service was moved to the north of the country, a depressed area with a high unemployment rate. Now that the Dutch Post has been privatised, it has recently decided to move its headquarters to a location near to Amsterdam Airport.

Another example: in many countries much land was expropriated for the construction of the railways. It was an easy procedure, because it was expropriation in the public interest. Nowadays in many countries the railway companies are privatised.

Large sites, like railway yards, in urban centres are not necessary any more for the functioning of the railways, so they are prepared for redevelopment as office blocks, shopping malls, etc. Here I ask the question; is this also in the general interest?

HOUSING

The retreat of the state in the field of housing is nearly complete. The state acts as a regulator for the distribution of land, sites and building plots, but is not an influential investor in the house building market. Let us look at the example of Amsterdam. Until the beginning of the eighties 90% of the dwellings built in Amsterdam were social housing, i.e. financed and subsidised by the state. Nowadays 30% is in the social sector and 70% is in the market sector. And to make things worse, the rents of social housing have risen steeply in recent years. It has been recognised, by the Dutch government, that the rents of newly built flats are too high for households with a low income. These households should therefore occupy the old flats that are left behind by middle class households which move into the newly built flats.

Officially the city administration of Amsterdam has an anti-segregation policy, building expensive apartments in poor areas and social housing in the areas with high family incomes. But here the market is stronger than the politics, and most expensive flats are built in the areas with the wealthier inhabitants.

RESTRUCTURING OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACE

In the sixties and seventies one of the themes of the architecture of housing was to soften the division between private and public space. A gradual transition between the street and the private house or flat was considered good architecture. It would stimulate the inhabitants to bring spaces like gardens, playgrounds, entrance halls, etc. under common control of residents. In some cases this worked out well, but in many public housing estates there was not enough social cohesion to make these common spaces work in the long term, resulting in neglect and vandalism. Hence, fences, video cameras and private gardens became the normal way to design housing estates.

Public spaces were caught in the system of surveillance. Video cameras were installed, at first for traffic purposes, later in the High Street and, especially in the United Kingdom, also in streets in housing estates with high crime rates.

The 'public' control over private behaviour has recently been perfected by the police forces of some countries introducing the 'zero tolerance' policy for behaviour in public space. This means that all offences are dealt with at once, especially offences committed by young urban non-professionals.

SQUATTING AND OTHER ACTION

In Western Europe squatting has lost some of its political character in recent years. Besides satisfying an urgent need for housing, squatting revealed the speculation in buildings and building sites and urged the politicians to do something about this. Now that the emphasis in the urban housing sector in many Western European countries has changed from the rented sector to the house owner's sector, the demands of the squatters have become less orientated towards no or low rents, and more towards seeking a low price to buy the premises.

Another change is the shift from squatting just for living space to squatting for living **and** workspace. No longer a future of living on social security in a cheap place, but of an independent, creative worker, working within the exigencies of the local, national and world economy, only needing inexpensive living and working space to make a good start (Peti Buchel, Carolien Feldbrugge, Bert Hogervorst and Annie Wright, in this book).

ACT LOCALLY

Of course, it is difficult to find people who are interested in self-organisation of a progressive nature if they feel the pressure of a system, in which they are stimulated to satisfy their needs by working hard, saving money (or taking high loans) and satisfying their needs at the market, where ready-made products are there to be bought. An example from the housing sector: developers wait to sell you their trendy though expensive apartments, with a mortgage contract ready to be signed. So if you have the money, you buy a house in a suburb and hide behind walls, fences, hedges or curtains.

In this situation, there is no great stimulus to produce your own environment in a creative way. It is said to be not so efficient (we cannot have all the skills in the world) and it could present an inconvenience to your neighbours.

But… creating your own direct environment together with other people is the way to escape alienation and promote solidarity, respect and mutual support. If it is on the scale of a small village or a street in a suburb, self organisation and direct action are the fundamentals of local action.

13

THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CITY
Giancarlo Paba, Raffaele Paloscia

"The time of reconstruction, both educational and general, is now seen to be opening in cities and universities alike. These can no longer be considered separately (.....). The dry bones of their past, long mouldering on opposite sides of the same valley hear again the call of life. Bone is jointing to bone, and here and there citizens and students are rising up again anew. But the call is now no longer either merely to action or to thought; but to both together in their alternation and interaction. (....) This is the life of the true university. Hence to revive it needs more than mere 'university reform'. To be reformed, it must be born of the city and of her travail. (...) Thought and action at their highest are thus the complemental energies of humanity in evolving its varied communities. University-City and City-University will thus be increasingly identified. Our City of Thought has become the City of Deed."
Patrick Geddes: University of Central India, 1918

Geddes' words entirely reflects our thinking on the relationship between the university and the town and in more general terms between theory and urban practice.
Our work group (Laboratory for the Ecological Designing of Settlements) has its roots in the University of Florence. Within the department of town and territorial planning, a research and action workshop has been created. It is an open group of teaching staff, research workers, post-graduate students and under-graduates who carry out both theoretical work and concrete planning work in the town and in the territory.
A very particular understanding of the concept of the territory and the place lies at the heart of our activity. The territory is not merely a simple physical thing, a space in the most trivial interpretation of the word. For us the territory is a palimpsest, a deep-reaching set of resources, values and possibilities containing many layers. It is a fibrous and thick cloth woven through time by the labours of history itself. The territory is not the flat, isotropous and uniform space that the models of urban economy consider it to be. It is in fact completely the reverse – a differentiated space having plurality and profundity and spread out over time.
The territory is a vast collective resource, it is productive and capable of reacting positively, it is an opportunity for the development and the transformation of human settlements.
At the same time we consider the place to be the result of the application to the territory of people's ability to create what is significant, their capacity of producing the forms of the

settlements and the landscape, their power to build a combination of environmental balance and beauty which go hand in hand. People build the places to be inhabited by transforming space into territory, nature into landscape and site into town.
Our second starting point is that which we have defined as self-sustainable local development. Identifying oneself with sustainability is certainly nothing new, but from our point of view and within the context of urban practice we consider the words 'self' and 'local' which stand before the term 'sustainable' to be of utmost importance.
Sustainability, in fact, is not, so to speak, a chemical fact, a purely technical issue concerning a balanced equilibrium between resources and uses which can be solved by applying mathematical equations. On the contrary, sustainability is actually a complex concept having many facets. In our view, self-sustainability has two fundamental meanings. Firstly, that a territory is sustainable when the social balance of the development is guaranteed. By that we mean justice, fairness, equality and the diminution of violence both towards people and nature. The second is that environmental sustainability can be reached and maintained in the course of time only when the community itself is a leading player in the development and is capable of exerting an influential role in the management and, in the end, in the self-government of the territory and the environment in which they are living.
Equally important is the local dimension of the town-planning activity. It is only within the place, within the space shared by a community, within the boundaries which a local community can recognize and even measure, that it is possible for the inhabitants to be able to control and govern sustainability and the environmental balance.
Despite the process of globalisation and standardizing of culture and society throughout the world, collective living nevertheless maintains its roots in the local space, embedded in some significant place on the planet.
The local society can manage sustainable development only if it is capable of building up an identity for itself and of creating a new form of community. Our concept of identity does not coincide with the vision of a closed and self-centred community of an inward-looking and mean *Gemeinschaft*. We see the identity and the community as the positive outcome of social and town-planning activity which works on the on-going significance of *us* and of *belonging*. That is, pluralism and articulation within the identity, an open and welcoming community.
Our interpretation of the vast theme of participation derives from the considerations discussed in the above points. We are opposed to the system of bureaucratic and centralized planning, we are equally opposed to the models of top-down planning which is authoritarian and therefore inefficient. We support bottom up planning – which is both communicative and at the same time

insurgent. We advocate inclusive democracy and antagonistic
co-operation, based on the concept of empowerment developed
by John Friedman.
Within urban practices this understanding is translated into the
experience of the participatory projects which we have conducted in
the decayed historic centres of Sanaa and Havana, in the sad and
anonymous suburbs of Florence, in the places of suffering in
developing countries like Tessana, Niger.

15

INURA ZURICH – URBAN PUBLIC SPACE IN A SMALL GLOBAL CITY
Andreas Hofer

The claim made by INURA of combining theory with action has been a source of unity and friction over the seven year history of the network. On what conditions is it possible for the different groups to participate in the dialogue? In what way do they benefit from the debate? What are the language problems between the groups, and how may they be overcome?

At INURA conferences we have realised time and again that the gap between academia and the street are structures of rejection which can be overcome in personal contact. Biographies intersect. House squatters become teachers and teachers engage in unions and in neighbourhood projects. The participation in urban movements in western cities is not tied to class. It is part of a field of new political forms which have developed since the sixties.

This is particularly true of INURA Zurich. In the small global city of Zurich (350,000 inhabitants, one million in the metropolitan area) political movements had no chance to differentiate. The members of INURA Zurich share common roots in the movements of the eighties (INURA Zurich is a coalition of a group of urban geographers SAU, the Ssenter for Applied Urbanism, and a group of critical architects, the Konzeptgruppe Städtebau). Most of INURA Zurich's members are working in university research projects, some have got a foothold in the private economy or public administration, but all of them are still engaged in a variety of urban movements.

This closeness of urban theory and social movements has facilitated dialogue. There are differences, however, which derive from the divergent methods and objectives of theory and action. And there are blind spots in the perception of urban public spaces which increasingly challenge the relevance of our approach. All this is taking place in Switzerland, a country which always found it difficult to come to terms with the city. The history of this rejection is summarised below, because it still defines the conditions of our urban discourse.

SIMULTANEITY

The closeness of the street movements and the theorists has prevented language problems. Theory and actions were in a permanent dialogue. Theoretical texts were received critically by the movements and used in flyers, theory was concerned with the movements and put their claims in the context of broader urban development.

This symbiosis between critical urban research and urban movements resulted in both sides being equally concerned with the same development trends in the city, such as the claim for cultural

free space in the seventies, the preservation of low cost housing and the resistance against megaprojects in the eighties, or, the latest development, the focusing on abandoned industrial sites as spaces for urban reform projects. The course of evolution has followed the same pattern: claims are made by newly formed groups, they find support by urban intellectuals and are integrated in a diluted form and with delay into the official urban development policy of a centrist government, or the real estate conceptions of the private sector.

DIFFERENCES

It was thus not the perceptions of the urban development in our town that were differing, there was an almost general agreement in this respect, but debate arose over the different objectives separating research and political action:

Research offers an analytical structure attempting to grasp the processes of urban development and their impact on communities. Common trends are looked for in different metropoles. The individual train station project, the restructuring of a downtown sector, are taken as case-study subjects confirming a development trend. The urban movements, on the other hand are reactions in a particular place. The different approaches of theory and practice may prevent productive cooperation for two reasons.

First, the distance between theory and practice needs to be very small. If an urban movement, four years after its activities ended, finds itself as a footnote in a scientific report, the productive connection between the two sides is broken. Only if action and theory are working simultaneously in an urban project can the separation between 'subject matter of scientific research' and scientists be prevented.

Second, symbiosis only works if science and urban movements are concerned with the same subjects and places. In this respect the problem today is not so much disagreement, but rather a certain helplessness. A comprehensive urban opposition project is not within sight either from the theoretical or the practical side.

URBAN RESEARCH AND URBAN CULTURE – THE CONQUEST OF A NEW REALM

There is hardly a country where there is such a grotesque contradiction between an urban society and the invocation of a rural culture as in Switzerland. While in the nineteenth century the country was seized by the industrial revolution, with some delay but

all the more fiercely, at the same time the rising bourgeoisie built itself an ideological fortress of rural myths. As in the US, the history of dubious and depraved migrant workers was forged into the cowboy myth [1], in Switzerland in retrospective, a marginal figure of society, the 'Senn' (an alpine dairyman), became the prototype of an independent, nature-loving people [2]. At the founding of the new Swiss state (1848) the towns lost their feudal privileges, and a complicated federalist system was created giving preferential treatment to rural areas and degrading towns to inadequately represented municipalities. To this day the official planning policy aims to bring together urban reality and the image of a rural idyll. The relevant planning concept [3] very cleverly presents a network of small and medium-sized towns which may be perceived as a metropolis from the outside, while inside it may remain an idyllic Heidi-land. Urban culture, urban theory, urban movements have something of an ill repute, they are suspect. Urban planning is not offered as a subject of study in Switzerland. [4]

As the 'city' is a blind spot on the map, movements dealing with it or growing out of it automatically have an explosive potential. Proletarian movements, fighting in times of crises with strikes and demonstrations, for their requests, were quelled with brutality by army units. [5]

Until recently they hardly appeared in the official history. Their existence only proved that the urban environment led to 'antisocial behavior' and that therefore the 'healthy thinking' of rural culture had to be encouraged even more.

The first movement explicitly proclaiming its urban origin was the student revolt of 1968. Even if many of its activists later moved to the countryside – some to live their ideals in communes, the others, successful in their career, to start a family in new middle-class row-house colonies in the clean country air – the city as a topic was now launched, and was brought up in the cultural and political debate. The movement of the eighties, which was particularly virulent in Switzerland, took up the city and its problems as its issue. They fought for urban space, against a bourgeois and provincial culture (in Zurich the conflict was triggered by a contested renovation of the opera), for an international, metropolitan atmosphere (music, visual arts) and took place only in cities (Basel, Berne, Bienne, Lausanne, Zurich). Now the ice was broken. All campaigns for reform in the eighties and early nineties focused on cities. Particularly in the cultural sector Switzerland made the connection to the big-city feeling of other European metropoles. Alternative culture got its place and its stages, and its sparkling vitality may pop up in a brochure on location marketing for Zurich as an argument for 'soft location factors'. This pioneer feeling was supported in Zurich by the economic boom of the 'golden eighties' and made possible by a government oscillating around the political centre, at times more conservative/liberal, then again dominated by social democrats.

It is obvious, however, that the pioneers of the urban movements benefited from these golden times only sporadically, despite the success stories: like the creation of the cultural centre 'Rote Fabrik' (Wolff, in this book), and a number of smaller meeting points, as well as a massive increase in culinary and club facilities. In particular, on the outskirts of the city a right-wing opposition against reform projects was formed, parties on the extreme right became stronger, they succeeded in forcing and, in some cases, winning referendums. The liberal, multicultural urban society was seen as threatening.

Attempts to create any project going beyond trendy entertainment, something allowing for new forms of living and working, were fiercely opposed. The house Zentralstrasse 150 described in this book (Klaus, in this book) had its origin in the living and working project 'Karthago' which had been rejected in a popular vote in 1993. The initiators of this project subsequently had the opportunity to buy a house on the real estate market where they were able to implement some of their visionary ideas – even at the high price of property in Switzerland.

The eighties, besides being the heyday of cultural development, were also a time of massive real estate speculation and inner city megaprojects. One moment you're fighting for an alternative theatre, and the next you find yourself in the absurd situation of having to defend your abode in order not be edged out of town, having to leave your seat for the spectacle to a newly moved-in yuppie.

The change in institutions and universities was slow to progress. The generation of '68 managed to take some key positions, but the children of the eighties were close behind and they had never practised the strategic instruments of institutions, so they stayed in precarious job situations, a form of low paid self-employment, not chosen entirely out of free will.

Finally, the recession that started at the end of the eighties is showing clearly how the successes of the movements were based on compromises made possible by the good times. Nobody was therefore prepared for the fights which broke out. The claims of the political left seem to be nothing but fair weather sand-table exercises (see also Schmid, in this book).

Thanks to the movements of '68, but in particular those since 1980, the city had become – and this is an achievement not to be underestimated – a subject of discussion. It was now time to defend the city in the national context and in the context of a changed economic situation.

17

VACANT SPACES – FROM MARXIST DISCOURSE TO PROACTIVE MOVEMENT

In 1989 the movement in Zurich was flaring up once more. The cause was the defense of low cost hosing and the 'city-destructive' megaprojects of the real estate lobby. In its heyday – an outrage in Zurich – it squatted dozens of houses, and in an abandoned gas meter factory 'Wohlgroth' the movement found its cultural heart that was not just living space, but an interesting party location and colorful meeting point for Zurich.

But the squats after 1989 (the Wohlgroth factory was evacuated by the police in 1993) proved to be just as vulnerable as the ever crazier financial balancing acts of the real estate lobby. The nineties, so far, have been marked by economic stagnation and a massive drop in demand by the service sector. While between 1970 and 1990 it had been possible to compensate the loss of surface area and personnel in industry with the service sector, unemployment was now rising to levels unknown before (from less than 1% to more than 5%), and more and more sites became vacant. Adverts proclaiming 'offices for rent' were appearing on office buildings. This sudden over-abundance of space, besides its economic significance, has thoroughly shaken the Swiss value system. Until now real estate has always been scarce. On arid soil the farmer grows the grain with a lot of hard work and know-how, a country poor in resources and densely populated was creating wealth by the native wit and hard work of its citizens. But all this has been crumbling in the past years. Suddenly there seems to be enough space, but not enough projects to occupy it. At the same time, outside pressure on Switzerland is increasing. The heroic history of Swiss neutrality is challenged by the claims of victims of the holocaust, and the European Union sees Switzerland as a cranky recluse.

These challenges, forcing Switzerland to redefine its conception of itself, revived the latent conflict between mainly conservative rural and suburban areas, and more progressive cities. Whether it is international relations, the question of migration, or social policies, there is a clear gap between the urban and 'rural' population. On a national level the 'rural' regions form a majority and urban issues regularly lose out.

This, no doubt, is an important reason why in the last years the political wings have moved closer together in urban areas. Liberal politicians no longer ignore the social problems in the city, and the left is willing to enter into a dialogue with the conservative forces if this means that at least part of the social achievements of the past can be upheld.

But such tactical considerations are not the only reason for a new political culture of opposition (which, if my argument is correct, is no longer an opposition in the strict sense of the word). It rather appears that the creative and discursive abilities acquired in the context of alternative culture, and the improvisation skills and the capacity to work with limited resources, are beginning to be made useful for social projects on a wider scale. The most spectacular experiment going on in this attempt to integrate opposition culture to shape the future is the concept of the national exhibition in 2001. This typically Swiss event which took place last in 1939 (at a time of extreme political insecurity) and 1964 (in a period of economic boom) used to be celebrated as a monument of the nation. After several national festivals of recent years developed into embarrassing disasters, and when the committee charged with the organisation of the exhibition had no content and no concept to show after years of preparations, the position of art manager was given to the video artist Pipilotti Rist, a controversial figure straight out of the Zurich 'scene'.

This penetration of established sectors, occurring in a number of areas, might be understood as a normal change of generation. But there are a number of arguments against this view: The generation of '68 conquered encrusted institutions like the media, administration and politics, and started to reform these, becoming part of the establishment in the process. But today we are observing more punctual, playful contacts. Political institutions are avoided, what is sought is the project; concrete action. This may be the squatting of a house, membership of Greenpeace, an artful intervention, or the founding of a company to buy property. Means and methods are chosen from case to case. The groups are not defined by uniform outfit and insider idiom. This may lead to the wrong perception by the older generation that these young people are less politically aware. They are not, they just don't have the ideology that explains everything and the faith in a completely different world to be fought for, but they are seeking the means to improve given situations. This pragmatic stand permits the change from a rhetorical criticism of conditions, to pro-active action.

URBAN REPAIR AND URBAN PRODUCTION

At present there are two mutually nurturing directions in the more confined area of urban projects:

The collapse of real estate prices (or rather their dropping to a reasonable level) makes it possible for tenants to buy and manage property. Bankruptcy estates of stranded speculators or defaulted construction ventures can be bought, and in their place the existing building substance can be softly refurbished and utilised in a city-compatible way. Newly formed cooperatives, housing associations and even the city (as an institution) have been increasingly taking advantage of such opportunities in the last years. [6]

A more ambitious project, the creation of new urban spaces on abandoned industrial sites, has been undertaken by groups like KraftWerk1 (p.m., in this book). The success of this project will show to what extent the claims of social integration and new forms of living and working can be implemented, not only in niches, but also in new construction projects on a larger scale.

JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY

If broad social concepts (in the sense of socialism or revolution) are no longer postulated, but there is only patchwork repair of the city, and punctual reactions to specific social problems, the question of legitimisation has to be asked. The traditional left was able to derive fields for action from their ideology. The pragmatic interventions of the new urban movements lack such concepts. They are therefore often met with suspicion. Are these not middle class intellectuals creating a comfortable niche for themselves? Where is international solidarity? Is this autonomous, flexible and mutual support not a capitulation to a state increasingly trying to pull out of its social responsibility? These questions are serious, but do they really need to be asked only of the new movements? The top-down approach of left theories constantly missed the real requirements of its objects (social groups). In the face of cultural differences and their inability to react to new problems (in particular ecological and feminist claims), theories often turned into 'terrible simplifications'. At the end of this century we probably have no option but to carefully check all elements in a rich history of struggle for social justice for their suitability for new structures of society.

Endnotes

[1] "The 'Wild West' is so powerful a myth that it is difficult to analyse it with any realism.... It was a dream of poor whites, who hoped to replace the private enterprise of the bourgeois world by gambling, gold and guns."
Eric Hobsbawm: The Age of the Capital, 1848 – 1875,
Vintage Books, 1996, p. 141, first published 1962)

[2] Walter, F. 1996, (1990) 'Bedrohliche und bedrohte Natur,'
(Chronos Verlag, Zurich)

[3] Die Grundzüge der Raumordnung Schweiz GROCH

[4] The only education at university level in planning is offered in the form of a post graduate course by the Institute for National, Regional and Local Planning.

[5] On the occasion of the general strike in 1918 in various towns and at an anti-fascist demonstration in 1934 in Geneva.

[6] Subsidised housing is of little importance in Switzerland if compared with neighbouring countries (only about 10% of the housing in the city of Zurich is municipally owned). This has been supplemented since the twenties by private cooperatives (about 15% of the housing offered in Zurich). In the last years, the founding of new cooperatives is booming. Many of these cooperatives date back to squats or political fights for individual houses. The tenants invest their savings to buy and renovate the house they live in, thus saving it from speculation. The relative affluence of Switzerland and the low mortgage interest rate encourage this transformation from occupation to ownership.

19

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LOCAL ECONOMY, SOLIDARITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

WRITTEN BY | ANDREAS SCHNEIDER

TRANSLATION | BARBARA STINER

CHAPTER

2.1

One of the essential factors shaping future urban development might be work – according to some theories even the essential one. Work in this sense does not only mean economic production. In functionalist perceptions it is often ignored that work, its organisation and distribution are of eminent social importance as well.

The advocates of globalisation and neo-liberalism are therefore confronted with the question of what solutions their models offer for the immense 'waste' this system produces. Can Adam Smith's hypothesis that 'individual greed, when monitored through the market, leads to most efficient allocation of goods' still be applied in a globalised world? Does a further increase in efficiency make sense when considering the 'redundant production

factors' (labour, territory) created in the long term? Exponents of neo-liberalism display a vague hope that by a fast flight forward, by another increase in efficiency, these 'redundant production factors' might be reinserted in the process. Cynically, however, this might be in contradiction to the logic inherent to the neo-liberal system.

Globalisation and neo-liberalism are therefore stuck with an unsolved 'waste' problem which is beginning to backlash with a destructive, dynamic force. The ever growing waste of resources, land, talents and the creation of completely new wastelands contradicts the notion that the free market is economically the most efficient system of allocation. And, that the lack of solutions to such problems is beginning to backlash, even in core countries of the globalised economy, can be shown by the social unrest in France in 1997/98. It is significant that standard bearers of neo-liberalism have recently begun to clamour for more government regulation and stabilisation of (international) market relations, to prevent globalisation and neo-liberalism from cannibalising themselves. For if no answer is found to the 'waste' problems of today's capitalism, this supposedly so successful alternative to socialism may very soon be dead as well.

The papers included in this chapter intend to show that there exist ideas to make use of the labour that became redundant because of neo-liberal capitalism. They map out solutions and strategies for 'derelict people' and for 'derelict land'. They show opportunities to unhook oneself at a local level from the disastrous spiral of globalisation, thereby offering, in a very pragmatic way, new perspectives to people no longer required by the global economy. At the same time, and this is politically fatal, they relieve neo-liberalism of its liability as the cause of the 'waste' problem and thus prolong the lifespan of this economic system. Once more, reform or revolution are the alternatives – a fundamental issue of ethical principles when considering the people involved.

It is in this field of tension that the four case studies presented are operating. A striking feature of them all is the fact that they are based more or less on a global perception, but act locally. They also have in common the fact that they tend to move in small circuits and place considerable importance on work as a social component. But while 'Living Wage Campaign' and 'Green Work Alliance' invoke the political responsibility of institutions in a rather defensive way, 'Exodus Collective' and 'KraftWerk1' show the more offensive, pro-active strategy of action groups which essentially rely on their autonomy. While the former attempt to reform the Keynesian structures of economy, the latter are working on a basically new definition of work and society, beyond established institutions. 'Living Wage Campaign' and 'Exodus' put the emphasis on the social sustainability of work whereas 'Green Work Alliance' and 'KraftWerk1' concede an important function to ecological sustainability as well.

The four articles of chapter 2 thus explore the spectrum between resistance and dropping-out, highlighting a vast field of opportunities for labour which became 'waste' as a consequence of a neo-liberal economy.

In 'Globalization and the Body', David Harvey exposes the topicality of Karl Marx's analysis of capitalism. He unmasks globalisation as essentially an artefact of propaganda and ideology, which since the mid-seventies has caused politicians to weaken the position of governments vs capital in anticipating obedience. Additional flexibility in favour of capital was obtained by the dissolution of trade unions with their collective contracts, and by the bargaining of employment conditions for each individual 'body'. Taking the Living Wage Campaign in Baltimore (USA) as an example, he illustrates how it may still be possible to enforce a policy in favour of fair wages.

'Exodus – Movement of JAH People' describes a movement of young working class people dismissed by the formal economy. Calling themselves 'derelict people on derelict land' they occupied a ruined farm and an abandoned hospital near Luton (GB) six years ago and are making a living from organising techno parties and from housing benefit. What makes them special is their radicalism. They show a way how our egoistic, work and money centred society might develop its values in times of structural unemployment. And they display a culture of protest with the greatest respect for each individual.

Roger Keil's essay 'Making a Difference – Making Green Work' illustrates that movements strongly inspired by trade unions may offer opportunities for environmental issues. In the Canadian rustbelt around Toronto, facing increasing unemployment, the (government financed) ecological up-grading to a greenbelt became an opportunity for useful and self-reliant occupation. It is obvious that such a review of the relationship between employment and environment also includes components of urban development.

'KraftWerk1' is the name of a community project about to be realised on a former industrial site in Zurich (CH). p.m. takes up the basic ideas of this eminently urban project designed to provide living and working space for 700 people. Multicultural living, partial self-reliance, communal facilities and democratic decision making are elementary features for building up this island partly outside of the formal economy. The idea was born five years ago and, with some luck, will become a reality in 1999.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE BODY

WRITTEN BY | DAVID HARVEY

CHAPTER

2.2

MARX REDUX

For the last twenty six years (with the exception of one) I have run either a reading group or a course on Marx's Capital, Volume 1. While this may seem the mark of a peculiarly stodgy academic mind, it has allowed me to accumulate a rare time-series of data points on reactions to and interest in this particular text.

In the early years there was great political enthusiasm for it. Participation was understood as a political act. Indeed, the course was set up (in parallel with many others across American campuses at the time) to try to find a theoretical basis, a way of understanding all of the chaos and political disruption evident in the world (the civil rights movement in the United States and the urban

uprisings that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, the growing opposition to the imperialist war in Vietnam, the massive student movements that shook the world from Paris to Mexico City, Berkeley and Bangkok, the Czech 'spring' and its subsequent repression by the Soviets, just to name a few of the signal events that made it seem as if the world as we knew it was falling apart). In the midst of all this turmoil there was a crying need for intellectual guidance. Given the way in which Marx's works had effectively been proscribed through the long history of McCarthyite repression in the United States, it seemed only right and proper to open up our copies of Capital to find out what it had to say.

It was not an easy text to decipher but for those of us in universities this was a normal challenge. In these early years many young faculty members (most of whom have since gone on to be famous) participated as did graduate students galore from all manner of disciplines (Math Sciences to English). We all puzzled our way through the text and it was, for me, an incredible privilege to work through materials that were initially unknown with so many extraordinary intellects armed with such different intellectual skills. I soon also found myself teaching the text well beyond the confines of the university, in the community (unionists, community activists, teachers) and even in the Maryland penitentiary. Teaching undergraduates was somewhat more fraught, for the dominant tone of undergraduate radicalism was anti-intellectual; many thought it rather un-radical to demand that they read let alone understand and write about such a long and tortuous book.

The situation is radically different now. I teach Capital purely as a course. I never see any faculty members and the graduate student audience has largely disappeared (except for those few who plan to work with me and who take the course as some kind of 'ritual of passage' before they go on to more important things). Of course many in academia mention Marx, but do so mainly to by-pass him as an outmoded 'structuralist' and 'modernist' or denigrate him as insufficiently concerned with the more important questions of gender, race, sexuality, human desires, or whatever. Undergraduates still take the course but for them this is no longer a political act. The wall fell down and the fear of communism dissipated. The course has a good reputation as an interesting course with a good professor. So, depending on their timetable and their requirements, some of them end up in Marx's Capital rather than in Aristotle's Ethics or Plato's Republic.

This contrast between then and now is hardly surprising. But there is another tale to be told that makes matters rather more confusing. In the 1970s it was hard to find the direct relevance of Volume 1 of Capital to the political issues that dominated the day. We needed Lenin to get us from Marx to an understanding of the imperialist war, that so unnerved us, in Vietnam. We needed a theory of civil society (Gramsci at least) to get us from Marx to civil rights, and a theory of the state (such as Miliband or Poulantzas) to get us to a critique of state repressions and welfare state expenditures manipulated to requirements of capital accumulation.

We needed the Frankfurt School to understand questions of legitimacy, technological rationality and the environment. In short, we needed a whole host of mediations to get from Marx's text to most of the political issues that concerned us and it frequently entailed an act of faith in the whole history of the Marxist movement to believe in the inner connection between Marx's Capital and all that we were interested in. This is not to say there was nothing in the text to fascinate and delight – the extraordinary insights that came from consideration of the commodity fetish, the wonderful sense of how class struggle had altered the world from the pristine forms of capital accumulation that Marx encountered. And once one got used to it, the text provided its own peculiar and beguiling pleasures. But the plain fact was that the text did not have much direct relevance to daily life.

The situation today is radically different. The text teems with ideas as to how to explain our current state. There is the fetish of the market that caught out that lover of children Kathy Lee Gifford when she was told that the line of clothing she was selling through Wal-Mart was made either by thirteen year-olds in Honduras paid a mere pittance or by sweated women workers in New York who had not been paid for weeks. There is also the whole savage history of downsizing (prominently reported on in The New York Times), the scandals over child labor in Pakistan in the manufacture of carpets and soccer balls (a scandal that was forced upon FIFA's attention), and Michael Jordan's $30 million retainer for Nike, set against press accounts of the appalling conditions of Nike workers in Indonesia and Vietnam. The press is full of complaints as to how technological change is destroying employment opportunities, weakening the institutions of organized labor and increasing rather than lightening the intensity and hours of labor (all central themes of Marx's chapter on 'Machinery and Modern Industry'). And then there is the whole question of how an 'industrial reserve army' of labor has been produced, sustained and manipulated in the interests of capital accumulation these last decades, including the public admission by Alan Budd, an erstwhile advisor to Margaret Thatcher, that the fight against inflation in the early 1980s was a cover for raising unemployment and reducing the strength of the working class. He said:

"What was engineered – in Marxist terms – was a crisis in capitalism which re-created a reserve army of labour, and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since." (Brooks, 1992).

All of this now makes it all too easy to connect Marx's text to daily life. Students who stray into the course very soon feel the heat of what amounts to a devastating critique of a world of free market neo-liberalism run riot. For their final paper I give them bundles of cuttings from The New York Times (a respectable source, after all) and suggest they use them to answer an imaginary letter from a parent/relative/friend from home that says:

"I hear you are taking a course on Marx's Das Kapital. I have never read it myself though I hear it is both interesting and difficult. But thank heavens we have put that nineteenth century nonsense behind us now. Life was hard and terrible in those days, but we have come to our collective senses and made a world that Marx would surely never recognize…"

They write illuminating letters in reply. Though they dare not send them, few finish the course without having their views disrupted by the sheer power of a text that connects so trenchantly with conditions around us.

Herein, then, lies a paradox. This text of Marx's was much sought after and studied in radical circles at a time when it had little direct relationship to daily life. But now, when the text is so pertinent, scarcely anyone cares to consider it. Why?

A TALE OF TWO ERAS

This paradox is embedded in a massive discursive shift that has occurred over the past three decades. There are all kinds of aspects to this shift and it is easy to get lost in a mass of intricacies and complexities. But what is now striking is the hegemony of an almost fairy-tale like belief, held on all sides alike, that once upon a time there was structuralism, modernism, industrialism, Marxism or what have you and now there is post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-industrialism, post-Marxism, postcolonialism, and so forth. Like all hegemonic tales, this one is rarely spoken of in such a simplistic way.

To do so would be particularly embarrassing to those who deny in principle the significance of any such broad-based 'meta-narratives.' Yet the prevalence of 'the post' (and the associated inability to say what it is that we might be 'pre') is a dominant marker for contemporary debate at the same time as it has become a dominant game in academia to hunt the covert modernists (if you are a dedicated postmodernist) or to hunt the decadent postmodernists (if you happen to be in favor of some sort of modernist revival).

One of the consequences of this prevalent fairy-tale (and I call it that precisely to capture its beguiling power) is that it is impossible to discuss Marx or Marxism outside of these dominant terms of debate. For example, a strong theme of reaction to my own recent work, particularly Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, is to express surprise and disbelief at how I seem to merge modernist and postmodernist, structuralist and poststructuralist arguments (see, e.g. Eagleton, 1997). But Marx had not read Saussure or Lévi-Strauss and while there are some powerful structuralist readings of Marx (principally provided by Althusser), the evidence that Marx was a structuralist or even a modernist avant la lettre, as these terms came to be understood in the 1970s,

is neither overwhelming nor conclusive. It is here that basing analyses on Marx collides with the beguiling power of this fairy-tale reading of our recent discursive history. Put bluntly, we do not read Marx these days (no matter whether he is relevant or not) because he is someone whose work lies in a category that we are supposed to be 'post'.

Now it is interesting to look at Marx's oeuvre through the lenses provided by contemporary concerns and fashions. He was, of course, an avid critic of classical bourgeois political economy and devoted much of his life to 'deconstructing' its dominant principles. He was deeply concerned with language (discourse) and was acutely aware of how discursive shifts (of the sort he examined in depth in The Eighteenth Brumaire) carried their own distinctive political freight. He understood in a very deep sense the relationship between knowledge and 'situatedness' ('positionality') though it was, of course, the 'standpoint' of the worker that was the focus of his attention. I could go on and on in this vein, but my point here is not to try to prove that much of what passes as innovative in our recent discursive history is already pre-figured in Marx, but to point to the damage that the fairy-tale reading of the differences between the 'then' and the 'now' is doing to our abilities to confront the changes occurring around us. Cutting ourselves off from Marx is to cut off our investigative noses to satisfy the superficial face of contemporary intellectual fashion.

Bearing this in mind, let me now focus on just two facets of this massive discursive shift: those captured through the terms 'globalization' and 'the body.' Both terms were little if at all in evidence as analytical tools in the early 1970s. Both are now powerfully present; they can even be regarded as conceptual dominants. 'Globalization', for example, was entirely unknown before the mid 1970s. Innumerable conferences now study the idea. There is a vast literature on the subject, coming at it from all angles. It is a frequent topic of commentary in the media. It is now one of the most hegemonic concepts for understanding the political economy of international capitalism. And its uses extend far beyond the business world to embrace questions of politics, culture, national identity, and the like. So where did this concept come from? Does it describe something essentially new?

'Globalization' seems first to have acquired its prominence as American Express advertised the global reach of its credit card in the mid 1970s. The term then spread like wildfire in the financial and business press, mainly as legitimization for the deregulation of financial markets. It then helped make the diminution in state powers to regulate capital flows seem inevitable and became an extraordinarily powerful political tool in the disempowerment of national and local working class movements and trade union power (labor discipline and fiscal austerity – often imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – became essential to achieving internal stability and international competitiveness). And by the mid-1980s it helped create a heady atmosphere of entrepreneurial optimism around the theme of

the liberation of markets from state control. It became a central concept, in short, associated with the brave new world of globalizing neo-liberalism. It helped make it seem as if we were entering upon a new era (with a touch of teleological inevitability thrown in) and thereby became part of that package of concepts that distinguished between then and now in terms of political possibilities. The more the Left adopted this discourse as a description of the state of the world (even if it was a state to be criticized and rebelled against), the more it circumscribed its own political possibilities. That so many of us took the concept on board so uncritically in the 1980s and 1990s, allowing it to displace the far more politically charged concepts of imperialism and neo-colonialism, should give us pause.

What of the body? Here the tale, though analogous, is substantively different. The extraordinary efflorescence of interest in 'the body' as a grounding for all sorts of theoretical inquiries over the last two decades has a dual origin. In the first place, the questions raised particularly through what is known as 'second-wave feminism' could not be answered without close attention being paid to the 'nature/nurture' problem and it was inevitable that the status and understanding of 'the body' became central to theoretical debate. Questions of gender, sexuality, the power of symbolic orders and the significance of psychoanalysis also repositioned the body as both subject and object of discussion and debate. And to the degree that all of this opened up a terrain of inquiry that was well beyond traditional conceptual apparatuses (such as that contained in Marx), so an extensive and original theorizing of the body became essential to progressive and emancipatory politics (this was particularly the case with respect to feminist and queer theory). And there is indeed much that has been both innovative and profoundly progressive within this movement.

The second impulse to return to the body arose out of the movements of post-structuralism in general and deconstruction in particular. The effect of these movements was to generate a loss of confidence in all previously established categories (such as those proposed by Marx) for understanding the world. This in turn provoked a return to the body as the irreducible basis for understanding. Lowe (1995, 14) argues that:

"There still remains one referent apart from all the other destabilized referents, whose presence cannot be denied, and that is the body referent, our very own lived body. This body referent is in fact the referent of all referents, in the sense that ultimately all signifieds, values, or meanings refer to the delineation and satisfaction of the needs of the body. Precisely because all other referents are now destabilized, the body referent, our own body, has emerged as a problem."

The convergence of these two broad movements has refocussed attention upon the body as the basis for understanding and, in certain circles at least, as the privileged site of political resistance and emancipatory politics.

I will shortly take up 'globalization' and 'the body' in greater detail. But I here want merely to comment on the positioning of these two discursive regimes in our contemporary constructions. 'Globalization' is the most macro of all discourses that we have available to us while that of 'the body' is surely the most micro. These two discursive regimes operate at opposite ends of the spectrum in the scalar we might use to understand social and political life. But little or no systematic attempt has been made to integrate 'body talk' with 'globalization talk.' The only strong connection to have emerged in recent years concerns individual and human rights (e.g. the work of Amnesty International), and, more specifically, the right of women to control their own bodies and reproductive strategies as a means to approach global population problems (dominant themes in the Cairo Conference on Population in 1994 and the Beijing Women's Conference of 1996). The environmental movements often forge similar connections, linking personal health and consumption practices with global problems of toxic waste generation, ozone depletion, global warming, and the like. These instances illustrate the potency and the power of linking two seemingly disparate discursive regimes. But there is a large untilled terrain within which these discursive regimes have been conveniently separated from each other. In what follows, therefore, I shall sketch a way in which 'globalization' and 'the body' might be more closely integrated with each other as a general proposition. But first I need a fuller description of what these different discursive regimes might be about.

GLOBALIZATION

One of the most compelling and concise descriptions of globalization is given by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. Modern industry, they wrote, not only creates the world market, but the need for a constant expansion of that market "chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe" so that it "must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere." Through its exploitation of the world market, the bourgeoisie has

"…given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. All old established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.

29

In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in (cultural) production. The (cultural) creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local (cultures), there arises a world (culture)…"

The fact that such a remarkable statement could be made more than one hundred and fifty years ago suggests that globalization is a long-standing process rather than something that recently arose. I have argued elsewhere, that the pursuit of a 'spatial fix' to the contradictions of capitalism has been a permanently revolutionary feature in the history of global capital accumulation since at least 1492, if not before (Harvey, 1982, 1996b). Wallerstein (1974), for example, traces the origins of the modern world system back to at least the long sixteenth century. The Pax Britannica at the close of the nineteenth century like the Pax Americana post World-War II (operated under the Bretton Woods Agreement) were certainly global systems of power and capital accumulation.

But to argue that globalization has long been with us is not to claim that nothing has changed. Three main forces have shifted the balance of that process since around 1970 or so (Harvey, 1996b). A ratcheting downwards in the cost of moving people and commodities removed locational restraints on production and consumption activities at the same time as deregulation of financial markets permitted, with the aid of the information revolution, the creation of much more fluid conditions of movement of finance and money capitals on the world stage (Chesnais, 1996). The effect was to create conditions for a radical dispersal of manufacturing, resource extraction and agricultural commodity production activities across the face of the globe. This meant massive proletarianization world-wide (a doubling of the number of wage workers in the world in twenty years) accompanied by deindustrialization in the traditional heartlands of advanced capitalism. Such processes gained added significance with the political collapse of the Soviet block, its opening as a field of accumulation, and the insertion of the remaining principal communist power (China) into the capitalist world market as a major competitor.

There were all kinds of cognate features including strong migratory currents of populations throughout the world, powerful processes of rapid urbanization that spawned cities of twenty million or so (mostly in the so-called developing world). Perhaps even more important was political reterritorialization through the emergence of sub- and supra-national powers and the patent diminution of nation state powers to control capital flow across state borders. This did not mean a general diminution in the role of the state, but it did change its orientation away from any kind of populist or socialist agenda towards what is euphemistically called 'creating a good business climate' (i.e. controlling the aspirations and powers of organized labor).

'Globalization', as we came to know it from the 1970s on, focused broadly on these innovative aspects of a globalization process that had been long-standing within the historical-geographical dynamic of capital accumulation. A variety of challenges can be constructed to this dominant account, particularly with respect to the supposed diminution of nation-state power (see Chesnais, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Harvey, 1996b; ILO, 1996). But I here want to focus on just one facet of this globalization process, notably the effects on wage labor and global working class formation.

The World Bank (1995,9) estimates that the global labor force doubled in size between 1966 and 1995 (it now stands at an estimated 2.5 billion men and women). But:

"The more than a billion individuals living on a dollar or less a day depend … on pitifully low returns to hard work. In many countries workers lack representation and work in unhealthy, dangerous, or demeaning conditions. Meanwhile 120 millions or so are unemployed worldwide, and millions more have given up hope of finding work."

This condition exists at a time of rapid growth in average levels of productivity per worker (reported also to have doubled since 1965 world-wide) and a rapid growth in world trade fueled in part by reductions in costs of movement but also by a wave of trade liberalization and sharp increases in the international flows of direct investments. The latter helped construct a globally integrated production system largely organized through intra-firm trade (ILO, 1996,2). As a result:

"The number of workers employed in export- and import-competing industries has grown significantly. In this sense, therefore, it could be said that labour markets across the world are becoming more interlinked… Some observers see in these developments the emergence of a global labour market wherein 'the world has become a huge bazaar with nations peddling their workforces in competition against one another, offering the lowest prices for doing business'… The core apprehension is that intensifying global competition will generate pressures to lower wages and labour standards across the world."

This process of ever-stronger interlinkage has been intensified by "the increasing participation in the world economy of populous developing countries such as China, India and Indonesia." With respect to China, for example, the UNDP (1996, 94) reports:

"The share of labour-intensive manufactures in total exports rose from 36% in 1975 to 74% in 1990… Between 1985 and 1993 employment in textiles increased by 20%, in clothing and fibre products by 43%, in plastic products by 51%. China is now a major exporter of labour-intensive products to many industrial

countries… For all its dynamic job creation, China still faces a formidable employment challenge. Economic reforms have released a 'floating population' of around 80 million most of whom are seeking work. The State Planning Commission estimates that some 20 million workers will be shed from state enterprises over the next five years and that 120 million more will leave rural areas hoping for work in the cities. Labour intensive economic growth will need to continue at a rapid pace if all these people are to find work."

I quote this instance to illustrate the massive movements into the global labor force that have been and are underway. And China is not alone in this. The garment industry of Bangladesh hardly existed twenty years ago, but it now employs more than a million workers (80 per cent of them women and half of them crowded into Dhaka). Cities like Jakarta, Bangkok and Bombay, as Seabrook (1996, chapter 6) reports, have become meccas for the formation of a transnational working class under conditions of poverty, violence, pollution and fierce repression.

It is hardly surprising that the insertion of this proletarianized mass into global trading networks has been associated with wide-ranging social convulsions and upheavals as well as changing structural conditions, such as the spiraling inequalities between regions (that left sub-Saharan Africa far behind as East and Southeast Asia surged ahead) as well as between classes. As regards the latter, "between 1960 and 1991 the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% of global income to 85% – while that of the poorest declined from 2.3% to 1.4%." By 1991, "more than 85% of the world's population received only 15% of its income" and "the net worth of the 358 richest people, the dollar billionaires, is equal to the combined income of the poorest 45% of the world population – 2.3 billion people" (UNDP, 1996, 13). Put in the dramatized terms preferred by the National Labor Committee (1996), it takes Haitian workers sewing labels into a Disney product fourteen years to earn what Michael Eisner, CEO of Disney, earns in one hour. This polarization is simply astounding, rendering hollow the World Bank's (1996, 3) extraordinary claim that international integration coupled with free market liberalism and low levels of government interference (conditions oddly attributed to repressive political regimes in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) is the best way to deliver growth and rising living standards for workers.

It is against this background that it becomes easier to assess the power of the tales assembled by Seabrook (1996) from his travels and interviews in many of the cities of the South:

"Indonesia, in the name of the free market system, promotes the grossest violations of human rights, and undermines the right to subsist of those on whose labour its competitive advantage rests. The small and medium-sized units which subcontract to the multinationals are the precise localities where the sound of the hammering, tapping, beating of metal comes from the forges where the chains are made for industrial bondage…

Many transnationals are subcontracting here: Levi Strauss, Nike, Reebok. A lot of the subcontractors are Korean-owned. They all tend to low wages and brutal management. Nike and Levi's issue a code of conduct as to criteria for investment; but in reality, under the tender system they always go for the lowest cost of production… Some subcontractors move out of Jakarta to smaller towns, where workers are even less capable of combining to improve their conditions". (Seabrook, 1996, 103-5)

Or, at a more personal level there is the account given by a woman worker and her sister:

"We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting…We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 per day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes – especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered – until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents)… We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory. When we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep."

Home is a single room, 2 meters by 3, costing $16 a month; it costs nearly 10 cents to get two cans of water and at least a $1.50 a day to eat.

It is clear from these and other anecdotal accounts, that the effects of the contemporary wave of mass proletarianization on individual bodies are far from trivial. How then, can we understand what 'the body' might be all about without paying attention to the globalizing processes of massive proletarianization that swirl around it? This brings us back to the question: how are we to understand 'the body' and what has the discursive turn towards that concept been all about?

THE BODY

Viewing the body as the irreducible locus for the determination of all values, meanings and significations is not new. It was fundamental to many strains of pre-Socratic philosophy and the idea that 'man' or 'the body' is 'the measure of all things' has had an extraordinarily long and interesting history. The contemporary return to 'the body' as 'the measure of all things' provides, therefore, an opportunity to reassert the bases (epistemological and ontological) of all forms of enquiry. The manner of this return is crucial to determining how values and meanings are to be constructed and understood and how politics can be imagined.

Foucault, for one, strove to shift our political horizons away from monolithic categories such as class, and hence away from class politics, to embrace the micro-politics of the body as an alternative site for radical politics. Foucault (1984, 46) writes:

"This work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical enquiry, and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take. This means that the historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions."

The warning is salutary and deserves to be taken seriously. But the turning away from all projects that claim to be global is, in my view, deeply damaging. It leads Foucault to prefer projects that are 'always partial and local' and to hope these realize generality in a different way. It drives a wedge between the discourses of 'globalization' and 'the body' so as to conform to Foucault's other view on the inherent heterogeneity, radical pluralism and incompatibility of multiple discourses.

While not everyone has followed Foucault into such a political position, it is undeniable that much of the recent discourse about the body has been constructed as an antidote to discourses about class and has played an important role in generating that massive discursive shift away from interest in Marx that I began by outlining. And it has, pari passu, made it not only undesirable but seemingly impossible to try to link discourses about globalization and the body in any systematic way. Yet there is something odd about how this has occurred, for there is much in the contemporary literature on the body that is perfectly consistent with the fundamentals of Marx's argument.

Consider, for example, the two fundamental themes that dominate the recent literature. Writers as diverse as Elias (1978), Bourdieu (1984), Stafford (1991), Lefebvre (1991), Haraway (1991), Butler (1993), Diprose (1994), Grosz (1994) and Martin (1994), agree that the body is an unfinished project, historically and geographi-cally malleable in certain ways. It may not be infinitely or even easily malleable and certain of its inherent ('natural') qualities cannot be erased. But the body is evolving and changing in ways that reflect both an internal transformative dynamics (often the focus of psychoanalytic work) and external processes (most often invoked in social constructionist approaches). But this is an idea that is powerfully present in Gramsci's analysis of Fordism and can be traced back, as I have shown elsewhere (Harvey, forthcoming), to the very core of Marx's work from The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 to Capital. The second theme, broadly

consistent with (if not implicitly contained in) the first, is that the body is not a closed and sealed entity, but a relational 'thing' that is created, bounded, sustained and ultimately dissolved in a spatio-temporal flow of multiple processes. This entails a relational-dialectical view (most clearly articulated in queer theory) in which the body (construed as a thing-like entity endowed with transformative powers) internalizes the effects of the processes that create, support, sustain and dissolve it. Here, too, an argument can be made that a relational dialectical reading of Marx's work (see Harvey, 1996a) is entirely compatible with such a view. The body which we inhabit and which is supposedly the irreducible measure of all things is not itself irreducible. There is far more agreement between, say, Marx and Foucault on this point than there is fundamental difference. Much of what Foucault has to say, particularly in his early works such as Discipline and Punish, is prefigured in Marx's chapters in Capital on 'The Working Day' and 'Primitive Accumulation.' Conversely, there is much in Foucault that can be read as a friendly and thoughtful extension of Marx's concerns rather than as a rejection and rebuttal.

But we here encounter a conundrum. On the one hand, to return to the human body as the fount of all experience is presently regarded as a means (now increasingly privileged) to challenge the whole network of abstractions (scientific, social, political-economic) through which social relations, power relations, institutions and material practices get defined, represented and regulated. But on the other hand, no human body is outside of the social processes of determination. To return to it is, therefore, to instantiate the very social processes being purportedly rebelled against. If, for example, workers are transformed (as Marx suggests in Capital) into appendages of capital in both the work place and the consumption sphere (or, as Foucault prefers it, bodies are made over into docile bodies by the rise of a powerful disciplinary apparatus from the eighteenth century onwards) then how can their bodies be a measure, sign or receiver of anything outside of the circulation of capital or of the various mechanisms that discipline them? Or, to take a more contemporary version of the same argument, if we are all new cyborgs, (as Haraway (1991) in her celebrated manifesto on the topic suggests) then how can we measure anything outside of that deadly embrace of the machine as extension of our own body and body as extension of the machine?

So, while a return to the body as the site of a more authentic (epistemological and ontological) grounding of the theoretical abstractions that have for too long ruled purely as abstractions, may be justified (and provide a proper grounding, as in the cases of feminism and queer theory, for an emancipatory and progressive

politics), that return cannot in and of itself guarantee anything except either the production of a narcissistic self-referentiality or the sacrifice of any sense of collective political possibilities. So whose body is it that is to be the measure of all things? Exactly how and what is it in a position to measure? And what politics might flow therefrom? Such questions cannot be answered without a prior understanding of exactly how bodies are socially produced. And on that matter Marx does have something illuminating and important to say.

VARIABLE CAPITAL AND THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY

Marx provides a coherent theory of the bodily subject under capitalism. It is limited in its purchase but powerful as a tool for understanding the social production and reproduction of bodies and of subjectivities within the dynamics of capital accumulation. The analysis also provides hints of how and why the two discursive regimes of the body and globalization can and should be reconciled.

The fundamental process that Marx looks at is that of the circulation of capital. This is understood as the use of money to buy a bundle of commodities (plant, equipment, raw materials, energy – all means of production – and labor power) in order to engage in the production of commodities for sale so as to acquire more money (profit understood by Marx as surplus value – measured as the difference between what labor power creates and what the laborer gets as a money wage). This process is viewed in its continuity. As more money is invested capital accumulates. Marx is interested in the relations and qualities of the different moments that exist within this overall process, the different forms it can take (as landed capital, commercial capital, finance capital, as well as industrial capital) and, above all, in its internal contradictions and crisis tendencies (see Harvey, 1982). The fundamental quality that I wish to draw attention to here, however, is that this process is a process that is fundamentally powered by the quest for exchange values. To the degree that money, the primary form of exchange value, is fungible and fluid across space and time, it assumes a globality and universality that commands and subsumes the other exchange processes necessary to support capital accumulation. In short, it is the monetary drive that underlies the process of globalization and, hardly surprisingly, it is the revolution in financial arrangements since the 1970s that have been at the heart of what we now term 'globalization'.

But there are other circulation processes necessary to the proper functioning of the general circulation and accumulation of capital. I shall concentrate on just one – the circulation of what Marx calls variable capital. In this circulation process the laborer as person takes his/her abilities to dispense labor power to market. He/she exchanges its use value to the capitalist for a money wage which permits him/her to buy use values (commodities) in order to live and thus be able to return to the labor market again and again. The circulation of variable capital is about the reproduction of

the laborer and therefore about the continuous reproduction of labor power as a commodity. Plainly, the reproduction of that labor power in a proper state is a necessary condition for the continuous circulation and accumulation of capital.

By using the term variable capital Marx makes it seem as if capital circulates "through the body of the laborer" and thereby "turns the laborer into a mere appendage of the circulation of capital itself" (Harvey, 1982, 157). It then becomes clear why Haraway (see Harvey and Haraway, 1995, 510) considers it so "crystal clear" that "the body is an accumulation strategy in the deepest sense" and why Foucault (1995, 221) agrees that "the two processes – the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital cannot be separated." The circulation of variable capital therefore describes the conditions under which laboring bodies and subjectivities get produced and reproduced within the circulation and accumulation of capital. I am not concerned here, however, to examine this process in detail (see Harvey, forthcoming). The only point I want to extract here is that variable capital circulates with use value rather than exchange value as its beginning and end point. It is thereby constrained in ways that the circulation of exchange values (capital) is not. Variable capital circulation is always about the particular and the concrete. It is always localized and contingent as opposed to universal and global. Consequently, the point of intersection between the circulation of variable capital and the circulation and accumulation of capital in general is the point at which the concrete, the particular and the contingent intersect with the abstract, the universal and the rule-bound certitudes of capitalist laws of accumulation on the world stage. This is, in short, the point where body politics and globalization processes intersect.

In Volume 1 of Capital it is the point at which Marx forcefully integrates a theory of capital circulation in general with personal tales like that of the milliner, Mary Anne Walkely, twenty years of age, who often worked 30 hours without a break (though revived by occasional supplies of sherry, port and coffee) until, after a particularly hard spell necessitated by preparing "magnificent dresses for the noble ladies invited to the ball in honour of the newly imported Princess of Wales," she died, according to the doctor's testimony, "from long hours of work in an over-crowded work-room, and a too small and badly ventilated bedroom." And it is likewise the point at which we can integrate this contemporary account of conditions of labor in Nike plants in Vietnam:

"(Mr. Nguyen) found that the treatment of workers by the factory managers in Vietnam (usually Korean or Taiwanese nationals) is a 'constant source of humiliation,' that verbal abuse and sexual harassment occur frequently, and that 'corporal punishment' is often used. He found that extreme amounts of

forced overtime are imposed on Vietnamese workers. 'It is a common occurrence,' Mr. Nguyen wrote in his report, 'to have several workers faint from exhaustion, heat and poor nutrition during their shifts. We were told that several workers even coughed up blood before fainting. Rather than crack down on the abusive conditions in the factories, Nike has resorted to an elaborate international public relations campaign to give the appearance that it cares about its workers, but no amount of public relations will change the fact that a full-time worker who makes $1.60 a day is likely to spend a fair amount of time hungry if three very simple meals cost $2.10." (Herbert, 1997)

And it is, of course, innumerable accounts of this sort that now make it so easy to connect Marx's account in *Capital* with the conditions of labor embodied in everything from Nike shoes, Disney products, GAP clothing, to Liz Claiborne products. And it has been reformist bourgeois outrage coupled with the power of working class movements that have led then, as now, to attempts, in this case via a Presidential task force, to regulate 'sweatshop labor' world-wide and develop a code of 'fair labor practices' perhaps certified by a 'fair labor label' on the products we buy (see Greenhouse, 1997a; 1997b; Goodman, 1996).

STRUGGLING FOR A LIVING WAGE

Struggles over conditions of labor always entail interventions at particular places and times concerning the concrete conditions of life and labor, but with implications of global significance to the abstract powers of circulation and accumulation of capital across space and time. I conclude, therefore, with a specific and highly localized example of how the circulation of variable capital works in an urban setting, linking together a form of body politics and the politics of gender, race and class as these unfold under conditions of globalization. I do so in order to highlight what Marx's perspective reveals and what the contemporary neglect of the Marxist perspective tends to obscure.

The severe deindustrialization of Baltimore's economy from the late 1960s onwards moved employment away from the blue collar (largely white male and unionized) industrial sector into a wide array of service activities, particularly those connected to the so-called 'hospitality sector' (hotels, tourism, conventions, museums) that underpinned much of the redevelopment effort in Baltimore after 1970. The result (in line with much of the US economy – see, e.g. Wilson, 1996 and Kasarda, 1995) was widespread long-term structural unemployment, the emergence of a stigmatized 'underclass' of the permanently unemployed, and the rise of non-unionized and female employment in low-paying 'unskilled' jobs (the main means for the ultimate reduction in unemployment in the 'anglo-saxon' model of competitive job-creation in a globalizing world). Low-income job opportunities arose in Baltimore in areas such as cleaning, janitorial, parking and security services. Paying

only minimum wage and often resting on temporary work that yielded even less on a weekly basis (with no health, security, or pension benefits) the growth of this form of employment produced an increasing number of 'working poor' – individuals or families fully employed, with incomes well below the official poverty line (a recent report put the number of children of the working poor in the United States as a whole at 5.6 million in 1994 as opposed to 3.4 million in 1974 – see Holmes, 1996). African-American women, drawn from the impoverished zones of the inner-city, became the main source of this kind of labor in Baltimore, indicating a discursive and largely racist-sexist construction of the inherent 'value' of that kind of labor power from that kind of place. This stereotyping was automatically reinforced and framed within a circulation process of variable capital and capital accumulation that insisted that this was the kind of labor power that was essential to its own valorization.

These broad economic trends were paralleled up by a nation-wide political attack upon working class institutions and government supports (see, e.g. Edsall, 1984) and a general shift by a whole range of public and private institutions towards political-economic practices that emphasized capital accumulation. The need to remain competitive in the world economy was cited as a primary rationale for such policies, first in the private but later in the public sector. One effect was spiraling social inequalities.

A local instance of this political economic shift is worth recording. In 1984, The Johns Hopkins University and The Johns Hopkins Hospital (both non-profit and educational institutions) in Baltimore formed a for-profit, wholly-owned subsidiary called Dome Corporation, which provides security, parking, cleaning and janitorial services through another subsidiary called Broadway Services Inc. This firm does some of the cleaning and janitorial work in the Johns Hopkins system as well as in a number of City schools, downtown offices, and the like. Most of the employees are women and African-American, drawn from the impoverished zones of Baltimore City. Most were paid at or slightly above the minimum wage of $4.25 (now raised to $4.75). Full-time employees paid circa $5 per week for health insurance, but a significant portion of the work was done by temporary workers with no benefits. The Johns Hopkins System has by this strategy achieved cost-savings on some of its cleaning bills and a healthy rate of return (circa 10%) on its investment. It also found a tacit means to roll back some of the significant gains made in the 1960s through a bitter struggle to unionize low-wage black workers at the hospital (Michel, 1996-7). And it has since been cited by other universities as a model of how to cut costs by outsourcing its cleaning work while also making a profit.

This is an example of how shifts in the circulation of variable capital can occur. Such shifts have radical effects upon bodily conditions and practices. Everyone recognizes that $4.75 an hour is insufficient to live on. To bring a family of four above the official poverty line would require a permanent job at $7.70 per hour plus benefits. The lack of health benefits and elementary care translates into a chronic epidemiological condition for many inner-city neighborhoods (and the sad paradox of cleaners unable to utilize the services of the hospital they clean). The need to hold down two jobs to survive translates into a condition of permanent physical exhaustion from a twelve hour working day plus travel time on unreliable public transportation between job sites and residences. When two jobs could not be had, the effect was to force some of the employed to live in shelters rather than regular housing. The spatio-temporal definition of the labor process (often late and/or erratic hours) existed, furthermore, in relation to a spatially constricted zone of possibilities for low-income living (given rents, housing affordability, public transport availability – car ownership is not feasible – and the like). Housing conditions are poor and are at the root of numerous problems varying from hypothermia in cold winters to lead poisoning of children. Nutritional choices are restricted and bad diets are common (the fast and junk-food/ obesity problem is obvious). An already-existing spatially segregated zone of bodily production in the city is reinforced. The persistent insertion of racially-marked and gendered bodies into this labor process severely restricts options for social improvement for certain social groups trapped within such impoverished zones (see Fernandez-Kelly, 1994; more generally, Hanson and Pratt, 1994).

The marks of all this violence upon individual bodies are not hard to read. Systematic studies again and again emphasize the stark impacts of the resultant inequalities upon life chances. "In the groups we studied," write Geronimus et al (1996, 1555-6) after a comparative study of similar zones of Detroit, New York City, Los Angeles and Alabama, "the number of years of life lost generally increased with the percentage of people in the group who were living in poverty, with the poverty rate accounting for more than half the racial differences in mortality." The data tell an appalling story: "the probability that a 15 year old girl in Harlem would survive to the age of 45 was the same as the probability that a typical white girl anywhere in the United States would survive to the age of 65." While lack of a living wage is not the only factor at work, the associations are far too strong to deny an active relation.

A campaign for a 'living wage,' organized by Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD) seeks to change all this. BUILD was founded in 1978 as a coalition between inner city church congregations and the Industrial Areas Foundation (an Alinsky-style activist organization based in Chicago). It had long been an activist voice in the city dedicated to the improved well-being of impoverished and marginalized populations. It played an important role in struggles to regenerate failing neighborhoods and it initially joined wholeheartedly in the city and corporate-led strategy to generate employment through public investments and subsidies to business (as, for example, in the Inner Harbor renewal, the construction of a convention center, a new ballpark, etc.).

In the early 1990s, BUILD recognized that its strategies were too limited. Revitalized neighborhoods slipped back into decay, lacking adequate employment. The public investment and subsidies to corporations were producing below-poverty jobs. The corporate-backed revitalization of downtown had not delivered on its promises and was increasingly viewed by BUILD as a 'great betrayal'. The churches that formed the basis of BUILD found themselves pushed to deliver more and more in the way of social services (soup kitchens, clothing, social assistance). BUILD decided to wage a campaign in the name of 'family values' and 'community' betterment, for a 'living wage.' They argued that business, in return for public subsidies, should commit itself to a social compact. This translated into the ideal of a minimum wage of $7.70 per hour, permanent jobs, adequate benefits and career opportunities for all workers. Recognizing the difficulty of achieving this overnight, BUILD proposed an immediate wage hike to $6.10 an hour rising to $6.60 in July 1996 and going to $7.10 in 1997 and $7.70 in 1998.

Like all such struggles, as Marx observed (Capital, Volume1 1, 409), the role of "allies in those social layers not directly interested in the question" is of considerable significance. The impetus for the campaign came from the churches. This set the tone concerning the definition of moral and civilized behavior that always enters into the determination of the value of labor power. What BUILD in effect says, is that the market valuation of labor power as it now occurs in Baltimore is unacceptable as a 'moral' datum for a 'civilized' country. But the focus on jobs connected immediately to the institutions of labor. This meant the creation of a new form of labor organizing which drew upon the skills of IAF, and the power of a union, AFSCME (which became a full partner in the campaign in 1994, providing personnel and resources). This means a move away from traditional workplace industrial organizing and an attempt to create a city-wide movement to change the baseline conditions for the circulation of variable capital. Jonathan Lange, the labor organizer working with BUILD, outlines the strategy as follows:

"Organizing is a relational activity, it takes place in a place among people, and it is not totally mobile like capital. Ultimately you are not organizing workplaces and factories you are organizing people so… the industrial model does not make total sense. So you've got to figure out how to organize… a total labor market no matter where people work, to build an organization that is transportable for people from workplace to workplace, which

means that the benefit plans have to be portable, the relationships in the organization have to be portable and not built all totally on one work place, which means that you have to understand people are not going to be leaders necessarily right away but potential leaders who can develop a following in their current workplace or when they move into their new one. It means you have to target those industries and corporations where your ability to withhold labor isn't the only strength you have, that you have other sorts of ways of getting leverage to try and reach recognition and accommodation… This is an experiment to try to figure out whether within a certain labor market if you merge, if you ally working people with other kinds of decency and power and you carefully target institutions that are not totally mobile, that cannot just run away with their capital, can workers get themselves on a more equal footing? And if you do that enough… can you begin to really raise the basis, the floor of wages in a city?"
(Interview with Jonathan Lange, Labor Organizer for BUILD, July 29th, 1996.)

What in effect this means is that the campaign to protect individual bodies from the effects of 'globalization' through labor organizing shifts, from the scales of the factory and the nation state to that of the metropolitan area. In so doing it parallels, of course, the rise of what is called 'urban entrepreneurialism' in urban economic development strategies after the 1970s.

The BUILD campaign won significant concessions in 1995 from City Hall which now mandates that all City wages and all sub-contracts with the City should honor the 'living wage' policy. Though the Mayor initially resisted on the grounds of keeping Baltimore competitive in the face of 'globalization,' he now claims the effort is cost-effective (when the reduced cost of social services to the impoverished poor is factored in). The World Trade Center (run by the State Government) has followed suit (with, interestingly, support from the business tenants in the State-operated building but heavy criticism from business leaders in the State). And now the Johns Hopkins System is faced with exactly that same question, both as the supplier of services (through Broadway Services) and, being the largest private employer in the state, as a demander of them (an interesting example of how capital so frequently operates on both sides of the supply-demand equation when it comes to labor – see Marx's argument in *Capital, Volume 1*, p.752). To this end a campaign began early in 1996 to persuade the Johns Hopkins System to accept the living wage as part of its own contractual practices. Again, the role of allies 'not immediately interested in the question' became crucial as some faculty, and students mobilized support for low-wage workers in the Hopkins system and integrated their efforts with those of BUILD.

The Baltimore campaign (which is currently being replicated in some twenty or so other cities as well as at the state level elsewhere) offers a rather special set of openings to change the politics of how bodies are constructed/destroyed within the City. Its basis in the churches, the community, the unions, the universities, as well as with those social layers 'not immediately concerned with the question' starts to frame body politics in a rather special way, by-passing some of the more conventional binaries of capital/labor, white/black, male/female, nature/culture in ways that even radical social constructionists should relish rather than frown upon. If, for example, Butler's (1993, 9) argument for " a return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter" is taken as the proper framing for understanding the body in a situation of this sort, then the 'living wage' campaign is a fundamental form of body politics.

The 'living wage' issue is fundamentally a class issue that has ramifications across the moments of production, exchange and consumption. It is also an issue that integrates race, gender and class concerns at the level of the 'city' as a whole. In particular, it opens up leadership roles for African-American women to alter bodily practices. The campaign proposes a quite different spatial model of political intervention in the valuation of labor power. It creates an alternative spatial frame to that of increasingly fragmented workplaces (within which the value of labor power can only be established piecemeal), serviced largely by mobile temporary workers that cannot be organized in traditional ways. The campaign offers the possibility for broad-based coalition politics to alter the base-line conditions of circulation of variable capital. It has the power, therefore, to define what the 'work' side of current proposals for 'workfare' welfare reform might be about.

Unfortunately, this potential relationship is now being inverted as the City is forced to absorb several thousand (possibly as many as 14,000) workfare recipients into its labor force (the total employment in all categories downtown is around 100,000). Both the City and Johns Hopkins have already used workfare recipients as 'trainees' at $1.50 an hour and this sometimes meant displacement of workers who had achieved a living wage and projecting them onto the streets. A revolving door can be set up in which workfare trainees can be employed for a 'stipend' (they still receive their welfare payments) for three to six months and then released onto the streets to be replaced by another set of 'trainees'. Workfare here sets an even lower datum than that of the minimum wage for the circulation of variable capital within the city. A political struggle, again organized by BUILD city-wide, led to assurances from the Governor and the President of the Johns Hopkins, that there would be no displacement of existing workers by workfare trainees (see Cooper, 1997).

Changing conditions for the circulation of variable capital will not change everything that needs to be changed, either within the labor process or without. It will not automatically improve the quality of the work experience. It does not automatically confront the sexual harassment of the women at work, the rampant racism

in the city, the deterioration of certain Baltimore neighborhoods or the stresses within and about the institution of the family. Nor does it open the door to revolution rather than reform of the wages system (abolition of the wages system is hardly an issue here whereas the reformist claim – of which Marx was roundly critical – for a fair day's wage for a fair day's work is). But the struggle over a living wage is a form of body politics. It does create necessary conditions for the further transformation of bodily practices on the part of a substantial number of working people in Baltimore. Without that, many other possibilities for social transformation are blocked.

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF SCALE

What the BUILD campaign seeks to establish is a basis for negotiating the value of labor power at the metropolitan scale. In so doing it tacitly recognizes that the micropolitics of the individual, the family and the community has failed to provide an adequate basis for a progressive form of body politics at the same time as the traditional means of influencing national politics, through work-place based labor organizing, has also lost much of its purchase compared to the powers of capital to induce the nation state (as well as many other levels of government) into a posture that assumes the creation of a 'good business climate', under conditions of globalization, to be its primary goal. It is not clear, of course, whether or not the BUILD strategy of inserting a metropolitan scale politics will succeed and it has to be said that the odds are maybe stacked against it. But there are some interesting general conclusions to be drawn from the effort.

First and foremost, it should be clear that there is no barrier of principle in seeking to integrate discourses on the body and discourses on globalization. Much can be gained by such a strategy though care has to be taken to ensure that any integration is properly done. The examples that already exist of such integrations – in the realms of reproductive rights of women and global population problems, human rights in general, and the relations established in the environmental movements between personal consumption habits and global problems – illustrate the possible ways in which politics might be constructed (as well as some of the pitfalls to such politics) to create a bridge between the micro-scale of the body and the personal on the one hand, and the macro-scale of the global and the political-economic on the other. But the "theory of the production of geographical scale," as Smith (1992, 72) observes, "is grossly underdeveloped" and we have yet to learn, particularly with respect to global working class formation and body politics, how to "arbitrate and translate" between the different spatial scales. This is not merely a technical problem (of the sort that is well-known and thoroughly studied in ecology – see e.g. O'Neil et al, 1986).

It is also both a political and a cultural problem. It means, as Swyngedouw (1997) points out, recognizing that spatial scales are never fixed but themselves perpetually open to being restructured and redefined through social processes of struggle (see Herod, 1991). It also entails finding modes of organizing and pressuring that translate adequately from the micro-scale of the body to the globality of contemporary capital accumulation while recognizing the incredible heterogeneity of cultural traditions and aspirations at work within an overall process of global working class formation. For if the world has indeed 'become a huge bazaar with nations peddling their workforces in competition against one another offering the lowest prices for doing business,' then the obvious imperative that Marx and Engels derived from their understanding of globalization in their own time operates with even more force in ours. Workers of all nations and in all situations must unite. Many may have much more to lose than their chains, but they also have a world to win and a whole civilization based on an egalitarian respect for the working body to construct. But how to build a political movement as an answer to the current phase of the globalization of capital by articulating wants, needs and desires at a variety of geographical scales from the body upwards then becomes an imperative issue to be resolved (Waterman, 1991). And the distinctively socialist contribution to any new form of labor internationalism has yet to be properly articulated, let alone discursively established, either in theory or through political practice.

37

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38

EXODUS – MOVEMENT OF JAH PEOPLE

WRITTEN BY	EXODUS COLLECTIVE
PHOTOS BY	PHILIPP KLAUS, MARK SAUNDERS, CHRISTIAN SCHMID, RICHARD WOLFF

CHAPTER

2.3

THE PRINCIPLE

Although to most people this is known as the title of a song by Bob Marley and the Wailers, to the Exodus Collective it describes a world-wide movement fighting for spiritual freedom, of which we are a single battalion. The philosophy that drives us is based on a very simple spiritual outlook, which we try to translate into our everyday lives. Basically, we believe that the essence of a spiritual existence is simply to do good for others, because this is compatible with a belief in 'oneness'. On the contrary, this society, which we call Babylon, functions on exactly the opposite, because in order to 'progress' there is a need to be competitive, or to do well against others. So, to apply this simple philosophy in practice is our aim, and this involves reclaiming lands and properties for this purpose. Those lands and properties can then be developed, founded on the principles of communal ownership and co-operation, as opposed to private property and competition, which allows for a natural organic evolution of the projects.

THE PRACTICE

Although originally formed to fight for the right to gather on unused local lands and properties to dance free of commercial exploitation, it wasn't long before the Exodus Collective extended this demand to other areas of our lives that were lacking socially. This took the form of occupying decaying local properties on a permanent basis for free community use, in order to re-create employment, housing and a sense of community in a town that had lost it totally. Exodus is a community self-help organisation active in housing, building of a community farm, and organising community entertainment in the Luton/Dunstable area. We have been putting on free dance parties (raves) since June 1992, varying in attendance from 500 to 10,000, on average 3,000. Funds are raised by voluntary donations in a bucket and drink sales, so Exodus dances are accessible to all members of our community. Many members of the Exodus Collective have been attending raves since 1987 so have an active experience of the whole development of the culture, from underground to commercialisation, through to a new desire to harness the energy of the dance to the betterment of the whole community. This has always been the role of our dances, organised until now in abandoned warehouses, quarries and woods. We are negotiating to enable two year's use of a large warehouse space where these events could be licensed, and by replacing an entrance fee with a community levy, this will provide the income for an ongoing autonomous community centre. This would be totally self-funding with workshops, craft stalls, an advice centre, cafe, sound studio, community newspaper and radio station. This is our aim, and what we have been fighting for since we first began our campaign of occupying unused land.

We are presently registering the project with the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM) as a community business. ICOM defines a community business as 'commercial enterprise which will trade with a view to making a profit, but where that profit will be used to benefit the community rather than make individuals richer, and where the ownership and control of the business is in the hands of the community.' This is a principle upon which all Exodus projects are based, making a distinction between personal and collective profit so that our combined energies and talents serve to benefit the whole community.

41

BENEFIT THE WHOLE COMMUNITY
Exodus community dances – roots of a 'respectocracy'

Exodus community dance parties are operated on a fundamentally different principle to a commercial event because the intention is to enable a community gathering free of exploitation rather than to make money. Completely staffed by unpaid volunteers, from the bar staff to the DJs, each party is a gift to the community, and this gift provides the basis for a different type of order, based on respect rather than authority. This policy is far more effective in preventing all sorts of trouble. The people who attend our parties form part of a large number of interlocking friendship networks – people come again and again. We have never advertised, only used word of mouth and sometimes a phone line. The whole party runs on a process of mutual respect and consent, rather than strict policing. This community approach has virtually eliminated any overt dealing or mugging at the dance, without using physical force. Therefore, unlike in many commercial clubs, non drug-users don't have drugs pushed in their face. Ex Chief Supt. Alan Marlow from Luton Division Police has admitted – based

on intelligence operations – the "lack of large-scale dealing" at our events and acknowledged that people seem only to bring drugs for their personal use. This is an ongoing process, which is improving fast as our methods become increasingly understood. We know this works. It offers hope. It can be replicated in other community dance events.

We have never searched people for personal amounts of drugs. We know what's going on because we are part of the community and part of the street culture. If people deal or threaten anybody at our parties, everybody acts as security. Dealers have been peacefully stopped, muggers identified and removed, even a stolen box of records located in a darkened warehouse in the middle of the night. This is only possible because our motive isn't profit, but instead to permanently base this community gathering, and the concept that enables it, in a warehouse facility that will be owned

EXODUS SELF-HELP INITIATIVES
Long Meadow Community Free Farm (LMCFF)

This project represents our first piece of land reclaimed by the people for the people, with the intention of implementing the principle stated above. It consists of 17 acres, and we have survived a systematic campaign to remove us and to return the land to private ownership. This campaign, waged by forces within the local establishment, has involved strategies that almost defy belief. Police operations, carried out after pressure was applied by politicians and local business interests, have employed methods such as the planting of drugs, agents provocateurs, and even going as far as to falsely charge an Exodus member with murder after a tragic accident. The farm has also suffered two arson attacks, which were never investigated by the police. This long battle is due to come to a head as we write, and we are confident that this land will be secured in the very near future for permanent and free community use. The Home Secretary (Ministery of the interior) is presently considering a demand for a civil rights inquiry into the many attacks made by the 'Bedfordshire Police and Others upon the Exodus Collective and Others'.

Long Meadow Community Free Farm is situated at Chalton X, which is on the outskirts of Luton. It is within easy reach of many council estates that suffer high levels of unemployment and social deprivation.

As a free farm it is open for free access to all, therefore providing a valuable community resource for people who otherwise simply cannot afford to use standard facilities. The cost of a family visit to a zoo, safari park or open farm is restrictive to most unemployed families. It is intended to investigate different ways of providing the energy that is required to operate the farm, for example wind, solar and other means.

History

In July 1992 Long Meadow Farm, a derelict ex-pig farm that had been compulsorily purchased by the Department of Transport, was used as a venue for an Exodus community dance party attended by 600 people. Due to the nature of the Exodus parties, many of those attending were young, local unemployed people, many of them homeless. It was during this party that some of those local people had a dream.

Although the farm and the bungalow that sits above it were in a disgraceful condition, those people were able to recognise the potential for a decent home, as well as the prospect of a community free farm. The idea was to salvage those buildings that were not

and controlled by those that use it. The people who attend the parties respect this stance, and it is this respect which maintains order at the gathering. It is by harnessing the energy and resources of these gatherings that we will be able to convert the warehouse into an autonomous community and activity centre that will be called The Ark.

Another motive is to prevent our community disappearing down the American road, with its massive drug-related crime rate and associated violence. We recognise the disastrous effects of prohibition on the community better than anyone else. The whole point of Exodus and The Ark is to include the whole community, with all its mistakes and experience, so a large section of it doesn't become a massive, rejected, discontented underclass. Unless we do something now, for ourselves and our brothers and sisters, for drug users and non-users, and especially for drug misusers, we know that ignorance, fear, unemployment and crime will bring more greed, guns and violence to our community – hence The Ark. It's our transport to a better world, here and now in Luton.

totally ruined by demolishing those that were, and using the waste materials to patch up the remaining ones. It was with this intention that those people occupied the bungalow, immediately solving the problem of the lack of a roof over their heads.

The farm was rebuilt largely by salvaging those buildings that were not beyond ruin, patching them up by demolishing those that were and by using pallet wood donated from local companies. Each pallet was individually broken up, and had the nails removed. The wood was then treated and re-used.

Many people whose skills and talents were being wasted via unemployment have been, and still are, able to use their skills helping to build and maintain the community free farm.

After a year's hard work the farm was ready to house some animals. Open days at the farm proved to be valuable community events. The whole project is valuable in many different ways to many different people. Primarily it represents an initiative by young local people who have otherwise been left nothing.

The farm is widely used during the summer months by people from the surrounding council estates. Three generations of animals now live at the farm, largely having been either donated or born there. Animals from the farm are often used for family fun days within the surrounding council estates. All of the services to the community offered by LMCFF are free of any charge.

In the future it is intended to operate a regular bus to and from the council estates, and to use some of the land for self-help initiatives such as growing food etc. Local school groups have expressed interest. Eventually the land will become an asset of The Ark Community and Activity Centre, which itself will be owned and controlled by the community.

44

HAZ Manor

In 1993, sixteen people inspired by the success of the occupation and regeneration of LMCFF, squatted a derelict building, called The Oakmore Hotel. In line with the Exodus principle, they began renovating the property. This led to over 60 riot police smashing the improvements to pieces using sledgehammers, in a night time raid. The squatters refused to be intimidated and began rebuilding the damage, until a further police operation led to their eviction in the snow.

Having anticipated the imminent eviction from The Oakmore, the residents had already targeted the next property, which was a derelict hospital owned by the local authority, and in the wake of the very public and outrageous police eviction from the Oakmore Hotel, this building was occupied. When local councillors realised our aims and objectives, many of them supported our occupation and we eventually won a legal tenancy at a peppercorn rent of £1 per annum. By combining the previously unused energies, talents and rent entitlements of the 36 residents, HAZ Manor has been transformed into a communal home for both single people and families. The elimination of the landlord, the reclaim of the land, and the collective pooling of resources are all in line with the principles of the Exodus movement.

The benefits arising from communal living become ever more obvious as the project evolves. The tenants, many of whom were homeless, felt that private landlords were often exploiting their situation. The severe lack of council accommodation, particularly for single homeless people, means extortionate rent for useless bedsit accommodation is being paid by Housing Benefits, with the tenant powerless in the middle. HAZ Manor provides much better than bedsit-type accommodation within a communal atmosphere. This has lead to a complete end to the feelings of isolation experienced in 'bedsitland' or worse.

As already stated, in the first instance, the residents squatted the old hospital. This allowed them to prove their intentions by their actions, by immediately beginning to improve the building. It also raised the issue politically, and enabled the vision to be evolved from within. With the assistance of Luton Borough Council, the tenants won the right to effectively become 'landlords' themselves, and to continue the process of renovating the derelict buildings. They are presently working to convert two more empty hospital wings into six flats, which will total 34 people permanently housed, with 12 short-stay beds, and will see the project almost completed. Although the tenants are officially 'unemployed' and receive benefits, all of the people involved feel very meaningfully employed, and that they are being constructive and making sensible and productive use of their time and benefit entitlements.

CHAPTER

2.4

It is always difficult for an academic to talk about a campaign he or she is involved in (see my contribution in chapter 1 of this volume). Yet, in this essay, I am doing just that. I will present to you the work of the Green Work Alliance (GWA) in Toronto, a coalition of labour, environmental and social justice activists whose main goal has been to further the local debate around environmentally sound and socially just employment. I have been a member of this organization since its inception in 1991. [1]

GREEN WORK ALLIANCE [2]

On May 2, 1992, around two-hundred people gathered in front of the Caterpillar plant in Brampton, Ontario, just west of Metropolitan Toronto, shut down the year before as operations moved to the United States. The rally and demonstration drew social and political activists from a variety of areas: labour unions, anti-poverty groups, peace groups, environmentalists. The speakers called for an end to the destruction of jobs in Ontario and made links between the deteriorating state of both the economy and the environment. They highlighted that government rhetoric of empty coffers lies, while huge subsidies were given to nuclear power plant operators, and pointed out how the dismal state of the welfare state provided little hope for those thrown out of their jobs. These were not simple issues, yet those assembled at the Caterpillar plant were willing to consider their complexity rather than being atomized in a host of single issue movements. In fact, those who had organized the rally in a new Green Work Alliance, were convinced that only a comprehensive perspective, able to link seemingly unconnected threads of political discourse, would be capable of successfully tackling the hardships that many people in Toronto had been experiencing since the onset of the recession in the late 1980s.

The immediate aim of the alliance was to reopen the Caterpillar plant as a site for green production. Jobs were to be created by investing in both the economy and the ecology. Various production models, technologies and products as well as ownership and financing alternatives were discussed. However, it soon became clear that those who had formed the Green Work Alliance were on to something more far-ranging. The opening of the plant with environmentally friendly production was to be considered only one – albeit a central – element of a larger project. A 'greenbelt not a rustbelt' was to emerge out of the region's battered economy. While the search for an environmentally friendly product was central to the initial stages of discussions in the group, something bigger than replacing agricultural and building vehicles by producing energy-efficient lightbulbs was envisaged.

Nick De Carlo, President of Canadian Auto Workers Local 1967 (CAW) and one of the founders of the Green Work Alliance, points to three factors leading to the formation of the alliance in late 1991. First, there was the closing of the Caterpillar plant in 1990 which called for some sort of innovative response on the side of the labour movement; secondly, conflicts and grievances around health and safety, long term risk and disability had long been issues in the CAW and other unions; and thirdly, a group of Japanese workers that had visited the Toronto area had shown examples of how alternative product designs could benefit the community. This and the experience of the workers at Lucas Aerospace in England who converted production in their workers-owned plant, served as possible models for the GWA. [3]

The Caterpillar plant was chosen for the development of the GWA's policies for four reasons: First, the reopening of the plant in the current slash and burn economy would be a significant success

47

in itself for the labour movement. Secondly, existing skill levels of the Caterpillar and other recently redundant workers could be protected by tailoring product development to their existing strengths. On the one hand, this was thought of as being a barrier to large scale deskilling of the industrial workforce and a way to link job growth to the existing supply of labour power; on the other hand, it would be a reasonable alternative to poorly targeted retraining schemes. Environmentally friendly production would combine both a rise in the use value of products and maintenance of skill levels. Thirdly, the reopened plant could strengthen the position of Ontario in the world economy. However, the GWA agreed that no product from the Caterpillar plant should result in job loss elsewhere. Finally, this would provide an opportunity to address the needs of the population in the region. The model case was that a reopened Caterpillar plant could perhaps be the site for the production of energy efficient windows for a suburban housing

York strike

Days of action, Toronto Transport Co., Toronto

48

Protesting for Green Jobs

project for 70,000 residents. The specificity and novelty of such a project would also be a safeguard against creating jobs here that had been cut elsewhere.

The coalition then developed options of organization and ownership which ranged from the founding of a crown corporation as an umbrella institution for green work, to a workers cooperative. These ideas were discussed with the larger environmental and social justice community in Toronto and beyond. At a conference in October 1992, the Green Work Alliance invited other movement groups to share their experiences, ideas and concerns. This attracted participants from all over North America, including Eric Mann from the Los Angeles based Labor/Community Strategy Center as the keynote speaker. However, the call to establish a crown corporation for green economic development failed since such an interventionist mechanism was becoming alien to an Ontario government (1990-95) attempting to modernize and discard traditional labour policies.

The strategy

This was followed by a reassessment of the political strategy of the GWA which focused on tapping into existing and potential public funds available for upgrading the environment while establishing a community economic development strategy. It was guided by three key experiences:

1. In terms of changing the political strategy, it became obvious that the organization had reached a point where demonstrations and activism were not automatically going to increase the support base in the community. More serious organizing efforts both in Brampton and in the inner city would be needed to maintain the momentum the GWA had gained in its early organizing phase.

2. In terms of product and technology research, the GWA concentrated on a proposal by two Toronto city councilors to energy-retrofit the city's homes under a public subsidy plan which would both create jobs and save energy.

3. Research on the feasibility of such a scheme and possible involvement of the GWA was supported by a proposal handed in to the Province for the funding of a community economic development project based on energy retrofitting in the Brampton area. New contacts were forged with other union locals in Southern Ontario with experience of union based community development strategies.

The strategy initially received support, as the Ontario government signaled it would commission Robin Murray, a British veteran of community economic development, suggesting they would be open to innovative ideas. However, the campaign ultimately failed, largely because of the general era of austerity and the unwillingness of the GWA to vacate their community and labour perspective in favor of a more market oriented, entrepreneurial approach.

This experience has led the GWA to develop a three pronged strategy. First, a political strategy: mainly to provide a voice for working class environmentalism in the general political debate. The GWA has since linked up with a number of other social justice or environmental organizations like the Metro Network for Social Justice. Second, a bargaining strategy: to force companies to make contractual commitments to greener production and to a community environmental job creation fund. Third, a community economic development strategy: the GWA looks into the possibilities of creating links with existing neighborhood groups in Toronto which have already engaged in CED.

49

WORKING CLASS ENVIRONMENTALISM

There are three related issues emerging from the theme of green work in the city: the economic crisis with its devastating pattern of unemployment, the ecological component of work in capitalism, and the challenges posed by postfordist urbanization.

First, there is the problematic of the economic crisis. Toronto experienced major gains in office employment during much of the 1970s and 1980s and the city's financial industry has lifted Ontario's metropolis into the rank of world cities. But at the same time, part-time work and lower paid service jobs as well as home-work in garment and other low wage manufacturing employment has increased. While in 1983 one out of every ten jobs was part-time, in 1989 this ratio had risen to one out of six. Women, youth and 'mass workers' have been the ones to bear the brunt of a restructuring process that has made service employment more flexible. Toronto's problems are not just related to being an emerging and restructuring world city. It is also the capital of Canada's rustbelt. As part of the major manufacturing belt of the American Northeast, production in Southern Ontario has been experiencing a roller coaster ride of ups and downs. Job loss in the manufacturing sector has been experienced in the Greater Toronto Area since the onset of the latest recession after 1989. Economic expansion since 1991 has

often resulted in what came to be known as 'jobless growth.' Much of the employment loss has been credited to the North American Free Trade Agreement, globalization, deindustrialization of urban core areas and the restructuring of the Canadian economy from an industrial branch plant economy to one based on services. This restructuring has led to a Janus-like economic profile. While the region's automotive industry has been thriving in recent years, (for example Ontario has two percent of the North American population but produces 15 percent of the continent's cars), many traditional consumer goods sectors have suffered losses in sales and employment. While corporate profits have soared, unemployment in manufacturing and construction has reached unprecedented levels in the Toronto region and welfare cases have risen from a monthly caseload of 36,000 in 1988 to 119,000 in 1993. There was no better illustration of the desperation of Toronto's working class families than the 26,000 applicants who lined up outside a General Motors employment center in January 1995 following a rumor of an additional 1200 jobs at the Oshawa plant. The economic malaise and the erosion of the employment base of the region is one of the reasons why the debate on creating green work has caught on in Toronto. The Green Work Alliance's slogan: 'A Greenbelt not a Rustbelt' expresses the demand by working class environmentalists to counter the economic crisis in the manufacturing industries with a job creation strategy that would lead to ecologically sound production.

Secondly, environmental concerns were fundamental to the emergence of the Green Work Alliance. These concerns can be largely divided into two kinds. First, there are the traditional health and safety issues of the workplace and home which have been organized labor's major concerns with environmental issues. Long marginalized by the (largely middle class based) mainstream environmental movement's focus on nature conservation, health and safety concerns have only recently been recognized as a major environmental issue. This issue highlights two difficulties: the jobs versus the environment issue and the problem of social justice. There is also the general acknowledgment by the labour movement that there is a growing inconsistency between its traditional goals, often linked to the pattern of capitalist accumulation cycles, and the destructive effects of growth which undermines the living conditions of the working class; Jim O'Connor calls this the second contradiction of capitalism. Both these environmental concerns are exacerbated by the experience and the crisis of Fordism and by the emergence of a new postfordist regime which renegotiated both the societal relationships with nature and the production process itself. Both aspects were also present in the Green Work Alliance from the start, as some of its organizers had been involved in health and safety work in their communities for years while others had been organizing around the more general questions of political economy, work, production and nature in the current restructuring process.

Thirdly, it has come to be recognized widely that Fordism came with a set of specific spatial forms, most visibly expressed in the center-periphery contradiction in cities, where a dense inner city core of high-rise buildings was surrounded by a sprawling suburban ring of single family homes, malls and extended production facilities. The extent and physical expression of this contradiction differed from country to country and even from city to city. For example, none of the major Canadian cities has experienced the deterioration of the urban core and the ghettoization of minority populations on the scale of many American cities. Nevertheless, the general thrust of this fordist urban form has been pervasive. The realization that the automobile dependency on Fordism and the growing sense of social unsustainability has been a major influence on the kind of politics that the Green Work Alliance stands for. To many members of

the coalition, it was evident that the reorganization of industrial production had to be linked to the way we build and use cities and communities. Therefore, most proposals to re-evaluate the relationship between jobs and the environment in Toronto have a component of rebuilding the city we live in, be it through energy retrofitting programs, the involvement of labour unions in environmentally sound housing production projects or discussions about lowering car-dependency.

The success of the Green Work Alliance has a lot to do with its capacity to address the fundamental problems faced by workers and communities today. The organization has captured the interests of workers on two basic issues:

The GWA has been able to liberate the imagination of workers by presenting a viable alternative of redesigning the production process; it showed them how they could be part of and even be the key to this process. In this way, workers don't feel as if they are victims but actors in and against restructuring and globalization. Secondly, the GWA has been taking on the destructive effects of globalization and free trade by presenting a positive and possible alternative.

In both cases, the GWA has adhered to one of the main principles of the labour movement: to start at the point of production where the strength of that movement has traditionally been most pronounced. But the GWA realized that it had to move beyond the shop floor perspective by presenting a green labour political agenda as part of a general push of the trade union movement towards a more inclusive social unionism. [4] Finally much of the GWA's role in this new understanding of unionism will critically lead down a path which makes stronger connections with the emerging environmental justice movement in North America.

51

Endnotes

[1] I am indebted to Nick De Carlo and Peter Fargey of the GWA for their time and effort to meet with me over this paper. Nick's strategic thinking helped much in drafting this text.

[2] Based on Keil, R. 'Green Work Alliances: The Political Economy of Social Ecology.'
Studies in Political Economy 44, Summer 1994: 7-38.

[3] In the preceeding article, David Harvey writes about globalization, the body and possible alternatives. It is possible, I would suggest, to link these three points of origin to Harvey's triad: globalization led to the closure of the Toronto Caterpillar facility; conflicts around health and safety issues are about the corporeal existence of the working class; and the possible alternatives are provided by the examples of Lucas and others. I want to add – and will get back to this later on – that the third dimension ultimately included seeking possible alternatives for the urban realm: from the production of single products to the production of urban space.

[4] See Canadian Auto Workers, 'Where Are the Changes in Our Union Taking Us?' Discussion Paper, 4th CAW Constitutional Convention, Quebec City, P.Q., August 23-26, 1994.

KRAFTWERK 1: AN APROACH TO A CIVILISATION BEYOND WORK

WRITTEN BY	p.m.
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CHAPTER

2.5

THE PLANETARY 'RUSTBELT': LIABILITY AND POTENTIAL

100 years of extensive industrialisation have left vast urban wastelands and abandoned buildings. This 'rustbelt' stretches from the West Coast of the USA to Detroit, from Pennsylvania to New England, from Liverpool across Middle Europe right through the old USSR to Vladivostock and parts of China and Japan. The development of the patriarchal work-machine has devastated large zones of the Northern Hemisphere. While some of these industrial areas are irreversibly polluted, many of them represent an opportunity for new uses, for people seeking to return to urban areas. Whether we like it or not, the 'rustbelt' is the ambiguous heritage of a cycle of development that is now definitely in crisis, be it in ex-socialist or capitalist zones.

Why not consider the re-use of these industrial areas in the context of movements and campaigns for alternative economies and lifestyles? In many urban areas such movements are looking for spaces to meet, to organise and to test new lifestyles. While there is a lack of housing for the homeless, for migrants, young people and others, vast office buildings, assembly-line halls, warehouses, storage areas, and port facilities stand empty and planners cannot offer viable proposals for their re-use.

What we propose is a world-wide movement of appropriation of these spaces as bases for a new civilisation beyond work. Some features of such a civilisation would be:

– the reintegration of most of the industrial production into a new type of extended home-economy;
– the re-creation of local communities (c. 500 people) based on autonomous definitions of their lifestyles, economic self-sufficiency, cultural values, organisational structures;
– a direct link with farmers around the urban centres for subsistence (about 90 hectares per community);
– the exchange of industrial or agricultural products between these communities and the outside economy;
– the reservation of 10% (or more) of the housing space for guests from other communities in the 'rustbelt', or individual travellers from elsewhere;
– the use and development of alternative technologies to achieve energy self-sufficiency of communities, or networks of them;
– the co-operation between communities in enterprises such as the maintenance of a public transportation system (e.g. railroad, Lisbon-Vladivostock; boat, Vladivostock-San Francisco; railroad, San Francisco-New York; boat, New York-Lisbon), and for systems of information (telecommunications), resources, food, mutual help etc.
(All these aspects of a post-capitalist/post-patriarchal society must of course be discussed in more detail.)

KRAFTWERK 1

The book KraftWerk 1 [1] presents ideas for a project in one of the industrial areas in the western part of the city of Zurich, Sulzer Escher-Wyss, which will soon be vacated. KraftWerk 1 is seen as a pilot-project for similar industrial areas in Switzerland or elsewhere.

The main features set out in KraftWerk 1 are:
– KraftWerk 1 will take over an available industrial site of about 20,000 sqm (or about 5 acres).
– KraftWerk 1 will provide a variety of housing (for 700 people), and jobs for c. 300. It will stimulate diverse forms of housing and employment, with membership open to individuals, co-operatives and public services.
– KraftWerk 1 will be subdivided into 30 to 40 'suites', units of 450 to 600 sqm on two floors, housing 15 to 20 people. These suites will define their own social structure, the standards of equipment, and will be self-financing.
– KraftWerk 1 will negotiate agreements with farmers of the region to stimulate a high level of self-sufficiency.
– Households, production, agriculture and culture will be combined to provide diverse ways of life, so that ecological circuits can be closed, resources used more efficiently and transportation reduced.
– KraftWerk 1 is also seen as an approach to solving the crisis of a society based on waged work which it is less and less able to provide. Between (unpaid) housework and (disappearing) waged work, new forms of making a living in a social context must be tested. Non-monetary waged work, communal services, internal exchange of services and products, create a better life with less work. KraftWerk 1 will redefine living, work and income, with the aim of providing an egalitarian distribution of work between women and men.
– Special funds will be created so that any social or ethnic group will be able to join KraftWerk 1. At least 50% of all administrative boards and committees will be made up of women.
– KraftWerk 1 is not going to be either a citadel or a ghetto. It will be a place where Zurich opens to the world.
– The total cost of Kraftwerk 1 will be about 120 million Sfr. (including the cost of the land, which is about 20 million Sfr.). KraftWerk 1 will be financed by co-operative shares and bank loans. So far, banks have shown lively interest.

To implement the project an association, KraftWerk 1, was founded in August 1993. There are about 150 active members and about 400 supporting members. KraftWerk 1 has had a widespread and mostly positive publicity in the Swiss press. The first large public activity of KraftWerk 1 was KraftWerkSommer in the summer of

1994. More than 60 events took place in a former factory, close to Sulzer Escher-Wyss area. KraftWerkSommer organised discussions on the KraftWerk 1 project, facilitated the exchange of international experience and encouraged the participation of local people in the planning process. A cultural programme, cafes, bars etc. made this event enjoyable and demonstrated that "life is possible after industry and on abandoned industrial sites". In 1995 KraftWerk 1 organised a series of public discussions in the form of a 'Sofa-University' in the Shedhalle (Rote Fabrik). A co-operative was founded, which now has about 60 members. At this stage talks with owners of possible sites are positive.

KRAFTWERK 1 AS A SOCIAL PROJECT

From its inception, the project KraftWerk 1 was deliberately placed in the context of international discussions around the end of Fordism/Keynesianism and the emergence of a more globalised, neo-liberal model of capitalist expansion. In 1993 we said: "If the economy isn't interested in us any more, we must look for other ways to make a living." Mass unemployment (or the general reduction of the wage-fund) is now a permanently established phenomenon in all old industrial countries. Classical Keynesian methods of trade-cycle policy are no longer effective. Wherever industrial investment is encouraged by state subsidies, this does not create jobs, but leads to more automated and computerised production and further lay-offs. The link between the size of industrial production and the creation of waged labour has definitively been severed. At the same time, the potential for social-democratic solutions based on state intervention has dramatically shrunk. On the one hand, lower tax returns have led to budget cuts and the reduction of welfare, while regulatory measures (like a shorter working week, taxes on energy) can easily be ducked by globally mobile capital. In this situation, trust in 'big' national politics and the self-healing potential of the market economy is melting away like snow on a warm spring day.

For some years attention has been turning to (or returning to) less spectacular initiatives in the immediate 'social' sphere. 'Useful work' without any commercial considerations has been created by local groups of parents (in particular for childcare), in systems like LETS (Local

55

Exhibition and Sofa University at Shedhalle, Rote Fabrik, 1995

Exchange Trade Systems), by collective subsistence farming in urban or suburban areas and by cultural collectives. In addition the activities of NGOs have expanded during recent years. For the US, recent figures show that 7.1 million jobs, representing 6.8 percent of the GNP, have been created in this sort of activity (cf. Revelli, p. 168). As NGO-activities are partly encouraged by state-subsidies and can be considered as a type of out-sourcing of former state functions (especially in the health and education sectors), using the cheaper work of volunteers, their role is ambiguous – a kind of indirect work-fare. The fact that work is useful and non-profit, does not necessarily imply that it increases direct control and autonomy of communities. All the same, interesting compromises between state agencies, NGOs and autonomous community initiatives are possible.

This approach to the reinvention of useful work in the social sphere can be described as a 'New Commons'. But as the authors of Eine Kuh für Hillary point out: "No New Commons without communities". Capital is basically powered by the co-operation and synergy of workers. To achieve this it has had to destroy existing forms of synergy in traditional communities, so that 'free' workers could be incorporated into the labour market. This distillation process of a modern proletariat was made possible by Enclosure; the appropriation of communal lands. Whereas this process is still going on in the South (e.g. New Guinea, Africa), movements to recreate a New Commons on the ruins of industrial capitalism and Fordism have begun in the North. The basis of a return to direct productivity will not be traditional communities (ethnic, religious, tribal), but voluntarily-formed communities with members that are bound together by contracts.

Ideally these new communities would develop organically out of existing neighbourhoods. In fact, there are many promising initiatives in numerous neighbourhoods or older co-operative housing projects. However there are certain constraints in existing neighbourhoods. Their social composition is very heterogeneous, with the interests of the employed, pensioners, the unemployed, and of house-owners and tenants for example, being so diverse, that co-operation is usually restricted to small groups or is short term. This makes many neighbourhood initiatives ineffective and exhausting, and there are countless stories of resigned and embittered 'neighbourhood-activists.'

To overcome this problem, KraftWerk 1 proposes the creation of a community from scratch on formerly uninhabited territory. It will be easier to test the potential of intentional communities when they can be formed by members without any former liabilities.

KraftWerk 1 is therefore not conceived as an 'organic' community, but as a deliberate, artificial creation whose basic rules are predetermined. At this stage, a kind of covenant, or contract, is being set out in a Charter.

56

KRAFTWERK 1 CHARTER
Preamble
"Share everything.
Play fair.
Don't hit people.
Put things back where you found them.
Clean up your own mess.
Don't take things that aren't yours.
Say sorry when you hurt somebody.
Wash your hands before you eat.
Flush.
Warm cookies and cold milk are good for you.
Live a balanced life – learn some and think some and draw and paint and sing and dance and play and work every day some.
Take a nap every afternoon.
When you go out into the world, watch out for traffic, hold hands, and stick together.
Be aware of wonder. Remember the little seed in the Styrofoam cup: The roots go down and the plant goes up and nobody really knows how or why, but we all are like that.
Goldfish and hamsters and white mice and even the little seed in the Styrofoam cup – they all die. So do we.
And then remember the Dick-and-Jane books and the first word you learned – the biggest word of all – LOOK."
Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, 1986

Principles and guidelines
Diversity
   Accepting that people have different interests, perspectives on life and values, we see diversity as a source of social wealth.
Equality
   All persons and groups involved in the project will have the same rights, regardless of gender, origin or income.
Openness
   KraftWerk 1 will not be an island, but a meeting place connected with the city, the country and the world.
Solidarity
   Existential risks are minimised by a system of collective guarantees. Instead of preventive exclusion, new forms of mutual support are created.

Sovereignty

KraftWerk 1 attempts to provide as many of the essentials of life as possible. Local self-reliance is the basis of a better collective control over material and political conditions.

Sustainability and justice

KraftWerk 1 facilitates lifestyles that are globally sustainable and just. We will not live at the expense of other people, nature or future generations.

Synergy

Household, production, culture and recreation are combined in such a way that they support each other and produce a manifold everyday life.

Voluntarism

Participation in programs, use of facilities etc. shall be voluntary. Goals are mainly reached by incentives.

Means

Suites

KraftWerk 1 makes it possible for groups of inhabitants to rent whole suites (15 – 20 persons, c. 600 sqm, on two floors) and to set them up and run them according to their own desires. Such suite communities can constitute themselves in the form of house-associations. They make sure that manifold lifestyles and concepts of privacy and communal life (singles, couples, families, communities, communal households) can coexist.

Collective infrastructure

KraftWerk 1 provides a wide array of collective services on the premises for child raising, health, food and drink, cleaning, use of goods, hospitality, culture, repairs etc. The services can be extended according to the wishes of the inhabitants.

KraftWerk 1 guarantees these services collectively. Users pay an additional share to participate in individually chosen programmes.

Social economic programmes

KraftWerk 1 provides the necessary organisation and space to implement monetary and non-monetary systems of exchange of work and services among its members.

Connection with city and countryside

As much of the food supply as possible is organised via direct delivery contracts with farms in the region. Everyday contacts with these farms are strengthened.

Sustainable lifestyles

KraftWerk 1 implements sustainable lifestyles through organisational, architectural and technical means. It focuses on social measures to reduce excessive use of resources. Technical measures are secondary.

Flexibility and subsidiarity

Regulations are minimal to allow flexibility. Sectorial organisations enjoy full self-determination. As little as possible is delegated upwards. Only the most strategic decisions are made in advance or by higher levels of organisation.

Integrative procedures of decision-making

Purely formal majority decisions are avoided by comprehensive consultations and integrative treatment of minorities.

The economic situation of members is taken into consideration in the process of regulating, so that nobody is excluded from KraftWerk 1.

Transparent accounting

All costs are calculated according to the different sectors. Sufficient funds must be allocated for maintenance and the further development of KraftWerk 1. Cross subsidies are to be avoided or, if necessary, they should be clearly targeted and temporally limited.

Duties

All members of the housing co-operative who live in KraftWerk 1 are required to join the organisation of users (OU).

Financial contribution

Additionally to the rent, a certain contribution, depending on income, must be paid to support the collective infrastructure, social programmes and sectorial activities. The sums will be fixed by users, in the phase of realisation.

Temporal engagement

Every member will participate in meetings and work on committees. Members are required to donate a certain amount of time to subsidise internal collective services. Precise regulations will be made by the users in the phase of realisation.

Communication

KraftWerk 1 is based upon the readiness of its inhabitants to deal with problems and conflicts in person and openly.

Rights and entitlements for inhabitants

Rights of use

KraftWerk 1 will endeavour to guarantee a life-long right of lodging for its inhabitants. The infrastructure is at the disposal of all inhabitants according to their individual wishes.

Social assistance

KraftWerk 1 will endeavour to guarantee social security for its inhabitants with social programmes and special funds.

It prevents involuntary social isolation through communications initiatives and in its very nature it brings people together.

Democratic participation

KraftWerk 1 members are assured secure democratic participation through its decision-making structures and discussion meetings. It actively encourages participation with translation and advisory services, informal preparation meetings etc.

Information

KraftWerk 1 shall guarantee transparency in every respect. It maintains a big bulletin board, publishes news letters and holds public hearings on demand.

The Organisation of Users (OU)

All boards or committees contain the same number of men and women; if this is not possible, the corresponding seats remain vacant.

There are two separate organisations within KraftWerk 1: one is the (already operating) Building and Housing Co-operative KraftWerk 1 (BHC), and the other is the Organisation of Users of KraftWerk 1 (OU), that will be established after the beginning of construction work. The BHC is responsible for the financing and building of the structures of KraftWerk 1 and its real estate administration. The OU guarantees the full participation of all users on the premises and organises social and other activities. In some aspects it resembles a tenants-association. This separation of functions and organisation seems useful as it gives the OU more freedom to take risks without endangering the overall existence of the project.

Users

Users are members of the Building and Housing Co-operative, owners of permanent enterprises, long-term workers of these enterprises, inhabitants or inmates and caretakers of associated institutions on the premises, other persons linked to KraftWerk 1 directly and on a long-term basis, and permanent guests. There is a slightly adapted Charter concerning the duties and rights of enterprises and their employees, and for external institutions collaborating with KraftWerk 1.

Sector groups

Users can organise themselves in different sectors or fields of interest (e.g. housing, workshops, culture, work and services exchange, child care), whose goals and organisation must be compatible with those of this Charter. Sectors are acknowledged by the plenary assembly that also lays down the number of their delegates in the KraftWerk 1 council.

Plenary assembly

The plenary assembly includes all users of KraftWerk 1. It decides on modifications of the Charter, the acknowledgement of sector groups and the exclusion of members. It elects the OU board, the controllers and the members of the mediation committee. A plenary assembly can be called by at least 10% of the members, by the KraftWerk 1 council or by the OU board. It is held at least once annually.

KraftWerk 1 Council

The Council consists of the delegates of sector groups and the members of the OU-council. As the heart of KraftWerk 1, it secures communication between the different sectors and manages the whole project. It formulates motions for the plenary assembly and assigns tasks to the OU board. It devises regulations for all sectors or adapts them to changing circumstances.

OU board

It is an executive board, elected by the plenary assembly. One member must also be a member of the executive board of the Building and Housing Co-operative. The OU board is part of the KraftWerk 1-council ex officio. It takes care of current affairs, and administration, accepts members formally and represents the OU officially.

Mediation committee

This intervenes in conflicts that are not resolved between the parties. Mutual agreements are preferred, but if these are not possible, the following sanctions can be taken: publication of the facts and seeking the mediation committee's opinion and the obligation of reparation of damages. The exclusion from the OU for a certain period of time is the ultimo ratio. Only the plenary assembly can exclude a member, and needs a majority of at least 75%.

Modification of Charter

The Charter can be modified by the plenary assembly with a majority of at least 75%, unless otherwise decided by the BHC.

Implementation

After the beginning of construction work and as soon as the number of prospective users is sufficient, the OU and its organs are constituted. The decision is taken by the board of the Building and Housing Co-operative, which nominates a founding committee. The first plenary assembly will decide on the legal form of the OU and will adapt the Charter and the statute accordingly.

(This Charter has been approved provisionally by a plenary assembly of the KraftWerk 1 association.)

Endnote

[1] The book KraftWerk 1 was published in July 1993 by the authors Martin Blum (artist), Andreas Hofer (architect) and P.M. (writer). It is available at Paranoia City, Bäckerstrasse 9, CH-8004 Zürich, Switzerland; Phone/Fax ++41-1-241 37 05 (100 pages, illustrations; Sfr. 20.- plus postage).

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B U I L

G L

DING

LOCAL

PLACES

IN A

OBAL

WORLD 3

CHAPTER

3.1

Native American tribes define their collective memory not within time but within space. The remembrance of specific events are not tied to particular dates, such as Easter in the Christian religion, but to the sites where such events took place. The events are connected to places and consequently these places are revered. There are spiritual mountains, sacred rivers and holy lakes which have been sites of reverence for generation after generation. Each site has its story, and this is respected as part of the wider cosmic history.

A bridge between this Amerindian philosophy and occidental culture is offered by Maurice Halbwachs who describes how the material world is filled with social messages and meanings invested in them by the respective culture. "There is no collective memory that is not moving

within a given spatial frame" (Halbwachs 1950, *La mémoire collective*, ouvrage posthume, Paris). Things, trees, houses, streets are carriers of stories, of events, of culture. In this sense places are always indicators and codes of social conditions.

The territorial disputes between indigenous peoples and 'society' in America or Australia are not just an expression of the collision of two different cultures, but of completely divergent concepts of the physical environment and the meanings attached to places. To build local places means consciously giving places a meaning. Power structures can be exposed and injustices made visible. Local places then develop a meaning that is much more than local. For 19 years in Buenos Aires mothers have been meeting every Thursday on the Plaza de Mayo to draw attention to the sons and daughters abducted or murdered by the military regime. The place has become a symbol of the reclamation of human rights, often being referred to as the Plaza de las Madres.

Building local places means to give a chance to different perceptions of space, looking at a great number of processes and changes in cities, like neighbourhoods being torn apart by highway construction, gentrification or where meeting places of minorities are closed under political pressure. Halbwachs writes in *La mémoire collective* (Paris 1950) "local customs form an opposition against forces intent on changing them, and this opposition is the best indicator to what extent the collective memory of such groups is based on spatial images". Obviously, disputes will arise around places threatened by planning and intervention. Two examples of groups who are explicitly engaged in planning processes and fighting for places are 'Women Plan Toronto' (WPT) and the Hammersmith Community Trust (HCT) in London. With their report on the expected social and economic cost should the Olympic games be held in Toronto, WPT were able to convince the Olympic Committee that the 1996 games had better take place somewhere else (Atlanta). HCT, as a local initiative with the aim to keep Hammersmith's centre open for the community, was fighting for many years against pure office building development in Hammersmith. On the other hand it shows how the global is linked to the local by developing strategies in a multi-ethnic society, one of the world's most pressing urban problems.

There are places which were very important for the collective memory since the last century: industrial areas. Standing for a well defined social order, the sweat and struggles of many decades, these places today are derelict. Global structural change, such as new forms of production and procedures, the introduction of new technologies and the ensuing streamlining of companies, the moving of production plants and mass dismissals as

a consequence have left large areas in many cities vacant. Together with abandoned harbour areas and derelict military training zones these sites offer the chance for a new definition, for a new meaning.

In almost all industrial countries such sites have been revalorised with local economies and the solidarity of communities. These attempts at creating new small worlds are a counterweight to the thoroughly rationalised, ruthless game functioning on a world-wide scale. Those sites which were not redeveloped in the eighties by the fast expanding service sector and its postmodern memorials of the fast buck, have been home to ever new ventures seeking for solutions to the failed model of wage work, to housing shortage and the exploitation of natural resources.

In the Amsterdam harbour different groups have been engaged for several years in realising a holistic lifestyle, which embraces working, living and cultural life, as described in the text on the Gilde van Werkgebouwen in this section. Other examples such as Exodus, KraftWerk1, Pure Genius, Centri Sociali, are detailed in this book and with all those examples which unfortunately could not be mentioned here, represent the innovative forces striving to implement lifestyles with a future on these vacant urban sites.

The text based on the experience of the house Zentralstrasse 150, an interim use in Zurich, shows how close such a culturally progressive and innovative venture can be to the global market: an estate and its users are in the focus of Zurich's development, and implicitly in that of global cities, by creating cultural products which ultimately find their way into the strategies of global corporations. While the difference in income and wealth between the rich and the poor is continually increasing there appears to be more contact between transnational corporations and socially or culturally innovative forces, almost as if they are mutually dependent: the corporations to deal with their global markets, the new creative people to secure their creative existence.

Many of the places described had to be fought for and thereby defined anew. Many of them began as squats. Three of the projects described in this chapter originate in cities with a history of fighting for houses: Amsterdam, Berlin and Zurich. The intense conflict between city government and social movement since the seventies and eighties subsided a long time ago. Margit Mayer shows examples of European and North American cities where city governments are today quite willing to cooperate with the former fighters and organisers

of social movements, such as in the development and implementation of social and cultural services, in housing projects and development of local economies. In this process, the organisations adopt an ambivalent position, offering the know-how they acquired in the years of conflict, on the other hand playing an important role in the relief of many existing problems the cities would be unable to solve themselves. In this process, social and communal work is integrated into the principle of free enterprise. Instead of appointing persons – job security included – states or municipalities employ people for limited projects or programs and grant micro credits.

Although many more urban sites have become vacant and the governments of many cities have become more tolerant with respect to experiments, many of these projects still fight for survival and against prejudices. In Berlin for example, the people of 'Wagenburgen', after many years of great open-mindedness, are facing a strong bourgeois backlash. Several Wagenburgen settled in recesses of the Berlin Wall. After the fall of the Wall they found themselves in the city centre of Berlin. They became a thorn in the flesh of the insatiable developers of the new German capital. This extraordinary venture, where hundreds of people had decided to live their life outside of apartments and flats, has come under strong pressure and may have been terminated by the time this book goes to print.

Building local places in a global world means to seize the opportunity in this age of cyber-space and increasing destruction of the environment to create niches and make use of places. These places may be defined anew.

THE CHANGING SCOPE OF ACTION IN URBAN POLITICS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL INITIATIVES AND MOVEMENTS

WRITTEN BY | MARGIT MAYER

CHAPTER

3.2

Urban movements take place within and are impacted by structural transformations and political reorientation in society, which means that activities that used to mobilize in the 1970s, may not do so today, and strategies that made sense in an earlier period, may be less successful today. We are facing new conditions, different challenges and new obstacles today. This article discusses some of these new trends and conditions in first world cities with a focus on those relevant for local initiatives and alternative movements. It then looks at what happened to such pro-active movements formed around social and economic problems over the last decade, and how their practice has been impacted by new municipal programs and changing funding structures. A third section draws out the political implications and strategic consequences for urban movements at the end of the 1990s.

1. THE RESTRUCTURING OF URBAN POLITICS

The structural transformations impacting on urban life since the mid-1970s follow from the fact that the Fordist growth model had begun to reach its limits around that time. This growth model had provided a temporary and prosperous compromise between labor and capital based on mass production, mass consumption, and centrally organized welfare state measures and regional development programs. Within it, municipal politics focused primarily on expanding urban infrastructure and managing large-scale urban renewal. This model began to reach its limits because the rigidities of the production structure and the rising costs and destructive side effects of mass production and mass consumption, and the politicization of those costs and effects slowed down growth rates and triggered social conflicts and movements (cf. Hirsch/ Roth 1986). With growth declining and loyalties dwindling, both the technical and social limits of this growth model had become apparent, and the Fordist modes of regulation had become dysfunctional. Thus, a search set in, not just to adjust the structure of accumulation (with new, more flexible forms of production), but also a search for new institutional arrangements and modes of regulation (cf. Amin 1994).The effects of this on cities can now be read about in a growing body of literature on 'dual cities', i.e. on the polarization of the economy growing mainly in its high-paying corporate service sector and low-paying sectors of downgraded manufacturing and lower level services (e.g. Mollenkopf/Castells 1991, Brown/Crompton 1994), as well as in the literature on flexible specialization which has led to a new hierarchical differentiation amongst cities and a new intra-urban competition (cf. Krätke 1991, 1995). These transformations have translated into a series of effects for urban politics. When reviewing the literature on recent developments in urban governance in West European as well as North American countries, one finds that, regardless of the particularity of the urban regime, the specific history and culture of a place, local authorities now increasingly engage in economic development (cf. Logan/Swanstrom 1990; Pickvance/Preteceille 1991, Stöhr 1990).

This first trend of increased local economic interventionism manifests itself both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. Quantitatively, local government spending for proactive economic development strategies takes up a growing portion of the budget. Qualitatively, new approaches to economic intervention have been developed. Whereas traditionally, economic development measures of local authorities were concerned with even distribution of (automatic) growth, intervention now is more and more targeted to strengthen indigenous urban and regional development and entrepreneurial initiative. Cities now 'market' themselves (in the global economy) publicizing the virtues of their respective business climate; they seek to make use of indigenous skills and entrepreneurship; they target subsidies to industries promising growth and innovation, but also to mega-projects and big festivals. This trend, consisting of a variety of efforts to mobilize and coordinate local potential for economic growth, seems to be the most powerful. The primary goal of urban policy now seems to be to initiate and stimulate private capital accumulation, and other policy areas are frequently becoming integrated with or subordinated to economic development measures.

An important aspect of this shift in the approach of intervention is that more and more non-state actors have become involved in this local organization of the economic conditions. Local authorities support or even establish new institutions for economic development and technology transfer, 'round-tables' have emerged locally and regionally to influence policy formation, and other new forms of cooperation are initiated and organized. Depending on the policy area, different actors are involved. For example, in the area of labor market policy, there will be the employment office, social welfare associations, churches, firms, unions and consultancies besides the local authority. In a growing number of policy areas, these non-state actors include the so-called third or alternative sector (Ashworth/Vogel, 1989; Lasser 1990).

The new approach to local economic intervention thus also brought a change in the formal political structures. In order to identify the intersecting areas of interest of the different actors, a more cooperative style of politics than the traditional top-down approach is necessary. Thus, more pluralistic bargaining systems have been tried out. This more horizontal style of politics does not mean that these bargaining systems and project-specific partnerships are more open for democratic influence or more accountable to local social or environmental needs. Participants may, in fact, form rather exclusive groups representing only selected interests [1]. Often, the balance of power is tilted towards business and against unions, environmental and community groups; frequently one even finds a cleavage between established community groups and more marginalized interests. But we do also find instances where traditionally excluded groups get to participate (cf. Mayer 1994). The important point here is that bargaining and decision-making processes tend to increasingly take place **outside of** the traditional structures of municipal politics. That is why we increasingly speak of local 'governance' instead of 'government': the local state has expanded to explicitly include and coordinate a variety of functional interests.

The second trend identifiable in the changing urban politics is related to the first one. As cities have emphasized economic development, this has redirected resources from other policy areas, such as social policy; it has also changed the approach and direction of social policies and led to a restructuring in the provision of social services. With this subordination of social policies to economic priorities, there is, again, a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. Not only has local government spending for social

consumption declined as a proportion of overall expenditure, but a qualitative shift is observable: the traditional redistributive policies of the welfare state have been supplemented or displaced by employment and labor market policies designed to promote labor market flexibility.

Cities have found that the increase in unemployment, underemployment, casualization of labor and new poverty cannot be handled with traditional welfare state policies, which were designed to treat such problems as transitory phenomena in a basically full-employment society. Hard indicators (for poverty, income distribution etc.) for the last two decades show that we have moved into a new period compared to the 1950s/60s, which knew no real recession. At the same time, the effects of the repeated recessions and the new risks created by the labor market confront the local state with a new challenge, because central governments everywhere have reduced their subsidies. Thus, local authorities have had to explore alternative and innovative ways to keep their cities functioning. Mostly they have done so by exploring alternatives in job creation and workfare that involve local organizations in the private as well as voluntary sector (cf. Blanke et al., 1987; von Hauff 1989; Evers/Olk 1996).

But the shift in social policies has yet another element related to the first trend of economic competitiveness. Since the image of cities is now playing such an important role in attracting global investment, stern anti-homeless and anti-squatter policies have been drafted, and regular raids are now carried out at the showcase plazas of all major cities. In order to drive out beggars, homeless people or squeegee merchants from the center of the cities (where they concentrate for a variety of reasons: the public space for their social relations, the institutions which service them etc.), these groups are being constructed as 'dangerous classes' or 'enemies of the state' (Ruddick 1994). Social policies have been replaced by punitive and repressive treatments.

Thus, the qualitative shift in the orientation of social policies consists both of a restriction of funds and services to the traditional 'welfare' clientele, which are replaced, especially in the case of those marginalized groups that appear to challenge the image of the clean citadel plazas, by punitive and repressive measures, **and** of a shift towards more active labor market policies, where municipal employment and training programs have been established, and where job-creative activities of third sector groups are being supported. These new policies have tended to blur the traditional distinction between economic and social policies, as they create a real link between the local economy and the local operation of the welfare state. Welfare becomes redefined in the direction of the economic success of a local area.

As with the first trend, the mobilization of local politics for economic development, the second trend, the restructuring of the local welfare state, also involves an institutional opening. More non-state actors have become involved in the provision and management of services that used to be public-sector-led and that are now transforming from mere 'services' to more active so-called empowering forms of community (economic) development: private and voluntary sector agencies, non-profit organizations, but also local and sometimes supra-local business. This has turned local government into merely one part of a broader system of service providers. In this expanded system of local politics, the public sector reduces its functions, yet plays a more activist role in its interaction with the non-state actors. This serves to make the local welfare state more flexible through less rigid bureaucratic forms and more competition. Thus, the role of the municipality has changed from being the (more or less) redistributive local 'arm' of the welfare state to acting as a catalyst of processes of innovation and cooperation, which it seeks to steer, more or less forcefully, in the direction of improving the city's economic and social well-being.

These strategies are being pursued not only in different national and regional settings, but also by adherents of divergent political tendencies. No matter whether more progressive forces or more conservative forces dominate a city government, priority is given to economic development policies via the entrepreneurial mobilization of indigenous potential, thereby pushing one of the formerly central functions of the local state, the provision of collective consumption goods and welfare services, into the background. In both cases, more and more public functions are privatized; in both cases, the increased engagement in the arena of economic development as well as the provision of social services tend to occur via new forms of negotiation and implementation involving non-state actors (and intermediary organizations). The conservatives are drawn to this model because it involves voluntary action and workfare, allowing state shrinkage; the Left finds it attractive, because it is 'enabling' people to exercise power for themselves; the Liberals pursue it, because it emphasizes local community action. According to these different political/ideological interests, the programs developed do take on somewhat different nuances and the new bargaining structures differ in terms of their inclusiveness and responsiveness with regard to the interests of neighborhoods, tenants, environmental or other social movement groups. Depending on the prevailing national political cultures, we also get a variety of models of these new partnerships or cooperation arrangements: at one end of the spectrum those that are strongly entrepreneurially influenced and framed by the rhetoric of a high-level volunteer summit, as in the US, or, at the other end, those that are still more state-oriented as in Germany. Such national-level differences will be discussed in the next section which is about movements; here, the relevant point is that it is neither the case that the new bargaining structures, as such, are more biased towards private business than the old form of urban governance,

which supposedly emphasized the separation between public and private profit. Nor is it the case that they necessarily prefigure political empowerment within localities, as Amin/Thrift (1994) insinuate. As before, we are dealing with the state as a contradictory consolidation of antagonistic interests. The concrete form which the new institutional arrangements take on, and the degree of their responsiveness and openness for social and environmental interests will depend completely on how actors at the local level seize and struggle over the opportunities and forms provided within this basic model.

2. LOCAL MOVEMENTS AND INITIATIVES IN THE 1990s

What have these larger changes meant for local movements and initiatives? Of the many different kinds of movements active in cities today, I will focus on the one which stands at the center of this conference. I will not discuss struggles against specific new forms of urban development, nor the various struggles in defense of threatened communities, where you find NIMBY and not so NIMBY movements; nor will I look at the emerging movements of the newly marginalized, the so-called new poor people's movements (for this breadth of contemporary urban movements see Hamel/Lustiger-Thaler/Mayer 1997). I will look at what happened to the self-organized initiatives around housing, self-help initiatives and groups formed around social and economic problems manifest in specific local places. Most of these groups – as a result of the transformations in urban politics described, and as a result of their own experiences in the course of the 1980s – have skidded into a different structural relationship with the local state than they started out with. The opening-up of the urban governmental system has included many of these groups, as it became the strategy of many municipalities to employ former social movement organizations in the development and implementation of (alternative) social and cultural services, of housing provision, and local economic development.

The development is illustrated by an organization in the Bronx, Banana Kelly, which received a Best Practice Award at the Habitat Conference in the summer of 1996. This community organization emerged from squatting and militantly defending houses in the 1970s, went on to rehabbing these houses, and is now managing hundreds of low-income houses, helped along by a variety of municipal programs funding sweat – equity and tenant management and the like. However, it is no longer only active in housing, but also in economic development. In fact, it has itself gone global in search for an investor and found a Swedish firm to set up a large paper mill for recycling Manhattan's enormous output of office paper. Yet, more than job creation, it is also engaged in education and training programs, which includes bringing Los Angeles gang members to Brooklyn to teach them family values and community respect. (Rivera/Hall 1996; Harris 1995; Holusha 1994)

This is obviously a bigger and more 'successful' case than many. Similar groups exist, though, in all the major cities of North America and Western Europe, with important political-cultural differences (for North America cf. Hoffmann 1997; Fishman/Phillips 1993; Rich 1995; Shragge 1997; for Western Europe: Rucht et al. 1997, Froessler et al. 1994, Stiftung Mitarbeit 1995; for comparative studies: Selle 1991, Mayer 1996). The establishment of alternative renewal agents and sweat-equity programs, and the funding of self-help and social service groups was in most places a long and contested process, but since the late 1980s municipal social and employment programs everywhere have been making use of the skills, knowledge and labor of such movement groups. Similarly, many cultural projects have become part of the 'official city', and many youth and social centers play acknowledged roles in integrating 'problem groups' and potential conflict.

These transformations were, to a great extent, accelerated by municipal, state, and national programs, in Western Europe also by supra-national programs of the EU. These programs, which were first launched in the U.S., were far from coordinated, far-sighted adaptations of regulation mechanisms; rather, they were disparate and uncoordinated reactions to the pressure of tenant groups and community organizations on the one hand and to the financial crisis of American cities, the renewal problems of decaying neighborhoods, and the threat to social integration posed by minorities and poverty populations on the other. Beginning in the early 1970s, the North American programs focused generally on neighborhoods and community-based organizing. In New York City, for example, the *Community Management Program* (launched in 1972) and the *Sweat Equity Homesteading Program* were not coordinated until 1978 in one administrative unit, the *Division of Alternative Management Programs*, within the Office for Urban Renewal. All the different DAMP programs required the self-labor ('sweat equity') of the tenants. Soon the municipal subsidy for this kind of self-help and self-organization proved 'successful' for the city, as rent payments went up and the rate of privatization was accelerated (cf. Mayer/Katz 1985).

On the national level, the Carter administration made neighborhood organizations a central component in the 'partnership to build cities' (1978) and its *Office of Neighborhood Development* distributed funds that subsidized program development, administration and staff salaries for community organizations. While these concessions to neighborhood-based groups and movements were modest in comparison to the billions authorized under the *Model Cities* and *Community Action Programs* of the 1960s, they were already designed to support privatization processes with state instruments and to systematically include the private sector in urban revitalization.

In the context of Reagan's 'New Volunteerism', the making use of societal self-organization reached a qualitatively new level. While many federal programs were cut back or eliminated, the remaining available funding was for specified projects only, so that

movement groups gradually began to transform themselves into co-producers/administrators of public goods and services. A variety of pilot programs manifested the search for viable tripartist arrangements, exploring what role the state might play in restructuring certain labor markets and modes of production: model *Enterprise Zone Programs* as well as the *Alternatives to Service Delivery* required the existence and participation of community-based organizations. A 1982 program *Partnerships for Service Delivery* called upon neighborhood organizations to develop "creative and innovative arrangements" for delivering and organizing services in all kinds of municipal policy fields (environment, crime, health, education etc.). Another program bestowed awards, so-called *Community Development Partnerships*, on neighborhood organizations who succeeded in mobilizing high matching funds of private investments for Community Development Block Grant (CDGB) funds. Also, the Reagan administration continued to support the *National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise*, which tested and propagated the capacity of neighborhood groups to become entrepreneurial. Other demonstration projects were launched under the name *Quality of Life Initiatives* by the Department of Housing and Urban Development; e.g. the *National Self-Sufficiency Project* provided funds to facilitate the move from 'welfare dependency' to productive employment for 'highly motivated' single mothers. The *Minority Youth Training Initiative* (1983) combined training of young people in housing rehabilitation and management with following job placements under a partnership of mayors, The Public Housing Office, and the private sector. All of these programs supported and subsidized active, community-based interest organization, made community groups a required partner in bargaining structures, but also forced them to adjust to the economic norms of the public-private partnerships (cf. Mayer 1987b). Thus, the path was long prepared for the mid-1990s, when both the Democratic White- House and the Republican "Contract with America" advocate 'community empowerment' strategies as a way to tackle the crisis of the cities (cf. Dreier 1993; Boyte et al., 1994).

None of the European countries know as thickly developed a community-based infrastructure as the United States. Movements have been less territorially based, and the equivalent state programs reacted in sync with the given political culture. In Germany, neither the old FRG nor the GDR had the tradition or structures of strong civic voluntarism supported and bound in by the state. It was not until the new self-help movements of the 1980s that a comparable rhetoric emerged ('subsidiarity'), which in a few states has meanwhile led to programs even with a neighborhood accent.[2]

In the early 1980s, German municipalities began to launch specific programs in response to the squatters' movement and the alternative movements active around women's issues, immigration, drugs and other social and health issues, such as long-term

unemployment (which, at that time, was still framed mainly in terms of the social problems it created). During this initial phase, the movements were still rather distinct, and the programs responding to them were, too. There were distinct programs geared to housing and urban renewal (1), self-help and social policies (2), and those of job creation for groups with problems on the labor market (3).

(1) As a response to the squatter movement, alternative renewal agents were created (called 'Stattbau' in Berlin in 1982 and in Hamburg in 1984, and similar ones later in other cities) and the Berlin Housing Senate launched a Self-Help Rehab Program featuring the inclusion of various intermediary organizations and both technical assistance and socially oriented renewal agents in the planning, formulation and implementation of housing and renewal policies (Clarke/Mayer 1986:412, Schubert 1990:37f., Boll et al., 1991:225f., Mayer 1987a:354f.)

(2) Out of the alternative collectives and citizens initiatives in Berlin, an umbrella organization 'Arbeitskreis Staatsknete' was formed to secure public funding for their social, cultural and political projects. The CDU Senate launched a social services program in response in 1983. While the umbrella organization 'AK Staatsknete' had demanded funding for a self-administered fund from various departments, the CDU offer was restricted to social services and health-related activities, but geared towards projects based on client self-help and voluntary co-production of health services (Grottian et al., 1988; Fink 1983). In Munich, a similar funding program was established by an SPD city government in 1984, called 'Die Münchner Konzeption zur Förderung von Selbsthilfe-Gruppen und selbstorganisierten Projekten im Gesundheits- und Sozialbereich'. Like the Berlin program, it sought to complement the existing system of social service provision by forms emphasizing self-organization and voluntarism. In both 'forerunner' cities, the largest amount of funding went to self-help centers and contact places, established to mediate between grassroots self-help groups on the one hand and the state and welfare bureaucracies on the other. By 1988, such self-help contact centers were established in 20 West German cities through a national model program, another model program was started in 1992 to establish 17 new centers in the east German states (Frankfurter Rundschau 1992).

(3) During the early stages, municipal employment programs were more properly social programs, though they were directly related to labor market problems. They targeted so-called problem-groups of the labor market, subsidizing their unemployment or

welfare benefits so as to make some kind of employment possible, often in the irregular 'second labor market'. Here, the city of Hamburg spearheaded the development with its 'Second Labor Market Program' established in 1982 (Fiedler/Schrödter 1983). Other cities were soon to follow, complemented by some states which established funding programs for job creation, centers for the unemployed, technical assistance for project management etc.[3]

What gradually happened through these programs was that diverse funding sources would get combined (from the Labor Office, through Social Assistance schemes, EC and state funding, Youth Services etc.), and cooperative arrangements between different offices within and outside the municipality emerged. Outside the municipality it was primarily the unemployment office, chambers, unions, welfare associations and non-profit organizations engaged in implementing the programs that emerged as partners of local government. In Germany, in contrast to e.g. Great Britain, through the whole first decade, dependence on the temporary public sector job creation schemes of the Federal Labor Office (so-called ABM measures) remained characteristic, which made these programs effectively more into social programs than into policies encouraging market success. This particularly German history currently contributes to the unique difficulties in entrepreneurializing social labor within the German labor market. Current efforts to flexibilize work requirements for welfare recipients face much bigger barriers in Germany than in the more neo-liberal U.S. and U.K., where workfare – including the right to earn and keep a wage or start a small business – has long been part of social policies.

In spite of such national variations, the various programs tying movement groups into social services, urban renewal, and job creation initiatives everywhere gradually blurred the boundaries between these different groups and policy areas, as social and housing and alternative projects have all had to expand their job creation and training capacities. They all learned to combine strategies tackling social marginalization or urban repair with job creation measures. They all began to relate their work somehow to the problems of the labor market or to structurally disadvantaged groups in the labor market. While old funding programs and increasingly also ABM funds are being cut, groups scramble for various EU funds and state and local programs that encourage labor market integration, and that presuppose the inclusion of non-state actors in the endogenous development of a locality.

Meanwhile, the rigid German laws regulating social and labor market policies have also begun to be adjusted. In 1992, the Berlin Senate launched a program 'Arbeit statt Sozialhilfe' (Work instead of Welfare) and in 1994 the federal government reformed the welfare law with a 'Hilfe zur Arbeit' aspect, i.e. a workfare component, which allows non-profit organizations and communal businesses to employ and train welfare recipients in housing renewal, solar technology or community restaurants. Such programs are already more widely developed in North America,

where they frame the scope of options for older and newer kinds of urban movements.

Alongside the initiatives and self-help projects that had their origins in the decade of high progressive mobilization, the 1970s, another type of movement – of later and different origin – has also become part of the routinized cooperation with the local state. As a result of the new conditions on the labor market and of the shift from social welfare to more punitive workfare policies, hundreds of new organizations have sprung up, non-profit organizations 'run by and for the homeless' or other new marginal groups, the number and variety of institutions and projects 'servicing' the marginalized has exploded, and many of them function within municipal programs that harness the reform energy of community-based organizations. Their labor seeks not just to 'mend' the disintegration processes which traditional state activities cannot address, frequently they develop innovative strategies acknowledging the new divisions within the post-Fordist city. Examples would be grassroots organizations such as Proyecto Esperanza in Los Angeles that help recent immigrants find jobs and places to live by training them to find work in the growing informal sector as day laborers rather than channeling them into normal job-training programs (Hopkins 1995). Obviously it is debatable how 'innovative' this kind of work really is.

Sometimes, as in the case of Montreal's Resto-Pop, the group is simultaneously challenging the state while exploiting its workfare program for its own goals of creating solidarity and empowerment. Chic Resto-Pop is a community restaurant/non-profit organization started in 1984 by 12 welfare recipients, providing jobs for the poor in the community and inexpensive meals (for 800 people a day). The (currently 93) trainees participate in a workfare program, but the organization is also mobilizing locally and demanding the transformation of this very workfare program, arguing both for local control and government support for the locally emerging social economy (Shragge/Fontan 1996:8; for other cases see Shragge 1997). Often, however, these projects are totally unaware that official politics increasingly looks to non-profit and community groups to replace state politics and to function as repair networks for the economic and political disintegration produced by globalization, and in fact manages to turn them into social entrepreneurs.

3. THE OPTIONS FOR LOCAL INITIATIVES AND MOVEMENTS

The groups and organizations that are now inserted into municipal funding and implementation structures play a complicated role within the urban movement scene. On the one hand they enhance organization building and lend stability to the urban movement sector. On the other hand, they contribute to the fragmentation and polarization of that very movement sector. Especially since they find themselves threatened by cuts and are faced with the reorientation of state programs toward labor market flexibility, competition among them for funding has intensified, the groups engage more in private lobbying strategies to secure jobs and finances instead of creating public pressure. Some of the alternative renewal agents and community-based development organizations also find themselves attacked by other movements, who do not qualify for the waiting lists or who prefer to squat. Such tensions were, for example, expressed in violent actions by autonomous groups against Stattbau, the alternative renewal agent in Berlin. As the rehabilitation of old buildings often prepares the way for gentrifiers to move into an area, protests were directed toward the symbols of advancing gentrification such as chic yuppie restaurants but also against the intermediary organizations who were seen as organizing these processes (cf. Kramer 1988). Similar tensions have been observed between squatters and community development organizations on New York's Lower East Side and flared up in the struggles around Tompkins Square Park (cf. Smith 1996: 3-29).

Thus, we are confronted with a number of new problems:
- with the new antagonisms within the movement sector, such as those just referred to, which are also a product of the restructuring of the urban polity, which has expanded and now includes some **but not others** in its governance arrangements;
- with the evidence that the inclusion of movement groups in revitalization and other partnerships has meant, for many, that they become tied up with managing the housing and employment problems of groups whose exclusion by normal market mechanisms might otherwise begin to threaten the social cohesion of the city;
- finally, with the trend to entrepreneurialize the social and community work of these groups, as funding support for them is increasingly only available through workfare programs or through microcredit arrangements.

On the positive side, however, the increasing dependence of city governments on such (former) social movement organizations for processing the complex antagonisms within contemporary cities does also enhance the chances for tangible movement input.

While this dependence is meanwhile institutionalized with the routinized cooperation between the local state and the former social movement organizations with regard to community economic development, client-based social services and women's centers, these new partnership relations are also beginning to influence interaction between the local state and other urban movements. The eroding local competence described for many city governments increases the pressure on the local political elites to negotiate and bargain with movement representatives within the channels and intermediary frameworks generated by the wave of routinization of alternative movement labor in the context of municipal (employment or revitalization) programs. Thus, today's movements making a stand on the use value of the city, such as ecological and poor people's movements, now may also expect to profit from the new culture and institutions of non-hierarchical bargaining systems, forums, and round tables. (Obviously, these new structures of governance are open to the less progressive, xenophobic, and anti-social movements as well).

In this way, movements active in and around the city today play a role, if a contradictory one, in contributing to and challenging the shape and regulation of the city. While their practice with innovative urban repair and their inclusion in municipal governance structures may well feed into the search for locally adequate post-Fordist solutions and arrangements, their challenge of undemocratic and un-ecological urban development schemes may yet contribute to a more participatory and more sustainable first world type of city, even while avoiding actual shifts of power. The new arrangements of urban governance and the expanded boundaries of local politics, involving the knowledge and assets of all kinds of non-governmental stakeholders, have made new avenues available for those forces amongst the urban social movements that can seize them and tease out their ambivalence. Rather than doing so only for particular defensive spaces or individual threatened privileges, they need to make use of these avenues within a broad, complex struggle for sustainable urban life in a global era. This struggle is not reducible to the simple antagonism between the global, cosmopolitan elites and the tribal local communities "retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro-forces that shape their lives out of their reach," as Castells and others would have us see it (1994:30). The movements themselves, and especially the proactive ones among them that have become tied into municipal programs and governance structures, are rather contradictory and complex agents themselves. They have to deal with the new fragmentation within the movement sector as well as with massive marginalization and social disintegration processes increasingly characteristic of urban life. The institutionalized, professionalized or entrepreneurial movements which now benefit from routinized cooperation with the local state, frequently want nothing to do with younger groups of squatters or cultural activists. Because of their preoccupations due to the new funding structures, they are often at quite a distance

from the growing marginalized and disadvantaged social groups,
whose forms of resistance do not automatically lead to mobilization
or wide-spread support. Thus it is becoming crucial that those parts
of the movement sector that enjoy some stability, access, resources
and networks devote part of their struggle to creating a political
and social climate where marginalized groups can become visible
and express themselves. Only if these movements manage to
interact and to politicize the social polarization inherent in the post-
Fordist city, and to build on the mobilizing potential of the new
inequalities, will the struggle for socially just, environmentally
sustainable and democratic cities have a chance.

Endnotes

[1] My argument is misunderstood if it is reformulated,
as by Amin in the introduction to his Reader, that
the rise of new bargaining systems based on
negotiation represents "in short, a better form of
democracy" (p.29)

[2] The state of Northrhine-Westphalia has made neigh-
borhoods 'with special renewal needs' an emphasis
in a major funding program. Cf. Lang, 1994.

[3] Most advanced was the program of the state of
Northrhine-Westphalia, cf. Matzdorf 1989.

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GILDE VAN WERKGEBOUWEN AMSTERDAM: THE TURNING TIDE

WRITTEN BY	PETI BUCHEL, CAROLIEN FELDBRUGGE, BERT HOGERVORST, ANNIE WRIGHT
PHOTOS BY	WILLEM VERMAASE

CHAPTER 3.3

THE IJ INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS GUILD, AMSTERDAM
The Guild's history

Amsterdam's old harbour (see map 1) includes an area of 270 hectares that was gradually abandoned over a number of years. Starting in 1978, a total of 18 premises in this area has been squatted by groups of artists and craftspeople, with activities ranging from traditional arts and crafts through to musical instrument making and website design.

We squatted these premises in order to keep our living and working costs to a minimum so that we can achieve economic independence now that subsidies are almost a thing of the past in the Netherlands. For the same reason, we decided to do all the building conversion ourselves. This involved 'sweat equity' which we discovered also stimulated the creation of our own work. In addition, we opted for self-management. This in turn increased our sense of self-worth.

Map 1: Overview of Amsterdam's harbour

MODERN SEA HARBOR

THE IJ

THE IJ

FORMER SEA

AMSTERDAM

Map 2: Overview of the Guild's Buildings

1 Het Veem, van Diemstraat
2 The Grain Silos, Westerdoksdijk
3 Customs Shed, Westerdoksdijk
4 Brandweerkazerne, Oosterdkseiland
5 Studios Asia, Oostelijke Handelskade
6 The De Zwijger Warehouse,
   Oostelijke Handelskade
7 Vrieshuis Amerika,
   Oostelijke Handelskade
8 The Wilhelmina Warehouse,
   Oostelijke Handelskade
9 The Argentina Office Building,
   Oostelijke Handelskade

10 Studio 12, Oostelijke Handelskade
11 World's End, Sumatrakade
   (Demolished 1996)
12 The Co-operative Harbour
   Companies Building, Azartplein
13 The Doctor's House, Levantkade
14 Botenloods "The Nieuwe Fooruitgang"
15 The Open Harbour Museum,
   KNSM Laan
16 Edelweiss, Levantplein
17 Levantkade 10, Levantkade

Another advantage of managing our own building is that we are more likely to attract new users with roughly the same interests. This also accelerates the collaborative process. It ensures social cohesion. But ultimately, the best economic option involves handing over the management and ownership of these premises to the people who use them: so as to guarantee low rents in the long run. Marx said, that the people must control the means of production. In our case, it ensures development potential for the small-scale self-employed – something that even the liberals would approve of. We're also providing self-determination for people with little or no money. And self-determination is vital to this group.

The Guild's vision and strategy

In 1992, Amsterdam City Council decided to re-develop the harbour on a grand scale. So it brought in the big guns: a Dutch bank with global connections. These plans involved demolishing most of the premises that we had squatted. Hence our groups formed an association in 1993 called 'The IJ Industrial Buildings Guild.' We wanted to make the citizens of Amsterdam aware of who we are and what we represent.

The Guild argues that more space must be made available for buildings that combine living with working. These premises should primarily house small-scale activities in, for instance, the arts, crafts and academic sectors. We contend that this approach will contribute to the accelerated development of urban identity. In addition, we support a market-place economy and we are not interested in structural subsidies. They destroy continuity.

The Guild wants to work with Amsterdam City Council on the basis of an equal partnership. To achieve this aim, its strategy has emphasised an integration of planning and consultative structures. We refuse to be a pawn in the political decision-making process as we consider ourselves to be an active partner that contributes both ideas and solutions. From the very beginning, the Guild has made a point of lobbying and of attending public inquiries. The result is that we are now included in neighbourhood councils, urban planning groups involved in the harbour's re-development and the Amsterdam Council for Urban Development. We are in constant contact with councillors and other local authority bigwigs.

Moreover, in co-operation with two housing associations, we have set up our own think-tank. Its aim is to collaborate with a number of academics and politicians in the development of our 'casco philosophy'. 'Casco' means a basic structure: a building's shell or framework. This philosophy is based on practical experience. However, the trick is to know how to apply these ideas to contemporary environmental planning with all its intricate rules and regulations.

Ultimately the collaboration between Amsterdam City Council and the bank has failed to deliver the goods, so the council has decided to develop the harbour on its own. This involves dividing the development area up into five sections and the Guild has fingers in most of these pies. Like the other participants, it has to be on its toes because the council is continually changing its priorities and strategies. Past experience tells us that this process will probably

drag on for another ten years. Unfortunately, the average commercial participant will throw in the towel after approximately three months. So the Guild is now the largest group that has withstood the test of time and is still active. In fact, we are becoming stronger and stronger.

We always try to place the interests of the individual building in a wider context. This means first relating each squat to the other squats in Amsterdam harbour so as to demonstrate its importance to the city as a whole. And we have also located our tradition of artists' squats within the broader context of other North-West European harbour cities.

The future

Our future activities include:

– organising an urban planning congress that focuses on our casco philosophy.
– collaborating with users' groups so as to develop and manage old and modern cascos.
– we are currently considering setting up building funds in consultation with the users of these types of premises.
  In addition, we have been approached by a group of 100 radical older women who want to set up their own casco.
– in collaboration with Amsterdam City Council, we are exploring various ways of legalising the casco principle and of applying it to the harbour.

The restaurant in what used to be the Brick Silo's boiler-house, Amsterdam

**Squatted Grain Silos
in Amsterdam.
The grey concrete Silo
with its 50 metre-high
shaft dominates not only
the local neighbourhood
but also the prevailing
emotional climate.**

THE CASCO MODEL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The casco model of urban development is a theory based on the experience of daily life along the banks of Amsterdam's harbour.

1. What does 'casco' mean?

Casco is a Dutch word meaning the shell or framework of a ship or building. It is frequently used by shipbuilders and architects. In the squatters' world, this word has come to be used in a wider context. In fact, squatting has become a tradition in Holland and especially in Amsterdam. Since the 1980s, squatters have focused on large utilitarian and industrial buildings. This meant that they gained valuable experience concerning the re-structuring, managing and use of large buildings with a solid basic construction. In other words, the squatters adapted the framework to their own particular needs. There are three important factors in this process: 1. self-management, 2. sweat equity, and 3. small-scale commercial and cultural activities, and a combination of living and working in the same building.

2. How did this practical experience lead to a model for small-scale city development?

At the end of the 1970s, the squatters were driven out of the city centre. So they moved into Amsterdam's empty harbour. Here, they introduced their form of organisation into an area where there was as yet no urban texture. The situation in the harbour widened their vision; their casco concept shifted from being an inner city based model to become a broader model of urban development.

This model contains three elements:

a) The built environment

In terms of a building, casco means a minimal basic structure that can be adapted and divided up according to its users' wishes. Hence, a casco building is extremely flexible and can radically change its internal appearance and functions. The users are not only responsible for the structuring of the building's interior but also for its exterior and the immediate surroundings.

b) Management

This entails the users' responsibility for the upkeep of the building's interior, exterior and its immediate surroundings. Specifically, this concerns internal administration and contact with the outside world.

A vital factor in this process is that there should be no separation between the building's development and its subsequent

(Illustration 1, Casco design by
Liesbeth van der Pol)

(Illustration 2, Casco design by Liesbeth van der Pol)

management: that the people who develop the building should also manage it. In other words, the management must not involve a third party.

c) Economy
Like a building, the urban economy also has a basic casco structure that includes production, commerce, consumption and culture. Combining these components through small-scale activities within a single building or neighbourhood creates the conditions needed for economic cross-fertilisation and social cohesion. When this is combined with the possibility of living and working in the same place, it will create an urban fabric that is durable, flexible and diverse.

Over the last 15 years, the Guild's buildings in the harbour have succeeded in realising a combination of the three elements of the casco model (the built environment, management and economy). Its members now advocate the introduction of the casco concept into the inner city and that the initiatives along the banks of the IJ represent an ideal starting point. In fact, this is a step back in time to a city centre that mixed living with production as opposed to its contemporary descendant where production is being increasingly excluded to the outskirts.

3. Testing of the model in a think tank
From the very beginning, the Guild has shared its ideas with anyone who was prepared to listen. This resulted in the setting up of a think tank in collaboration with a housing corporation called 'Het Oosten'. Eventually the think tank also attracted the participation of academics, a second housing corporation, politicians and an investment company. One of the main issues they explored was: can casco be applied to new buildings?

In early 1995, this led to a series of casco workshops. These consisted of brainstorming sessions between members of

the Guild, members of the housing corporations and a numbers of architects. At first, the architects feared that their professional expertise was being undermined. Yet ultimately it turned out that the casco model allowed more freedom not only for the users but also for the architects themselves. The architects maintained total creative control over the building's basic structure and the users were subsequently responsible for its further development.

One of these architects, Liesbeth van der Pol, rose to the challenge and came up with a series of designs involving the three main types of harbour buildings that had been squatted by the Guild's members: the silo, the warehouse and the transit shed.

The first example (see illustration 1) is a concrete structure covered with a wooden facade. It is inspired by the grain silo in Amsterdam which was squatted in 1989. Van der Pol's design consists of eight floors and a lift shaft with plumbing, gas and electricity. The facades are completely blank: there are no windows, no doors and no entrances of any kind. Van der Pol's explanation was that future users would be undaunted by such a minor obstacle. Instead they would grab the nearest chainsaw, break their way in and make their own windows and doors. In other words: to be able to use this building, you first have to squat it!

The design of the second example (see illustration 2) is based on a traditional mercantile warehouse. It consists of a series of towers with identical faces. They have already been provided with wooden flaps that can be lowered to form suspended platforms. These buildings are separated by pre-fab huts where the future users can develop their initial activities. The buildings shown in this drawing are at an advanced stage. Although they were originally identical on all four sides, these buildings' imaginary users have used their platforms to expand sideways and to gain access to the neighbouring tower. However, Van der Pol's design promotes a flexible structure so that future users can always demolish these connecting bridges so as to opt once more for isolation. The same, of course, applies to the towers' internal structure. In other words: these buildings are never 'completed' and allow for constant change.

The design of the third example (see illustration 3) is based on a transit shed; it consists of trusses supported by concrete pillars. Its space can be defined by dividing walls that are shifted at will. The building has an oblong form; its floor is made up of a mixture of cobble-stones and sand so that users always have access to the shed's pipes and cables. The shape of the roof can also be changed according to taste; here, its form refers to a Chinese pagoda.

These designs and the workshops themselves received much favourable press coverage. There was frequent outside attention and visitors included architects, environmental designers and representatives from the city council.

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
4. Advantages of the casco model and conditions of success

Anyone can opt to use the casco model but it specifically offers opportunities to people on or beneath the minimum wage. These people can potentially buy casco buildings cheaply (through user-friendly loans) because they are 'unfinished' and only offer basic facilities. The users then gradually invest in their building's development according to their means and tastes. Hence, the casco model means a long-term development where money is generated in the building rather than by means of the building. In other words: the casco model opposes the building exploitation by developers who are out to make a quick buck.

But there are emotional as well as financial advantages to the casco model: it empowers users and imbues them with responsibility for their own environment. In short: the casco concept has been developed through the re-use of existing industrial buildings with solid structures. These include harbour buildings such as warehouses, transit sheds and silos. The concept also encompasses the squatters' ideals of sweat equity, self-management, the combination of living and working, and the stimulation of small-scale economic and cultural activities.

Successful casco development requires the following:
1. Allowing both individual residents and users' groups to invest in the built environment.
2. Dividing the responsibility for the built environment into at least two layers: the management of a 'grid-block' or neighbourhood by the users; the management of the city or district by the local government. This should alleviate the structural powerlessness and apathy prevalent amongst residents so that the user is once again made 'king of the castle'.
3. Involvement of the users at a low-value moment in the construction cycle. This also applies to new buildings.
4. Encouraging a local urban economy involving productive culture, small-scale businesses and knowledge as spearheads.
5. The approval of both government and users of an intricate mixture of economic functions consisting of living, working, commerce and culture.

Casco equals opportunity equals freedom!

SOME SMALL-SCALE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HARBOURS OF NORTH-WEST EUROPE

To place the Guild's initiatives in an international context, its research team visited altogether seven cities: Dublin, Liverpool, Bristol, Odense, Copenhagen, Rostock and Szczecin (see map 3).

The aim was to investigate examples where harbour premises are being re-used on a small-scale by the arts, academic and crafts sectors. The choice of North-West Europe was determined by four factors: a comparable socio-economic background, a common historical development, the area's climate and the available budget.

All the harbours included in this research are being developed through a collaboration between the private and public sectors. The approach is radical if the development is being primarily undertaken by private partners or by an agency that has been specifically set up for this purpose. Here, the aim is profit and not permanent management. Liverpool, Rostock, Copenhagen and Dublin are prime examples of this. It is only when the city council plays a major role in developing a harbour area that small-scale initiatives can took root as is the case in Bristol, Odense and Szczecin. Artists are playing a vital role in the regeneration of the harbours in Bristol and Odense. However, none of these harbours can compare with the sheer scale of squatting and self-management that has developed in Amsterdam's harbour. This knowledge has increased the Guild's awareness of its special situation; it is now up to Amsterdam City Council to do the same and to facilitate the Guild's initiatives.

Map 3: Map with ports visited by the Guild in North West Europe

1 Dublin
2 Liverpool
3 Bristol
4 Amsterdam
5 Odensee
6 Copenhagen
7 Rostock
8 Szczecin

ISLANDS IN A CODED URBAN SPACE — WAGENBURGEN IN BERLIN

WRITTEN BY	RENATE BERG
PHOTOS BY	RENATE BERG
	ANJA VALENTIN (SCHWARZER KANAL, 'WAGEN'-DAYS)

CHAPTER

3.4

Explanation: The term 'Wagenburgen' refers to the wagon barricades the pioneers used to erect in an attempt to defend themselves from attacks in the Wild West.

The meaning itself should not be taken that literally. As paraphrases you can use terms like e.g. wagon parks, carriage strongholds or portacabin sites.

Wagenburg at the 'Kinderbauernhof'.

Wagenburg at the 'Kinderbauernhof'

SELF-PORTRAYAL

In Berlin there are 11 sites (in June 1997) with groups of people – altogether about 500 – living in converted portacabins, circus wagons, caravans or trucks. Among these 11 sites there are two legalised larger sites with about 100 and 120 people, which are relatively far from the city centre. The remaining nine sites are situated in the inner city, mostly around the area of the former Berlin Wall.

There were two distinct phases in their origin. The first phase dates back to the 1980s when the squatter movement expanded. In those days, Berlin showed a certain tolerance towards squatters, alternative projects and subculture, which was allowed to develop in niches in the divided city. The second phase started after the Wall had come down, when the former 'no man's land' suddenly offered undeveloped open space. At that time there was an acute housing shortage and Wagenburgen emerged all over Germany.

The nine sites in the inner city of Berlin consist of groups of 4 to 30 people. We see ourselves as an alternative housing project promoting a different style of city life. It was a voluntary choice for us to live in a wagon, therefore it should not be seen as a kind of self-help project to combat homelessness or anything along those lines.

The sites in Berlin are all quite different in terms of spatial as well as social structures, and include people on social welfare as well as full time professionals. The largest group amongst the 'wagon dwellers' consists of part-time workers, free-lancers and people in further education such as apprenticeships – mostly crafts – or university. Most of the wagon dwellers are between 20 and 35 years of age, although there are people from other age groups.

The reasons for living in a wagon vary according to each individual:

1. Life in a wagon offers the opportunity to live within a group but without certain group members exerting too much influence on others. Thus the members of a group can be individually very different. Any conflict situation can be alleviated by the spatial divisions on the site.
2. For many of us, life on a Wagenburg offers an alternative to the anonymity of the metropolis. For this reason and also in order to remain politically active, a well-functioning group structure is very important to us. Therefore, we also choose who we want to live with. The decision is generally made in a plenum and demands group agreement.
3. In our wagons we can organise the inner and outer space of our personal living environment in an autonomous and personally responsible way, since it is quite free from pre-organised functional division.
4. A lot of people moved into a wagon in order to live closer to nature, i.e. not to feel locked away from weather and seasonal changes.
5. In our wagons we can decide independently on the kind of building material, energy sources and standard of furnishing. We often use and recycle old materials, which would otherwise be thrown away.

Performance at the Wagenburg 'Schwarzer Kanal'
– outside and free of charge.

6. For many of us ecology is very important and we strive to use our resources consciously. The problem of supply and waste management is therefore met with cost-effective, and wherever possible, with environmentally-friendly solutions. We have to fetch water in cans and rubbish collection is often difficult, therefore we have to rely on economical consumption and avoid waste wherever possible. We also use solar cells, recycled rain water, raw sewage treatment, and compost cesspits, we plant plants and try to improve the soil. All in all, this is a mixture of the actual wish to live more ecologically, pure necessity and achieving a positive impression in the eyes of the public.

7. We do not have to pay extortionate rents.

8. Wagon dwelling is a certain kind of freedom, since we are out of any institutional control. There are no property managers, no janitors or landlords who could have an influence on our lives.

9. For many people life in a wagon is a mobile way of life, without being fixed to a particular site. It is possible to change the position on the site itself or to change the site completely or to travel around for a period of time. This flexibility has become more and more popular, i.e. there is a trend towards moving into self-propelled vehicles, which is partly due to the uncertain situation, partly influenced by the demands of the education and job market and partly down to a basic need for independence and freedom. However, this mobility of the individual can only be guaranteed if there are enough fixed sites where they can find a temporary home.

86

Demonstration at the end of the 'Wagen'-days, Easter 1996

The wagons are generally lived in by only one person and normally owned by their inhabitants. The furnishing of a wagon is very functional and tailored to the needs of the individual. A lot of things are self-made. The wagons are well-insulated and furnished with ovens against the winter cold. Nonetheless, winter is a very exhausting season, due to the long dark hours, crampedness, permanent dampness outside and a general 'lack of communication'.

However, summer compensates immensely for these shortcomings, since we spend most of our time outdoors. The free spaces between and around the wagons then become a kind of 'common living room'. A lot of activities take place there which could not possibly take place in houses, such as cabaret, acrobatics or working with metal or wood.

Thus we can combine living, working and spare time. Despite all these pleasant aspects, living in a wagon is a very time-consuming affair. Organising our everyday life is very complicated and the constant fight against eviction demands a lot of activity.

Networking

Above and beyond these single groups there are larger interrelations which connect the wagon dwellers. In Berlin, we have run for the past one and a half years a city-wide 'wagon plenum' which takes place on a weekly basis and which concerns the inner city sites in particular. Since December 1990 there have been nation-wide meetings called 'Wagentage' which are also attended – if only sporadically – by Swiss, Dutch and Danish wagon dwellers. These meetings take place on a roughly quarterly basis, each time on a Wagenburg in a different city. The programme includes workshops, parties, film showings, concerts, theatre performances and so on.

Within these networks we have a constant exchange of ideas and there are many close, often personal contacts between wagon dwellers from different cities. There are a lot of people who travel around and visit different Wagenburgen throughout the country and often stay on different sites for a short period of time. The numbers of those who have moved – often more than once – from one Wagenburg to another are increasing constantly. This leads more and more to the impression of a large family being established.

Within the framework of these 'Wagentage' we also publish our joint magazine "Vogelfrai". "Vogelfrai" (='outlawed') contains articles and news from the different Wagenburgen, such as eviction threats or site changes, reports on workshops, what's on, fairy tales or stories and small ads. We also run comprehensive discussions in the magazine and it always gives the latest address list, which now contains more than 120 addresses.

The inside of a 'Wagen'

A CHANGED SITUATION: FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW

In legal terms, Wagenburgen at best occupy – even from a euphemistic point of view – a grey area. In federal German Law, however, there are certain fundamental principles according to which we can be 'illegalised' (Building Laws, Camping and Caravan Guidelines, Environmental Issues ...).

This initial situation – which is bad enough – has seen massive changes in the past few years. In the course of the neo-liberal city development, Berlin found itself in the middle of a far-reaching re-structuring process. The fall of the Berlin Wall gave the initial boost and the development of 'Enterprise Berlin' (a quote from the reigning mayor of Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen) is strongly supported by the city's conversion into the 'federal capital with seat of government'. The city is very keen on creating an investor-friendly ambience and the inner city of Berlin is under enormous pressure to be utilised and exploited. A quote from the senate such as "Berlin no longer exists just for its own sake but is the display window and representative of our state." (Senator of the Interior, Jörg Schöhnbohm on the occasion of the eviction of the wagons on the East-Side-Gallery on July 17th 1996) illustrates this. The results of the city development so far do indeed point towards the end of the history of tolerance in Berlin. They used to brag about their subculture; now they want to get rid of it.

In the past few years there have already been several evictions and relocations of Wagenburgen. By the end of the parliamentary term in October 1995, all wagon sites were supposed to be cleared – but they are still talking about providing replacement areas. This plan was not executed as they were unable to find new space. We always tried to initiate talks with the administrative authorities, one example being the round table talks we organised between August and November 1995. But the administrative authorities did not take part in them, which was the reason why we could not discuss any concrete suggestions and solutions. We had to realise that neither the local authorities nor the senate were interested in talking with us or in offering alternative spaces. Therefore we considered the 'round table', after several talk attempts, a waste

of time and decided to discontinue it. The principle of the 'round table' obviously did not succeed.

A key moment of our history was the clearance of the East Side in July 1996, with about 200 inhabitants, the largest Wagenburg in Berlin. We refer to this because the clearance was covered in the media throughout Europe. This Wagenburg was named after the nearby East-Side-Gallery, a remaining section of the Wall. The East Side had hit the headlines on several occasions, e.g. stories about drugs (dealers and users), petty criminal activities as well as muggings resulting in grievous bodily harm and even manslaughter. The tabloid press commented on these incidents in their usual 'shock horror' style, while numerous politicians as well as the rest of the media polemicised and inveighed against the wagon dwellers. There is, and has always been, the strong tendency to depict us as antisocials that one can only refer to in terms of criminalisation. In the course of the clearance mentioned above, this process found its climax. Headlines such as "Tuberculosis, car wrecks and drugs next door to the railway station" determined public opinion. The image 'Wagenburg equals Slum' was confirmed, and even if it takes five months and a tiny newspaper article eventually stating that there was never even a single case of tuberculosis, nobody will notice.

It is a fact that other wagon dwellers have considered the East Side as a melting pot with a potential threat of developing into a slum. But we have always pointed out that the problems of the East Side have to be solved on an individual and social basis, that not all Wagenburgen are the same but have to be looked at individually, and that evictions do not solve problems but simply move them to a new area.

After the clearance, the senate followed up with a decision according to which all inner city Wagenburgen had to be evicted by the end of 1997 and even the sites which had been legalised were only to be kept for a short period of time. The senate points out that "Wagenburgen are no qualified solution for a re-integration into society and permanent avoidance of homelessness for their inhabitants."

As a so-called alternative site for all Wagenburgen they searched for an area on the outskirts of the city, which we called an internment camp. But this concept is no longer an option. The senate decision was amended in April 1997: the sites are still to be cleared by the end of this year, but there will be no alternative site provided, since it is considered financially unviable. In the

Autumn of 1996 we started another attempt to negotiate with the senate. This attempt failed after about six months, since the conservative party (CDU) stuck to the line of action described above.

The current situation and the concrete extent of the threat is estimated and interpreted quite differently by the individual wagon dwellers, but we all have recognised a turn for the worse, especially in connection with the so-called 'Capital Madness' (German: 'Hauptstadtwahn'). We have always been of the opinion that we were never particularly wanted, since we could not be utilised. Now we are an even greater obstacle in the face of the 'utilisation pressure'. On top of that we are now seen as a disturbance factor in the concept of interior safety. Growing privatisation, the retreat of the state from social tasks and increasing control and repression are now to be considered part of the threat we are facing.

RESISTANCE AND POSSIBLE SCOPE FOR ACTION

Numerous activities are being undertaken in order to counter the Sword of Damocles that is the threat of eviction. We have chosen various means in our struggle against it:

1. Negotiation attempts with the communal legislative body and authority.
2. Public relations work which is divided into press coverage and other activities such as stalls at street fairs, open days, action weeks, etc.
3. Co-operation with universities who sometimes show a scientific interest which tends to result in a certain level of support.
4. Networking attempts with alliance partners such as the inner city action group, churches, social initiatives.
5. Contacting investors.

Our intentions are to preserve the possibility of life in a wagon and to give it a secure legal basis. First and foremost we try to remain on our current sites. We are not opposed to alternative sites, but they would have to fulfil certain criteria: not on the outskirts, not too noisy, not totally concreted over, appropriate infra-structure and a little bit of vegetation.

In our struggle against the eviction threats we have so far reached our limits rather quickly. In our negotiation attempts with the senate we were quite sceptical as to what we had let ourselves in for. It seemed obvious that it was impossible to obtain legal assurance for all Wagenburgen. We therefore envisaged splits, which so far have fortunately not materialised.

Our main approach, which we have been advertising to the public and the communal authorities, is the project character of the Wagenburgen, i.e. the fact that we pursue alternative, cultural, social, ecological or artistic ideas. We sell this in order to justify the fact that we are entitled to live in the inner city, especially since we live on 'choice cut' plots (German: 'Filetgrundstücke'). Looking at the fact that the state is increasingly retreating from its social and cultural tasks, we see this as a chance to slip into the remaining vacuum. This would mean an institutionalisation of the Wagenburgen. We would have to agree with certain rules and regulations and we have asked ourselves what price we are prepared to pay. Some of the Wagenburgen have managed to straddle these issues with minimum compromises. It was obvious however, that those Wagenburgen which were not prepared to get into local politics were going to be the first to be hit with displacement or eviction. The bitter reality so far, however, has been little interest in our attempts, all our efforts have been in vain.

PERSPECTIVES / MODELS

We, as wagon dwellers, see ourselves in terms of ideology, as ranging from 'critical of the system' to 'in radical opposition'. But at the same time we are not a fundamental opposition force nor a homogenous movement. In order to make this clear I will now list those contradictions known to me which are part of life in a Wagenburg:

1. The search for clear community structures which at the same time value individuality and the need to retreat.
2. Moving away from the ever-accelerating social rhythm into la more time-intensive, slow organisation of everyday life, but at the same time adapting to modern dynamics and flexibility through our own mobile home.
3. The need for protection within a group in the face of being exposed and open because of a lack of walls.
4. The escape from anonymity into a social context combined with the desire to live in a big city
5. Moving away from the exploitative performance ethos but at the same time doing our share to build and maintain an infra-structure and organise our daily lives.
6. Creating a space where nature and environmental influences can be physically experienced while facing the challenge to do so in an ecologically severely disturbed metropolis.

These contradictions have to be considered in connection with social individualisation. The contradictions and conflicts are inherent in the individual and multiply within a group. Our heterogeneity and contradictions, however, make the 'model Wagenburgen' a concept that cannot be generalised.

The biggest conflict is the permanent need to justify ourselves in the face of the pressure to open ourselves to, and provide services for, the general public, although most of us just want to live in the way we have chosen. In addition to this pluralism of life styles there is yet another tendency: the increasing polarisation of society makes more and more people want or indeed need to live in a wagon. This becomes a problem in larger Wagenburgen which are no longer self-administrated. While smaller communities are still capable of voicing their interests and organising themselves as groups, the communication problem in larger Wagenburgen makes this basically impossible. The fear that Wagenburgen are threatened by a partial but possibly growing slum problem is justified, as the example of the East Side illustrated.

The most important aspect of our resistance seems to be the explanatory public relations work. Without the necessary support, our legalisation bids will always face the resistance of the public, which itself is influenced by the ignorant tabloid press and the line of the senate not to accept Wagenburgen as an alternative housing project.

The struggle against marginalisation and ghetto building has to be seen in connection with social fragmentation, which is why we should pursue co-operation with other oppositional forces beyond our own particular interests. On the other hand we have to face the question why the multi-layered structure of a city should be brutally destroyed.

The current development intends a total replanning and reduction of free areas and public spaces. The open areas of the inner city are increasingly coded, i.e. they are all being utilised. Even if we accept the conditions of transport and communication and the pressures of competition, we have to ask whether the reaction to the former may indeed negate the latter and that by re-building the cities the planners might 'shoot themselves in the foot'. The cities might turn out to be no longer viable or desirable, neither for the population itself nor for commercial developments.

The multi-coloured and non-conforming sub-culture, with Wagenburgen as a part of it, may therefore find another justification.

CITIES OF THE WORLD ECONOMY NEED PLACES LIKE ZENTRALSTRASSE 150

SUBTITLE	SUBCULTURE AND PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE LOGIC OF GLOBAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT — IN THE CASE OF ZURICH.
WRITTEN BY	PHILIPP KLAUS
PHOTOS BY	LUZIA BROGER THE SMALL PICTURES ON PAGES 96/97 ARE BY VARIOUS PHOTOGRAPHERS
TRANSLATION	BARBARA STINER

CHAPTER

3.5

Cities are places of innovation, of change, of Zeitgeist, capital and power. Zentralstrasse 150 in 1995 and 1996 was right in the center of these fields of force. As free and important as its existence was in the urban context, it was consequently in the logic of global urban development as well as that of Zurich. In other words: Cities of the world economy need places like Zentralstrasse 150. The purpose of this essay shall be to substantiate this thesis.

ZENTRALSTRASSE 150

The property Zentralstrasse 150 was bought in 1994 by the Karthago cooperative. It had been searching a long time for a suitable building for the realization of their concept of living and lifestyle as a 'bolo' in the sense of the utopian world design bolo'bolo conceived by the author p.m. [1]. The premises Zentralstrasse 150, set up in the 1950s, is located in the borough of Wiedikon, built at the end of the last century. The building had been standing empty for some time. Before that it had been used as an office building as well as a storage and shipping warehouse by a Japanese electronics company. It was not possible for the members of the cooperative to move in at once, because the building had to be adapted to the requirements of the living community that was to be created. The period for this communal planning process was assessed to be two years. It was decided to sublet the building during this period. This interim use started in February 1995 and ended in September 1996. The top floors were leased to artists and small firms of the Zurich scene. Part of the ground floor was used as an office by the Karthago cooperative as well as a meeting place for Kurdish men and women. The rest of the ground floor and the basement were handed over to 'All'.

'All' was a group of innovative young people. They initiated a cultural venture in three parts: first there were lectures, concerts, exhibitions; then a bar was opened once or twice a week, which soon became an important meeting point in Zurich; and thirdly it was used as a club for Techno parties. 'All' is the german word for 'universe' and is the same word as 'all' in English. And no less than the 'all' were the pretensions of this group!

As a whole, the property was taken over by a flock of artistic people renting its rooms: painters, video artists, film producers, writers, party organizers, architects – let's call them the new creative force. A high density of information and creativeness were brought together, resulting in a process of mutual inspiration and drive. The bar and parties caused Zentralstrasse 150 to radiate all over town and beyond. Some of the 'new creatives' were known before they moved in, some became known later or are still in the process of becoming known. In any case they met a very stimulating, highly urban environment in the borough of Wiedikon.

There was a well defined policy applied to dealing with the media. The operations at Zentralstrasse 150 were not made public in order not be exposed to 'disturbing forces'. Neither the printed media nor radio or television ever reported on Zentralstrasse 150 [2], in spite of the fact that lots of media workers visited both the bar and the parties, and there was no lack of renowned cultural persons on whom they might have reported.

91

The 'All'-crew and other activists in the backyard of Zentralstrasse 150

Zentralstrasse 150 and urban development in Zurich

The evolution of such a place, both rich in culture and stimulating, is not a coincidence. It is part of the logic of the urban development specific to Zurich, but also typical of other world cities.

After years of economic growth and increases in material affluence, in 1973 Switzerland suffered the first crisis in post-war times: the oil crisis and the revalorization of the Swiss franc. While the oil crisis triggered a short period of reconsidering values globally, the revalorization of the franc had a direct impact on the export industry of Switzerland. With products increasing in price, their competitiveness in markets fell abruptly. The consequence of this was the closing down of enterprises and mass dismissals. The uncertain job situation in industry was compensated for by a fast growing service sector. Banks, insurance companies and other service industries expanded globally and required more and more space. They pushed their way into the city centers and were willing to pay higher and higher rents for offices in the center. Zurich in the eighties became an important location of highly specialized economic activities, in particular for the banking sector. A number of transnational corporations made their headquarters in Zurich, local enterprises expanded their activities internationally and effected their control functions on the world market from here [3].

The more service enterprises pushed into the city center, the higher the real estate prices climbed. Apartments became scarce as many of them were transformed into offices, and rents increased dramatically. The city lost a considerable part of its population. The exodus from the city, and consequently the suburbanization of Zurich, had started already in the sixties. In particular families left the city: The cities had become inhospitable, as Mitscherlich [4] wrote in his famous pamphlet in 1965. Cars and the massive extension of the road system made it possible to live in the country – which soon became suburbia – and work in the city.

While Zurich was experiencing a continuous economic boom, the largest city in Switzerland remained somewhat behind in cultural matters. There was no money and no room for 'other' cultural events besides the established institutions (Opernhaus, Schauspielhaus, Kunsthaus, Tonhalle and a few small theaters). Even jazz bands found it difficult to get suitable venues to play in.

Pressure towards the city, 'd'Bewegig' (the movement) and the struggle for room

With punk and new wave something got moving at last in the music scene of the city in the late seventies. Groups popped up like mushrooms, and anyone mastering three chords on a guitar was part of it, performing in the basement of a high school or in some other makeshift premises, crying out to society how little he or she thought of it. This scene was the cultural basis of the movement of the eighties, the so-called 'd'Bewegig'. In the spring of 1980 the citizens of Zurich were called upon to vote on a subsidy of 60 million Swiss francs for the opera. This vote was the famous straw that broke the camel's back: 60 million for established culture, and nothing for alternative culture! On May 30 1980, the night of Bob Marley's Zurich concert, attended by 10,000 people, some two hundred people got together in front of the opera to protest against this proposed bill. The police intervened, and there were major confrontations between 'the youngsters' and the police. While the 'youngsters', or 'chaotics' as they were soon to be called, were only asking for consideration of their cultural and social requirements; namely financial support and space for their own culture, meeting points, and more quality of life; society and the public for several years were at a loss. There was a wide movement of the discontented taking to the street in their thousands and believing in social change. Some of the slogans of this movement were: 'only tribes will survive', 'we demand an end to pack ice' or 'down with

Fig. 1: Comparison of occupation (fulltime jobs) and population in the city of Zurich 1965–1991
Source: Statistische Jahrbücher des Kantons Zurich.

the Alps – a free view on the Mediterranean'. The political alternative was at the same time the cultural alternative.

The 'Rote Fabrik' (Red Factory) and AJZ (Autonomous Youth Center) [5] were wrested from the municipality. Cultural life was blooming in the eighties, in these centers as well as in dozens of communes. Buildings were taken over by squatters time and again. Probably the most famous squat was at the 'Tor zu Aussersihl', the Stauffacher squat in 1984. This is where the idea of Karthago has its origins. These squats were an expression of the determination not to give in to the pressure on the boroughs and the rapid change of the environment.

'D'Bewegig' claimed the city also, and in particular, for its own. It grew as a reaction to the territorial claims of the expanding service sector in prospering Zurich, which threatened both to completely block the real estate market for normal wage earners and to suffocate public space under concrete. It was also a reaction to Zurich as a culturally destitute and conservative town.

City development continued. In particular borough five was under enormous pressure and was undergoing gentrification. It became fashionable to reside in this international melting pot with its Italian, Spanish, Turkish and Asian restaurants, shops and stalls, and at the same time so close to the city center. The yuppies were moving in, and speculation reached heights never heard of before. Apartments were vacated, redeveloped and refurbished in luxury style[6]. As an off-shoot of the 'Bewegig', a movement against housing shortage developed in the late eighties. Substantial numbers of people took to the street to protest against speculation and demand affordable housing. Several empty buildings – more than ever before – were occupied. The largest squat was that of the Wohlgroth premises in borough five, in close vicinity to the main station of Zurich. A center of 'alternative' culture was set up where eventually more than a hundred people were living and realizing their concept of life[7]. The squat ended after three years with a large-scale evacuation in October 1993. The squatters were offered a vacant factory on the outskirts of town as an alternative. The Wohlgroth people, however – to the dismay of the media and a considerable part of the population who had been sympathetic to the Wohlgroth project so far – rejected this. But it is obvious that the city is the place of innovation, and this is particularly true for social and cultural innovation of the type that took place in Wohlgroth. These cannot be realized in the suburbs. Everybody wants the center – the dissidents, too.

MAP OF ZURICH – BOROUGHS AND PLACES OF INTEREST

❶ Zentralstrasse 150 (1995–96)
❷ Kanzleizentrum (1983–91)
❸ Stauffacher-squat (1984)
❹ Wohlgroth – squatted Kulturzentrum (1990–93)
❺ AJZ – Autonomes Jugendzentrum (1980–1982)
❻ Jugendhaus Dynamo. Public youth centre (1985– …)
❼ Kulturzentrum Rote Fabrik (1980– …)

1,2 etc: Zurich's borroughs characterization

1   City – financial district; Bahnhofstrasse which is one of the most expensive shopping malls of the world; Niederdorf, the medieval town for pleasure and shoppping.
2   Enge – parts of this borough belong to the city; upperclass residences.
3   Wiedikon – working class; migrants; jewish community; housing coops, some industry at the outer border
4   Aussersihl – traditional working class; migrants; red light district.
5   Industriequartier – as the name says: industry; traditionally working class; migrants; red light.
6   Unterstrass – middle class residences, universities, hospitals.
7   Fluntern/Hottingen – upper class residences.
8   Seefeld – higher middleclass next to the lake

9, 10, 11, 12 are not on this map.
9 + 11 are industrial and low income, subcentres of Zurich, 10 and 12 are working class residences, 12 suburban.

Empty buildings, interim use, free space

The structural change that started in the seventies lead to more and more abandoned industrial sites. At first, the service sector elbowed into these areas[8]. The conservative politicians wanted to leave these areas fully to the booming economy. The political left wanted a structured development. The fight for these vacant industrial sites lasted until the cantonal government (with a conservative majority) intervened in 1996 and gave consent for office development.

But: the situation had changed radically since the boom years. In the first place, speculation had slackened considerably, and secondly the demand for office space fell. This was due to the onsetting recession and also to the fact that the creation of value is being realized by less and less people on increasingly small surfaces[9]. Conclusion: the desired demand for industrial sites was absent.

Some factory owners realized that they would not be able to profitably dispose of their sites within a reasonable time. Instead of letting them stand empty, they let the rooms to artists and promoters etc. at low cost. This way they not only made a modest amount of money, but also prevented occupation by squatters. Over the course of the last twenty years in Zurich there have been implemented more than two dozen interim use projects – and in some instances permanent ones – in vacant industrial sites for cultural ventures in the largest sense of the word[10].

On these vacant industrial sites in Zurich and in other places, a cultural life grew beyond anything that had existed before. The sites became areas of tolerance where consumption was not compulsory, but space for meeting, for rehearsal, for simply being, for experimenting and getting together; they became free spaces. Many of them, however, only survived for a short period.

Zentralstrasse 150 – workshops, living quarters and 'All'

In the beginning of 1995 the upper floors of Zentralstrasse 150 were taken up as living and working space: the ground floor and the basement were occupied by 'All'. For these spaces the following factors were decisive in the creation:

1. The recession, sinking pressure on the city, continuously decreasing space requirements of enterprises, and the relocation of production to the countryside or abroad led to more and more abandoned industrial sites and, as from the early nineties, empty office buildings. Such an empty office building is Zentralstrasse 150.

2. In the course of the last fifteen years of the 'Bewegig' and the Stauffacher squat, the people of Karthago have acquired an astonishing amount of skills in organization and the implementation of ideas, and in particular in dealing with authorities, politicians, real estate owners, and sponsors, which eventually lead to the purchase of Zentralstrasse 150.

3. There was (and is) a great demand for low rent work space by artists of all kinds in advertising, design, film, music, sound, in fashion, architecture and tour operating, even in writing. In a word: a flourishing sector of 'new creatives' depends on such interim use in order to survive in a market where they are needed as suppliers of new ideas. For the period of 1995-1996 the Karthago people were free to sub-let the house as they pleased.

4. The 'All' as a bar and meeting point, a site for raves and parties, a place for exhibitions and performances and laboratory for avant-garde art developed from the explicit resolution to create a free space for just such activities. This decision was based not only on the fact that other important spaces for social and cultural innovation such as the 'Wohlgroth' no longer existed, but also on the fact that different scenes wanted to build up something new together. In this case, the skills acquired in appropriating space and setting the scene for cultural events was an important prerequisite for the creation of 'All'.

It was not just an accident that creative, innovative, fertile, even workaholic forces came together at Zentralstrasse 150. The upper floors were leased deliberately, and the 'All' in the lower floors was planned in minute detail by a only a few people intent on shaping a source for overall artwork. A lucky strike, because the encounter grew into a mutually enriching conglomerate.

The 'All' bar on the ground floor became an important meeting point, once a week, for a city-wide exchange of ideas. The atmosphere felt like the sum or rather the hum of a multitude of projects. Media representatives of the most varied origins, activists of today and yesterday, advertising artists and promoters, one-man or one-woman entrepreneurs, people on the dole and artists from the backwoods were stranded here with high hopes. To a background of muted Techno music and with a drink in their hands these people were enjoying a new rendez-vous: at last another free space! On the other hand, if you came along playing the fiddle, you would not be able to penetrate the bustling of loquacious busybodies. The same fate befell those who on the spur of the moment tried to show their films, recite their poems, or play their music. All projects had to be discussed and approved beforehand.

On the lower floors, however, culture was not something to be talked about, but to be experimented with, to be lived and driven to extremes. Raves, parties, after-hours: break-through of extremes, emergence of suppressed emotions, an expression of staging oneself to compensate for an inhibited and trivialized everyday life. Here there was leeway for individual freedom.

The occupants of the upper floors were, as mentioned, a colorful flock of creative, innovative, to some extent passionate, workers and for the most part young people. Creative work was done in a variety of areas like film, painting, performance art, advertising, design, writing, tour operating etc. The density of information produced and available with such a grouping was inevitably high. Encounters in the staircase and the cooperation of these creative people was programmed. Owing to the low rent tiny enterprises were thriving in an inspiring environment.

At the same time, Zentralstrasse 150 was a mirror of development in general. The number of small companies with less than ten employees has been increasing for years, while the number of other enterprises has been decreasing since 1991. The reason for this is, on the one hand, the fact that with the high number of unemployed many people are trying to make their living by establishing their own company. On the other hand, many of the large enterprises are outsourcing more and more of their services, making use of external consultants or suppliers. This is obviously saving costs, because, as an example, it will be the responsibility of these smaller companies to pay their own staff. In a one-man or one-woman company this problem will not arise: either you get an order or you don't. In times when orders are not easy to come by, this will lead to self-exploitation being taken for granted. Cities of the world economy or global cities, however, depend on these 'new creatives' who just barely survive with their own mini-enterprise.

The Thesis of Global Cities

Zurich is probably in the second row of Global Cities [11]. The uncontested leaders are New York, London and Tokyo. Global cities are those cities in which the worldwide decisions of transnational corporations are made and from where the majority of global financial transactions are controlled. Even if certain strategic functions of a corporation are relatively free in the selection of their location, they are still concentrated in the centers of the major cities. Saskia Sassen even recognized a specific concentration in spite of the options of telematics [12]. This concentration is explained by the fact that the specialized services of computer science and advertising, financial, legal and other consulting firms catering to big business are dependent on cities, i.e. the proximity of other specialists. Only in this way are they able to keep up with the high speed of innovation and product development. Corporations, on the other hand, depend on the production complex of these specialists, serving corporate interests. In the global cities the highly sophisticated services and telecommunication infrastructure required for the implementation and management of global economic activities are available. Stock, securities and foreign currency transactions of all kinds have left behind the importance of traditional commerce and industrial production. Direct investments worldwide in foreign currencies in the eighties tripled as compared to goods exported. In parallel with this globally active sector of the affluent and the rich there is, however, the sector of the miserably paid cleaning staff, maintenance personnel and unskilled labor, made up to a large extent by immigrants. In the global cities the dwellings of these are in the immediate vicinity of city centers.

Culture, Production of Culture, and Subculture in the Logic of the Global Cities

Let's pursue the theory of global cities further to include culture, the production of culture, and subculture in order to finally arrive at the thesis that cities need places like Zentralstrasse 150.

The established culture today is a well functioning commercial entity, aiming at a blend of adventure and event, and a central urban factor. One of its manifestations is the 'festivalizing' of cities described by Margit Mayer and Bernd Hamm, in this book.

Fig. 2: Development of companies based on number of staff; in Switzerland Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Company statistics 1965-95.

number of companies

- Companies 1965
- Companies 1975
- Companies 1985
- Companies 1995

Conventional good taste has mixed socially with pop culture. A corporate consultant may be a fan of Lou Reed – like the Czech President – or find La Traviata grandiose, dance through the night at a rave, and eat breakfast at the Red Factory on Sunday morning, without ever having any personality or other problems. A rich cultural environment is an asset for a city and is also used for the promotion of inward investment. For the affluent and rich it is an essential ingredient of a place worth living in. Concerts, theater, opera, musicals, exhibitions and festivals of all sorts are essential characteristics of an 'important' city.

But what about subculture, that kind of culture which is not promoted and subsidised by public funds, and which is the manifestation of the part of the city population wanting to be different? The most innovative product developments in the form of cultural creations take place in subcultures. Call them avant-garde or trend setters, they are taking place at particular places under particular conditions: in garages, in abandoned industrial sites, most often in temporary arrangements, in

places where people meet to bring their ideas to reality, at Zentralstrasse 150. And: they are ahead of their time, and one fine day they will be commercially usable.

Established culture as well as subculture is the urban substrate on which people whose job it is to develop new products thrive; these may be financial, fiscal, promotional or cultural products such as festivals or commercial raves. Whatever the type of product, they have to be one up on the competition, they have to be innovative – and they need to have a market, be in demand. In the global cities thesis, it is the corporation-oriented services which are responsible for the consistent growth of the cities, for their concentration of power and capital. These corporation-oriented services depend on proximity and information in order to survive in a competitive market and maintain their innovative potential. The innovators in the enterprises of corporation-oriented services need a creative environment in which to spend their leisure time, look around, find inspiration. This need can be met by the established culture.

What is essential, however, is that subculture is an important supplier of product development, in particular in the area of advertising art, fashion, design, layout, language, and music. Advertising and the media draw their creative capital from the

97

Work in Zentralstrasse 150

subculture. I had been looking for an accurate term for this process, when I came across a company on the Internet describing its company profile as follows: 'marketing activities in overlapping scenes' or 'szeneübergreifende Massnahmen' in German. This expression accurately describes the process. 'In overlapping scenes' means nothing other than transactions from one 'scene' to the next with the objective to open up the widest possible segments of the population for the products of transnational corporations. This company is tied to other mini-enterprises (a dance agency, computer shop, hair stylist, Close Combat Underwear and others) in a deserted office building on the periphery of the city. It offers night-life guides and promotion for the tobacco and liquor giants. What looks like something purely for scene-insiders on the homepage, in reality proves to be a cultural transaction company acting from the innovative, creative subculture straight into the marketing strategies of transnational corporations.

An example of the speed with which cultural innovations may be marketed is the 'Bewegig'. After the riots of the Opernhaus, hardly a few weeks passed before the designs of sprayed slogans, flyers, and pamphlets appeared on commercial posters [13]. Rock music, of course, was also big business right from the start. But in the nineties everything is much closer, more fluid and everything happens very fast. Techno, as a youth culture, has been absorbed by the market. In the meantime, even the city utility companies are acting as tour promoters for parties, together with the third program of public radio, aimed at a young audience. The Sponsors are ABB, Sulzer, Chesterfield – all of them international corporations with a cash flow in the billions. The rooms of the city electricity works in the past were utilized to transform alternate current into direct current. With new technology, only a fraction of the space is needed for this process. The building may not be demolished, however, as it is protected under the historical monuments act, which led to the idea of a party. The party extended over three nights on April 4, 5 and 6 1997. Each night was dedicated to one form of power generation: hydro night, atomic night and

solar night. While in Germany the Castor transports of nuclear waste were fighting their way through protesting crowds with a huge deployment of police forces, in Zurich, crowds were dancing around the golden calf of nuclear power, sponsored by ABB Switzerland. The flyers posted up before the event were in state-of-the-art design, even the logo for radioactivity looked really sweet. This is the culmination of a policy of capitalizing culture imaginable only in the nineties.

But inside the youth culture around Techno there are other forms of evolution going on as well. One such way was chosen by the 'happy people'. The 'happy people' not only lived and worked closest to the sky on Zentralstrasse 150, they were also the operators of open-air techno parties. Together with the fun this kind of Techno offers they also managed to establish a small enterprise which seems to survive beyond Zentralstrasse.

Conclusion

Cities – cities of the world economy in particular – enable cultural innovations such as those taking place on Zentralstrasse 150, and they need them to feed the market with new ideas. Culture, production of culture, and subculture always found ways and means to claim and occupy space. Industrial sites were joined by deserted office buildings. The empty buildings are one by one filled with mini-enterprises offering the most unconventional services in the areas of media, advertising, and culture, consulting, marketing, organization, event operating, and even security operations. They depend on low rent and a maximum of information exchange, on trends, new developments and hits.

The 'new creatives' of Zentralstrasse 150 found new space when the project ended, thus re-establishing themselves. One room was moved as a piece of art to the Centre de l'art contemporain in Geneva even before the interim use ended. Several artists relocated to the neighboring estate on Zentralstrasse 156. Some others found common workshops in other abandoned industrial or office sites. The 'All' no longer exists. But the constellations and cooperation that had grown in the two years of interim use prove to be enduring. Some of the new creatives had been known or even famous before their time at Zentralstrasse 150, some became known during that period, and still others will make it – certainly.

Culture is not the same anymore. At Zentralstrasse 150, creativity was not used to shock the establishment with incredible happenings, to claim space and rights, to fight injustice, transnational corporations and class arrogance, or to establish a different society, but in the first place to create and live culture, to survive financially, to find shelter in interim use, to make a living from a mini-enterprise, and to have fun doing all this; and if

necessary to associate with others to find a path into an uncertain future. Today's subculture moves in the soma of a linked digital world. It has sucked in the destruction of forests with its mother's milk, accepted AIDS as part of the initiation rites, and come to take the glitter and make-believe of the postmodern age for granted.

Zentralstrasse 150 was a bit of leeway in the capitalist shell of the artificial consumption-inducing logic of Zurich's money-grubbers and their staff of servile consulting specialists.

Endnotes

[1] p.m.: bolo'bolo, Paranoia-City publishers, Zurich, extended and improved edition 1986

[2] In 1996 a group of people (among them the author of this contribution) decided to produce a book on Zentralstrasse 150 which appeared end of 1997: Zentralstrasse, Edition Patrick Frey, Scalo-Verlag, Zürich 1997

[3] cf. Hansruedi Hitz, Christian Schmid, Richard Wolff: Boom, Konflikt, Krise – Zürichs Entwicklung zur Weltmetropole, in: Hitz et al.: Capitales Fatales. Urbanisierung und Politik in den Finanzmetropolen Frankfurt und Zürich. Rotpunktverlag, Zürich 1995, p. 213 ff.

[4] Mitscherlich, Alexander: Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte. Eine Anstifung zum Unfrieden. Frankfurt 1965

[5] The 'Rote Fabrik' today is an established center for alternative culture. (see the article in the book "A Star is born". The AJZ was torn down in spring 1982.)

[6] An example of this trend was Heinrichstrasse 137. After 1987 the property changed ownership twice, both times at a massive price increase. After rent increases, the tenants were given notice in 1989. On july 10, 1990 the house was squatted. The last owner went bankrupt in 1992. Together with a communal housing foundation the squatters were able to acquire the estate in 1993 for a third of the price paid at the last transaction. cf. "Röntgenblick", no 3.

[7] cf. also Philipp Klaus: Leisure in Abandoned Industrial Areas. Between Marketing Concept and Self-Help Project, FUTURES, vol. 28, No.2, Oxford 1996, and Das Buch Wohlgroth, Edition Patrick Frey, Zürich 1994

[8] Martin Blum, Andreas Hofer, P.M.: KraftWerk 1, Projekt für das Sulzer Escher-Wyss Areal, Zürich 1993

[9] In the city of Zurich alone there is an estimated surface of vacant office space of 500,000 m2. This equals 6,6% of the total office space available. In the metropolitan area of Zurich this percentage is even higher with almost 20%. Back in 1990 there was no excess capacity at all. Information taken from: Wüest und Partner: Monitoring, Zürich 1996, p. 95.

[10] A list of 'Culture and leisure factories' for the whole of Switzerland is included in: Philipp Klaus und Roger Monnerat: WoZ-Dossier Fabrikalternativen, Die Wochen-Zeitung No. 16, April 21, 1995.

[11] Attempts have been made time and again to classify cities based on certain criteria such as number of international representations, entertainment etc. Depending on the criteria selected, this classification will vary. An overview of the different classifications can be found in Angelo Rossi: Concurrence territoriale et réseaux urbains. L'armature urbaine de la Suisse en transition. vdf, Zurich 1995, p. 105ff.

[12] Saskia Sassen: Cities in a World Economy, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1994 / Metropolen des Weltmarktes, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1996

[13] This was the subject of an exhibition of the Museum für Gestaltung, August 31 to October 23, 1988 'Anschläge – Plakatsprache in Zurich 1978-1988'

Zentralstrasse 150 – by night

WOMEN PLAN TORONTO: GRASSROOTS PARTICIPATION IN RE-SHAPING THE CITY

WRITTEN BY	BARBARA LOEVINGER RAHDER
ILLUSTRATIONS	BIRGIT STERNER

CHAPTER

3.6

Would cities be different if women's needs and interests were included in the planning process? Women Plan Toronto (WPT) is a grassroots women's organization that uses participatory methods to involve diverse groups of women in changing urban planning processes and outcomes in the city. The purpose of the organization is to raise awareness of women's gender-based planning concerns and advocate practical alternatives at the municipal level (MacGregor 1994, p.1). This paper begins with a brief background on the status of women in Canada, as a means of setting the context in which WPT operates. It then describes a few of the projects WPT has organized to include women's concerns in the planning process, and concludes with a brief analysis of the organization's main strengths and weaknesses.

It is useful, first, to have some background on the status of women in Canada generally:

In most age groups, women and men are found in equal numbers, but over the age of 65, 62 percent are women, and this proportion increases with increasing age (Statistics Canada 1996).

There is a significant and continuing wage gap between men and women. In 1993, a woman working full time in Canada earned an average of 72 cents for every dollar earned by a man (Statistics Canada 1993). The gap is smaller among professionals, but is still quite wide. According to a survey for the Canadian Institute of Planners, women planners earn 82 cents for every dollar earned by male planners (Research Dimensions 1997).

Much of women's work is unpaid. In 1992, Canadian women spent an average of 1,482 hours on unpaid housework, including child care, compared with 831 hours for men (Statistics Canada 1994).

Women have more difficulty finding affordable housing. According to the Canadian government, affordable housing is defined as housing costing less than 30 percent of your total household income. Among homeowners, affordability is a problem for 20 percent of women, compared with 12 percent of men. It is significantly worse for those in the rented sector, where 46 percent of women, compared with 27 percent of men, have problems affording shelter (Statistics Canada 1995).

Women experience more violence, particularly in the home. One in four women in Canada has been abused or assaulted at some time in her life, often as a child, and one in eight has been abused by a male partner or spouse (MacLeod 1987). It is estimated that 30 to 40 women are murdered by their male partners each year in Ontario, accounting for 70 percent of the women murdered in the province. This rate is similar for Canada as a whole, but more than double the rate in Switzerland or the United Kingdom (Crawford and Gartner 1992).

According to these statistics, Canadian women tend to live longer, earn less, do more unpaid housework and child care, have more difficulty finding affordable housing, and experience more violence than Canadian men. Anishnaabe (aboriginal) women, immigrants and ethnic minorities, and women with disabilities face more barriers to needed services than white women in Canada (Rahder 1994). What does this have to do with urban planning?

Women Plan Toronto began to explore this question in 1985. The group was inspired by an article published in *Women and Environments magazine* on the Women's Committee of the former Greater London Council (Modlich 1986). The article, by Beverley Taylor, described the way in which the Women's Committee had organized to address planning policies related to the social and economic needs of women, highlighting in particular women's needs for access to child care and public transport, and their need for personal safety (Taylor 1985).

WPT began, then, by holding a series of informal discussions with women to find out about their experiences and their ideas about Toronto's urban environment. These groups included women in employment, full-time homemakers, homeless women, immigrant women, Anishnaabe women, high school and university students, elderly women, women with disabilities, and single mothers. Most groups identified problems similar to those noted by women in London, and all of the groups explored ideas about what the city would be like if it were more woman friendly. Suggestions ranged from 'equal pay for work of equal value' to more public washrooms for women (Women Plan Toronto 1986).

Over the past decade, WPT has expanded and contracted several times as various issues have been taken up by the group. In many ways it continues to be a thorn in the side of municipal planners and politicians. The organization has maintained its position on the cutting edge or on the margin, depending on your perspective. Some of the most notable projects WPT has been involved in include:

– Safety Issues: The WISE report – 'Women in Safe Environments' – was a ground-breaking project in 1989 that documented women's concerns about safety in relation to urban planning and design practices in Toronto. Undertaken in co-operation with the Metro Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC), the WISE report spawned safety audits of the public transport system, public parks, and underground parking garages. By 1990, the City of Toronto had established a Safe City Committee under the auspices of the Department of Planning and Development, and has subsequently developed quite stringent regulations for the design and lighting of public spaces (METRAC 1990).

– Municipal Elections: In 1991, and again in 1994, WPT conducted workshops with women's groups and produced a booklet on women's election issues. The booklet included a report card

ranking the various candidates' records on women's issues, and provided examples of questions women might want to ask candidates at public meetings. This was a tremendously successful campaign–with the women's report card being reprinted in Canada's largest daily newspaper, the Toronto Star (Singh 1995).

– Housing: Not only have WPT been an active advocate for social housing and housing intensification, but they have been involved in creating housing for women. They have worked with Sistering, a women's drop-in center, and with the Older Women's Network, a senior's advocacy group, to build social housing for older low-income women (Singh 1995).

– Resisting Mega-Projects: When Toronto was competing to host the 1996 Olympic Games, WPT produced an intervenor report entitled 'How Women Lose at the Games.' The report documented the social and economic costs and risks to local women, as well as the lack of benefits for them, associated with hosting the Olympic Games (Sanford and Farge 1990). Another group, called Bread Not Circuses, spearheaded the opposition to the Games in Toronto, and produced a similar intervenor report documenting the social and economic costs for poor people in general. The International Olympic Committee decided to hold the games in Atlanta.

– Resisting the Megacity: A current project is focusing on the municipal elections for the new megacity of Toronto, which is an amalgamation of the six former cities of Toronto, York, East York, North York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke. This election is one of the most important in recent history because of the way in which the Province of Ontario is restructuring local government responsibilities. WPT have worked with other groups, first to resist amalgamation, and then to develop a pamphlet highlighting gender-related issues, such as why women must vote and how to ask questions about issues that affect them. The pamphlet highlights proposed changes in areas such as income support, social and community services, housing, safety, transportation, health, education, and human rights. It provides basic information about the implications of amalgamation under each category, and then lists practical questions women can ask their local candidates, such as what will you do to protect vulnerable people, particularly women, children and people with disabilities? (City of Toronto et al 1997, p.4).

These are examples of the types of projects WPT have worked on at various times. The process it uses, and the gendered perspective on urban issues are central to the group's work. These are also key characteristics of WPT's organizational structure, which is composed of voluntary committees called 'circles.' The term 'circle' suggests that there is no hierarchy among participants – everyone who attends a meeting is allowed to participate in decision-making – though the more one participates, the more

comfortable, knowledgeable, and potentially influential she might be in the group. The thinking behind this informal structure was clearly spelled out in the group's first newsletter:

"We recognize that women find it hard to meet the time requirements of leading traditional organizations... We want to welcome women's participation whenever it is feasible. Whatever tasks and decision need to be carried out will therefore be shared by all those who participate at a given time" (Women Plan Toronto, quoted in MacGregor 1994, p.65).

The structure of the organization, then, fluctuates with its membership, depending on who is involved, what their interests are, and what issues are on the public agenda (or put on the public agenda by WPT). There is one part-time staff member, and a core of about 8 to 10 volunteers who are usually very active in the circles and on various projects. Another 50 women or so are less active members, and up to another 30 individuals and organizations are part of a broader network which is kept informed, and sometimes mobilized, around important issues and events (MacGregor 1994).

As in many local action groups, the main strengths of WPT are also their main weaknesses. The informality and lack of hierarchy gives volunteers a great deal of freedom to work on the issues that are of most concern to them, but this can also be confusing to new members who do not necessarily know where or how to fit in (MacGregor 1994). Similarly, the small core of active volunteers who do the bulk of the work, provides continuity and an organizational memory that can be useful when new projects are getting underway but, without turnover in the core, this group can also become burnt-out. WPT thus appears to shrink and expand, according to the energies of those in the core. Some members of WPT also worry that they have become so successful as the voice of women that they are now the token women's group and are consulted by planners who are more interested in appearing to be politically correct, than in actually addressing women's concerns (MacGregor 1994).

Women Plan Toronto has had a palpable impact on urban planning in Toronto. For more than a decade the organization has worked hard to focus attention on women's needs in the city providing a critique of the inequities of mainstream planning, and developing alternative visions of what planning and urban life might be like if all our diverse needs were taken into account. Ironically, perhaps, the women whose efforts sustain this organization pay a price for their involvement – their work is unpaid, and its value often unrecognized.

women plan toronto

shared experiences and dreams

SUmmary of major themes :

more space for preschoolers.

quality daycares available need to be made. **daycare**

• subsidized on weekend.

flexible hours

getting around

lights can turn too quickly for us to cross safely

icy sidewalls are dangerous

not enough seating

only one exit could be trapped

stop

TTC

not enough lighting

kneeling buses for seniors

it would be nice if t.t.c. drivers were friendlier to seniors, moms and new canadians

doors make it difficult to get on with strollers

need to plan seperate trips

doctor

must take ttc = $

plaza

safety

afraid

not enough lighting

too close for kids playing

underground parking garages unsafe

wouldn't it be nice if there were homes not domes

distances

kitchens are not designed for families

design

stair edges should be marked

housing

no choice, low availability, not affordable

finding a place

2 tenants sharing common living + dining room

common rooms for kids

coping with discrimination attitudes + stereotyping

"People think you lose your marbles when you turn 65"

recreation

Wouldn't it be nice if community centres weren't recreation centres'

community centres are just a name

coping with hostel rules

CITY HALL: NOBODY IN

TTC price too high !

wouldn't it be nice if community centres had activities anyone could join in and participate

quality playgrounds are needed.

103

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TITLE

HAMMERSMITH COMMUNITY TRUST: DEVELOPING LOCAL STRATEGIES IN MULTI-ETHNIC BRITAIN

WRITTEN BY LOUANNE TRANCHELL

CHAPTER

3.7

Hammersmith Community Trust is a non-profit company formed by local people in 1984 to increase their involvement and participation in the redevelopment of Hammersmith Town Centre. It developed out of a campaign which was launched in 1978 to object to the speculative office development proposals. The six acre site was being considered as one of a number of large-scale redevelopments above London stations. The early versions of this plan were dominated by 1 million square feet of single-use office space. The site, which includes the interchange for the bus and tube stations, has continued to be the object of attention for planners and developers ever since, and the redevelopment is not yet completed.

In the 1970s the campaign group called themselves People Before Profit. They decided to draw up a local alternative to the speculative commercial plan. They worked with voluntary specialists, with the Greater London Council (GLC) and the local

authority, the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham (LBH&F). As a result of this campaign, the site and the town centre were redefined as a Community Area by the GLC, and as a conservation area by the LBH&F.

In 1984 the group formed the Hammersmith Community Trust (HCT), newly constituted and renamed, to act as the client of a leading architectural practice who were commissioned by the GLC to design an alternative transport interchange. This scheme went through the whole local planning process and it was granted detailed planning permission. Finally, it was called to a Public Inquiry by the then Secretary of State for the Environment, who ignored his own Inspector's recommendation, and granted permission for the commercial scheme to go ahead.

Although in Hammersmith the development was over a tube station, there were many similarities in the effect of the proposal on the surrounding area to the early proposals for the Kings Cross redevelopment. Loss of residential units and local character, no concept of mixed town centre uses, no provision of space for the local community; a plan dominated by very large, bland, uniform speculative office accommodation.

The London Voluntary Services Council was based near Kings Cross at that time. It offered to host and service half a day each month for representatives from a number of campaigns throughout London who were equally concerned about inappropriate redevelopment proposals in their local areas. These included Covent Garden, Coin Street, Battersea and Docklands.

This group soon developed a strong London-wide network. They sought theoretical and technical assistance from young planners and students, particularly from those at the neighbouring

Bartlett School of the University of Central London (UCL) and from the South Bank and Central London Polytechnics. Contacts at the Bartlett School were already working with urban researchers at the Universities of Zurich and Florence, and through them, with others in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Berlin. Much of this research was concerned with the future of cities and shared a common perspective with the published works of David Harvey.

Local people had to learn fast and have the courage of their convictions. The threat to the neighbourhood was obvious and there was little attempt on the part of the early developers to consider local needs. The freehold of most of the site in Hammersmith was legally in public ownership as the property of London Transport. This did not prevent the transfer of the use of the site from public transport to private office space, nor did it protect the town centre from the huge instant increase in scale and traffic.

I was invited to attend the inaugural meeting of the International Network for Urban Research and Action in Zurich in 1991 through the Bartlett School of the University of Central London. Studies which compared Kings Cross and the Zurich HB development proposals had brought together researchers from Switzerland and England. Local campaigners in the Hammersmith Community Trust had always appreciated the input from academic researchers. It helped them to make their case and it gave support with up to date reliable technical data. I also worked for Coin Street Community Builders as an information officer and throughout that campaign there were fruitful alliances made in the researchers' work with the activists.

The first INURA conference extended our mutual experience, fields of research, practice and roles. It was agreed that the net-work was to be international, reaching beyond Europe, to projects, practice and models for the future of cities.

The first meeting also agreed ten founding principles. Among them was the commitment to share experience and information, to empower people in their neighbourhoods, to oppose racism, class

and gender discrimination, to create strong and diverse visions of the future in cities, and to support environmentally sustainable urban development.

The London and UK campaigns were familiar with large and small scale developments but the range of contributions to INURA meetings has usually extended the spectrum, both to finer-grain and to mega-structures. From oasis culture, where fertile soil is very gradually extended through delicate watering rituals, to shifting the infrastructure of whole harbours and waterside developments. From the project that helps people to self-build and ease the pressure on migration in a city that is growing too rapidly, to the redevelopment of an entire de-industrialised area or redundant car-plant. From squatting a medieval castle to telecommunication and transport systems for the new century.

The different approaches and languages have given INURA meetings strength and depth. They are memorable, human experiences quite unlike the drifting world of 'conferences'. We have been introduced to German analysis, Dutch systems,

106

Luke Smith, Grey Heron, Thomas Pratt, Claire Quinn. Children scetches of different sites along the Thames Path in Hammersmith and Fulham.

UK planning, Italian 'territory' and the North American 'environmental policy interwined with growth and decline'. Each year, the visit to a different city has helped to focus us upon what is grim and what is promising and hopeful about the future of the cities where we live. Some problems are shared and very obvious, especially for young people and the future of paid employment. Some opportunities are small grain local initiatives which might be overlooked and undervalued as part of the urban development process.

My work has predominantly been concerned with London, with strategic planning and town centres, and with the policies for the river Thames and public parks. I am an activist with no relevant qualifications in this field and I came to it through a lengthy local campaign in which I helped out as a theatre technician and resident. I worked for over twenty years in the voluntary sector and for the past four years I have seen the public sector side of urban development as an elected councillor for this town centre ward, Hammersmith, in West London.

London has had to ride dramatic shifts in policy, personnel and structure in this decade. It has had no London-wide government but it is now likely to get a Mayor and an Assembly in 2000. It has new Unitary Development Plans for each Borough and countless regeneration initiatives. The London Docklands Development Corporation exited in March 1998 and around 20 programmes have been bundled up into a Single Regeneration Bid (SRB) The London Planning Advisory Committee that replaced the GLC Planning Committee has steered a number of studies including *State of the Environment* and *London - a World city*. Since 1 May 97 the Department of the Environment (DoE) has been renamed the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in an attempt to achieve more integration.

There has been movement too in the voluntary sector. The DoE supported the setting up of the Development Trusts Association (DTA) to bring together all the community organisations involved in projects and development, to share best practice and expertise. The DTA runs courses and an annual conference with themes like 'Finding the Means' and 'Here to Stay'. Although it is the Boroughs that are required to deliver the environmental pledges of Rio 92, it is the voluntary Local Agenda 21 groups who are drawing up the agreed indicators. Vision for London (VFL) is another voluntary network that has run a programme and keeps a Diary which focuses on who runs London and how.

Acronyms abound and most of this activity does not reach the 'grass roots'. There is a definite renewed interest from above that 'citizenship' should be 'better taught'. Transparency and openness are to be encouraged, particularly in a local movement. 'Globally induced restructuring of urban areas' undoubtedly affects West London if only because of Heathrow airport. The Estate Times also plays its part by flagging up development trends, the front runners currently being 'budget hotels' for the millennium and 'family entertainment centres with multiplexes'.

Britain has a population of 55 million. Of these 47 million live in England, 5 million live in Scotland and 3 million live in Wales. In Greater London, 20 % of the population is of an ethnic minority background. London is home to 50 % of the ethnic minority population of Britain. London Pride, an association of London businesses considers this to be one of London´s strengths in the 'London Prospectus'.

Hammersmith Community Trust recently organised a round-table to start off the response from people in Hammersmith & Fulham to the new Commission set up by the Runnymede Trust, who are taking evidence until the end of June 1998. The Commission will look at Britain now and how it will develop over the next twenty years. It will look at law and policies in the UK and Europe and recommend change if they believe it is needed to achieve social cohesion and respect for diversity. The questions they have framed concern Institutions, Culture, Families, Work, Justice and Others.

Every researcher and member of INURA works within an accepted framework of law, planning and culture. Certain frontiers are shifted faster than others, sometimes by the market, sometimes by public pressure and sometimes by political change. The network that has been developed by INURA is able to register and respond to these changes swiftly. It is able to assess the benefits and disseminate the information and trends. It has an immediate reference in the ten principles.

The example of the Runnymede Trust Commission in Britain is a significant one. Once it was 'Empire Britain', then 'Commonwealth Britain'. In both of those models, the ethnic minorities were 'exotic' outsiders. This Commission is on the future of 'Multi-Ethnic Britain' which implies an indigenous mixed 'inside' population. When social geographers study settlements, the 'inside' make-up is as important as the physical manifestation of the place. The exciting truth of the INURA network is that this kind of reality emerges simply from the academic or the activist 'telling their story'. The possible future of cities is revealed and shared through the many stories that members have carefully collected and compared.

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
URBAN

CLAIMING HISTORY

ACTION

4

RECLAIMING HISTORY FOR URBAN ACTION

WRITTEN BY | ANDREAS HOFER

TRANSLATION | BARBARA STINER

CHAPTER

4.1

At a very intense stage in the history of the twentieth century, the beginning of the thirties, an architectural competition was advertised for the construction of a palace for the Soviets. The most famous architects of the time submitted projects. The evaluation of the results sparked a serious controversy. The different architectural concepts, each developed as a reaction to the technological and social changes of the recent years, stood face to face over how the revolutionary upheaval could be expressed in architectural terms. The adepts of modernism wanted to remove all memories of the old, pre-revolutionary times. Bright and smooth, more machine than house, was to be the symbol for the battles successfully won. The nationalist forces, growing stronger in the threat of World War II, believed that only the perpetuation of heroic Russian history could create a vision for the future.

By a decree from on high the dispute was settled in a most Solomonic way: the monument was to be neither modern nor historical – but simply big. A multi-layered cake on a surface of 300 square metres, on the top a figure of Lenin, hand stretched out.

Ten years ago a few kopecks bought us a ticket for the Moscow outdoor swimming pool. A number printed on it directed us to a sector. Through a corridor made of glass bricks, coated in green algae, we immersed ourselves in the heated water of the piece of cake assigned to us. In the centre a pedestal with diving tower and lifeguard. We were swimming on the foundations of the monument. The project had begun with haste as the foundations were excavated but soon hit structural problems caused by the meandering of the Moskva river. The project then came to a halt as all resources were diverted to the onsetting war preparations.

The question of how revolution could be expressed architecturally, the question of the scale great things could claim in the existing city, and the question of the relationship between tradition and the avant-garde simply dissolved in an outdoor swimming pool.

While the debate between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists' has continued into the eighties with purely formalistic arguments, it recently became clear that the question was worded the wrong way. Both sides believed that they were discussing the proper shape of a world to be newly created. They were always adding touches to the ultimate vision, the completely newly designed city. It was only with the beginning of the ecological debate postulating the limits of growth, and the caving in of real estate production in the cities of the Western hemisphere towards the end of the eighties, that, for a second time, the sky-rocketing traditionalist or modernist concepts collapsed. This fostered the understanding that the objective was not to search for a vision of a new city, but to continue building the existing one with respect and intelligence. The reference to the historical city is not based on a formalistic attitude but on the insight that even the most euphoric new concept may fail. The larger the envisaged project is, the more consideration should be taken for the existing city.

The following contributions will present local initiatives attempting to draw their power from their relationship to the place on which they grew, and its past. It is certainly not by coincidence that they originate in Italy and the UK, countries with a long and abundant history. They not only carefully rely on the historic reference, in order to dampen potential planning mishaps, but they gain from history a sensitivity for the diversity and inconsistency with which social developments leave their mark in the landscape.

The British movement 'The Land Is Ours' refers playfully to the feudal right of usufruct [1] of the land. The land is claimed as common, to be used and exploited only on a temporary basis by individuals. Their fight is aimed at real estate speculation abusing land as a profitable

good, against national highway planning and technocratic planning methods. Like Robin Hood in his time, they don't hesitate to reclaim their rights where they believe them to be abused by despots. And like Robin Hood, they have become popular heroes through the spectacular capture of trees, undermining of highways, and the audacity with which they built their settlements right in the middle of London.

In the Italian contributions, prefaced by a theoretical text by Alberto Magnaghi, the term 'territorio' plays a central role. This word is not easily translated and stands for a landscape shaped by people, an organism grown over centuries, in a process during which town and country have found a symbiotic balance. From these memories, passed down in part only as traces, rules for the conception of the future are sought. The sensitivity devoted to a place includes the people living there. Planning becomes a search by a community for its future, in which they all participate.

The Land Is Ours and the contributions of the Italian groups have different roots. The uniting factor is a deep mistrust of 'modern' schematised, capitalist, land exploitation strategies. The local aspect is used as a strategy to develop solutions for a place from its history. Carefulness, participation and sustainability are to be safeguarded by the sensitive development of the existing fabric. What may look at first sight like romantic retrogression, proves to be a radical contestation of the pompous concepts of our century. The possibility of creating living space, fit for people, by means of global top-down strategies is flatly rejected.

Endnote

[1] usufruct: The right of enjoying all the advantages derivable from the use of something which belongs to another, as far as it is compatible with the substance of the thing not being destroyed or injured.

TERRITORIAL HERITAGE: A GENETIC CODE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

WRITTEN BY | ALBERTO MAGNAGHI

CHAPTER

4.2

INTRODUCTION

The Italian 'territorialist' school has developed its own contribution to the working out of the concept of sustainable development by taking up and integrating the standard issues (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1975; Hettne, 1996) of basic needs (Streetend); self reliance (Galtung,1980); and eco-development (I. Sachs, 1980; Tarozzi, 1990). The technicalities involved in recent applications of sustainability which are moving towards the decision making process, are disputed and, consequently, a strictly environmental vision of sustainability has been rejected (I. Sachs, 1993). The Italian approach has focused in on the increasingly relevant role of local development and has arrived at the elaboration

of the concept of 'self-sustainable local development' (Magnaghi, 1995a) and put forward analytic applications and experimentation in a variety of territorial contexts (Magnaghi, 1995b). This definition puts the emphasis on the role determined by the balance between the three objectives of: directing development towards fundamental human requirements (which cannot be reduced to material needs); counting on one's own strength – thus, the development of self-government by the local society; and developing environmental quality. Our approach creates coherence between these three objectives, and puts at the top of the list the value of territorial identity and its heritage (we refer back to the themes of bio-regionalism of Mumford and Geddes), considering them as the strategic issues for the sustainability of development.

This type of approach underlines the increasingly important role of the territory itself when facing problems of sustainability. This means that the production of *territorial quality* is an important indicator of the production of lasting wealth.

THE TERRITORY AND THE SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH

We define the territory as a product of history in the long-standing processes of co-evolution between human settlement and the environment, nature and culture. Territory therefore is a result of the transformation of the environment through the work of successive layered cycles of civilisation (Turco,1988; Raffestin, 1984).

Throughout a complete period in history culminating in Fordism and mass production, traditional theories about development have considered territory in ever diminishing terms. The producer/consumer has taken the place of the local inhabitant; the seat of business that of the place itself; the economic region that of the historical region. We have gradually rid ourselves of the territory which has become a mere technical necessity to support economic activities and functions which have been placed there for reasons increasingly extraneous to the context of the territory itself or to its environment, its culture or its identity. These qualities in fact derive from its long term historical construction; and this 'ridding oneself' of the territory (Magnaghi, 1990) is the basis for the decay which has produced unsustainable development.

A process of accelerated 'Fordisation' has been witnessed (particularly in Italy) in the context of the new international post-war division of labour. Given the historical and geographical conditions in which the transformation has been taking place, the process of de-territorialisation in Italy is quite striking, and evident in the exodus from the Piedmont and Alpine valley urban systems, the abandoning of the Apennine 'back-bone', marginalisation of the historic urban pattern in small and middle-sized towns, emigration from the south, and the growth of metropolitan areas in the Po ellipse as a result of the labour amassing process. With the exception of its historical buildings, the territory is being dismantled. Open spaces are dismembered into: a) spaces used for the further urbanisation of industrial suburbs b) hill and mountain spaces in decay through abandonment and neglect c) spaces (some) on the areas cleared for 'green industry' d) coastal areas standardised to the mass production of 'pleasure and leisure'.

The built-up environment is buried by suburban building, by the great mono-functional systems and by the new metropolitan hierarchies; and the anthropic environment turns to models of mass production and culture which destroy and standardise the wealth and diversity of territorial cultures.

In short, the territory, in the complex and integrated sense of physical environment, built-up environment, and anthropic environment is quite simply dead and buried, reduced to the abstract timeless space of the economy. Pierre George (1993) comments that Maurice Le Lannou's 'homme habitant' has been substituted by 'l'homme producteur', the long-standing destroyer of identity, of places. The 'local' disappears because 'places' and local identities disappear as values to be used in economic development models and in 'modernisation', even in Left-wing culture.

Technical development and the construction of an artificial 'second nature' have added weight to this process of 'getting rid' of the territory which is often described as 'de-territorialisation'. For a long time it coincided with the growth in well-being and with the widespread Western World concept of 'the world system'. In the 1970s, however, this 'imperial' process began to backfire, creating new poverty instead of wealth. The divide which separates economic growth and well-being is evident not only in the Third World but also in the industrialised West. Daly and Cobb (1994) showed in their analyses of the two curves of GNP (Gross National Product) and ISEW (Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, which is obtained by adding and extracting some external costs which are not normally included in the traditional GNP calculation) that the two curves ran a parallel course until 1975, subsequently the GNP continued to grow while the ISEW fell dramatically. In other words, the indicators of well-being show a downward trend. The relevant issue is that the corrective factors of the ISEW (measured in costs) pertain mainly to urban, territorial and environmental decay. However, we are actually talking about a new type of poverty (urban, environmental, identity, territorial), brought about by models of quantitative growth. From these analyses and others carried out on European situations (W. Sachs, 1992), it emerged very clearly that the issue of self-sustainable development is linked to the defining of a different role for the production of territorial and environmental quality in order to produce wealth.

115

Starting from this change in indicators for measuring wealth, the 'local' reappears as a disturbing issue about growth (and about the Left) in two fundamental stages. The first is the spontaneous, geographical shifting (in Italy – not planned as in France) of the production of wealth in the long-term historical mesh of the territory and the revitalisation of the territorially based economy, following the crises in the 1970s affecting the large industries and the metropolitan areas. The system of small businesses – design, fashion, knives, shoes, pottery, pasta, wine, oil, recycled rags and so on – comes from the long standing local productive and artistic cultures, thus redrawing the 'Third Italy' (Bagnasco, 1980). A kind of 'coming home' after the short and intense metropolitan adventure. But the second stage is decisive: the 'local' stands out as an essential issue for development when:
a) in the whole world, the *ethnic, linguistic, identitarian* dimensions become principle vehicles of conflict (Carle, 1996; Criscone, De la Pierre, 1995; Lafont, 1993), in the context of the accomplishment of the 'world system' and of globalisation and this becomes a counterweight to it;
and b) the *environmental question* explodes and increasingly forces the internalisation of the capacity to reproduce natural resources in the calculation of cost-benefits in the human settlement (Bresso, 1993).

Territorial economics, identitarian questions and environmental issues radically modify the wealth indicators which distance themselves, in head spinning fashion, from the GNP. In short, the *production* of the territory (understood in its whole as the production of environmental and living quality, as the valuing of typical production in typical landscapes, of territorial and urban identity, of new municipality and belonging), becomes an internal issue. It is indeed a fundamental issue as far as the production of wealth, with reference to models of sustainable development, is concerned. It is only with the maturation of these issues, which became prominent in the 1980s and the 1990s, that the territorialist and the localist approach received attention in town planning and economic circles.

But at this point (we might say, since the Bruntland report, 1987) the ways of interpreting sustainability (and in relation to it, the role of the territory and of the environment) differ. For the sake of simplicity I will here refer to three approaches schematised as follows:
– the functionalist or eco-compatibility approach
– the environmental or biocentric approach
– the territorialist or anthropocentric approach.

The **functionalist approach** interprets the question of sustainable development as an issue of eco-compatibility. Quantitative growth, world market laws and globalisation remain unquestioned. The movements from Fordism to the information society, from the standardised factory to the virtual company, from salaried work

to self employment, are all interpreted as an evolution of a social-technical system. This system inevitably goes hand in hand with an even further artificialisation of the 'second nature' – the transferring of many activities, production and socialisation processes, and community relations onto telematic networks and cyberspace; and the further divorcing of nature and culture through genetic manipulation and cloning. The territory and the environment merely act as a 'base' to support the global economic development system, the reproduction costs of which are external to the evaluation of capital: 'local' is a function of 'global'. All observers, from the World Bank to the UN, now recognise how great the local and global environmental crisis is. The very scale of this crisis is calling out for attention to be paid to just how much environmental systems can stand from the human pressure to which they are subjected. The territory is considered as a beast of burden: one mustn't overload it, otherwise it will die (and will thus be unable to perform its duty). It is my opinion that this continues to be the prevalent approach in basic politics. It is an approach which makes all too evident the divide between the two terms 'development' and 'sustainable'. The term 'development' continues to be centred on economic growth, the laws of which are dictated by competition between companies, local regional systems and by the cities within the world market. The term 'sustainability' is measured up against the maximum threshold of degradation and environmental pollution compatible with competition. The measurement of this threshold is done through the evaluation of environmental impact and the definition of limits of exploitation and consumption of resources. Meanwhile a 'transferability' of resources themselves is acknowledged which allows an enormous ecological footprint on the part of the industrialised country in the competitive race – this in pure imperialist style. The problem of (weak) sustainability results in the imposition of control mechanisms and attempts at counterbalancing environmental decay: restrictions, laws, taxes, cleaning-up operations, national parks, protected areas, etc. The decay, however, continues to be produced and accumulated in exponential form by the economic laws of development themselves. It is the task of governments to set these limits and restrictions but it is the world market which continues to decide on what, how, where and how much to produce.

The **environmental and ecological approach** has underlined just how unreliable this merely remedial attitude towards traditional growth models is in relation to helping to find strategic solutions to environmental problems. Who sets decay limits scientifically? How reliable are they as regards cumulative aspects of decay? How effective are the remedial policies in the face of the spread of decay? The environmentalist approach replies to these questions by putting forward sustainability as a respecting of the self-reproducing laws of the environment which is considered as an autonomous living subject whose rights are to be respected in order to prevent decay of the anthropic system. We are not talking

116

about limiting environmental decay, we are talking about not producing it in the first place. This implies squeezing human activity into the limits of self-productability of the environmental systems understood as natural systems – biosphere, geosphere, hydrosphere, fauna, flora, ecological networks. The excess of accumulated human production means that now the real source of wealth lies in ecological economics. The construction therefore of high quality environmental systems (and not only the prescribing of limits for pollution and decay) represents the aims of this approach: the production of high environmental quality constitutes the new 'fixed share capital' and the preconditions of sustainability.

The **territorialist approach** has many points in common with the environmental approach. It diverges, however, on the 'partiality' of the biocentric point of view which assumes the natural environment as a value in itself, as the unquestionable source of norms for human action in general and of planning in particular. This approach adopts the territory (in terms of long-standing historical construction), rather than nature, as its point of reference. It may indeed be called anthropocentric. Sustainability is interpreted as the activation of positive relationships between the three components which go to make up the territory: the **natural environment**, the **constructed environment** and the **human environment**. The production of high territorial (not only environmental) quality is the precondition for sustainability, in that the production of the territory is adopted as the basis of the production of wealth.

The difference between territory and environment as a reference point for sustainability is a determining factor in that the territory does not exist in nature. It is the result of the dynamics of successive layers of civilisation which have defined, over a long period, the morphological, landscape, cultural and environmental identity.

In this light, the territory becomes a highly complex living organism. It is made up of localities (either regions or settlement areas) having their own history, characteristics, identity, and long-term structure. Territorial and urban 'types' have thus emerged through co-evolution between human settlement and the environment. The territorialist approach gives greater value to this genetic heritage and believes that it constitutes, through its transformation and non-destructive growth, the foundations of sustainability.

From this point of view, in the process of planning one cannot isolate a problem of environmental sustainability if one does not consider the relationship between the actions of the settled community and the surroundings. To do so one would have to be indifferent to the social sustainability of these models as safeguarders of nature. The environmental issue cannot be

resolved as a separate entity but in terms of a problem of relationship. It can be dealt with only if we face up to the problem of a different kind of relationship between the social-cultural system, the economic system and the natural system. This alternative relationship must bring into play dynamics which can create a lasting balance between the settled community and the environment. Where there is not socio-diversity there cannot be bio-diversity (Raffestin, 1995). The emphasis is therefore placed on the issue of the reconstruction and the development of constructive relationships between the local community and the environment, this being the strategic element in sustainability. The definition of 'self-sustainable local development' was born in opposition to technical definitions of sustainability. In fact, it would prove unthinkable to propose a development model which had to be 'sustained' technically from the outside: without support this model falls into crises as its growth laws constantly produce and accumulate imbalances, decay and destruction of resources.

We must instead aim at the construction of positive principles in human settlements which, through confirming the co-evolutionary relationship between culture and nature, between settlement and environment, do not require any kind of support to reproduce themselves. But the statement of these principles does not just involve limitations to the present development model (usually inefficient), but the transformation of the *genetic principles* of the model itself. From this spring the concepts of 'local' and 'self' which underline the necessity of a culture of self-government and 'care' of the territory, which does not entrust the sustainability of development to technological machines or to heterodirect economies, but to a re-acquisition of environmental know-how and territorial production on the part of the local inhabitants, in a world populated by so many 'life-styles' (I. Sachs).

This meaning of sustainability is beginning to permeate the institutional debate; we are witnessing a progressive spreading of references to include 'local' and 'self', above all in Local Agenda 21 and in the Agenda Habitat II of Istanbul (1996).

If we adopt territorial decay as the fundamental problem to be tackled within a sustainable development project we find that sustainability indicators must be more complex than environmental ones – involving social, cultural, geographical and economic sustainability. Territorial decay does include environmental decay but it also has to do with the decay of the built-up territory and its isolation from the rest of the issues and also with the social decay which then follows. In this approach, environmental decay is interpreted as a systematic process of de-territorialisation, of de-structuring of local identity, of the breaking down of the relationship with the local context and its environmental know-how. It has been substituted by an artificial second nature which is completely out of context. If environmental decay is the result of these factors, any action aiming at sustainability must be principally directed towards removing them.

The rebuilding of broken co-evolution relationships (and, therefore, the starting up of re-territorialisation forms) requires radical change in the concept of the production of wealth. Thus, the curve of new poverty which the ISEW denounces can be inverted only if we include the production of settlement environments with high territorial quality in the indicators which measure the growth of wealth. The issue is therefore one of resuming, in a new form, interrupted territorial production, in other words, the production of values.

However, in the history of civilisation, territorial high quality has always come about through the positive relationship between a settled community and its surrounding environment. Therefore its production can't help but come about through new territorialising policies in which the local community (even when multiethnic, mobile, changing) recognises its own territory and values it by creating sociality.

The corner-stone of sustainable development is self-recognition and the growth of local identity; its capacity to reconsider itself (Cassano, 1996).

THE REASON FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-SUSTAINABILITY

The concept of local development usually hinges on the rediscovering of the territory as heritage, as a 'milieu' (Dematteis, 1996; Governa, 1997) within which to discover valuables and resources for the growth of wealth. One must make a distinction between 'valuables' and 'resources': the territorial valuables are the elements making up the heritage which are independent of the specific and provisional forms of use; these values can be intended as resources when a particular society actively re-interprets them; the historical heritage may be used, in the extended sense used by Choay (1992) in a dissipating way, in a preserving way (for future generations) or in growth and valuation.

Presuming it to be of little or no use and irrelevant to cost-benefit calculations, this 'heritage' has been dissipated by those great powers which are the models of industrial growth. De-territorialism is not simply a process of reducing territory to support economic activity. Behind this reduction we can witness – in some cases implicitly, in others explicitly – a destruction process; destruction of culture, of identity, of local production systems, of the landscape, of artistic and cultural heritage, of environmental systems and many more. The process of making all production and consumption homologous has, however, gradually underlined the fact that new poverty is the result of the reduction in variety and complexity, both biological and social. Moreover, it shows that giving a value to territorial heritage (in terms of the unique identity of places and differentiated development styles) can be the corner-stone of the production of wealth, in sustainable terms, of the increase in territorial heritage to be enjoyed by present and future generations.

Today, 'local' is the focus for real clashes. Everybody needs the local: from the delocalised virtual company to the systems of the nation-states in crisis, to the economic systems and the cities in competition for the quality and the differentiation of products. The real issue on which the projects differ is what is being referred to: the territorialist approach takes on the *inhabitants* and their reconquering of the territory as their point of reference, and as producers in a scenario where economic growth is no longer synonymous with the growth of wealth (nor with employment); on the contrary, many approaches to development may emphasise and use local resources (environmental, territorial, human) to exogenous ends, using them up in world market competition and without necessarily satisfying the needs of the inhabitants.

But what projects and policies are necessary to preserve and make the most of territorial heritage, taking the inhabitants as a reference point? Briefly:

1) Local development is not to be confused with the policy of 'small is beautiful'. It is rather a viewpoint which brings out and gives value to the individual characteristics of place irrespective of its geographical dimensions (its social-cultural 'milieu', its genetic heritage, the long-term territorial type, the type of landscape). Any transformations are based on using these inborn and individual characteristics to the best possible advantage.

The first issue concerns the building up of territorial information systems capable of revolutionising quantitative analytics of functionalist origin, in the interpretative passage of the territory from 'support of functions' to 'heritage to be valued'. These information systems take on somewhat different forms from the institutionalised ones in economic geography and in regulating plans, which are instrumental in zoning and in the regulation of land use in relation to economic growth. The new concepts which are arising in the community programmes and in regional legislation (e.g. Regione Toscana, 1995) which are connected to this are: 'sustainability', 'structural plan', 'structural invariants', 'charter of the places', 'territorial systems', 'settlement environments'. These require, in order to be put into practice in the town-planning and territorial projects, a new analytic corpus aimed at describing, interpreting and representing the identity of places. This requires a) that not everything can be transformed and that the territorial and environmental structures which define the long-term identity of a place must remain and be given their true value; b) that which can be transformed must be subject to rules which produce an increase in territoriality (which are capable of reproducing 'territorial type' resources, development of the local community, increased aesthetic and environmental quality, production of the identity of the landscape, etc.).

118

We are, however, at the beginning of scientific research and experimental verification. The first step (which is not an obvious research issue) towards the creating of 'the charters of places' which propose agreed rules for transformation whilst safeguarding and giving true value to the heritage, is the description of the identity and the quality of localities, and representing them according to their social self-recognition.

Moreover, if the territorial heritage becomes the foundation of the quality of economic development and the production of wealth the need for structurisation – multidisciplinary in the case of knowledge and multisectorial in the case of action – becomes evident as values of the physical, built-up, anthropic environment, considered in their long-term identitarian valence, must be made to interact synergetically and positively.

Placing real value on the territorial heritage, as a principle which then determines the type of development which is to occur in a place, implies selecting how much and what kind of activity to introduce. The charter of places which highlights long-standing rules and invariants defines both productive activity and settlement models which can bring about transformation whilst increasing, rather than reducing, the value of the heritage. Productive activity means how, what, where and how much to produce in order to increase soil fertility, self-reproduction of environmental systems, value of built-up territory and the landscape, and human and social capital. The term 'settlement models' will, on the other hand, be concerned with dimensions, typology, materials and techniques, energy and environmental balances.

2) With the prospect of local development, the territory's government must take on a new role since the production of wealth is based on giving value to the territory itself. The local government no longer administers only services in relation to economic choices which are both external and 'global'; it manages, rather, territorially based economic systems giving significance and potential to those who have set off on the path towards sustainability. It must promote particular 'development styles' connected to the safeguarding and the value of local identity. It forms relationships which in the case of other 'localities' are complementary but which tend away from officialdom and which, in the case of higher levels, are auxiliary. In this neo-municipal prospective, the Town Hall once again becomes the voice of the local people and a government for them in a very real sense.

3) The concept of self-sustainability is based on the assumption that only a new relationship of co-evolution between local inhabitants/producers and the territory is capable, through 'caring', of determining a lasting balance between human settlement and the environment. New ways, new knowledge and new technology will be partnered with the environmental wisdom gained through the ages. Therefore self-sustainability and self-determination, sustainable development and self-centred development become interrelated concepts, each strictly depending on the other. The concept of self-sustainability alludes to the need of a far-reaching re-dimensioning of the economic sub-system which, having become dominant, has de-stabilised the processes of self organisation of the social and natural sub-systems. It also alludes to the need for a parallel development of the role of the official local institutions. A strong process of decentralisation is necessary which will strengthen the practices of co-operation, which will develop new forms of community; which will guarantee, in their turn, new processes of accumulation of social capital. The reconstruction of the community is the essential element in self-sustainable development. The anthropic community which 'sustains itself' ensures that the natural environment may sustain it in its action. The act of preservation (even of environmental values) which is not born from internal faith and from self-reliance is destined to create resistance and failure.

4) The concept of 'social production' of the territory which calls for the self-government of the settled community in the production of wealth, necessitates a process of reconciliation between the figure of the 'local inhabitant-consumer' and that of the producer. This relationship was radically broken off in the Fordian model with the social extension of salaried labour and the submitting of exchange relationships to the market. Participation historically took shape as aid on the part of the technicians in developing demands and projects which could be realised by the inhabitants themselves. Or else, negatively, as a formation of consensus to projects which had already been decided. However, in either case, the inhabitants are not residents who possess the means of production in their own area, in their own town or their own territory: They have no idea where the light, the food or other necessities come from or where their rubbish goes to; they don´t know why their salaried work is 'far away'; in many cases, in 'virtual companies' for example, they don´t even know who they are working for. The scenario set out by the territorialist approach is very different indeed: there is the assumption of the drawing together of the figure of the inhabitant and the producer both in rural and urban areas (in an economic system which reduces salaried labour and values the widespread creating of work for oneself and relationships of reciprocity, thus expanding the third sector), since the production of territoriality becomes important for the quality of development.

We are outlining a process, therefore, which evolves from 'participation' towards 'the social production of the plan' until it arrives finally at 'the social production of the territory'. Here we can

see, amongst other things, the differences in the approaches: between town-planning policies of conservation (of the historic centres, of the landscape, of the environment) and policies for the activation of processes of re-territorialisation. The latter does not require only norms, restrictions and boundaries but, above all, the production of territorial values. If inhabiting means also producing the quality of one's own settlement environment, participation develops in this productive act and not just in the individual issues of residing.

This reconciliation is possible in an era which is characterised by negotiated salaried labour, by the expansion of self-employment, by the crises in the field of free exchange and the growth of reciprocal relationships: on condition that the work carried out by a self-employed person isn't a molecule strung on to a globalised system but that it becomes the connecting link in the new productive relationship between the settled community and the environment – relations which through 'caring', maintain and give true value to the importance of the territory and the environment to favour the growth of a relationship of solidarity and the creation of social bonding. While it is true that the production of sociality is an essential element that the local community must invest in to produce territory, the reverse is also true: to produce sociality you must invest in the production of territory.

Self-employment and small business which constitutes, for better or for worse, the potential overcoming of salaried labour as a dominant historic form of the social relationship between production and conflict, can be determining as a collective subject for the construction of another development which is sustainable both environmentally and socially. In fact, self-employment and small business:

– can reach in a responsible way the production aims, and if supported by public policies, can be directed towards socially useful production;
– is endowed with molecular and widespread technical and communicative know-how;
– makes up a significant part of both the 'third' and the voluntary sectors; it can widen the range of goods with activities supported by relationships of reciprocity and co-operation, through trade relationships;
– can bring together the inhabitant and the producer in relation to care, maintenance and growth of territorial and environmental heritage, to promote activities which are essential to the production of durable wealth (through creating new sociality, new democracy, new municipalism in the production of shared territorial values).

These potentials can be gathered in strategies of self-nomination and re-socialisation of labour around local shared projects in which the inhabitant-producer becomes the leading character in the development project, in the search of its quality, its specific identity and its 'charters': through his intervention on what, how much, and how to produce the transformation of the territorial heritage in forms that will last.

Widespread creation of one's own employment can, therefore, in connection with a policy of sustainability founded on the development of local autonomy, become the central productive base of territorial based socio-economic systems, which are emancipated from globalisation's dependence on standardisation.

A significant example is the new role that can be given to the agricultural producer: from producer of goods destined to go on the market, to producer of goods destined for the common good (through hydro-geological safeguards, the reclamation of land and the realignment of environmental systems and urban suburbs, the valuing of landscape, the development of the economy on a local basis – transformation, tourism amid agricultural settings, craftsmanship, etc.). When the local inhabitants cum agricultural producers turn back to traditional agricultural know-how and in doing so create a lasting increase in fertility (and is thus in tune with production for the common good) they come out of their isolation as individuals with their eye on the market, and are in fact co-operating in the building of new sociality, of a new town-country relationship. This new relationship hands the centre stage back to the rural areas in the form of valuing the importance of the territory and the environment, through the production of common public goods to be shared by all.

Participation evolves, therefore, towards a situation of self-government of the settled community, whilst having all the contradictions and the conflicts that social complexity imposes, with the enactment of local contracts and decision making, in which the local system of players can find pacts of co-operation as far as strategic and project reference scenarios are concerned (here, for example, they allude to the 'territorial pacts' promised by CNEL (Consiglio Nazionale per l'Economia e il Lavoro), the formation of 'agencies' for the 'development' missions promised by the European Union). The new forms of socialisation are not to be sought in local defence mechanisms of 'segregated identity', but rather in 'social pacts' (Bonomi, 1996) which liberate 'live people' (Gambi, 1986) from the social mix of each place and which build up new community forms linked in innovative and transformative ways to the long-standing socio-cultural and territorial models.

In this light, the role of local government, if strengthened as government of the economy, serves to indicate, select and give incentive to the players who are carriers of positive energy for the sustainability of projects and 'styles' of differentiated development, through the giving of true value to the inherent resources in a lasting form. Within the planning process there need to be new

forms of listening to the 'dumb players' (Borri, 1996), to the meanings of the contexts, through communicative approaches in which participation leads to self-awareness which strengthens the weaker players and pushes the results of social interaction towards an outcome of sustainability.

The conflict therefore shifts to the theme of *heterodirection/ self-government*, in the clash between different development models which involve different models of organisation of work and different social production relationships. The clash is inevitable in the process of the growth of new local societies which put themselves into relationship with the world system through networks, devoid of hierarchy, of autonomous towns in the archipelago (Cacciari, 1997), in order to emancipate themselves from the suffocating rules of competition on the world market, towards new forms of co-operation and back-up.

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121

THE 'PURE GENIUS' LAND OCCUPATION: REIMAGINING THE INHUMAN CITY

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CHAPTER

4.3

"WHAT'S THE POINT OF CITIES, BUILT WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S WISDOM?"
Bertolt Brecht 'Great Times, Wasted'

Mike Davis commented in his discussion of the dark side of contemporary Los Angeles that as the "walls have come down in Eastern Europe they are being erected all over our cities"[1]: there are scars in every city now. Our cities increasingly flaunt their 'inhuman character' [2]; poverty and wealth existing in vicious proximity, the formation of urban landscapes razed by the incessant demands of the car and the increasing disappearance, enclosure and surveillance of public spaces. The task of creating more just and sustainable forms of urbanisation has never clamoured as

violently as it does today in the cities of Britain. In the context of such hostile directions of urbanisation, the occupation of a piece of derelict land, owned by Guinness and marked for development, by activists associated with the land rights campaign – 'The Land is Ours' [3] – in Wandsworth between May and October 1996 was innovative, welcome and necessary. It was an important event for many reasons, but it was riven by tensions and problems which demand being engaged with.

On May 5th, 1996, about 200 activists moved on to 14 acres of ex-industrial land at Gargoyle Wharf beside the Thames, adjacent to Wandsworth Bridge. The aim of the occupation was to form a demonstration site illustrating possible uses of derelict and wasteland in Britain's cities which are more sustainable and socially equitable than existing ones. Activists moved prefrabicated structures on to the land – including structures to house communal debate, make-shift dwellings, and compost toilets. Large quantities of compost were moved on to the site so gardens could be constructed and planted, enabling vegetables to be grown healthily and successfully on land which was concreted over and potentially still contaminated. Some activists stayed beyond the first weekend/week, but a loose community of about 50 people formed on the site in an ad hoc way out of a mixture of local homeless folk, travellers and activists. This community came to be known as 'Pure Genius'. People on the site were encouraged and helped to build low cost and low impact housing with materials mainly from the detritus of urban society, often found in skips near the site: some of these structures possessed strikingly innovative character and designs.

The land, which had been derelict and enclosed for seven years, was the site of an old brewery which Guinness had acquired as part of its asset stripping of Distillers during its murky takeover of that company. Guinness had sought planning permission to build a supermarket on the land, an application which was later turned down. The site's location illustrated London's brutally socially polarised character: a social polarisation in this case entrenched by the policies of Wandsworth's – radical right dominated – Conservative Borough Council. Adjacent to the site, along the Thames, was a luxury waterfront housing development. The site's backdrop was a badly maintained social housing project separated from the site by a busy main road: its inhabitants largely welcomed and were supportive of the occupation. Over the period of dereliction a rich pioneer ecology had developed on the site: a survey by London Wildlife Trust found more than 300 plant species, including many rare in London. Merely opening up such a piece of land was an important effect of the occupation, making it a resource which a deprived local community could use rather than being alienated and excluded from it.

There are three elements of the occupation which I believe are significant. Firstly, the innovative way in which the campaign moves the direct action movement on to a terrain where it can begin to expand its own agenda rather than being fixed within the imaginative structure provided by constant opposition. Secondly, ways in which it provides an active interrogation of what it is to live in this land in the late twentieth century, celebrating events in English/British history which have often been ignored or dismissed, in a way which can wrest some of the terrain/experience of Englishness away from the political right. Thirdly, the ways it suggests that the broad green movement can engage with urban politics in ways that link questions around the environment and social justice.

DIRECTIONS FOR DIRECT ACTION

The direct action movement in the UK, a fractured and fluid network rather than a stable movement, burst into the nineties provoked by the Government's road programme and found itself incensed into unity by the Criminal Justice Act [4]. While at times it has been strikingly innovative, its influence and imagination have been constrained by a tactic of response to agendas and ideas formed by the government and private capital. Although alternative voices around the direct action movement have forged spaces in which they can speak and crystallise (like *Squall: the magazine for (as)sorted itinerants*), opposition and fragmentation have hindered

its ability to articulate a will to shape society. Such problems are partially intensifying as parts of the movements politics become hardened and fixed – a direction symbolised by the rise of the tunnel as a main part of the resistance – with activists becoming rebels against *any* future rather than being part of imagining and constituting a new one.

The argument of Gramsci, that advanced capitalist societies depend for their legitimacy on the "spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" [5] can inform our ways of thinking about how social/political movements can challenge and reshape this direction. Dominant groups elicit this 'spontaneous consent' by constructing hegemonic power relations which, through a complex interlocking of political, social and cultural forces, diffuse their own lived system of meanings and values throughout the whole of social life. This process works through institutions, such as media and education rooted in civil society, which shape the ordinary thoughts of the mass of the population: the legitimacy of the state being bolstered by the law and the use of force in times of crisis/conflict [6]. Thus power is not brittle and rigid – as it often seems to be conceptualised in the anti-roads movement – but is fluid and amorphous; it urges, incites and solicits as much as it punishes. To challenge the direction of such societies one must contest at the level of the terrain on which hegemony is secured: i.e. one must consider not only the economic, but also the moral/intellectual arguments which can prove decisive in transforming and shaping the ordinary thoughts and actions of people and social groups.

The 'Land is Ours' occupation represents a significant development towards developing a will and praxis to shape society because rather than squatting land in the route of a proposed road, it has taken the initiative to define for itself which land and which issues are important. Through this it forms the germ of an alternative hegemonic formation which connects disparate forms of struggle and begins to find spaces around which it can take a 'leading' role in society. This is not in the narrow sense of providing ordinary political leadership but in the much deeper and wider sense of actively illustrating/forging directions which society could take, through engaging with and attempting to shape the common sense of the moment.

In the present situation the ideological project of Thatcherism has succeeded in making free market monetary values seem almost 'natural': the only and 'spontaneous' way in which the world is conceptualised, attaching this to a regressive vision of a society based around a fixed notion of the family. New Labour though placing different accents on certain areas, has not broken with this privileging of the market and the family. Defined as it is against radical democratic ways of modernising the Labour movement, in government it is allying this emphasis on the market and the

family with paternalistic and hierarchical attitudes which construct working/marginalised as the passive subjects of the wills of bureaucrats and experts. These attitudes structure the much heralded 'New Deal' which is distinguished by its refusal to forge spaces which allow the ideas of the young unemployed to be integrated into the conceptualisation and construction of projects to move them from 'welfare to work'. Thus there continues to be a vacuum for the articulation of ideas which can challenge and re-imagine dominant and accepted values in innovative and inspiring ways.

This space is being partially filled by a small subset of new social/political movements like 'The Land Is Ours', which have stressed linking direct action with the battle of ideas. A fine example of the way the occupation engages with this struggle is the way the campaign recaptures certain languages and gives them a different accent to the one with which they are usually encoded. In reclaiming the 'stolen language of self help' [7] from the way Thatcherism articulated it to a selfish and monetised individualism, it opens the possibility of restoring the idea of 'self-help' as one of the core ethics and values of a flourishing and socially aware alternative. In doing so it illustrates how problems like homelessness can be engaged with in direct ways where dwellers have control over their own housing and micro-environment, and where people have exposure to the immediacy and empowerment associated with direct action in a supportive atmosphere. It develops an ethic which can create forms of housing directly responsive to people's desires and needs. This offers a way beyond both the bureaucratic colonisation of lived space which is the legacy of post-war social housing policy in Britain and the individualism of Thatcherism.

CONTESTING ENGLISHNESS

A contestation of dominant interpretations of 'English history' is integral to the identity and practice of 'The Land Is Ours'. The occupation of the site at Wandsworth was timed to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the squatting movement which shook England immediately after the second world war. In the summer of 1946, 45,000 people, mostly ex-serviceman, squatted disused barracks and military land as a response to the post war housing shortage [8]. Celebrating this anniversary is important because it challenges the official versions of English history as inherently uncontested and not riven by struggle. Major landowners still derive legitimacy from the production of the idea of England as a 'green and pleasant land' where the status and territory of land owners was uncontested, a discourse which represents the mass of the people as unchanging and not active in the creation of their own history or landscape. A similar contestation of history has been

an important part of the road protests. Its creative, cheeky culture has thrown up icons like the Union Jill – a reworked Union Jack –, symbols which offer tentative resources for the construction of oppositional imaginations informed by a "pluralistic, post colonial sense of British culture and national identity".[9]

This whole invocation of history is beset by a tendency to sediment experiences of dissent into sealed constructions of ethnicity and place. The result of this, as in other radical celebrations of English dissent, is to deflect attention away from the way dissent in England was shaped by its place in transatlantic systems of exploitation and cultural exchange, leaving the impression that it evolved organically from its own transformations. If these interrelations are taken seriously, I think it is possible to draw on the complex history of dissent in Britain to ground an oppositional imagination which is inclusionary, inspiring and pluralistic. What was important was the diverse nature of people living on the site, travellers – black British – urban homeless – showed that 'The Land Is Ours' had not substituted land owners for an ethnically purified 'ours'. Such an interrogation of the past, and of the symbols of the past, allied with a pluralistic reality can rupture the potent image of an undivided English people which was powerfully mobilised by Thatcherism to fight enemies both internal and external to the British state, and lives on in the discourse of New Labour which presents itself as 'the patriotic party because it is the people's party.'[10]

ARTICULATING THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

The ideological division between the country and the city is long standing and pervasively structures the contemporary green movement. Even as the materiality of this division becomes more and more blurred and complex, the symbolic potency of this ideological/cultural boundary becomes more pronounced. The green movement's tendency to root itself in the values of an imagined idyllic countryside based in a rigid and tremulous gaze to the past. which castigates the city as a virulent pathological excrescence, has led to a poverty of green perspectives on cities and a reticence to seriously engage in urban issues. This is related to the way the green movement has rarely integrated the ideas or experiences of the poor into its theory or praxis around ecological issues. Where there have been innovative positions developed around ecological and urban issues, they tend to have emerged from alliances which have ruptured and expanded the movements intellectual boundaries. Inspiring examples are the road protests against the M77 and the M11 Link Road in Britain where itinerant activists have intersected with local working class communities in Glasgow and East London, and the US Environmental Justice movement where poor black and hispanic communities have mobilised against the racism structuring location of hazardous waste sites and which threatens to make their localities 'ecological sacrifice zones'. These movements have found it necessary to

engage with the nature of capitalist urbanisation because it is frequently in such marginalised urban locales that the multiple oppressions arising from the interrelationships between poverty and ecological problems are lived.

In reconstructing cities in a way which would facilitate their appropriation by their inhabitants it is crucial to recognise that cities are the result of interrelating processes working at many different scales. It is necessary to interrogate the unjust processes which create unequal distributions of wealth and unequal access to decision making etc: as, after Iris Marion Young, "a focus on distributions is insufficient if it ignores the broader structural and institutional context within which decisions are made." [11] The direct action at the M11 link road, in East London, and the M77, on the Southside of Glasgow, struggled against the result of decision making processes which internalise the spatial inequality of cities like Glasgow and London. The Wandsworth occupation began to untangle and illuminate questions about the ownership of land and the way companies like Guinness are able to dominate structures like planning processes. The circulations of money which shape the city depend on intertwining relations between the worlds of planning, linked to local state administration, and of developers conceiving 'for the market with profit in mind.'

The result of this alliance is a 'brutal functionalism' which would raze the entirety of the banks of the Thames into car parks, supermarkets and luxury flats [12]. The occupation was important in that it explored the possibility of using direct action, with its attendant strength of spontaneity and immediacy, both to illuminate, and alter, these processes through which unjust decisions are being made rather than just protesting against the unjust outcomes. It illustrated some of the processes which exclude the felt needs and lived experience of local people, especially working class and other people lacking cultural capital, from shaping the direction of cities and their particular micro-urban environments.

The loss of the feeling by the citizens/inhabitants of a city that they have the ability to achieve what is possible in their urban environments has had a pervasively debilitating effect on imaginations about progressive change. What the French philosopher/sociologist Henri Lefebvre called 'the right to the city' crystallises this absence. He conceived of this as a right to direct and shape the character and direction of the city by forms of participation and appropriation which are distinct from, and transcend, the right to property and the right merely to visit the city [13]. Expelled from the centrality of the city by the omnipresent walls of property and the enclosure of public spaces, and also

expelled intellectually and symbolically from the representations of the city which pervade and structure official decision making processes, marginalised groups find their ability to form this 'meandering cry and demand' crushed. A reality of the city is created which drifts above people's desire and right to appropriate and direct urban life for themselves without the mediation of profit.

The Wandsworth occupation crystallised this desire, this demand for the city to become more than an entity divorced from its citizens'/inhabitants' lives. It acted, albeit briefly and ambiguously, as a node for the demonstration that through direct action people can begin to assert this right, illustrating that people can recolonise and begin to shape their own lived spaces and environments, rather than to have these lived spaces colonised and striated by abstract forces of planning and profit. It began to wrest away imaginations of cities from the narrow constraint of profit – opening up whole areas of people's imaginations about the possible directions of the urban environments in which they live, which at present are given no space to develop. In this way the site had the potentiality to become a discursive space where people from the surrounding community could come and discuss the direction of their area without the rigidities, banalities and exclusions that pervade the formal political process. It suggested embryonic ways in which campaigns and institutions shaping cities can be structured, in an open and radically democratic way, breaking the rigid structures and languages that usually cage debate about planning.

In its everyday existence the site also illustrated directions beyond the rigid division and commoditisation of functions and different parts of life, in societies where domains like culture and leisure are being collapsed into the economic, through celebrating and mingling different parts of life and existence. The boundaries of art, work, access to 'nature' and through the site's gardens, production of food on the site, were blurred. It also illustrated how the city could be reappropriated as a forum of uncommodified leisure and play although in doing so it illuminated how deeply these concepts are related to existing ethics and definitions of work. It showed how difficult it is to root notions of festival and play in a community suffused by the banality and boredom which pervade the everyday existence of many experiences of unemployment and homelessness, because of the tendency for such notions of festival to become dystopian through being pervaded by the kind of dreams of narcissistic escape associated with hard drug use.

EVICTION AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS

On October 15th at around six o clock in the morning bailiffs entered the site to carry out an eviction on behalf of Guinness. They were supported by Metropolitan Police attired in intimidating riot gear, with shields, helmets and long handled batons, although resistance to the eviction was almost entirely non-violent: this eviction cleared the way for the sale of the site for an undisclosed figure to a luxury housing development consortium. As evicted residents walked away over Wandsworth Bridge, mechanical diggers were bulldozing people's homes and trashing the sites vegetation. The eviction stimulated much discussion about the site, much of which focussed on its internal problems: articles by two of Britain's most respected environmental journalists, John Vidal and George Monbiot, in *The Guardian* of October 16 concentrated on "how few pissheads it takes to wreck a site". It is accepted that the site itself had serious problems, but there has to be an effort made to relate the internal problems of the site to the way that the occupation was constructed and conceptualised.

Many socially damaged people were knocking around the site: including people with mental health problems, people who'd been pushed out of social services care and folk with severe drug/drink problems. This occupation was thus part of a social movement/campaign which, like many of the road protests and groups such as the Exodus collective in Luton, is composed as much by 'forced outs' as 'drop outs'. This was exacerbated in the 'Pure Genius' case because the occupation happened in an area which was simultaneously socially polarised and socially fractured. It therefore lacked the embryonic forms of community and social/institutional bases out of which demands like 'the right to the city' could be formed and articulated. This has a dramatic impact on the way a campaign functions and is constructed. Trying to create a community with and alongside socially damaged people is a mentally and physically draining process. The very act of daily reproduction of a site like 'Pure Genius' in such difficult social conditions is something which saps the energy of a community and makes it nearly impossible for it to have any positive direction. At the same time it becomes easy for people with problems to be scapegoated as the reason for the problems of the site and for attention to be deflected away from ambiguities/less problems in the formation and conceptualisation of the campaign.

One of the key differences of contemporary societies from the kind of societies in which non-violent direct action was pioneered by writers/activists like Gandhi, is that they are increasingly 'Societies of the Spectacle'-societies characterised by a constant stream of disembodied images divorced from meaning [14]. Campaigns like 'The Land is Ours' never cease to be conscious of having to orient their action to the eye of the media and letting their form of action be dictated by the need to conform to the desires of this eye. They constantly risk becoming just another image in the raging stream of disembodied signs.

Planned as a one week demonstration site which if possible would evolve into a community, the occupation was conceived with a short time scale because of the limited time people could commit: it was also an unexpected benefit when people were actually able to stay on the site and were not immediately evicted. This demonstration site, though, can be seen as reducing direct action to visual soundbite.

Many of the people who were involved in the organisation of the occupation have backgrounds in the media: including several current or ex-journalists including one media persona, George Monbiot. This made it natural for the occupation to be on one level a well organised media stunt. The occupation captured media attention wonderfully – obtaining favourable and supportive coverage in the international, national and local media – but the short term structure which evolved to achieve this created a condition from which it was virtually impossible to create a socially sustainable community. It attempted to create the material conditions needed for an ecologically sustainable community, without at the same time providing the means for facilitating a socially sustainable community. The way the community was rapidly thrown together hindered the development of the minimum amount of sortedness and internal communication/democracy that a site has to have for negotiation of life there – and for some form of negotiated exclusion to work.

A genuine commitment did exist throughout the life of the site to it being a pluralistic community which would enable homeless folk to build their own dwellings and gain a permanency denied to them elsewhere. The campaign, however, was structured by a naïve projection that people could come in and, form the bare structure of a community which they would then leave for an ill-defined section of other people, like 'the homeless', to fill. This rested on a simplistic view of the conditions that homeless people face. It expected them to be able to adapt quickly to life in a very different situation without considering the stresses that drink/drugs use/abuse taken to cope with homelessness, mental health problems and problems like lack of direction/esteem etc, would place on the everyday life of such a community. There were also only sketchy ideas about how the site could become self supporting – unlike the most inspiring social alternatives like some of the sorted Amsterdam squats which have formed their own embryonic micro economies largely independent of state benefits. [See some of the other contributions to this reader]

Gramsci argued that the ideas/movements which gain the greatest popularity are not necessarily those which possess the greatest clarity/coherence, but often possess a certain 'logical elasticity' [15]. The green movement with its bewildering array of inflections of opinions appears to be one such movement: the direct action network is often no different. The attempts of the 'Pure Genius' site to tackle problems of homelessness, alongside problems of inner city ecology, is a symptom of a tendency to suggest that one can easily add social justice problems to an environmental concern and stir and quickly come up with an adequate solution. The objective is crucial, but in avoiding deeply interrogating social problems, and the complex interrelations between social justice and ecology, it becomes easy to drift into a

situation where nebulous and problematic notions like community become 'flags of convenience' which disparate groups of people can become united behind. It is not particularly surprising that what results is not particularly coherent or successful.

What the 'Pure Genius' experience perhaps illustrates best is the way an abstracted vision of small communities has become accepted as the dominant alternative adopted by the contemporary green movement, without the short-comings of such communities being adequately discussed. It has not engaged with the ways that small communities have immense potentiality for allowing the reproduction of the petty 'tyrannical bitterness' that pervade our everyday lives, and the tendency for such communities to form and cement their identity by exclusion and chauvinism.[16] One reaction to the social problems which the site experienced is to advocate the formation of socially purified communities which some of the road protest camps, e.g. the Fairmile camp in Devon, approach. These are communities where outsiders are not welcome and not integrated into the life or decision making processes of the site. This is presented as the necessary alternative to sites riddled by those who are seen as unsorted, folk who are usually termed 'lunchouts' or 'brewcrew'. In wishing to transform our society we have to start from 'attending violently to things as they are in the present'. We start from socially divided communities, and to create socially purified ones of our own is a disastrous and pernicious strategy.

The weakness of the kinship structure that emerged at Wandsworth, with very little development of shared goals or structures of mutual aid, illustrate that mediation by face to face relations is not necessarily liberatory, and is also very difficult to foster and develop. What needs to be thought through is ways of keeping the militant concern and commitment to particular places, which was present throughout the Wandsworth occupation, but fostering it through networks of flows of people, techniques and ideas generated by direct action and other movements and through interaction with the areas which surround it. This would constantly challenge and regenerate the community, working against tendencies towards fixed chauvinisms and parochialisms. If emergent structures of internal democracy and kinship are encouraged to develop more organically and securely – and in more open and genuinely radical democratic ways – then action with those representing community in different forums can be more sinuously related with people's vastly differing needs and desires. This could prevent the tendency at times in the Wandsworth case for the division between the imaginations and articulated needs/ roles of people and planners to be reproduced within the campaign. One activist spoke of his annoyance that people outside the community had been negotiating to build relatively expensive 'ecohouses' on the site when he had constructed his own dwelling for under £100, inspired by a Scandinavian design. This is symptomatic of a wider failure to integrate the views of forced out and marginalised people into the actual planning and conceptualisation of the occupation itself.

This necessitates having a notion of people as riven by all sorts of complex divisions differences rather than perhaps the rather homogeneous one which was adopted in the Wandsworth case. Unless the complexity of this notion is interrogated and integrated into the structure of campaigns and institutions, the aim of a fluid polyphonic process shaping the city will be replaced by a different elite colonising lived space whilst representing themselves as representing the interests of others and in reality only articulating *its* own 'right to the city'. The kind of more open structure needed to achieve this may be approximated by the current direction of 'The Land Is Ours', which is evolving towards a situation where its role will be to facilitate more organic grassroots campaigns/formations and articulate links between them and other organisations rather than parachuting in artificial communities overnight. In order to avoid sedimenting itself in to a rigid, fossilised centre it is in the process of reconceptualising itself as a federation of interrelating but autonomous local groups and groups struggling along particular axes.

We live in societies in which the boundaries between people and nature are being constantly transgressed and broken down. One of the possible responses for the green movement in the shadow of such transformations is nostalgically to invoke values of an imagined past when societies based around small communities were close to, and in harmony with, nature. This route leads backwards to a regressive dream of communities which in reality were often suffocating. As Frantz Fanon demanded, there can be "no question of a return to nature" [17]. The task we face is the much harder one of envisioning "a different and less hostile order of relationships among people, animals, technologies and land"[18]. This necessitates taking urban environments seriously and engaging with the complex forces which are shaping them in increasingly hostile and unjust ways.

At best, sites like Pure Genius can become nodes which illuminate some of the hostile forces shaping our cities; which can crystallise the demand for the right to the city; and can begin to establish some collective ground from which to articulate this right in what are fractured and divided communities. Through direct action techniques like land occupation they can stimulate the starting point for an interrogation of and "reconstruction of the boundaries of daily life" [19], becoming nodes of the struggle to "command and educate the common sense of the age" [20] and move it in a progressive rather than reactionary direction – towards values based on social and ecological respect; a slow and a molecular process but also an urgent one.

Endnotes

[1] Davis, (1990, p.224)
[2] Walter Benjamin. (1973) refers to Parisians living under Haussmann as becoming conscious of 'the inhuman character of the great city'.
[3] The Land Is Ours – 'a land rights campaign for Britain' campaigns 'peacefully for access to land, its resources and the decision making processes affecting them, for everyone, irrespective of race, age or gender.'
[4] The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act was a direct legislative attack by a weak and divided government on the forms of peaceful protest and alternative lifestyles which the direct action movement had pioneered.
[5] Gramsci (1971, p.12)
[6] This description of hegemony is taken from Raymond William's chapter on hegemony in 'Marxism and Literature'
[7] Colin Ward (1985).
[8] See Hinton (1988) for an interesting discussion and summary of this movement.
[9] Paul Gilroy (1993, p.11)
[10] The introduction to Stuart Hall's 'Hard Road to Renewal' has a fine discussion of Thatcherism's relation to, and production of, populist nationalism.
[11] I.M.Young (1990, p. 22)
[12] Lefebve (1996)
[13] ibid.
[14] Debord (1967, thesis one)
[15] Gramsci (1985, p. 405–406)
[16] Young (1993)
[17] Fanon (1990, p. 253)
[18] Haraway (1989, p. 15)
[19] Haraway (1997, p. 181)
[20] Hall (1988, p.

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129

TITLE

PARTICIPATED PROJECTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF FLORENCE

WRITTEN BY | ANNA LISA PECORIELLO, IACOPO ZETTI
PHOTOS BY | LAPEI

CHAPTER

4.4

THE LOCATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PROJECT

Every city has its dark side, that other hidden, and unpresentable face of a respectable city where all that is considered to be undesirable, dirty or dangerous is lumped together out of sight and so out of mind.

The south east-section of Florence, a large zone referred to as administrative Quartiere 4, wedged in between the hills and the river, is one such area. Once considered Florence's garden because of the abundance of its agricultural produce, it now houses what the 'normal' city would call 'left-overs': industry, warehouses, dormitory towns, gasometers, cemeteries, rubbish tips, depositories, public building, prisons, huts and nomadic camps. Its boundaries contain a historical catalogue of public housing: the 19th century housing for

The derelict courtyard of the council houses at Via canova 25, home to 348 families
(top)

Aerial photo of the city of Florence, Quartiere 4 lies inside the white square
(bottom)

'the destitute'; the vast belt of working class housing of the 20s and 30s; the 'garden-city' of the post-war years; the great waves of public housing in the following decades. Over the last few years, there has been much building activity in the remaining areas. As a result of this the population has reached a total of 70'000 inhabitants. Gradually taking over the plain, building has expanded to such an extent as to overwhelm and suffocate those small pre-existing settlement areas: farmhouses, villas, the little hamlets along the historical roads and the farming villages. This expansion of the built up areas has of course completely upset the environmental system and the agricultural organisation: gone are the fields, the canals have been 'buried', the natural water course has been interrupted, the river overflow areas have fallen into decay, the margins of the hill-line have been attacked. Along with them, the less visible, but equally important aspects of social bonds, the sense of belonging to a community and local identity, have disappeared.

THE 'REVERSE SIDE' TODAY

Since the post-war years, the area has had a stigma attached to it, mainly because of the presence of low-cost public housing, but today the situation is gradually changing. As in many peripheral areas, we have witnessed a process which can be defined as urban consolidation or as the inhabitants adapting and *reinterpreting* the suburb. This perhaps could explain the social and political liveliness of the area. We can detect the beginnings of an attachment to the territory, memories of the places are resurfacing, there is a defence mechanism reacting to any new urban intervention which the inhabitants consider detrimental. The wealth of committees and grass roots groups which are present in the area and which came into being as a spontaneous and direct opposition to local council planning is connected with this process and provides a wider range of opportunities than in the past. For this very reason, the inhabitants' committees have been engaged as privileged interlocutors by the LAPEI research group [1] who have decided to experiment in Quartiere 4 with a community planning project – a somewhat rare occurrence within the Italian context. The aim was to draw up a proposal for reinterpreting and reorganising the area focusing on the needs of its inhabitants and thus to give an alternative and contrasting view of the situation as opposed to the one-sided, monopolising view of the technical experts, politicians and businessmen who have always been responsible for its modelling and formation.

131

'Doorstep party' organised by the inhabitants themselves in an attempt to regain the courtyard space: children's games, drawing and replanning of the courtyard, open-air supper and debate.

FOUR SMALL TOWNS ON THE ARNO RIVER

The initial idea was: 'to plan together four little towns on the Arno.' At the beginning, what was little more than a slogan nevertheless captured the idea that in the inhabited areas the normal conditions of a communal life which was rich, autonomous, relatively complete and self-sufficient should be formed using the four original hamlets as a starting point, and that a chain of independent and recognisable centres is better suited to the life of the people than one great congested and unmanageable centre.

We tried to set up a *network* of committees with the aim of getting beyond the logic of mere opposition to single projects, and to reach a better awareness of the relationship existing between the various problems.

Through interaction with the inhabitants the image of the area (which depends on the city centre – anonymous, fragmented and divided into abstract compartments by congested and polluted main roads) was gradually overturned :

– the inhabitants want centrality. They want to feel they belong to a place which is recognisable both in architectural and town-planning terms. They want to be able to identify their own settlement as the first meaningful link within the world network.

– the local inhabitants desire not only houses but also an 'extension' to their homes in such a way that the daily needs can be met entirely within the bounds of their own settlement.

– the local inhabitants want an improvement of flora and fauna in their neighbourhood. They want access to the river and the hills; they want the boundaries and the intervening spaces within the territory to be filled up with agriculture and rural areas. They want all the necessary forms of green areas: children's playgrounds, gardens on their doorsteps, urban parks, paths and pedestrian walkways, playing fields; they want the continuity of the rows of vines and trees and they also desire a little wilderness.

– the local inhabitants want a soft traffic system which will provide an alternative to being forced towards the city centre and to the car itself; they want a light tramway system, a cycle track, restricted traffic zones in the old villages, a landscaped road instead of the new dual carriageway. They want the creation of green pathways leading to schools, churches, facilities, sports centres, gardens and parks, river and hills, along safe, pleasant routes well protected from the motorised thoroughfare.

In this way, then, the plans for the little town of San Bartolo came into being. In an attempt to enrich the organisation of public space in which the village takes on a compact and recognisable form, minor building work would exploit the original themes while enhancing their liveliness through the introduction of facilities and meeting places. To this we can add the plan for a soft transversal link from the Arno to the hills, a replanning of the system of squares, the planning of four 'green' pedestrian walkways and cycle tracks and the reclaiming and environmental cleansing of a riverside area.

Another project concerns the courtyard at number 25 Via Canova fenced off by a wall of council housing, home to 348 families all living at the same address but who hardly know each other. In the project the inhabitants have expressed the wish to feel that they are a part of a community of neighbours who will themselves manage the communal space known as 'the daily work, play and meeting square.' They have pushed the practical side of the project ahead of its time by organising a residents' party in the courtyards during which the children played together for the first time and the adults took over the space below their houses as an 'extension to their homes.'

Then there is the project for the little town of S. Lorenzo a Greve, which arose from the need for a traffic free village so that space could be given back to street life and its relationships. It was then extended to include the inhabitants of the villages along the lower Greve in a landscaped road project to provide an alternative to the construction of a devastating urban dual carriageway. The same project has seen school children involved in the planning of a stretch of the banks of the river and of a free space, at long last able to meet their need for independence and adventure (free at last from the clutches of the adult world which would like to see them involved only in pre-planned structured activities).

WAYS AND MEANS

This project was built up in the course of a series of workshops and open meetings over a three year period. The most important result of the work lies not so much in the projects themselves, but in the experience of interaction between the local inhabitants, university research workers and, with a good deal of difficulty,

'The daily work, play and meeting square'.
Project for the transformation of the courtyard at 25, Via Canova to meet the needs of the inhabitants:
reduction and reorganisation of the parking space, the square, the self-built social centre, the children's play area, the five-a-side football pitch, the bowling area, the vegetable garden, the pedestrian walkways etc.

'Green walkways'. A continuous system of protected cycle tracks and pedestrian walkways linking public spaces and buildings through the green areas of parks and gardens attached to blocks of flats.

'The transversal town'. The project for the little town of San Bartolo as a reorganisation of the territory between the hills and the rivers Arno and Greve, in transversal direction with respect to the present communication infrastructures, starting from urban 'empty spaces': residual agricultural territory, green areas, system of the squares and public spaces, the future riverside park along the Argingrosso and the hill areas.

the local authorities. We do not believe that there is an absolute and optimal way of involving the population. We therefore decided to experiment with different methods: ranging from an adapted version of an experience like *planning for real* or *planning for people* as in the case of the Via Canova Courtyard project, to complex procedures of official interaction between both public and private bodies and agencies, in the phase which is currently dealing with the step forward to the conversion from participated projects to town planning regulations and the realisation of the plans (system of co-ordination between the research group, grass-roots workers, local administration, the housing department, public bodies etc.).

In each of the different situations different methods of communication were used: drawings, posters, questionnaires, models, parties and get-togethers, exhibitions, games, 'Gulliver maps' where one can write freely. A distinctive feature of the work is perhaps the importance given to pictorial representation of the project. To solicit reaction from the people we used illustrative material, in advance of the project, to identify the problems and to open up the field of opportunities on offer to the residents, as a means of dismantling and then restructuring their wishes in an innovative manner.

WHAT HAS ACTUALLY CHANGED IN Q4?

A collective construction process will be successful if, and only if, the players involved take the plunge, putting themselves into play, and thus allowing themselves to change their perception of the area in the process of interaction (desires, options, expectations, the way of looking at things and perhaps to a certain extent their view of the world). This most certainly has happened to us as members of the research group. We have learnt not to plan other people's lives in abstract or according to our own values. As far as the local population was concerned, they in turn have re-discovered their ability to discuss, to weigh themselves up against the reasons of others, to build up values shared by a real community after years of being excluded from participation. What has not changed in any tangible way whatsoever are the town-planning management practices carried out by the local government administration, which at the time of writing has not started work on even one of the simplest or least expensive proposals put forward by the inhabitants. A more active public engagement would have given the local residents some faith to change things. It may be too late – it will be much more difficult to involve the people directly next time round.

Endnote

[1] LAPEI stands for the Laboritorio di Progettazione Ecologica degli Insediamenti (Laboratory of Ecological designing of Settlements) and is a group of research workers operating within the Department of Town and Territory Planning in the University of Florence. The work group concerned with Quarter 4 was composed of: Giancarlo Paba, Mariantonietta Davoli, Anna Lisa Pecoriello, Simona Paperini and Iacopo Zetti.

133

THE SMALL HISTORIC TOWN AS A PLANNING MODEL FOR TODAY

WRITTEN BY GIANCARLO PABA

Primo Disegno Idrografico per la difesa dai rapidi Fiumi.
E Principio radicale di Sistema per li Navigabili.

USABLE PAST

Lewis Mumford often used the important concept of *usable past*. He considered the past as a laboured intellectual and moral construction. Constructing a *usable past* from one's own culture means interpreting the story in a selective, purposeful way.

Constructing a *usable past* serves to build up the present, searching the past for principles, rules and long-term tendencies which may still form the base of today's town and culture.

It is, for example, the great nineteenth-century American cultural past that, for Mumford, is called upon to nurture his urban and environmental thought – respect for nature, a regional vision, a neighbourhood and community feeling and the love for small towns.

SMALL TOWNS AS LIVING RESOURCES

In Tuscan towns, a very particular usable past is to hand, written in stones, building materials, the urban fabric and the types of settlement.

It is not merely a case of copying ancient, medieval or Renaissance urban planning, but of developing genetic principles of territory and town formation.

Small centres in Tuscany could be analysed as active, living resources. The integrated system of towns is an operative model: not as something to preserve, but as a set of instructions written in the soil and on the stones which may guide today's urban planning policies.

A few general principles are briefly indicated in the following points.

THE RULE OF THE LIMIT

The town must have a certain measure and a boundary too. The town boundary must be perceptible. Of course, it may no longer be the walls, but the town must have recognisable limits which are morphologically defined.

The town must have a dimension, a certain measure. Aristotle used to say that the importance of a city does not depend on its physical or demographic size, but on the *potency* of its population and culture.

Renaissance Florence had only 60 – 80,000 inhabitants. It was great, not huge.

The bigger cities must be organised into recognisable, relatively independent parts. The true city has no outskirts, but it is a centre or a collection of centres.

THE PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY

Every city is different, particular. The history, shape, traditions, culture and social life are all different. Each city has its own identity; it is a distinct and complete local society. The tendency today is to acknowledge the city as being homologous. Huge agglomerations tend to look like one another; city outskirts are all the same. The small town environment is, on the other hand, made up of differences and the specific local culture.

THE PRINCIPLE OF BELONGING AND OF THE COMMUNITY

The sense of belonging is fundamental to urban life. You belong to a region, a town, a district, a neighbourhood. The principle of belonging amalgamates relationships between community and settlement.

The municipality is the collective symbol of the town, the symbol of civic unity and autonomy. The small town model is characterised by the single town's independence and capacity for self-government. The small town model may, today, become a model for new municipalities constituted by free people voluntarily united in friendship and community.

THE GENIUS LOCI, OR 'INDISSOLUBLE MATRIMONY' BETWEEN THE CITY AND ITS SITE

The city is not cold, abstract space; the city is a place. Each city takes shape from its site. The earth creates the city. Land shapes create the form of urban places. The territory provides resources, the raw materials and building materials. Let us remember the etymological meaning of geography and topography: the topography of the city interprets land geography: the city 'writes' its shape, interpreting the form traces of the place.

THE CITY AND THE COUNTRY

The city is not a world apart, separated from the rest of the territory. The town organises the territory surrounding it. The countryside, in turn, defines the features and regulates the metabolism of the city. There exists a relationship of functional and aesthetic interdependence between the city and the countryside it is contained in. Agricultural land is also the result of a collective project composed laboriously over the course of time.

The countryside is a great human enterprise: just observe Ambrogio Lorenzetti's paintings in Siena (the pictures called 'The Good City') and you will see people constructing the countryside and estates, town and landscape together, with infinite, qualified labour. The harmonious relationship between town and country is one of the most important features of the small town model.

136

THE SMALL TOWN AS AN ECOSYSTEM

The town functions as a living system. It attracts resources from the surrounding land, but it contributes to recreating those resources by constructing an organised, sustainable territory around it. The ancient relationship between Italian towns and water (the water system) is a very significant example of a correct, positive balance between towns and resources.

TOWN NETWORKS

The strength of the Tuscan model is not the dangerous quantitative power of the large agglomerations, the boundless metropolis, or the amassing of people and things. But rather it is the specific, intelligent power born from the energy and creativity of towns acting as a network. Small cities in Tuscany are both local and all-encompassing, small and world-wide. The territory of the hundred Tuscan towns is not a banal heaping together of urban centres, but rather it is a complex system of relations. Living within the network of a town does not necessarily mean that one must make do with a more limited field of opportunities than the big city or metropolis offers. Indeed, on the contrary, it is possible to live fully by exploiting network relationships, whilst maintaining the human scale and harmony of small settlements.

THE TOWN AS A STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC PLACES

Contained in Tuscan cities' usable past is the lesson of a balanced relationship between private and public realms. The town framework consists of an organic system of collective places: roads, squares, alleyways, courtyards, gardens, parks, etc. forming a continuous system – an intermingling of houses, public places and public buildings.

PARTICIPATION

The town is a collective product. Its inhabitants in the past contributed indirectly to building it – sometimes even directly. Today's system of institutional, bureaucratic planning has moved away from the sphere of daily life. From the usable past of the ancient Tuscan towns we can recover the citizen's direct protagonism. Participation and community planning may reduce the gap between city government and the desires and hopes of its inhabitants.

THE TOWN PLAN OF VILLASANTA: A CASE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING

WRITTEN BY | MONICA VERCESI (ECOPOLIS)

CHAPTER

4.6

This text deals with a participatory process conducted by Ecopolis in Villasanta, a city of 15,000 inhabitants situated within the Park of Monza, north east of Milan. In particular, I would like to focus on the interaction of those involved – the inhabitants, the municipal representatives, the industrial community and the urban planners hired to do the technical work. In addition, I would like to outline the unexpected developments that subsequently occurred, particularly the participatory process for a project to be undertaken in 1998 concerning the maintenance and improvements of the roads.

PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW TOWN PLAN

In 1996 the municipal representatives of Villasanta commissioned the Ecopolis Institute of Research to co-ordinate a participatory process for the revision of the city plan. The project was supervised by the Dipartimento di Scienze del Territorio of the School of Architecture of Milan, which provided scientific consultation. A private group of urban planners was also involved. Villasanta is divided into three distinct sections: the historical area; the residential area constructed in the 1960's around some farms; and a more recent residential area which was built near a commercial centre. This last area is continuing to expand because of the influx of people migrating from Milan, and is reducing the vitality of the historical centre. There are agricultural areas to the east and, to the west, the Park of Monza and a part of the Lambro Valley. The biggest problems are excessive traffic through the historical zone and also the separations created by two railway tracks and a former storage area and refinery for an oil company, Lombarda Petroli. The most evident effect of this situation is the difficulty of reaching one part of the city from another.

The main priority of the plan was to ensure that any changes would be made through a participatory process and have a minimal impact on the environment. Specific objectives were, to limit residential growth, to redefine the use of roads, to solve some environmental problems like that of the oil storage facility, and to control the impact on the town of the commercial centre in the northern zone. This project was developed interacting with representatives of the four following groups: the population; urban planners; the business community; and the municipality.

The process with the inhabitants served to inform the other two groups about their wishes and ideas. This process was developed in three phases: the analysis of inhabitants' perceptions and use of their city; the definition of the priorities of the city plan; and the development of specific projects for each of the three sections of the city. The first phase involved the leaders and some members of most of the 60 associations and groups of the town. During this phase we succeeded in defining the inhabitants' image of the city and their ideas for improvements through the elaboration of mental maps, the outline of problems and resources, and comparison of perceptions of the old and new inhabitants. During the second phase, participation was expanded to include ordinary citizens, by contacting the captains of each 'palio' (neighbourhood) team. In this phase we distributed a questionnaire which asked each person to list, in order of priority, existing problems. Based on the information gathered with this questionnaire we developed strategies to improve the city plan. During the third phase, also open to the whole population, we organised a series of workshops in each area. The first part of the workshop was to reorder the list of priorities according to the needs of each area. Then the inhabitants were asked about specific changes they wanted in their area. The conclusion of this phase was the creation of a map of the entire city that synthesised all the suggestions.

DISTRUGGIAMO LA PERIFERIA! COSTRUIAMO UNA "CITTA' DI CITTA" PER ABITARCI.

Abitare non è solo risiedere, è vivere, lavorare, incontrarsi, discutere e progettare insieme la città. Rivendichiamo per tutti la possibilità di "star di casa" a Milano. Valorizziamo i luoghi storici e formiamo nuovi centri di vita. Rifiutiamo la riduzione della città a luogo degli affari.

RISCOPRIA ED ESPRIMI LA CAPACIT DI INVENTA LA CITTA'.

Ognuno può diventare costri tore della città con i proori saperi. Partecipiamo alla costruzione dell"altra città":
• rest iamo la democrazia reale: esprimiamo le nostre esigenze di qualità de vit di comunicazione, di socializzazione.
• sosteniamo la progettualità sociale (dei comitati quartiere, dei gruppi di volontariato, delle associ
• chiediamo spazio per l'intervento diretto (autocostruzione) e la gestione nella costruzione della città.

PAOLA CAPRIOLO [Scrittrice]
LIONELLO CERRI [Musicineteatro Anteo]
NICO COLONNA [Smemorando]
GIANCARLO CONSONNI [Poeta Architetto]
ORESTE DEL BUONO [Giornalista]
MASSIMO DE VITA [Teatro Officina]
IDA FARE' [Gruppo Vanda]
GIALAPPA'S BAND
ENZO JANNACCI [Cantante]
LAURA LEPETITE [Edizioni Tartaruga]
LA REDAZIONE DI "LINUS"
MAURIZIO ACCATTATO [Teatro Sala Fontana]
MICHELE [Gino & Michele]
SAURO PARI [Teatro Nuovo]
DAVID RIONDINO [Attore]
PAOLO ROSSI [Attore]
SERENA SARTORI [Teatro del Sole]
PIERO SCARAMUCCI [Radio Popolare]
GIULIO STOCCHI [Poeta]
IL GRUPPO DI "SU' LA TESTA"
ROBERTO TRAVERSO [Teatro Out Off]
MARCO ZAPPAROLI [Edizioni Marcos y Marcos]

139

Invitiamo Tutti A Lavorare Per Q

Ecopolis poster, Milan, 1992

During the same period the group of urban planners did a series of interviews with the representatives of the business community. The results of these interviews were reported to the inhabitants at a workshop, along with the urban planners' perceptions of the city, and they were discussed and integrated into the inhabitants' image of the city.

The participatory process with the representatives of the Municipality was organised after the conclusion of the other two groups. It was structured in two workshops during which the representatives worked using the same interactive methods as the inhabitants. The aim was to solicit responses about the biggest problems that had emerged during the consultations with the inhabitants. The people's aims were listed and planning ideas were developed. The administration then had four different options to deal with the analyses and the proposals we made:

– to recognise the problems and the solutions provided by the inhabitants and to include the proposals in the official planning strategies;
– to recognise the problems but not the suggested solutions – and therefore to search for other solutions in the official planning schemes;
– not to recognize the problems and therefore not to address them;
– to recognise the problems but not to address them as part of the city plan, looking for other methods to solve the problems.

EMPOWERMENT IN PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT

The work on the city plan prompted the municipal representatives to hire Ecopolis for another project concerning the maintenance and improvement of the roads. The problem of roads and mobility which had come out in the previous project presented an opportunity for further involvement of the population. This second project, which is now underway, aims to be, more than the first project, a way to give the inhabitants more power over their territory.

We are involving those people who have a more intense and particular relationship with the roads: children, teenagers, the handicapped and the elderly. Firstly, the work consists of gathering information through these people about the actual situation and this will be used by the administration to support the technical choices that will be implemented. Together with this work requested by the administration, Ecopolis also proposed another operation: using the same subjects to gather information about the existence of small improvements or projects made by citizens or groups of citizens and directly contacting these people. At the same time the Councillor of Public Works was asked by Ecopolis to think about which methods would be more efficient in supporting the inhabitants' proposals. For example:
– intervening through municipal regulations;
– developing a partnership with associations like WWF to organise courses and supply materials;
– looking for sponsors to donate to the community the supplies for creating and maintaining green spaces;
– organising a call for participatory projects for the improvements to a street.

CONCLUSIONS

It's not easy to give a conclusion, because both of the projects are far from completion. However, we can make at least two observations.

Firstly, there is a contradiction between the revision of formal city plans and participative planning processes. The methods and the timing of legal processes made the administration play their usual role as political decision-makers. Creating a common language and entering into true dialogue was therefore impossible.

The second observation that can be made is that through these two projects there has been a significant change in the municipal representatives' perception of participation: at the beginning these processes were perceived as something occasional and as a way to build social consensus, but they have now become a more common administrative practice and a way to give the inhabitants more power to take part in the development of their territory.

T H

U R B A

E

POLITICS

OF

NISATION

5

TITLE

THE POLITICS OF URBANISATION

| WRITTEN BY | CHRISTIAN SCHMID |
| TRANSLATION | BARBARA STINER |

CHAPTER

5.1

Urbanisation can be seen as a process of social transformation which is fundamentally changing the spatial and temporal conditions of everyday life. Urbanisation is not a mere expression of general social and economic developments, like a footprint in the sand, but itself constitutes a specific field of social interaction and struggle.

Today urbanisation is situated in a context of global economic restructuring and the world-wide implementation of neo-liberal policies with their resultant social consequences. The list of which, as Bernd Hamm reminds us, is long: unemployment and distributional conflicts, crises of public finance, the dismantling of the welfare state, intensified socio-economic

polarisation and increasing inequality in life prospects. According to Hamm's analysis, the process of urbanisation under such conditions is characterised by aggravated social segregation, based not only on ethnic and cultural criteria but above all on social class. As Hamm emphasises, social segregation is not in itself the problem, but rather the increasing disparity between rich and poor neighbourhoods and the resultant social tensions and conflicts is. As affluent neighbourhoods barricade themselves in from the rest of the city, more and more districts – even in wealthy cities – slide into social dereliction. Hamm draws the conclusion that the local conditions for self-organisation and neighbourhood initiatives must be encouraged and a local infrastructure of subsistence created.

However, the papers collected in this section on Mexico, Havana, Toronto and Amsterdam demonstrate that the global trends outlined above do not produce uniform local impacts: While economic processes are becoming increasingly uniform under the dictate of global liberalisation, they occur under very diverse cultural and social conditions on the local level. The new global regime does not inevitably lead to a homogenisation of urbanisation processes, but rather to an intensification of uneven development and regional differences. Consequently, a wide range of objectives and confrontations have been put on the political agenda in contemporary cities.

Localist approaches have been emerging above all in Havana. On the one hand, the situation of Havana is unique due to Cuba's political and economic isolation. On the other hand, Havana presents an instance of a peripheral city which has been left behind by the global economy and finds itself in a deep-rooted structural crisis. As Raffaele Paloscia demonstrates, one of the immediate problems of Havana is the lack of material and financial resources. The city is close to physical collapse, and even historically important buildings are dilapidating. This situation decidedly requires a strategy which includes the local population. On the basis of the 'territorial approach' (see section 4, 'Reclaiming History for Urban Action'), Italian scientists, together with local forces, are launching a pilot project for an urbanisation model founded on the preservation of the physical environment, the strengthening of cultural identity, the valorisation of local resources and self-government.

The direct impact of the neo-liberal global regime on the politics of urbanisation is investigated in the paper by Beatriz García Peralta, Víctor Imas Ruíz and Sara García Jiménez. The authors corroborate the increasing influence of global institutions and organisations on public housing programmes in Mexico. This influence has intensified the shift towards a neo-liberal housing policy which is not only inefficient and costly, but has entailed the escalation of an exclusionary policy which has had particularly negative implications for the poor population.

145

The contribution by Stefan Kipfer on Toronto provides an exemplary demonstration of how the politics of urbanisation are deployed to implement a neo-liberal development model. The conservative government of the Province of Ontario is leading, in effect, a 'class struggle in space', the instrument of which is the forced amalgamation of six municipalities into one city of Toronto. The direct impact of this policy is the destruction of local forms of coordination and social policy. Against this neo-liberal policy, however, an oppositional movement emerged, exploring new forms of resistance and political organisation. A fragile alliance evolved, consisting of organised labour and social movements, whose actions peaked in a 'metropolitan strike'. Although this alliance did not develop a coherent strategy, it offered a glimpse into a different urban world. It tested an alternative social project at the local-regional level that connects multiple scales of social interaction.

A network of social interaction of a quite different kind is presented by Geert Lovink and Patrice Riemens: The 'Amsterdam Digital City' is a virtual town with about 50,000 inhabitants, consisting of a great diversity of places and localities. This digital network is strongly anchored in the everyday life of Amsterdam. At the same time it creates a cosmopolitan urban space in which people around the globe can participate. Urbanisation by Internet thus gives a completely new dimension to 'transnational urbanisation'.

All these papers clearly demonstrate that urbanisation is a process which is shaped not only by global economic processes, but also by social and political conflicts at the local and regional level. They also show the various territorial scales implicated in the politics of urbanisation: neighbourhoods, cities, urban regions, national states, up to the global scale.

Urbanisation and globalisation have unsettled the entrenched scales of political-territorial organisation. Between and, to some extent, across these scales, complex social networks are emerging. In consequence, these networks disclose the potential for a new urban project: the urbanisation of politics.

GLOBALISATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND POLICIES FOR THE URBAN POOR

WRITTEN BY | BERND HAMM

CHAPTER

5.2

1. THE PROBLEM

Urban actors of all sorts feel increasingly that they are at the receiving end of developments on which they are unable to exert any influence. Locational decisions of private business, the urban budget, migration streams, or the increasing erosion of purchasing power are beyond their limits of action and yet are decisive for the development of cities and regions. Things happen 'somewhere' and 'somehow' but the local consequences of such happenings seem no longer monitorable. Are local actors becoming helpless victims of globalisation? Where are remaining margins of action? How can local action be responsibly designed and implemented?

A long tradition of research and theory in urban development has treated urban units, not only within their administrative boundaries (the problem of boundaries has been intensively discussed but data availability enforced the factual administrative

definition – remember among others the attempts already made by Kingsley Davis in the late 1950s to empirically correct this misunderstanding, and those of Donald Bogue, Svend Riemer or Shevky and Bell at the theoretical level), but also as relatively independent, even relatively autonomous entities. Moreover, the social ecology tradition used to think in terms of natural history – while the community power tradition ignored the socio-spatial processes resulting from the mechanism analysed. Both assumptions have time and again been seriously challenged and, of course, been falsified. But until the 1970s, this seemed to be of limited significance forempirical research and theoretical conceptualisation. The entire school of factorial ecology, prominent well into the 1980s, remained unimpressed by these arguments. Today, the question is more urgent, more direct and less abstract: What has urban theory to contribute to the understanding of urban development and urban phenomena, and of what use is it for the possible solution of urban problems? More generally: What is urban theory today, and what is its relevance as seen from the perspective of future scenarios?

The question is universal in a rapidly increasing urban world. The practical answers will, of course, be different for Calcutta or Berlin, Shanghai or Brussels, Lagos or Toronto, Cairo or Melbourne, Moscow or Manila, Curitiba or Oslo. But different as they may be – globalisation captures them all and imposes on them an increasingly similar framework of development conditions. So there is a need for urban theory to identify the major factors in this framework and how they operate; this will be attempted in the second section of this paper. After this, we have to understand how such factors translate into local structures, of which land use specialisation and segregation are the most important aspects. Finally, we will discuss scenarios of the probable urban future, and look at what local action can achieve.

2. GLOBALISATION

International interdependence has existed since the inception of the nation state. It has, however, become more dense, more complex, and more comprehensive. By 'globalisation' we denote that this process has gained a new quality. In 'international interdependence' we see states as the main actors, and not necessarily all states are involved; in 'globalisation', all states are affected and the structure of interrelations becomes dominant over the intentions of the actors in shaping their action. Globalisation relates to the emergence of a global society. The major engine driving this process is the globalising economy. But its consequences make themselves felt in all spheres of policy, ecology, culture and society. Fundamental changes can be observed since 1973: some major events may be recalled like the first oil price shock in November of that year, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the establishment of the economic summits of the Group of Seven (G 7, USA, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany), the election of neo-conservative governments since the early eighties, the beginning of 'supply-side economics', debts crises, the inception of structural adjustment policy in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the pull-out of USA and Great Britain from UNESCO, and the Gulf War. Important symptoms are the internationalisation of production, trade and finance and a change in the global power structure. But first of all it is capital which has overcome all barriers of space and time and is tirelessly seeking after the least chance of profit.

To put it simply, the notion of globalisation means that a growing proportion of the global population is subjected to the same conditions of development. Increasingly over time, actors and social units find themselves in circumstances to which they can at best only adapt. This is only superficially a 'new world disorder'; we can rather observe a new structure of power and distributive relations emerging. In the old days, sovereign nations states have been the main actors; now, transnational corporations (TNCs) have joined them. Increasingly important are supranational (e.g. the European Union) and international (e.g. the IMF) organisations even if their character is informal, as in the case of the G 7. The fabric of international agreements and regimes (e.g. GATT/World Trade Organisation, WTO) becomes more densely woven.

However, global interdependence is neither all-encompassing nor symmetric. Living conditions do not level out in all parts of the world. Development conditions vary according to the position of a given country in a hierarchical world system. This differentiation has, from the great discoveries on, been eloquently described in world systems theories (first of all Wallerstein 1974 et al.) as the emergence of capitals and peripheries. International exchange between partners of unequal strength serves to maintain the power

of the stronger; among partners of equal standing, it serves towards inner integration and mutual control, and delimitation against others. Empirically, the inequality among states has increased, and this is also the case within most societies. Globalisation does not happen by natural law but is intentionally produced and enforced until it develops its own dynamics in power relations and economic, technological, and ecological forces. 'Globalisation' connotes the almost equal extension of economic interrelations over the globe. The development conditions seem to homogenise and level out differences. This impression is not only incorrect, it is deeply false.

Under conditions of globalisation, the nation state does not only not become superfluous, but it changes its role so as to subject living conditions to the wishes of TNCs. This state is weak because it is an executive agent of uncontrollable forces, and it is especially weak where it should deliver services to its citizens. What is perceived as a loss of control is in part the deliberate surrender of executive power (deregulation, failure to enforce tax regulation), and partly the result of enormous public debts (privatisation, destruction of the welfare state) from the privatisation of profits and the socialisation of deficits. But this state is strong when it comes to enforcing the demands of the globalising economy against society: It provides for the production and maintenance of infrastructure, legal safety, a well-educated working force, minimal costs for private business, reduces union power, maintains weak environmental regulations, controls social unrest and conflict, and helps to create favourable conditions for TNCs in international organisations. This is perhaps most obvious in the management of the international debts crisis and structural adjustment policy. TNCs use differences in such conditions between countries to blackmail states and threaten to relocate jobs if their demands are not being met.

On the surface, market regulation and majority rule have gained global predominance since the collapse of socialist regimes. But another contradiction is becoming increasingly clear: Global society built on such principles may be economically successful if measured with the usual indicators, but it is not sustainable. It cannot guarantee a decent living, nor does it concede democratic participation to all humans, nor is it able to safeguard the natural basis of human survival. Just the opposite: all available indicators show a sharp polarisation of rich and poor, the destruction of natural life support systems, violations of human rights. Global society reveals symptoms of existential crisis in the very process of its emergence. The Club of Rome was not the first but is most impressive in pointing to this 'problématique' (as they called the syndrome of complex interrelated aspects of crisis). The emerging global society is deeply divided, shattered by distributional struggles, and it lives at the cost of later generations. Manifold are the arguments which even see the entire human species at the

brink of destruction. It was the World Commission for Environment and Development which popularised 'sustainable development' as the key-notion of an opposing position, a path of development which allows present generations to satisfy their basic needs without compromising future generations in fulfilling theirs (WCED 1987, 46).

International economic interdependence is a consequence of the division of labour between countries which specialise in the production of certain goods in order to do so as efficiently as possible. International division of labour is supposed to produce welfare gains for all countries involved. Goods, raw materials, work force and capital are exchanged across borders. A country's international economic relations limit its scope for domestic action and define in relevant ways its position in, and influence upon, international hierarchies. The highly industrialised OECD countries in particular exchange a large volume of products and production factors similar to each other in quality and quantity; their economic relations are symmetrical. Much less is the involvement of non-OECD-countries in international economic exchange. Their exchange relations with OECD-countries are asymmetrical: there are significant differences in the structures of imports and exports (raw materials against machinery, capital investments, emigration of qualified labour force).

TNCs are the most visible agents of international economic interdependence. They organise global exchange along trans-national production and trade chains and impose their supply on global consumption patterns. Central business districts of cities around the world offer evidence of this. TNCs control strategic industries decisive for future market success, power, and welfare: genetic engineering, chemical and pharmaceutical industries, cars, space industries, new materials, robotics, information and communication technologies. In the key industries, a global struggle for strategic leadership is going on which decides the basic technologies which will be applied in the future. To arrive at and hold profitable market positions, resources are combined and strategic alliances concluded, together with further expansion and concentration, and destructive competition. Global financial players provide the monetary means necessary to channel the allocation of resources. But TNCs are less autonomous than it may seem: they depend on the profit expectations of their owners. Increasingly, these owners are financial institutions like banks, insurance companies, or investment funds who care much more about profit maximisation than for the source of the capital they are investing.

TNCs contribute one third to the global product; almost one third of the entire global trade of, the USA or the United Kingdom is under control of TNCs. Among the 100 biggest TNCs (1992), 26 are of US origin, 16 originate in Japan, 12 in France, nine in both the UK and Germany, eight in other EU countries, 17 in other OECD countries. They operate mostly from industrialised countries and have covered the world with their subsidiaries. But TNCs are only

marginally relevant for employment: less than three per cent of the globally active population find jobs in TNCs, eighty per cent of them in industrialised countries.

TNCs need nation states as their operational basis, for the provision of numerous services and infrastructures. Governments court TNCs even if they do not bring widespread social benefits. Few states benefit directly from the profits of high-tech production. Where production is more labour intensive, radical cost competition lowers the salaries. Non-industrialised countries may offer cheap labour, but they do not have the infrastructures which TNCs prefer. Global polarisation increases, and the economic structure solidifies. Industrialised countries built supranational blocks like, the European Union, NAFTA, APEC in order to improve the working climate for TNCs. Social security and environmental standards are being destroyed and homogenised on the lowest possible level. Clear evidence can be provided of the intensification of global trade, production, and finance. World trade, as the most visible form of global economic relations, increased over the last few decades much more than the global product. It happens mostly between industrialised countries and allows them to export their dirty industries (coal, steel, shipyards) to low-income countries.

Production becomes international via foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI serves to gain and safeguard sales markets and access to raw materials. Regional differences between countries in factors relevant for the TNCs are being used to undermine protectionist measures. During the early 1980s, FDI increased by ten per cent annually, in the late eighties by fifteen, in some areas by thirty per cent. In regional terms, FDI is concentrated in Europe, North America, and Japan/Pacific. Developing countries have no role to play here; among the very few exceptions are the free enterprise zones in the People's Republic of China.

Ten per cent of all foreign assets are FDI, ninety per cent are pure financial placements. These are being traded on international financial markets which, as a result of technological innovation and deregulation, have liberated themselves from all control. It is not only production which counts in investment decisions but also interest rates, currency relations, or decisions made by other investors. A highly specialised profession cares for the realisation of profits, no matter whether they result from the killing of jobs, dumping, even semi-legal or criminal undertakings, or pure speculation. The invisible hand becomes most important here: the volume of international financial transactions exceeds by many times the volume of the international movement of goods.

Globalisation is also an important trend in the political sphere. By 'world politics' we mean the activities of governments in so far as they are designed to shape global phenomena. National governments are by far the most important actors in world politics, and certainly so in the United Nations and its special organisations. Political globalisation means that the fabric of global political

institutions and regimes has become tight enough to determine, to a considerable extent, the action of national governments. In addition, there are political interdependencies in international and supranational agreements which shape national or regional conditions of development. It is important to stress the actors' *national* bases because governments remain dependent on their respective electorates and clientele, and because they define, to a large extent, the margins for action and the influence of national non-governmental organisations. Their weight in world politics depends on their respective national support and their relative position in a hierarchical world system.

Since its inception the United Nations has developed under the dominance of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the shadow of East-West confrontation. Only on this condition can one understand the construction of the security council as the only UN body capable of taking binding decisions. This also holds true for the Bretton Woods institutions (especially the IMF and the World Bank) which, although residing under the roof of the UN, were neither subject to instructions from, nor accountable to, the General Assembly, nor did they follow the 'one nation, one vote' rule. Two structural divides can be observed in the history of the UN: decolonization led, in the sixties, to the admission of many new members (the 'Group of 77', i.e. the developing countries) and in consequence changing majorities in the General Assembly against the western capitalist countries. UNCTAD became their major forum, and their greatest success was the adoption of the New World Economic Order in 1974, the failure of which was, however, decided in the very same moment, when the western governments refused to sign an integrated commodity agreement and accept a code of conduct for TNCs. UNCTAD was superseded by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was transformed into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The end of this phase was marked by the break-down of the Bretton Woods system 1973. In 1975, the annual economic summits of the G 7 began which have been firmly institutionalised since. At the same time, the UN lost importance especially because the US government refused to pay its regular dues and to accept the International Court of Justice as a conflict regulating institution. The G 7 became the nucleus of a new global power structure devoid of any idea of democratic control. Not only does the G 7 in fact rule over the security council; it also holds the majority of votes in the IMF and the World Bank, and controls NATO. Until only a few months ago, i.e. before the British and French elections, all G 7 governments were in the hands of neo-liberal parties.

Secondly, it was the end of the socialist regimes in 1989/90 which resulted in a new increase in the number of member states while, at the same time, ideological East-West confrontation came

to an end. More than anything else the Gulf War of 1990/91 marked the change towards North-South conflict. Not only was this the first war about commodities but also a clear demonstration of the increasingly unilateral, egocentric policy the US government had decided to follow on the global level.

A series of world conferences showed the demand for global regulation: 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1993 The United Nations Conference on Human Rights, 1994 the World Conference on Population and Development, 1995 the World Summit for Social Development, and the World Conference on the Status of Women. It was here that non-governmental organisations started to play a more visible role. All world conferences had as their result a final declaration and a plan of action. Yet the OECD countries, while signing these documents, do, in fact, nothing to implement them through their national policies.

The economisation of world politics has not been paralleled by a similar politicisation of the world economy; democratic control remains nationally fragmented and increasingly meaningless. The IMF and World Bank are the dominant institutions which enforce neo-liberal economic policy all over the world ('structural adjustment'). The convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty serve a similar goal within Europe, with the destruction of the welfare state, privatisation etc.

In ecological terms, every human society forms part of a natural cycle on which it exerts more or less influence. These cycles are essentially global even if we only observe their local symptoms. Some societies appropriate more than the carrying capacity of their own territory by, e.g., importing natural resources from, or exporting wastes to, other territories. This is done by the increasingly dense network of international trade. The extent of such interdependence has been estimated: existing research shows consistently that the OECD countries over-use their own natural resources by roughly tenfold, if we accept the equal right of all humans to the earth's natural resources as a yardstick. Of the green house gas emissions of the last 150 years, ninety per cent emanate from the industrialised countries. Research on climate change estimates that oceans and plants may be able to absorb some 13 billion tons of CO_2 annually; however, almost six billion of the world population emit currently some 29 billion tons of CO_2 per year, and the absorptive capacity of oceans and plants is continuously damaged. The green house effect and the depletion of the ozone layer takes place mostly at the cost of developing countries.

The appropriation of global natural resources by the western capitalist countries does not only happen directly with the import of raw materials and the export of wastes, but also indirectly with the import of semi-finished or finished products. A realistic picture

152

would also have to take into account the respective externalised costs. Global economic interdependence tightens causal effects between its own action and its consequences at some other place, while at the same time rendering them more obscure: Climate change, ozone depletion, the extinction of biological species, or the pollution of the oceans, while resulting from natural resource consumption on the part of the rich countries, make themselves felt in other parts of the world, in the futures or in forms which are not directly attributable to their origins. The process of globalisation is accelerating.

International environmental policy has not been inactive. There are a great number of conferences held, declarations, protocols and conventions signed and committees enacted. 130 national governments have participated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and signed up to global sustainable development with the Rio Declaration and the Agenda 21. Almost all national and international organisations declare themselves for environmental protection. But the basic contradictions persist: the very mechanisms of the world economic systems which are responsible for the destruction of the natural-life support system are supposed to save the environment, and the rich countries, while verbally acknowledging their obligation to act, continue to prevent effective action (as, it was the case in the process of preparing the Kyoto climate summit).

It is the structure of the international division of labour and of the trade and financial relations, all dominated by the western countries, which allows for their net import of natural resources and thus their appropriation of the life chances of others. Transnational corporations and national governments are the principal agents towards this goal. The relative affluency of the western societies is only possible at the cost of those world regions which are forced to export natural resources and under-consume their resources. In other words: The west imports life chances from other world regions, and exports its problems there. This unequal exchange is being accelerated and intensified by increasing economic growth and distributional struggles. The west enforces a development model based on growth, marketable goods, and international trade, while at the same time destroying subsistence economies and natural assets. The world economic system is responsible for the destruction of the global life support system.

The global *problématique* also involves a social dimension. Although the global income per capita has tripled in the last fifty years, it is increasingly unequally distributed: the proportion of

world income appropriated by the richest twenty per cent of the world population has increased from 70 to 85 per cent from 1960 to 1991, while the proportion of the poorest twenty per cent dropped from 2.3 to 1.4 per cent. 358 individuals possessing a fortune of more than one billion US dollars have more than the poorer half of humanity (UNDP 1996). Every fifth human being lives below the poverty line. The number of those in poverty increases rapidly, especially in Eastern Europe where the victims of transformation become more and more visible. Malnutrition, illness, miserable housing conditions or homelessness, low life expectancy, hopelessness and despair are among the regular concomitants.

The World Summit for Social Development called for the elimination of poverty, full employment, and the struggle against social disintegration. Ten Obligations of Copenhagen were adopted. The German government was among them; until now it was not willing to clearly substantiate what this meant but rather promised to act on a case-by-case base. With respect to a national poverty report, also among the obligations, the government holds that there is no poverty in Germany and therefore no need for such a report.

Precarious and poorly paid work become regular in the OECD countries as a result of economic globalisation, and an engine of growth in the newly industrialising economies, while the majority of developing countries remain in the position of exporters of raw materials with increasing poverty. The consequences are increasing exploitation especially of women and children on the one hand, massively increasing migration streams on the other. International competition and the resulting cost pressure produce growing socio-economic polarisation: the poor and the public pay for the profits of share-holders while the middle classes are diminished and social safety nets eroded.

The European Union has only weak competence in social policy as the social protocol of the Maastricht Treaty has been negotiated to insignificance by the intergovernmental conference. Although the British opting out is no longer valid, it is the weaker member states like Portugal or Greece who resist harmonisation on a higher level so as not to lose competitive advantages. It is easy to predict that any extension of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe will be followed by social dumping.

Migration is the natural result of unequally distributed life chances, economic, political, ecological, or cultural. The number of migrants world-wide is estimated at between 70 and 200 million, only one fourth of which are legally defined migrant workers. Volume, direction, and selectivity of migration streams depend on the push and pull factors between the countries of origin and destination. With increasing polarisation, migration has also increased. For many migrants, especially from Eastern Europe and from Africa, the European Union is the privileged region.

The brain drain exhausts the countries of origin of economically and culturally active parts of the population, thus accentuating unfavourable conditions for development because they result from global economic inequalities. In the receiving countries, migrants make up the lowest social strata and are exposed to xenophobia, racism and social conflict in situations already characterised by unemployment and poverty.

Also, culture is seriously affected by globalisation. Non-English languages are increasingly penetrated by foreign words of mostly anglo-saxon origin, with pop music and computer technology serving as the main transmitters. There is simply no way to surf the Internet without at least some rudimentary knowledge of English. Electronic technologies and global information media produce patterns of languages, attitudes, and behaviour which aim at global homogenisation, from advertising via entertainment to the planned production of needs and values. Most of the news originates from US new agencies. The media are controlled by global players. Every supermarket presents a sample of goods which have travelled from around the globe. US films and soap operas distributed by globally active agents have driven out local production, and sports, fashion, consumption, leisure, and conflict regulation patterns are being defined in conformity with American middle class standards. Those social strata with at least some purchasing power become standardised and homogenised so as to allow target group advertising. They represent 'the normal' and 'legitimate desires'. All over the globe, they use their computers with the same operating system and software, pay their bills with the same credit cards, and stay in the subsidiaries of the same international hotel chains which are proud of looking exactly alike everywhere. International retail chains locate in the central business districts of all cities of a given size which increasingly have the same combination of stores. Only on the surface and only for the naive can this mean a globally unifying culture; in fact it is the extinction of cultural variety and plurality and their replacement by profit mad monopolies, just in the same sense as biological species are exterminated.

153

3. HOW DOES GLOBALISATION TRANSLATE INTO URBAN DEVELOPMENT?

Traditional urban development theory was based on the explicit or implicit assumption of local autonomy and governability. There was, in part of the literature, recognition of supralocal factors, but empirical urban research was always bound by the administrative delimitation of cities. However, even in ancient history, the first global city, Rome, would not have grown to its size without the *Imperium Romanum*. Until industrialisation, city size was clearly determined by the potential of the respective hinterlands and the available transportation technologies. In some sense this holds true today; but nowadays this hinterland is the world and transportation costs became almost negligible. The 'natural' limits to urban growth are no longer effective; they have been replaced by competition in a hierarchical system of cities. Determinants of urban development even for middle-sized cities are defined by transnational corporations looking for profitable locations; city budgets subject to national grants which themselves depend on international financial speculation; migration resulting from global inequality; unemployment and public debts, which drive cities towards the receiving end of global developments. Competing with each other, they fight for relative advantages for the location of industry and commerce, hoping to stabilise or improve employment and their tax base, while at the same time wasting immense amounts of money to become attractive for private business. Autonomous local self-determination has shrinked close to zero. Where there are remainders for local decision-making, corruption and nepotism are part of the game. The extreme situation of cities almost totally controlled by a combination of organised crime and corrupt administration can be observed in Eastern Europe where, under the influence of some crypto-capitalist ideology, the borders between the legal and the criminal have been destroyed.

If we define 'urban development' more systematically as the change of land use patterns and the segregation of social collectivities in the urban space due to changes in the parameters for action of urban actors, then we find supralocal determinants responsible for all these components. In ecological terms, a definition based on the throughput of material and energy would be more adequate; cities are entities which cannot survive from their own resource base. Whatever cities use for their survival has to be imported, and whatever they exude has to be exported – again they existentially depend on supralocal relations. The city is a metabolism, it is an organisational unit in which the metabolism between humans and their non-human environment is managed. The hinterland is global in principle, but the degree of interdependence varies with the relative position of a city in the hierarchical system of cities. It is not only that TNCs apply a global perspective in looking for profitable locations; also small local businesses see themselves exposed to supralocal competitors. Nor do cities autonomously and independently control their investments, but rather depend on grants given by higher levels of government and determined elsewhere. No city council has the power to control unemployment or immigration; yet city budgets have to absorb the resulting costs.

It is not too difficult to understand and extrapolate the consequences: The continuous impoverishment of cities prevents them from taking responsibility for those services and infrastructures which for decades have been seen as part of the common good. Cities are being subjected to manipulation in the interests of capital, euphemistically celebrated as privatisation. Who will benefit if private sponsors make the final decisions about urban culture? Who can seriously control the quality and quantity of available drinking water if it is in the hands of private profiteers? Globalisation will result in more unemployment and poverty for the many, and more wealth for the few, thus socio-economic polarisation. Increasing economic concentration, increasing currency or commodity speculation, increasing polarisation, increasing public indebtedness will result in more urban uniformity, more cost pressure, more unemployment, more working poor, more immigration, more inner city segregation with unrest and crime, more regional disparities, and definitely less governability. Small islands of wealth will emerge in the oceans of poverty, and will be protected by military and police forces. Social Darwinism will eat up the fruits of enlightenment, *homo homini lupus* – this precisely is the ideology of the present version of capitalism. Those who drive forward these trends will find corruption and crime, violence and disease, extremism and racism in their entourage. Advocates of supply-side economics are certainly not surprised by such consequences; rather they know them and take them deliberately into account. Under their influence, governments resort to repression to keep the level of manifest conflict down. This is not an unrealistic picture of the worst casepossible but is already happening. The technical and legal provisions for repression have been provided and are being completed.

An adequate theory of urban development can no longer be confined to city limits, to single disciplines, to retrospective epistemologies. It must be global in perspective, future-oriented, transdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and normative, and demand that cities play a role in global sustainable development, for the safeguard of security, social justice and democratic participation, and decent living for all its inhabitants. It must understand the inextricable trinity of ecological, economic, and social sustainability.

Throughout history, cities have been divided places. They have always been the products of surrounding societies and their respective pattern of inequalities (as a matter of fact, it would be more precise to understand 'society' as an abstraction built as

the sum of its cities), they have always translated social into spatial separations. Only if we are willing to address social inequality will we be able to reduce spatial segregation. This has become more difficult as globalisation enforces inequality, and the construction of our political machineries and decision-making processes is such that it will continue. Now, the globalised corporations and the wealthy deprive the state of due taxes while at the same time using public infrastructures and externalising costs. However, it was only a few decades ago that there was a broad social consensus that the political sphere should be entrusted with levelling out inequalities produced by capitalism. Urban spatial segregation – according to class, life-cycle, ethnicity, culture or religion – is not a problem *per se*, but rather an integrating mechanism in heterogeneous societies. What are, then, the conditions under which segregation goes along with tolerance, openness, the appreciation of cultural diversity and enrichment? Under which conditions is spatial segregation likely to result in violence, discrimination, tension, unrest, and conflict? Immense empirical evidence is available which clearly indicates that the decisive factor is *socio-economic polarisation*. Where the degree of inequality is low, diversity will be experienced in a strong positive sense; where it is high, class conflict will be multiplied by other factors such as ethnicity. It is also obvious that relative equality produces much less social cost than high levels of inequality. This is not so much about a static picture but about dynamic processes: Whoever deprives the young from the opportunity of a decent life, will yield violence and illness. We also know much about the mechanisms which locate urban problem areas either in the classical zones of transition or, more recently, in the multiple-unit housing estates at the urban fringe.

All this has been well researched for many decades, and we have sound empirical evidence from many cities. The problem is not so much further research but rather how research can be translated into decision-making. Much less attention has been paid to the possible policy options of cities under conditions of tight budgets.

4. WHAT POLICIES FOR THE URBAN POOR?

Should, or must cities bow under the conditions set by the globalised economy? How could they resist? In general, an alternative strategy can be developed when cities decide to delink from global trends wherever possible, and turn their attention towards the interests of the local and regional populations. Most cities do have the potential to survive from their own endogenous forces if these are sufficiently developed. They need not wait for higher levels of government to act. Key principles for alternative strategies include delinkage, self-organisation, and the careful use of natural resources. But many city governments are trapped by the false promises of neo-liberal ideology and the alleged beneficial effects of competition. Even if they are, their least obligation is to do what they can to prevent pauperisation.

Is globalisation without local alternatives? Is adaptation and competition the only available option for urban policy? What can be done to soften the effects of globally produced inequality? What is the local contribution to global sustainable development? For the social aspect on which this paper concentrates, it is essential to understand the difference between *real* and *monetary* income. While monetary income is what you may get as a salary for your work, or as dividends for your shares, or as interest for your capital, real income is about the total of living conditions including fresh air or water, healthy food, good education for your children, a safe neighbourhood, access to public infrastructure and health services, social welfare in case of risks, help in case of emergency. The two do not necessarily correlate with each other (and were almost completely independent of each other in the former socialist societies).

This opens a broad array for possible action. Projects to help people, especially the unemployed and poor, in self-organisation and mutual self-help should receive public support. Non-monetary exchange systems (LET systems), for example, need some minimum co-ordination to be effective which in practice means some office space, a telephone and PC, a small salary. Communal housing, if under pressure to become privatised, may be transferred into co-operative ownership. Urban renewal and revitalisation can be organised so as to give residents the chance to contribute their own working time, with some professional advice, against the guaranteed right to stay in their homes. Neighbourhood centres may be set up which provide all the necessary tools for people who want to engage in the repair of their housing, or car, or for gardening, along with adequate consultation services and supervision. Child care can easily be organised by the families themselves, which is also the case with health care for the elderly or for the sick, only minimal infrastructural provision or monetary compensation is necessary. Open spaces may be made available for subsistence gardening, and public parks and streets planted with fruit trees (which was relatively common in the eighteenth

century for the use of the poor). There is a great number of creative, self-organised projects from which important lessons can be learned. Third World countries have experience with dual economies, and Eastern European informal economies were instrumental in rescuing the shortcomings of central planning. Motivation for self-help and self-organisation must be strengthened, and barriers of an administrative, legal, or fiscal nature removed. This might come closer to a true 'market economy from below' (Hernando de Soto) than the highly concentrated, highly regulated formal economies. The resources poured into unemployment benefit and welfare can be used for public works. André Gorz had, almost twenty years ago, proposed a guaranteed minimum income against a certain amount of public work over a person's life-time.

A strategy for self-help urban renewal and ecological reconstruction, could make an interesting starting point. Usually, urban renewal areas reveal a typical combination of (a) a high pro-portion of poor and unemployed residents, (b) deteriorating housing stock, (c) physical infrastructure in need of repair or upgrade. This is the case in inner city urban renewal areas in capitalist societies, but more so in cities of the former socialist block, or of so-called developing countries. A similar situation can be found in many of the peripheral, multiple family housing estates erected in the sixties and the seventies. Where this is the case, self-help projects could be initiated which follow the principles of ecological construction (materials, energy saving, use of renewable energies, use of rain water, greening the surroundings, etc.), make use of the 'free-time' and expertise of the unemployed, give them the necessary tools, materials and expert advice and which would involve, and train, craftsmen. In return, residents involved in the process may be granted the right to stay in the house at minimal rent. Where several parties cooperate, the right to stay may be granted to all residents together as a co-operative against the obligation to maintain and administer the building or even entire neighbourhoods. In such cases it would be highly probable that residential communities would stabilise, accept responsibility for their house and neighbourhood, become trained in democratic decision-making, and develop organisational and subsistence networks. Thus, a triple effect could be achieved: some employ-ment for the poor, ecological urban renewal, and better training, while the necessary investment remains relatively modest.

All this and other measures are possible at the local level. One of the preconditions is that segregated poor neighbourhoods are stabilised, existing exchange networks supported, property rights conceded, solidarity, identification and responsibility for the neighbourhood promoted and supported. Mechanisms which enforce mobility should be changed; it is better, for example, to combine smaller housing units into bigger ones and thus to adapt them to changing family needs instead of forcing people out when they have children. Immigrant populations should be given the right to vote, and they should be encouraged to self-organise and build up representative organisations (Canadian multicultural policy is

a rich fund of experience). It is not segregation *per se* which is the problem, but rather the conditions under which such segregation emerges and persists. It is, but it is not only monetary income which is missing under conditions of poverty, more important altogether is the syndrome of marginalisation. It is to a large extent in the hands of local policy matters to act and create empowering conditions, and it is not money in the first place which is lacking, but political will, insight, and imagination. What we need are infrastructures for subsistence.

The concept of social organisation based on full employment in paid work from which social dues and taxes can be deducted is over, and it will not come back. There is no comprehensive blueprint for a utopian future, and perhaps that is a good thing. Cities are at the receiving end of globalisation, and they must cope with developments on which they have no influence and which produce problems. But they are not helpless. Distribution policy is not only made by taxes and social welfare but also by securing infrastructures for subsistence to help prevent pauperisation. This must, of course, not be used as a pretext to justify the end of employment and social policy. The conditions for survival for those who do not find sufficient paid work in the formal sector must be provided.

Higher levels of government may in the meantime find measures to tame global capitalism. History can demonstrate that this is not only possible but urgently necessary. Since early industrialisation, with an average life expectancy of little more that thirty years and children working up to ten hours daily in coal mines, capitalism has not become more humane. Civilisation begins where the weak are accepted in their natural law as humans, and protected from ruthless exploitation. We have to defend civilisation against the attacks of global capitalism, and cities have an important role to play in this fight.

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THE LA HABANA/ ECOPOLIS PROJECT: URBAN REGENERATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

WRITTEN BY | RAFFAELE PALOSCIA

PHOTOS BY | RAFFAELE PALOSCIA

CHAPTER

5.3

Within the Laboratory of Ecological Designing of Settlements (LAPEI) of the University of Florence there is an operating department, which aims to back up theoretical and methodological research work with some planning experiences in developing countries. Through the work of this department, an attempt is made at experimenting with the territorialist approach towards ecological transformation. This approach is based on the idea of self-sustainability and is articulated on various levels, from the production of environmental quality, to the recognition of the value of local identity and resources to be brought into action through new forms of self-government. One of the projects currently underway is the La Habana/Ecopolis project, discussed here in relation to two elements: the context and the project.

Colón.
Location of the community action projects and initiatives

★ Casa Museo Lezema Lima
1 Solar **La California**
2 Centro Promotor Cultural Gonzálo Roig
3 Proyecto Social-Comunitario **La Ludoteca**
4 Proyecto **Por la fuerza de la vida**
5 Proyecto **La cultura físca de mi barrio**
6 Proyecto **Recreación y esparcimiento de los jóvenes**

Straits of Florida

Centro Habana

La Habana Vieja

Plaza de laRevolución

Playa

Cerro

La Habana. Map of the municipalities in the central area highlighting the boundaries of the barrio Colón.

1. THE CONTEXT

Within a world which defines itself as being in a transitional phase, Cuba is in transition in a very particular sense. Although unequivocally on the losing side, Cuba is not willing to accept and mould itself to the winners' logic. For some this means it is pathetic, its days numbered; for others, a bulwark of resistance through the pursuit of a certain ideology; for others again, a potential laboratory pointing to a third path. Those involved in the project are with this third group.

In 1989, on top of the long-running embargo imposed by the Americans, we saw the sudden fall of the communist countries which had guaranteed a counterweight to the effects of the embargo. One single piece of data: Cuba's final channel of trade for 85% of its exports was eliminated more or less from one day to the next; and most of the resources essential to life on the island simply disappeared. This is how the *period especial* started, an emergency period of extreme restrictions reaching the very limits of survival. During this time a course of reflection got under way, whose purpose, at least for some, was to start up new ways of social and economic organisation which, with the inevitable opening up to the market, would not lose what had been gained by the Cuban revolution. In terms of health and medical equipment, hygiene controls, literacy and schooling, the care of children and the elderly, infant and childhood death rates and average life expectancy, those who have never had contact with Cuba are amazed to find the standards we would expect to find in Europe.

Another element which distinguishes Cuba sharply from so many other Latin American countries is that here we do not have a megalopolis like Mexico City, Lima, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro. These started with a population similar to that of La Habana at the end of the '50s (about 1,500,000 inhabitants) and have now grown beyond the 5 million or the 10 million mark. La Habana today barely exceeds a population of 2 million because of a decisive policy of decentralisation and discouragement of the process of urbanisation, backed up by an effective diffusion throughout the national territory of primary services and productive activity. The disturbing Latin American scenario of illegal settlements, favelas and villas miserias, is absent.

What is not absent however – here lies the real emergency in La Habana – is a widespread and almost general decay of the physical structures, of buildings, streets, technological plants, infrastructures. By way of an incredible illustration: in La Habana, since the beginning of the *período especial*, an average of nearly 3 buildings a day collapse. Buildings which are part of an urban pattern of great historic and architectural value, whether they are in the original nucleus dating back to 1500-1600, the expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries, or in the quarters of the season of eclecticism at the beginning of the 20th century culminating in original art deco in the '30s.

All this is causing dramatic problems for the preservation of a heritage which belongs to the world. UNESCO has put La Habana Vieja on the list of places to be saved and in fact there is large scale intervention being carried out there. Other places of minor interest, however, seem to be abandoned to their fate; it is in one of them that the LAPEI intends to concentrate its attention.

However, there are resources which are not lacking in Cuba: first and foremost, human resources. General access to all levels of education on the one hand, and some characteristics of the Cubans on the other – creativity, adaptability, strong identity – have transformed the *período especial* into a great moment of collective experimentation. The process is on-going, although pushed and pulled by often contradictory forces. I will pause, with good reason, to present some positive data:

a) The use of the other resource which is not lacking in Cuba, the beauty of the nature and of the towns, has allowed the island to become an increasingly popular international tourist trap, attracting capital from overseas which is otherwise inaccessible. I will not dwell on the negative aspects that this can produce and is, in fact, to a certain extent, producing. We can see how human resources include the ability to experiment, in this case, with original forms of managing the income from tourism. A part is deducted and used for a redistribution to meet primary needs, a situation which has led to a visible improvement in living conditions since 1994, after which considerable direct funding has been made available for urban renewal. The tourist who drinks his *mojito* – the traditional Cuban aperitif – on Bodeguita del Medio, where Hemingway alternated bouts of drunkenness with literary composition, is unaware of the fact that a considerable part of the $5 that he pays will go directly towards swelling the funds for the restoration of the buildings in La Habana Vieja.

b) The springing up of small entrepreneurial activity, but also grass-roots groups in the various *barrios*. In a clearly stated vision of solidarity and community, they are equipping themselves to face a situation where there no longer exists a central organisation which, for better or worse, answered needs. This has supported the most varied collection of activity – productive activity, services and facilities, artistic production, green spaces, symbolic locations, etc.

c) Research into the most diverse ways of using and recycling local resource materials to substitute for the imported goods which are no longer available. The most easily encountered example of this on the streets of La Habana is transport, where the number of bicycles has leapt during the *período especial* from 50,000 to 1,000,000 and they are often equipped with the weirdest and most ingenious Heath Robinson contraptions for the transporting of goods and people. The same kind of transformation in the lifestyle of the Cubans can be witnessed in every area of social life. This "making a virtue of necessity", coupled with the new forms of self-management, seems to be producing an almost natural tendency towards self-sustainability.

An area taken over for community use after being made available following the collapse of a building.

2. THE PROJECT

The La Habana/Ecopolis project has been promoted in Italy by three NGOs (CRIC of Reggio Calabria, COSPE of Florence and Terra Nuova of Rome), by Legambiente and by LAPEI.

The project unites numerous Italian and Cuban partners, the Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital being the catalyst and co-ordinator. Its aim is to sustain, from an economic, technical and managerial point of view, a number of initiatives put forward by local institutions and grass-roots groups working towards an ecological transformation of La Habana.

The approach adopted, which we would define as territorialist, is an integrated approach towards urban renewal, based on a set of priority options, which are bound together in a complementary fashion. Both the Italians and the Cubans are in agreement on these options: the safeguarding and the production of environmental quality; the consolidation of cultural identity; giving true value to local resources; the definition of forms of self-government.

At the time of writing, the project is composed of a set of initiatives thought out by the Provincia Ciudad de La Habana and which have sprung from differing realities. 5 of the 15 municipalities of La Habana are involved, each of which, through aiming at responding to the specific needs expressed on the spot in different areas of actions has thus become an important element in that overall vision of urban regeneration which is being pursued.

The relevance of this initiative to the general reference framework would seem evident. At the same time, given the immediately operative aims, designed to give concrete and visible results in a specified period of time, such initiatives retain a fragmentary character which runs the risk of reducing its innovative potential.

We feel, however, we can help a greater unfolding of this potential with immediate effects within the individual projects, by placing our specific university laboratory research alongside the vast experience accumulated by the NGOs responsible for the project, that of the Legambiente and, on the spot, that of the Grupo. We feel, too, that the effects will also be seen in the continuing updating process of the *Estrategía para el desarrollo económico-social de La Habana*, which is the fundamental document of town-planning policy in La Habana of which the Grupo is the author.

With this purpose in mind the promoters have decided to operate alongside the specific initiatives which have already been defined as an integrated pilot project of urban regeneration. The aim of this was to start up a general process of self-sustainable ecological transformation in a specified context – the *barrio* Colón – and to form in the short to medium term, a point of reference for other initiatives heading in the same direction.

It is in such project experience that, without neglecting its overall involvement relative to the global project, LAPEI intends to commit itself, working in strict collaboration with its Italian and Cuban partners, while paying particular attention to all requests expressed from the community at a grass-roots level.

Within the diverse realities involved in the project La Habana/Ecopolis, the *barrio* Colón (approx. 1/2 sq. Kms with 29,000 inhabitants), corresponding to one of the *consejos populares* of the municipality of Centro Habana, appears to provide the most suitable context for drawing up and experimenting through a pilot project. This is because of its many extremely serious problems but also because of its high potential. Here I will mention some which came to light immediately during a first, rapid survey carried out by myself and others in November 1996.

Some of the problems are:
– extremely high population density, the highest in the whole province (580 inhabitants per hectare), with highly overcrowded houses widespread;
– advanced and, at times, irreversible decay of the buildings with high incidence of collapse, due to complete lack of maintenance work;
– very precarious conditions of the roads and of the network infrastructures in general;
– total lack of green spaces.

Some of the potentials are:
– presence of spontaneous grass-roots groups, which are of fragile structure but very active and motivated and operating in various aspects of community life;
– population made up of many different cultures and many different religions;
– proximity to La Habana Vieja, which is the most important tourist attraction within the capital;
– buildings of high quality and historical and architectural interest;
– locations having particular symbolic value for local and national culture;
– served by very busy commercial routes, although at the moment in a critical phase;
– widespread small scale commercial activity, with differing levels of formal recognition;
– presence of numerous empty spaces in the urban pattern to be re-used on a collective basis.

The elements which characterise the pilot project should be:
– an integrated approach towards urban regeneration aimed at experimenting, in a single territorial context, on the viability of the set of objectives laid down in the general project: the development of community participation on various levels and at various stages in the project; the restoration and the functional reorganisation of the physical structures; the re-establishment of environmental balance; the recognition of the true value of local identity and culture; the boosting of the economy of the local community based on the available human resources; the safeguarding of a dignified level of existence especially for the most vulnerable population.
– the dual character of the action dedicated to tackling the present emergency situation but which, at the same time, does not fail to look towards the future and beyond its own existence. On the one hand, experimental, aimed at going more deeply into the themes which are relevant to research into new and innovative methods of action, in a process of ecological transformation articulated in phases of short and middling periods. On the other hand, operational, designed to give even minimal results, but which are immediately practicable in situations in which specific action would seem urgent and indispensable.

The aims of the work, to be placed in the general framework of the La Habana/Ecopolis project (and therefore in an adequate metropolitan dimension of the phenomenon) and to be modified and specified according to the requirements reported by the grass-roots groups and by the other official players, can be summarised as:
a) definition of a global, analytical and interpretative picture of the different scales (Ciudad de La Habana; municipality of Centro Habana);
b) careful analyses of the physical, environmental, cultural and productive components of the *barrio* Colón, to be put into action in the form of 'participated diagnoses', in which the role of local grass-roots requirements is central to identifying problematic areas and priorities;
c) focusing on those proposals for taking action regarding reorganisation and renewal which are of an urgent nature concerning specific issues (system of collecting, recycling and disposing of solid waste; public spaces and green areas; restoration and restructuring of buildings; infrastructures and networks);
d) the drawing up of an integrated project with guidelines indicating the pathway towards a self-sustainable ecological transformation, which can be put into practice through the direct participation of the population.

163

Marianao. Building erected by the inhabitants themselves. (First version of the plan by architect Mario Durán Camejo).

Marianao. The roof top area of the building used as a meeting place open to the community. The management has been entrusted to a small cooperative made up people living in the building.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING POLICY IN MEXICO IN RECENT DECADES[1]

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CHAPTER

5.4

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to examine the changes in Mexican housing policy. Following the 1917 Political Constitution (which arose as the result of an armed social movement), workers' right to housing was recognized and the State was established as the guarantor of the fulfillment of this right [3]. This discourse has changed radically since the late 1980s as a result of Mexico's adoption of the neo-liberal model and its adherence to the guidelines of international financial organizations. However, one point should be noted: housing policy has primarily been aimed at the working classes in the so-called formal [4] sector. This means that the majority of the population has been excluded from public housing programs (with a few exceptions). And the housing

programs produced over half the housing in the main cities. Despite their limited scope, the results of these programs, have provided better housing than most of the housing produced by the private sector (i.e. without any involvement of the State) [5].

Without ignoring the importance of production by the social sector, this analysis explores the changes in public institutions which have adopted the rules of the free market, thus hampering access to housing by the population with the lowest income.

The first part of this article provides a brief description of the characteristics of housing policy, during the various periods which define Mexico's economic development. The second part assesses the impact that the adoption of the guidelines issued by international organizations has had on the housing policy of the Mexican State at different times. The paper ends with a summary of the changes in housing policy from 1988 to the present, and the questions raised by these changes.

I. STATE HOUSING POLICY PRIOR TO 1988

From 1920-1930, after the most violent period of the revolution had ended, economic activity was resumed, the first public institutions for economic development were created and the centralized administrative apparatus that would permit the consolidation of the country's social, political and economic stability, was strengthened [6]. In the face of the demand for housing, the State created the first system of financing for housing [7], narrowly aimed at enabling State workers to purchase housing.

During the period from 1930-1950, the import substitution model led to the beginning of industrial modernization which fostered an increase in migration from the countryside to the city. This led to the rapid growth of certain cities, particularly Mexico City, where the establishment of shanty towns [8] produced a significant expansion of the city; this constituted the main process of urbanization, recognized by the State as an inevitable housing alternative for sectors with the least income.

From 1950-1970, Mexico recorded sustained economic growth, supported by the development of the industrial sector, public investment and permanent State intervention in the spheres of economic and social life. The country's gross domestic product maintained average annual growth rates of 7.1% from 1959 to 1970 and 8.9% in the construction sector (see table). This resulted in rapid urbanization, primarily in Mexico City. It is estimated that the proportion of the population living in shanty towns rose from 2.3% in 1947 to 32% in 1952 [9]. In 1970, the population in the metropolitan area of Mexico City reached 9.4 million.

In order to expand access to housing, the State created the Housing Financing Program (PFV) in 1963 [10] to offer mortgages at preferential rates and stimulate the construction of public housing (housing designed for purchase by low-income families). The employers' obligation to provide housing for their employees was established in the 1917 Constitution. But owing to the lack of specific regulations and necessary institutional channels, this obligation was only partially fulfilled until 1972, when three public funds for housing were set up: one for salaried workers in the private sector; another for State employees; and another for members of the armed forces [11]. Despite these programs, public housing could only be afforded by a section of the middle class and workers. The fact that the majority of the population had been systematically excluded from the programs meant that the population continued to satisfy its need for housing through self-construction on the edges of cities.

Since the public housing organizations established up to then only catered for salaried workers and excluded a large proportion of Mexican households which were not incorporated into the formal labor market (47%) [12], in 1982, a trust was set up for the non-salaried population [13] to expand access to public housing.

During the 1970s, the economy began to slow down. In consequence the country's economic course was modified by implementing an expansive fiscal policy [14]. Moreover there was an oil boom which succeeded in maintaining the annual growth rate of GDP at 7.1% from 1971 to 1981 and raising GDP in construction to 9.5% (see table). However, this led to an imbalance between the fiscal and monetary variable, which accelerated inflationary pressures which in turn led to the economic crises of 1976 and 1982.

Percentage Variation of national GDP and Construction Product (in millions of pesos at 1980 prices)

Year	National GDP	Annual Variation	Average	Const GDP	Annual Variation	Average
1971	2,455,795	4.20%		132,961	-2.60%	
1972	2,664,537	8.50%		156,362	17.60%	
1973	2,891,023	8.50%		181,067	15.80%	
1974	3,067,375	6.10%		191,750	5.90%	
1975	3,239,148	5.60%		203,063	5.90%	
1976	3,375,192	4.20%		212,404	4.60%	
1977	3,493,324	3.50%		201,147	-5.30%	
1978	3,779,777	8.20%		226,089	12.40%	
1979	4,127,516	9.20%		255,480	13.00%	
1980	4,470,077	8.30%		287,164	12.40%	
1981	4,862,219	8.77%	7.10%	328,555	14.41%	9.50%
1982	4,831,689	-0.63%		305,354	-7.06%	
1983	4,628,937	-4.20%		246,762	-19.19%	
1984	4,796,050	3.61%		260,003	5.37%	
1985	4,920,430	2.59%		267,076	2.76%	
1986	4,735,721	-3.75%		239,521	-10.32%	
1987	4,817,733	1.73%	-0.10%	246,213	2.79%	-4.20%
1988	4,884,242	1.20%		236,118	-4.10%	
1989	5,047,209	3.30%		245,799	4.10%	
1990	5,271,539	4.40%		270,625	10.10%	
1991	5,462,729	3.60%		293,899	8.60%	
1992	5,615,685	2.80%		310,651	5.70%	
1993	5,649,380	0.60%		321,834	3.60%	
1994	5,858,407	3.70%		337,926	5.00%	
1995	5,495,185	-6.20%		258,513	-23.50%	
1996	5,775,440	5.10%	2.10%	287,984	11.40%	2.50%

N.B. For the first Quarter
Source: Indicadores Económicos, Banco de México, November, 1996

In the early 1980s, the Mexican economy, like that of other Latin American countries, was plunged into an unprecedented crisis. This was expressed as a sharp decline in the GDP and Construction Product as well as in a rapid inflationary process, reflected as an increase in the overall level of consumer prices and building costs (which rose as a result of the cost of materials and land) – in turn affecting the population's purchasing power and the rates of housing credit recovery. During this period, GDP recorded a negative average annual growth rate of -0.1% while GDP in construction showed an average annual decrease of -4.2%, falling to -4.2% and -19.2% respectively in 1983 (see table).

Inflation, which had maintained an average annual rate of 2.9% until 1970, increased during the 1970s until it reached an annual average of 14.4%; the highest rate of inflation in the country's history was registered in the period from 1982-1987, with average annual rates of 90.7%, reaching a peak of 159.2% in 1987.

However, public housing production did not reflect the economy's performance, since total production rose from 68,000 annual dwellings in the period from 1971-1980 to over 150,000 dwellings in the period from 1981 to 1987, despite the reduction in social spending caused by the economic crisis. This was due to the fact that investment for the production of housing was provided by contributions from private and State employers of 5% (INFONAVIT, FOVISSSTE), as well as from a proportion of banking funds (legal reserve) [15] and the scant recovery of mortgage credits, which together accounted for 85% of the total investment. Purely State participation (tax funds) was reduced to public housing for low-income residents, which accounted for only 15% of the funds invested [16]. Maintaining the organization's production and financing of mortgages at fixed interest rates (4% annually) during periods of high inflation entailed high indirect subsidies as a result of the low credit recovery [17], at a high cost for the organizations which were progressively weakened.

Despite its failure to solve the housing deficit (which, in 1976, was calculated at 3 million units) [18], housing policy before 1988 was extremely important because:

1) the State played an active role in the promotion and implementation of this policy, leading to an increase in the housing supply;
2) new alternatives were made available to the various housing applicants;
3) affordable credit conditions were established with low mortgage interest rates;
4) housing production was maintained, leading to a relative improvement in urban housing infrastructure, since the construction of housing complexes meant not only the incorporation of new housing but the provision of infrastructure which enhanced their surroundings;
5) the development of the housing sector and its agents was encouraged;
6) the subsidy was regarded as necessary for access to housing.

It is essential to point out that this policy experienced problems linked to corporate clientelism and the discretionary way in which credits were granted, the awarding of contracts to companies without public bidding and low credit recovery due to the inflexible handling of the subsidy (fixed mortgage rates of 4% when inflation reached a peak of 159%) during the periods of economic crisis. [19] Moreover, during this period, negotiations were carried out for the restructuring of external debt, in which the Mexican government pledged to adopt the suggestions of international financial organizations as part of its economic policy. At the same time, a group was formed within the government to define national economic policy. This group was heavily influenced by neoliberal ideas, which culminated in 1988 with the election to president of the person who had implemented economic policy in the previous administration. [20]

II. CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the conditions imposed by international financial organizations such as the IMF, one of the reasons behind the changes in housing policy in Mexico has been the new approach adopted by the United Nations and the World Bank towards the housing issue. The new approach was expressed in declarations at World Conferences and in the specific conditions attached to the international loans assigned to this sector. Due to the importance of the problem of the homeless and the deterioration of the environment in human settlements, the United Nations has promoted the discussion and orientation of general policies concerning this problem through the following events: the World Conference *Habitat I*, held in Vancouver in 1976; the organization of the *International Year of the Homeless* (1986); the formulation of the *Global Housing Strategy for the year 2000* (1988); the United Nations Conference on *Environment and Development*, in Río de Janeiro in 1992; the Summit on *Social Development* in Copenhagen in 1995; the organization of *Habitat II*, in Istanbul in 1996.

The Vancouver Conference was particularly significant because of the importance of proposals based on all levels of planning and their reformulation within the context of the first crises of the Welfare State. The Global Housing Strategy put forward the initial ideas on the 'enabling strategy,' defined as the provision of a legislative, institutional and financial strategy to allow private agents to develop the housing sector. The 'Agenda 21' at Rio in 1992 incorporates the concern for sustainable development of world policies in relation to the environment. The Copenhagen Summit demonstrated the problems of development, poverty and deterioration of the minimum conditions of well-being caused by the globalizing model and, finally, the Istanbul Conference based its

declaration on the two seminal ideas of 'housing for all' and the 'sustainable development of human settlements in an urbanized world,' proposing market strategies and the 'enabling strategies' of the State as instruments for achieving this.

The implementation of the proposals of *Habitat I* was seriously hampered in developing countries, due to the socioeconomic conditions surrounding the profound crisis of the 1980s, the rise in poverty and urban contradictions and conflicts. *Habitat II* found these countries in an even more difficult context, overwhelmed by external debt and unable to finance social policy and increasingly dependent regarding the adoption of economic and political decisions. The Global Plan of Action drafted at *Habitat II* focused on the population and its settlements and on governments, and pledges to direct and develop 'enabling strategies' in the various countries and give settlers the opportunity to exercise their rights and fulfill their responsibilities by working to improve their own environment.

The so-called 'enabling strategy' is a political approach of the World Bank which began to be implemented in developing countries in the early 1990s [21]. The World Bank started to provide loans for housing projects in 1972 [22] and since then, has wielded a powerful influence on the formulation and orientation of housing policies. The development of this policy can be divided into three stages.

The first, concerning the financing of projects involving 'plots of land with services' and the 'improvement of slum neighborhoods' implied the first important change in post-war housing policies – fostering the replacement of the total provision of public dwellings with the help of the State sector by the private construction of dwellings. On the grounds that the mass production of public housing would require increasingly large subsidies and the fact that low-income family units built their dwellings using an evolving process of self-help and self-administration, the Bank promoted experimental projects in developing countries involving supplies for 'dwellings' [23] which would be affordable for low-income families Costs would be recovered and could be consolidated by progressive processes of self-construction and repeated by the private sector which would shift towards a more modest sector of the market [24]. This last aspect of reproduction and commercialization never flourished because of the impossibility of providing real profits for the private sector.

The second stage entailed the gradual replacement of loans for projects involving plots of land and services by loans for institutions for financing housing. After 1983, the Bank's policy was reoriented, focusing instead on national systems for financing houses and attempting to influence the general policies and performance of the sector. This housing policy sought to accompany the economic reforms and structural adjustments promoted by the World Bank itself and the International Monetary Fund, suggesting

modifications to aspects which limited the free operation of capital markets such as excessive regulation and the existence of controlled financing sources and circuits, setting interest rates below those of the free market, providing generous subsidies, etc. The policy was aimed at integrating the provision of housing into the general financing systems within a context of the progressive liberalization and deregulation of the market [25].

Finally, the third stage, implemented in 1989, was primarily aimed at 'improving the entire housing sector,' one of the proposals of World Bank, the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to 'enable' the free development of the sector through market forces. As a result of this proposal, the State's role was reduced to creating the legal and institutional framework for the facilitation of and timely intervention in 'areas where the market has flaws.' The new priorities for World Bank loans in the housing sector are linked to: 1) policy reforms, the development of property rights and the improvement of financial markets, the modification of regulations and the elimination or replacement of general subsidies by subsidies focused on the beneficiaries; 2) investment in large-scale primary infrastructure projects, improving infrastructure in slum neighborhoods and squatter settlements and providing infrastructure for projects involving plots of land and services; and 3) institutional reform [26].

Mexico played two very different roles in *Habitat I* and *Habitat II*. Mexico arrived at the Vancouver Conference with a housing policy that had been consolidated by the creation of the National Housing Funds for Workers (1972) and a progressive, recently formulated *Law of Human Settlements* (1972). The Conference had a positive impact, as reflected in the creation of the first two National Housing Programs (1978), the creation in 1982 of the National Fund for Popular Housing (FONHAPO) and the passage of a Federal Housing law (1983). However, twenty years later, in Istanbul, Mexico's role was virtually irrelevant. Moreover, at meetings prior to Istanbul, it had contradicted its own Constitution, by supporting, together with the United States and Japan, the international repeal of the 'right to housing,' within the context of a process of reforming housing policy in accordance with orthodox World Bank guidelines.

Housing programs in Mexico have received loans from the World Bank from 1986 to the present. The first of these was aimed at the Program for the Renovation of Housing for the 'reconstruction of Mexico City,' following the 1985 earthquakes, and for FONHAPO, aimed at the progressive implementation of programs involving plots of land and services and housing. FONHAPO received additional credit in 1990, bringing the total amount of loans to nearly

$1,250 million USD [27]. In 1989, the Housing Financing Program (PFV) received $300 million USD from the World Bank to enable it to guarantee its middle-level public housing programs, funds for which were drawn from a percentage of bank funding which was repealed that year in the context of the privatization of the sector. Likewise, from 1997 onward, the PFV began to receive further credit from the World Bank for $335 million USD which would be earmarked for the support and development of the secondary mortgage market.

III. NEO-LIBERAL HOUSING POLICY

Since 1988, the country has witnessed a discourse of 'change' which purports to replace State involvement by deregulation in which the scope of government action and the general functioning of the economy are defined [28]. This policy permeated many economic sectors: finance, foreign investment, trade, and communications and services, housing being no exception.

At the beginning of the present decade, Mexico experienced a short period of apparent economic bonanza, which managed to reduce annual accumulated inflation from 159.2% in 1987 to 7.1% [29] in 1993, through price and salary control, and the 4.4% growth of GDP in 1990, while the growth rate for construction rose to 10.1% that same year. This situation was accompanied by structural reforms which included reforms of the tax system, the privatization of companies in the State sector and the nationalized bank, renegotiation of external debt, the reform of the financial system and trade openness. This boosted international confidence in the future of the Mexican economy, which was reinforced by the signing of NAFTA and the massive influx of speculative external capital (bonds, treasury bonds, investment in the stock exchange), which, determined by their short-term yields were an important factor in the financial crisis, involving a devaluation of 150% in relation to the dollar, massive capital flight and the sharp fall of the country's GDP to -6.2% and of construction to -21.4% in 1995.

Although housing policy had already experienced a number of changes during the crisis and the structural adjustment of the 1980s, these changes were finally consolidated with the 1990-1994 National Housing Plan and the institutional changes carried out in 1992. There was a progressive shift from a public system of supply to a fundamentally 'private' one, in which the State's role was to 'enable' supply and demand in the housing market [30], leaving the promotion of housing to the private sector, comprising banks, constructors and developers, the prime beneficiaries of this policy. These characteristics can be grouped together as follows:

Property rights

As mentioned earlier, popular urbanization in the principal Mexican cities has mainly been carried out on the urban periphery, through the creation of irregular settlements through squatting, and the invasion of public property as a 'tolerated' form of the insertion of the poor into the city. Since the early 1990s, this irregular situation, which had been assumed within the spheres of political clientelism, was forcefully attacked by the massive regulation of plots of land. The aim of this policy was to create a system of private property rights. This process obviously facilitates commercial transactions involving land and housing, which could lead to the expulsion of poor family units. This contributes to speculation involving urban land and the general commercialization of access to housing [31].

Liberalization of the system

Legal restrictions on the circulation of publicly-owned land and the rented housing market were lifted. The legal framework of credit institutions was modified, and the compulsory legal reserve from which the main funds of the Housing Financing Program were obtained was repealed. Finally, the task of obtaining and administering retirement funds was privatized, including the subsidiary housing account which constituted the basis of the funds for INFONAVIT. The role of the principal public housing organizations has been modified, either through changes in the law which originally created it, such as INFONAVIT; by decentralizing and dividing them into three metropolitan zones, as in the case of FONHAPO; or by becoming dependent on international resources, as in the case of PFV; or by adjusting their regulations and programs to adhere to the guidelines of the liberalization of the system, thereby relinquishing most of their control over the process of producing and allocating housing and becoming mere intermediaries in the sector.

A new mortgage financing system

The mid-1980s saw the start of changes in the financial system, the most important of which concerned interest rates. Although regulations existed which meant that rates could be adjusted to the market with the authorization of the Banco de México, it was thought preferable to assume regulated public mortgage loans. When it was decided to change the situation, a policy of progressive, gradual changes was adopted: first, by indexing the debt to the official minimum salary, to adjust monthly payments according to variations in the former and then, by institutionalizing the so-called 'unlimited financing of interests' to be able to operate with the rise and fall of inflation which was gradually imposed until it eventually replaced the total 'real value' of the debt [32]. Since 1989, virtually the entire system had operated using liberated (deregulated) credit rates and conditions.

Changes in the mechanisms for credit recovery can be evaluated in: the re-design of mortgage loans, in both the public and commercial sector, in mortgages with adjustable rates or dual indexes and UDIs [33]; the development of nominal interest rates applied to recovery, initially fixed or regulated and currently the same as those of the market [34]; the time allowed for paying off debts, which is now up to 30 years, and the maximum proportion of income legally allowed to be discounted, which should not exceed 25% but which is generally over 30% [35].

Finally, another important aspect has been the progressive elimination of the subsidy, now only directly allocated for prompt payment to housing programs to combat poverty. The types of indirect, implicit and cross subsidies have disappeared as a result of the changes and measures carried out.

One can say that under the previous system for financing public housing, the State, in its various branches, was the administrator and controller of the entire system, which was virtually total following the nationalization of the bank. Nowadays, the reverse is true: the State no longer administers or controls much of the sector, since these functions have gradually been taken over by the private sphere, as a result of the changes introduced and the participation of new agents who now control the various stages of the dynamics of the system. Thus, the State has reduced its role to facilitating the participation of private agents and serving as an intermediary between the latter and housing agents.

These changes were made for the sake of greater efficiency. However, the State's rescue of the financial sector has entailed high costs for the country, over 11% of the GDP for 1997, which is financed by tax budgets and the external debt. This has affected society as a whole, by reducing the percentage of GDP allocated to social spending and reducing the amount of investment in the productive sectors.

CONCLUSIONS

Although State housing policy was sometimes misguided during its period of greatest intervention, one of its effects being that it immobilized social participation, the short period during which neo-liberal measures have been implemented has shown that the participation of private agents – particularly the financial sector, the basis of the new policy – has been both inefficient and costly.

The national situation is currently undergoing a series of changes. The start of democracy after single-party control of the country for over 60 years opens up the possibility of reinforcing organized social groups, which, together with the State, will be able to propose new alternatives to offset the negative effects of neo-liberal economic policy. This route is not easy, since it entails overcoming deep-rooted inertia and elements, such as political clientelism, inefficiency and corruption, among other things, as well as accepting or proposing new alternatives without ignoring economic and political limitations at the international level.

Endnotes

[1] This article is the result of research study no. IN 302196, sponsored by DGAPA-UNAM, undertaken at the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM.

[2] With the support of Edgar Díaz Ortega, a grant-holder involved in the project.

[3] With the modification to Article 4 of the Constitution in 1983, it was recognized that, 'Every family has the right to proper, decent housing...'

[4] It is important to note that, given the economic development of the country, historically, a high proportion of the population has always been excluded from any system of social benefits, for example, there has never been a system of unemployment benefits.

[5] This point is part of a debate which will be taken up in the conclusions.

[6] Michel, 1988, pp.11.

[7] In 1925, it created the Head Offices of Civil Pensions, granting credit for its workers. In 1933, the Banco Nacional Hipotecario y de Obras Públicas (National Mortgage and Public Works Bank) was created and in 1934 the Federal District Department was authorized to build houses for its employees. Likewise, in 1943, the IMSS began to finance housing programs for its affiliates.

[8] Generally on land without services or basic infrastructure.

[9] Coulomb, and Sánchez, 1992, pp. 92.

[10] One of the main features of the PFV was to reduce interest rates in bank mortgage loans from 15% to 9% and to determine the credit features of the banks which financed housing as well as the requirements to be met by the population benefiting from this.

[11] INFONAVIT, FOVISSSTE, and FOVIMI respectively stipulated that bosses were obliged to contribute 5% of workers, salaries to these funds. For a fulllist of acronyms refer to glossary at end of article.

[12] Garza, 1988, pp. 29.

[13] FONHAPO

[14] The aim of this policy was to recover the dynamism which had been lost by stimulating demand through greater public spending on social work.

[15] 'Legal reserve' was a legal mechanism.

[16] Through organizations such as FONHAP, FIVEDESU and State Housing Institutes, among others.

[17] INFONAVIT has an implicit subsidy totaling huge amounts due to its handling of fixed interest rates (4% annually) at times of high inflation (which in 1987, reached 159%) which led to a low recovery of the credits allocated; actual recovery of credits up to 1987 was lower than 14.4%, meaning that INFONAVIT was effectively granting subsidies of 85%. C.N.I.C 1990, pp.12.

[18] Programa Nacional de Vivienda, 1977-1982, SAHOP.

[19] García and Imas, 1995.

[20] Until 1997, when there was greater democratic openness for the first time, Mexican policy had been vertical and president-centered.

[21] Two key World Bank documents on the subject are: Urban Policy and Economic Development: a Program for the 1990s 1991 and Housing: An appropriate environment for the housing market 1993.

[22] During the period from 1972-1990, the Bank participated in 116 projects on 'plots of land with services', complementary schemes for improving neighborhoods in 55 countries with an average expenditure of 26 million dollars per project. See Pugh, 1993, p. 5.

[23] 'Plots of land with services.'

[24] Post-war housing policy was based primarily on the role of the State as the provider of public housing. However, since the late 1960s, John Turner and William Mangin criticized this policy, giving a positive value to self-help and the ability of the low-income urban population to solve their housing needs with no guidance from centralized bureaucracies. The World Bank adopted this position by implementing it in projects involving 'plots of land with services' and 'improvement of slum neighborhoods', which sought to exploit the potential of self-construction, while at the same time seeking greater links with the private construction sector to ensure that these projects could be reproduced in the housing market.

[25] With this shift in policy from financing projects to financing oriented towards the development of the financial sector, two important aspects were revealed: 1) the increase in the average size of the loans rose from $19 million USD between 1972 and 1975 to $211 million USD between 1985 and 1990 and 2) shifting the bank's operations to countries with higher incomes as a direct consequence of seeking greater development of the financial sphere of housing policy. See other data in World Bank, 1994, p. 65.

[26] World Bank 1994, pp. 73 and 74.

[27] Pugh, 1994, p. 22.

[28] Deregulation constitutes the general framework which reduced control over economic activity by simplifying the regulations governing mercantile institutions and exchanges and making them more flexible.

[29] During the period from 1988 to 1995, real salaries fell 53.7% as a result of State control and the economic crisis of 1995.

[30] These changes faithfully adhered to World Bank precepts.

[31] Imas, 1997, pp. 145f

[32] Maydón, G., M. and R. Yesín T., Bursatilización de hipotecas en México: sistema de servicios y derechos requeridos, Banco de México, Mexico 1995, p.6.

[33] Investment unit, a monetary measure whose value is adjusted to the inflation index.

[34] Nominal interest rates had to be adjusted until in most cases they were as high as real interest rates.

[35] For details of the period of time allowed for paying off credit in the various organizations as well as amount of income to be deducted see Imas, R. Víctor J. ,1997, pp. 152-155.

Glossary

BANHUOPSA – Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A. (National Urban Mortgage and Public Works Bank)
Created in 1933 to attend urban needs (infrastructure, road systems, housing, etc. Funds obtained from Federal Government. Activities currently carried out by BANOBRAS (National Public Works Bank).

DDF – Departamento del Distrito Federal (Federal District Department).
In 1934, the DDF began construction of low-income housing for its workers. Funds obtained from State contributions.

FIVIDESU – Fideicomiso de Vivienda Desarrollo Social y Urbano (Housing and Social and Urban Development Trust).
Housing Trust created in 1983 by the Federal District Department to meet housing demand in the Federal District; beneficiaries of the programs include organized salaried and non-salaried social groups. Funds primarily obtained from private banking (FOVI) and to a lesser extent from State contributions.

FONHAPO – Fideicomiso Fondo Nacional de Habitaciones Populares (National Working Class Housing Trust Fund).
Trust created in 1982 to meet housing demand of organized social groups, preferably non-salaried. Funds obtained from State contributions and, since 1986, from World Bank loans as well.

FOVIMI-ISSFAM – Fondo de la Vivienda Militar (Military Housing Fund).
Housing fund created in 1973 to meet housing demand of military personnel. Funds contributed by the State and equivalent to 5% of its workers' salaries.

FOVISSSTE – Fondo de la Vivienda del Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales para los trabajadores del Estado (State Workers' Social Security and Services Institute Housing Fund).
Housing fund created in 1972, to replace Head Office of Civil and Retirement Pensions. Beneficiaries of programs are salaried State workers. Funds obtained from contributions equivalent to 5% of salaries of workers employed by public organizations and entities.

IMSS – Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social. (Mexican Social Security Institute)
Social Security Institute for salaried workers in private sector. Funds obtained from contributions from employers and workers. Stopped building housing in late 1960s.

INFONAVIT – Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores del Estado (National State Workers' Housing Fund Institute).
Housing fund created in 1972 to attend salaried workers in the private sector; resources obtained from employers, contributions of 5% of their workers, salaries.

PFV – Programa Financiero de Vivienda (Financial Housing Program)

FOVI – Fondo de Operación y Financiamiento Bancario a la Vivienda. (Fund for the Operation and Bank Financing of Housing.)
PFV and FOVI were created in 1963, to channel investment from private banking into housing for lower-income groups. Beneficiaries include salaried, preferably middle-income persons. Prior to 1989, resources derived from compulsory contribution (legal reserve) by private banking to housing for lower-income groups (fluctuated between 3% and 6%). Since 1989, resources obtained from Federal Government, and World Bank loans.

UDI – Inflation-pegged Investment Unit

UNAM – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

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171

URBAN POLITICS IN THE 1990s: NOTES ON TORONTO

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CHAPTER

5.5

"Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched?" (Lefebvre, 1991a, 11)

"In the final analysis, is what Marx calls class struggle not the struggle for democracy? An economic, social, political struggle for urban democracy?" (Lefebvre, 1991b, 86)

Transnational urbanization is a key dimension of 'fin-de-siècle' capitalism (Harvey, 1996). Today, capitalist urbanization connects social spaces in new, transnational ways. Although it includes national territories and state institutions, it cannot be grasped in state-centric terms. Transnational urbanization builds on but escapes and undermines the institutions, forces and strategies of national development which had circumscribed urbanization in the advanced capitalist world and provided a model for developmentalist strategies in the South during the post-war period. Transnational urbanization is not of course a linear and inevitable tendency of global homogenization. It is a profoundly uneven tendency which includes multiple scales of social interaction and various distinct processes, from global city-formation (Sassen, 1991) to the development of industrial rustbelts in the North, and from mega-urbanization and the development of new industrial macro-regions in the South. Transnational urbanization is also fundamentally contradictory, shaped as it is by new forms of (ecological and financial) imperialism and contradictions, which, as the recent crisis of globalizing finance in Eastern Asia indicates, reverberate quickly throughout the capitalist world. And finally, transnational urbanization is a conflictive process which was produced by and responded to the rebellions and disjunctures of the late 1960s and 1970s. It is thus driven not only by forces of capitalist restructuring but also by contested, yet powerful dominant strategies, discourses and symbolism (Keil and Kipfer, 1994).

As a combination of structural forces, political strategies and symbolic struggles, transnational urbanization appears to have aborted post-Fordist experiments of regulation and strategies of crisis-management different from neo-liberalism. This observation is nothing new for those in the South who have been living through the various 'lost decades' of the 1980s (in Latin America or Africa) or for those in the North who have experienced the ravages of militant neo-liberalism and neo-populism symbolized by such figures as Thatcher and Reagan. But after the fall of the Eastern Bloc, economic depression and intensifying 'market Stalinism' (Harvey, in this book) have led to a new political situation shaped by a mixture of aggressive neo-liberalism, neo-populism and fascistic tendencies in other places as well. Enlightened capitalism seems no longer an option even in those cities in the advanced capitalist world where since the late 1960s urban movements had instilled elements of ecological modernization, cultural democratization and social regulation into urban transnationalization (Mayer, 1987; Hitz et al. 1995). Accordingly, a defense of post-war, Fordist institutions (housing, welfare, labour legislation) and more recent, post-Fordist achievements (planning reform, alternative economic networks, movement institutions and micro-projects of social experimentation) will be insufficient in the struggle against the forces of Social Darwinism that shape transnational urbanization today. This observation implies theoretical shifts towards conceptions of urban politics which transcend the local and include transformational moments that do not function as mere stimuli for the modernization of the capitalist city. In the following, I will try to demonstrate these claims through a discussion of contemporary global-city politics in Toronto.

THE NEW CITY OF TORONTO

The Toronto urban region continues to be shaped by the polarizing and fragmenting tendencies of global-city formation (Todd, 1995). Despite the deep real-estate slump of the early 1990s, Toronto's political economy is still molded by (1) a recomposition, polarization and segmentation of class structures and labour markets (via partial deindustrialization, new middle class employment in the producer services sector, and the spread of marginal, super-exploitative employment in low-end services and sweatshop manufacturing sectors); (2) demographic globalization (through immigration from mostly non-European regions and the complex articulation of these immigration processes with the above-mentioned labour-market tendencies); (3) uneven processes of spatial restructuring (which include expansion of the Central Business District, gentrification, neo-Fordist exurbanization, new geographies of immigrant settlement in the urban periphery and the production of multiple micro-ghettos of poverty and marginality); and (4) a variegated recomposition and degradation of urban ecologies. These processes of urban-regional restructuring have recently been accentuated by depressionary circumstances and austerity politics. The latter forces have intensified global-city formation by accelerating deindustrialization, doubling unemployment, escalating poverty and homelessness, and increasing uneven employment growth which is pitting the CBD and the (growing) exurban periphery against (stagnating) downtown neighborhoods and the old suburbs.

Thriving on the fear and uncertainty of the 1990s, 'late Thatcherism' is shaping the current political conjuncture in Toronto. In 1995, a Conservative government was elected in the province of Ontario. The new Conservative politics is rooted in a constellation of business interests, professional segments and sub- and exurban neighborhoods and borrows from Thatcherism and current US-Republicanism. Ideologically, it complements zealous neo-liberalism with strands of fiscal, authoritarian, patriarchal and radicalizing populist discourses which try to mobilize popular support symbolically and thus reconstruct bourgeois rule. This reconstructive Conservative project represents a 'class struggle in space': Institutionally, this spatialized struggle attempts to institute right-wing goals by restructuring the local state and municipal government. In Toronto, this means: (1) the forced amalgamation

of the six municipalities in the inner half of the Toronto region (the former Metropolitan Toronto) into one City of Toronto and the construction of an unelected regional governance system dominated by conservative exurban interests outside the new City; (2) the imposition of severe fiscal constraints onto the City of Toronto by downloading fiscal responsibilities for public housing, welfare, transportation, public health from the province onto municipalities; and (3) the redesign of the local state to shield bureaucratic procedures even further from democratic accountability (in policing and public administration), undermine public sector unions in the municipal sector and facilitate privatization, deregulation and marketization in such areas as education, property taxation, land-use planning and water and sewage treatment. Symbolically, the new right urban politics builds on and promotes resentful and racialized images which associate the urban with categories of immigration, crime, drug-abuse, welfare-dependency, deviance

Since 1998, Metro Toronto is the new amalgamated City of Toronto

174

Metro Days of Action

Geogina

Brock

East Gwillimbury

Uxbridge

Scugog

DURHAM

Newmarket

Whitchurch Stouffville

Aurora

Clarington

King

YORK

Richmond Hill

Oshawa

Pickering

Whitby

Markham

Caledon

Vaughan

Ajax

Scarborough

PEEL

North York

METRO TORONTO

York E.York

Brampton

Toronto

Etobicoke

Halton Hills

Mississauga

Milton

HALTON

Oakville

Burlington

and oppositional behavior and counterpose these images of the 'inner city' to representations of 'normal' and 'productive' life in exurban neighborhoods. While accepting the 'imperative' of promoting Toronto as a global city, neo-populist discourse thus draws on the 'anti-urban' suburbanism that are rearticulated in the lived spaces of exurbanization (Seaton, 1995; Graham and Keil, 1997).

What is the significance of these initiatives for global-city formation in Toronto? The outcome of Conservative policies will of course depend on future struggles. Still, the new Tory politics is likely to help reorganize the coalitions, institutions and symbolic economies which mediate and organize the process of urban transnationalization in Toronto. Since the late 1960s, urban movements have produced networks of activism which sustained oppositional politics at a variety of scales. Centered in the former city of Toronto – the central part of Metropolitan Toronto and the new City of Toronto – these movements converged in a loose constellation of urban reform that undermined the technocratic modernism and unabashed growth politics of the post-war period. This reform regime emerged out of struggles against expressways and urban renewal projects in the early 1970s and came to be rooted in the new professional middle classes and propertied downtown neighborhoods which underwent gentrification under the protection of reform policies (Magnusson, 1983; Caulfield, 1994). New middle-class urban reform a sustained 'comfortable', left-liberal urbanism (Jacobs, 1992; Sewell, 1991). This comfortable urbanism continued to dominate reformist discourse even after the late 1970s, when new voices (public sector unions, queer and feminist groups, environmentalists, and new immigrant communities) managed to selectively add their concerns to the reform agenda (Stasiulis, 1989; Hartmann, 1996; Wekerle, 1996) and produced vibrant sub- and countercultural notions of urban life (Joseph, 1996; Walcott, 1995). This loose constellation of urban reform was too restricted to downtown Toronto to seriously affect the tendencies and urbanisms of sub- and exurbanization. It was also too moderate to challenge the strategies of 'world-class' urbanization and 'frontier' urbanisms pursued by elites and downtown gentrifiers (Smith, 1996). But the discourses and pillars of urban reform – collective consumption, citizen participation, environmental and land-use regulation and multiculturalism – did lend global-city formation in Toronto a more 'qualitative', and sometimes progressive twist.

Since the early 1990s, shifts in the political orientations of reformist forces, the pressures of global-city formation, and changes in municipal policy (cutbacks, welfare bashing, privatization, land-use deregulation) have eroded urban reform in Toronto. The new Conservative politics of the provincial government does more than contribute to that process of erosion, however. It threatens to destroy the institutions, policies and activist networks which had moderated global-city formation and sustained a measure of opposition against right-wing populism. The constraints imposed on the new City of Toronto by the Conservatives are formidable. Heavy fiscal pressures, the uncertainties created by the transition to a new administrative structure in the amalgamated City, and the prospect of exurban dominance in the governance of Toronto's urban region not only threaten what is left of urban reform. Judging from developments during and after the recent election in the new City of Toronto, these constraints are also facilitating a recomposition of political forces that undermines the institutions and social coalitions that had sustained reform in the past. The recent elections to the new City of Toronto produced a solid right majority that is led by an unabashedly boosterist and fiscally populist mayor and centered on affluent neighborhoods, business interests and suburban homeowners mostly outside the traditionally reform-friendly territories in downtown Toronto. While the future of Toronto is contingent upon the response of oppositional forces (and their capacity to regroup into a new urban left), there is no doubt that the provincial 'class struggle in space' and shifting political constellations in the Toronto region threaten to surrender the city to the untrammeled forces of Social Darwinism: inter-city competition, boosterist growth politics, resentful populism and exurbanization.

THE METROPOLITAN STRIKE

Given the hard times of the 1990s and the forcefulness of right-wing radicalism, it is not surprising that oppositional politics has been defensive. The forces which have defined the opposition to the new right agenda in Toronto have drawn reactively on past practices of mobilization, networks of organization, intellectual traditions and socio-spatial milieus to defend Fordist institutions or achievements of urban reform. The resistance to privatization, labour-law reform, and cutbacks in defense of collective consumption organized by the labour movement and labour-community alliances rearticulated the tradition of English Canadian social democracy and the post-war institutions of organized labour. And the mobilizations against amalgamation and municipal restructuring, led by neighborhood groups and citizens' organizations in Toronto, extended the legacies of middle-class urban reform of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite these continuities, opposition politics has also revealed promises for the future. There have been new forms of struggle. The marginalized, discriminated and racialized have made their presence felt in a small version of the Rodney King riots in 1992 and a fledgling squatters' movement supported by anti-poverty organizations (Clarke, 1992). Also, 'old' struggles have acquired new qualities. As a result, Toronto

Metro Days of Action

witnessed the most intense period of popular mobilization in its history between 1995 and 1997. Resistance bypassed organized party politics, grew beyond the fragmented networks of activism in downtown Toronto and connected to newly mobilized segments of the population in other parts of the new City. This return to mass politics was accompanied by a radicalization of conflict (in street protests and political strikes) and points of convergence between 'old' and 'new' forms of activism.

Let me illustrate these points with a few remarks about the most promising moment of the recent mobilization wave: the 'metropolitan strike' in late 1996. The bulk of the opposition against the provincial Conservative government has come from organized labour (notably the public sector unions) and allied social movements. Between late 1995 and early 1996, student protests, repeated mass demonstrations and a confrontational public sector strike questioned Toronto's peaceful and orderly image as 'New York run by the Swiss'. At the same time, segments of the provincial labour movement decided to suspend its reliance on the social democratic New Democratic Party in favor of alliances with other social movements. These segments in the labour movement initiated a strategy to organize rotating 'days of action' (mass demonstrations and political strikes) in Ontario's urban centers. This strategy culminated in the 'Metro Days of Action' in the fall of 1996: a week of political events (rallies, public fora, vigils, concerts, political theater) in what is now the new City of Toronto.

These events peaked in the biggest mass demonstration in the history of Toronto and a one-day, quasi-general political strike that shut down significant (but not all) parts of the local economy. Organized by the local labour district organization, a social justice umbrella organization (the Metro Network for Social Justice) and a broad coalition of about 70 movement organizations, these events were targeted against the cutback measures of the provincial government and framed as a resistance to neo-liberalism and 'the corporate agenda'.

What was interesting about these moments of struggle was their inarticulate but real claim to a 'right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1968). The Metro Days of Action were conceived as a mere local manifestation of a larger (province-wide) mobilization against (supposedly) aspatial forces (neo-liberalism, globalization) represented by the new Conservative government: a struggle 'in the city' without grounding in or effect on urban space. Yet the mobilizations were fundamentally urban insofar as they articulated and produced specifically urban networks of mobilization and effectively disrupted everyday life by laying claim to urban public space. Not least due to the strategic role of the public sector, the

political strike reconnected production (labour) and reproduction (community). Shutting down public transportation, dispatching workers and supporters to picket lines closest to their residential neighborhoods ('community cross-picketing') and interspersing picket-line action with demonstrations at strategic locations throughout the city linked movement activists with important segments of organized labour (notably teachers and civil servants) and newly mobilized strata of the urban population. By temporarily reintegrating the politics of time (workplace action) with the politics of space (street protest) in a community of struggle, the Days of Action allowed everybody to reclaim their city from the relentless, alienating rhythms which normally dominate everyday life. Similar to the strikes and protest in the France and Paris of late 1995, the Metro Days of Action thus represented a 'metropolitan strike' (Negri, 1996): a mobilization against abstractly conceived forces which transcends sectoral boundaries through a spatial integration of struggle, effectively (if indirectly) reclaims the city as public space and offers (however inadvertently) glimpses into a different urban world.

The Metro Days of Action reverberated through Toronto politics long after the event. They spilled over into the (middle-class centered, but broadly spread) mobilizations against amalgamation and municipal restructuring that characterized early 1997. They raised expectations of the politically possible to the extent that, in the fall of 1997, an illegal political strike staged by Ontario's teachers' unions had the potential to usher in a general strike. At the same time, oppositional movements have not yet developed an alternative project to seize the initiative from right-wing populism. This can be explained in part by the disabling legacy of Fordist organizational practices and petty leadership politics within the labour movement, which blocked a more explicit urbanization of oppositional politics by constraining dynamics of mobilization and re-segmenting oppositional politics along 'sectoral' (and thus aspatial) lines. One corollary of these limitations has been the failure to problematise the stranglehold of property politics in urban development and (dominant and reform-oriented) urbanist discourses. Another effect of this retreat from space was the limited extent to which labour-community solidarity politics is connected organically to new immigrant communities, subcultural milieus and the 'politics of the unheard': the super-exploited, the poor, marginalized or racialized. Because of these limitations, the meaning of Toronto's metropolitan strike is best grasped in subterranean terms: as a moment in a possible future. Together with other recent mobilizations, the Days of Action revealed at least implicitly a potential for an urbanization of class politics. They pointed to the possibility of constructing a new urban left which could take on the forces of barbarism at many scales and connect resistance to the development of an alternative social project at the local-regional level.

TOWARDS A NEW URBANITY?

The Toronto of the 1990s is characterized by a new political situation that Antonio Gramsci would have called a 'passive revolution': a weakly hegemonic conjuncture of structural instability and intensifying conflict shaped by revolutionizing bourgeois rule. While oppositional politics has thus not (yet?) managed to wrest the initiative from neo-populist forces, it has contributed to this new political situation and opened up opportunities for the future of progressive urban politics. What are the conceptual implications of these observations? They seem to suggest a need to recover anti-capitalist perspectives and meta-theoretical reflections which partly transcend those analyses (in certain formulations of regulation theory and other middle-range approaches) which focus on 'local' politics as a force in shaping and 'adapting to' 'post-Fordist' capitalist arrangements (Economy and Society, 1995). First, the interesting aspect about Toronto's metropolitan strike was precisely that it articulated multiple, not just local scales of social interaction and that it could not be grasped in conventional urban terms such as the politics of land-use, urban ways of life, the local state or municipal government. Second, the Toronto case clearly indicates that while the period of anti-Fordist resistance and reform politics after the post-war period has come to an end, the new political arrangements have not fully congealed yet. The hard times and 'late Thatcherism' of the 1990s have raised the stakes for progressive urban politics to a point where a move beyond defending past achievements, guarding treasured lifestyles and reproducing past practices in 'old' and 'new' movements is imperative and, maybe, possible. In turn, the fluidity of the current situation and the magnitude of the threat posed by the new right indicate that urban politics cannot – and should not – be reduced to forms of resistance within 'established' politico-economic structures and forms of regulation.

The Toronto case thus calls for notions of urban politics broad enough to escape the confines of the local and open enough to search for transformational potential in defensive struggle. I would argue here that a re-reading of Henri Lefebvre's open urban Marxism is fruitful in this regard. Lefebvre insisted on a full urbanization of Marx's, Gramsci's and Benjamin's pre-theoretical treatments of the 'city' as the site of not only capitalist development and bourgeois modernity but also of utopian promise and revolutionary politics. For Lefebvre, the urban is a mediation of the 'global' (general) order and the immediate realm of lived space (Lefebvre, 1990, 86-95). Caught up in the contradictions between the macro-structures of capital and state and the micro-worlds of everyday life, urban politics is no mere local affair. In an urbanizing

world – and most starkly in our age of transnational urbanization – urban politics articulates local, regional, national, continental and world-wide scales all at the same time (Brenner, 1997). And as the contemporary condition for knowing and changing the world, the urban has universalizing properties and transformational potential. The struggle for urban space holds promise for social change as a whole because modern everyday life already contains contradictions and utopian fragments that point to the possibility of a different – post-capitalist – world. The challenge is thus to connect latent energies and promising moments, such as the experience of a metropolitan strike, to strategies in search of a post-capitalist urban society characterized by generalized self-determination (in workplace and neighborhood) and non-alienated (sensual, creative, diverse) forms of urbanity (Lefebvre, 1968, 12-4, 129; 1978, 195-206; 1990, 140, 154-177).

Actualizing Lefebvre in North American contexts such as those of Toronto is of course problematic: it presupposes the difficult intellectual task of translating (and thus modifying) Lefebvre's theoretical fragments (Keil, 1997). While transnational urbanization and the return of mass politics have established the structural and conjectural conditions for such a translation, the difficulties remain daunting. Toronto lacks the legacy of urban political traditions, intellectual milieus, and urban movement practices which produced radical notions of urbanity in continental Europe. Currently, urban discourse in Toronto is dominated by the rearticulated 'anti-urban' suburbanism characteristic of exurbanization and neo-populist urban imagery, and the superficially cosmopolitan 'frontier' urbanism produced in gentrified lifestyles. The 'comfortable' (but increasingly defensive) middle-class civic urbanism of downtown urban reform politics is only partially a counterweight to these dominant urbanisms and does not make the transformational claims Lefebvre proposes. At the same time, actualizing Lefebvre in what is a culturally globalized context also means facing the challenge (and opportunity) of engaging with the largely ignored non-European notions of urban life which exist in submerged fragments in new immigrant communities and subcultural milieus. It remains to be seen whether mobilization, activism, critical intellectual interventions, and memories of such moments as the metropolitan strike can produce a different, popular and multicultural version of global urbanity. Yet without a search for transformational notions of urbanity, urban research remains a hyphenated activity: a mere local application of social theory (Prigge, 1995, 181). Politically, side-tracking the realm of the urban would be abandoning a terrain of struggle which is formative for new right hegemony and left political projects alike.

Metro Days of Action

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179

THE MONKEY'S TAIL: THE AMSTERDAM DIGITAL CITY THREE AND A HALF YEARS LATER

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| ILLUSTRATIONS | SCREENSHOTS FROM THE WEBSITE: WWW.DDS.NL |

CHAPTER

5.6

Populatie van De Digitale Stad: 60408

The new media is often talked and written about and much of this is a sales pitch. Users are consumers, and they are being promised the earth. A kind of sanctified, mythical aura is being drawn around 'on-line-mankind', and if we believe the cyber-ideologists, its representatives are a species of half-gods. The Amsterdam Digital City (DDS, 'De Digitale Stad'), was hyped into metaphysical proportions by the media within days of its launching, in January 1994.

Yet it is unquestionable that the DDS functioned as a catalyst in the Netherlands. For many it represented their first contact with the Internet, whether direct or not. But the DDS also grew rapidly into a symbol of the 'public domain' in Cyberspace. Even though it did not bridge the gap between politicians and their constituency (which had been one of its prime stated objectives, and the reason why the government put money in it) it did have an exemplary function in the ongoing debate about the 'information society'. The DDS-system grew quickly into Europe's largest and most famous public computer-network, or 'freenet' as Americans would call it. In practice, this means scores of phone-lines, a free e-mail address for every user, disc-space for a home-page, lots of opportunities to make contacts and gather and disseminate information, and above all, the freedom not to be bothered by censorship and surveillance.

By the middle of 1997, DDS had over 50,000 'inhabitants', that is, registered users, and many more visitors, or 'tourists'. There would be even more, but the limits of the current system's capacity was surpassed a year ago. It is a sad truth that most European Union Internet- and web-projects remain fairly empty and virtual indeed, and are devoid of a significant number of users (we may mention here the Berlin 'Internationale Stadt' initiative, the DDS's most direct clone, whose less than 300 members have now simply been sold off to a commercial provider).

Meanwhile the Amsterdam DDS has managed to spawn a diverse and lively net-culture. The system has grown so big, and so intricate, that hardly anybody – and surely not its management – has an overview of it. This is exactly what makes it interesting to push all the exaggerated stories and expectations aside, and to look at what makes such a complex net-project work.

In our opinion, the prime cause of the Digital City's success is the freedom that has been granted to its users from the very beginning. This sounds trivial, but it is not considering the increasing control over Net-use in universities and corporations, especially outside the Netherlands. The DDS has never turned into a propaganda-mouthpiece for the City Hall, under the guise of 'bringing politics closer to the common people thanks to information technology'. The DDS-system is not the property of the Municipal corporation, even though many people assume this to be the case. In fact, the DDS has not received any subsidy from the municipality over the past two and a half years. (The Corporation remains one of its biggest customers, though.) The simple fact that politics constitutes only a (small) fragment of our daily lives has affected the Net too. Besides, it appeared so quickly that politicians were neither able, nor willing, to familiarise themselves with the

new medium: efforts made in the beginning by the DDS to bring them on-line and start a dialogue with their constituents proved to be a waste of time. And the citizens were far more interested in talking to each other than to engage in arcane discussions with narrow-minded politicos.

Nina Meilof [2], who has a background in local television (another flourishing sector in the Amsterdam culture), has been hired by the DDS to organise discussions about local political issues, such as the (failed) attempt to restructure the municipality into an 'urban province', the controversial house-building drive into the Y-lake at IJburg, the even more controversial North-South underground railway project, and the extension of Schiphol Airport, which already has the whole environmental community up in arms. At the moment, experiments are running on the Beurs-TV network, with a hook-up on the Internet. The techno-savvyness aspect aside, the main goal is to look at the possibility of transcending the immobility of current political rituals. To achieve this, the limitations of the political game must be well understood.

"A major advantage of DDS remains its anarchic character. There are a lot of secret nooks and crannies, such as cafes in remote places. Then you may look into home-pages and find the history of that particular cafe, replete with the club-jargon, a birthday-list and a group-snapshot. There is a Harley-Davidson meeting point for instance, that coalesces around one particular cafe, and it brings a newsletter out. This kind of subculture is of course far more thrilling than the mainstream sites maintained by big corporate or institutional players. No way those sites ever swing."

DDS is therefore looking for a kind of balance, to give this type of subculture optimal growth, without the politics being discarded altogether. A precondition for this is the system's independence. But that costs money, and quite a lot to boot. The DDS has increasingly grown into a business while wishing to retain its non-profit character. The management is pursuing a policy of courting a handful of major customers who bring serious money in. The aim is to attract projects that fit into the DDS set-up, but this is not a totally friction-less process. In practice, the DDS is divided into three components: there is a commercial department that hunts for the dough, there is an innovation wing that develops new technologies for corporate customers, and there is the community aspect, where DDS wants to be a sort of a social laboratory. But the image of a 'virtual community', as Howard Rheingold has called it in his book of the same name, is not really appropriate here. The DDS has rather grown into a multi-faceted amalgam of small communities, who share among themselves the intention to perpetuate the DDS system as an 'open city'.

It is here that the central interface of the DDS plays a key-role. It is designed to provide an overview of the mass of information offered. In keeping with the name of the system, the DDS interface is built around the notions of 'squares', 'buildings/homes', and '(side-) streets', but it does not show pictures or simulations of the actual (Amsterdam) city-scape, as many people would expect. There are, for instances, 'squares' devoted to the themes of: environment, death, sport, books, tourism, social activism, government, etc., but the interface is not able to give a full representation of the underlying activities. News features, and the DDS's own newspaper, 'The Digital Citizen', attempt to fill this lacuna. How does an insider get an update?

"I am getting the stats of the most popular 'houses' (= home-pages), so I go & look into them from time to time. Now we have a network of male homosexual 'houses' springing up. They show pics of attractive gentlemen. Those are popular sites. All this is fairly down-to-earth in fact. Cars, drugs, how to grow your own weed, music sites with extensive libraries. There is also a massive circuit where you can obtain or exchange software, and some of these 'warez-houses' (!) will be up for one or two days and vanish again. And of course, you've got Internet-games, that's an ever-green. But it may also be a home-page on some very rare bird, and then it turns out to be an internationally famous site attracting ornithologists from all over the planet. Yet other people freak out on design or Java-scripts. And you've got the link samplers. And don't forget the jokes-sites..."

182

In the DDS there is a gigantic alternative and 'underground' world, but there is also an official city on the surface and in the open. The subject matter there is of the 'democracy and the Internet' variety. For 6 months in 1996/97 there was an experiment with a 'digital square on traffic and transport issues', sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Public Works & Roads. Registered DDS 'inhabitants', with an e-mail address, could react to such statements as: "If we don't pull ourselves together to do something about congestion, traffic jams will never subside", or: "Aggressive driving pays: it gets you there faster " or: "The automobile is the most marvellous invention...of the previous century."

The experiment even boasted the luxury of a professional moderator, journalist Kees van den Bosch, who invited a different high-profile politician every month, to stir up the discussion. And the government was footing the bill. Van den Bosch says he is satisfied with the degree of participation. Yet, it is easy to be taken in by over-optimism. Just a handful of participants can generate an impressive number of statements. Genuine new ideas and arguments have been scarce. The evaluation report also states that little use has been made of the opportunity to obtain background data on the issues at stake. A large majority (say 75%) of the participants make one contribution and disappear from view, whereas the remainder keeps grimly at the discussion. The report also praises the large number of very personal traffic experiences, which can jump-start senior bureaucrats in the ministry into action. The hierarchical routine, with a minister at the top making decisions, would then be temporarily pushed aside. After a while the ministry's official will simply join the fray, and sometimes come up with a reaction on that very day.

Nonetheless, Nina Meilof puts more faith in the indirect influence exercised on politics through the channelling of the new media. "At the moment, we are witnessing the dressing-down of the referendum instrument by the local body-politics [3]. Politicians are constantly tinkering with the rules, in order to give the impression that voters have a say, while in fact everything stays the same. Every referendum gets comprehensive coverage in the DDS, but it is clear every time that politicians do not (want to) have any truck with it." Therefore, Nina Meilof thinks that it is far more interesting and rewarding to do your own thing on the net and leave it to the old media to report it. This way you do exert quite some influence, however indirectly. "You may even hope that some day the politicians will want to come closer to the horse's mouth." While the Internet's growth may be exponential, it still takes some time for the institutions and rituals to adapt to the new situation.

A tremendous amount has happened over the past three to four years in terms of technological development. It has always been the custom at the DDS to give a totally free hand to the computer-people. And since the DDS is a big system on the fast-growth lane, crisis is a permanent feature of systems operations. Technical problems and glitches are an every-day occurrence as the system is constantly being stretched to the limits of its capacity. There is also an overriding ambition to be on the cutting edge in innovative technology, and to take a pole-position on the knowledge frontier, a game at which the DDS has been remarkably successful up to now.

"*At the moment we are heavily into real -audio and -video, into combinations of Internet with radio and TV. It would be great if we could provide a home-page-TV for our users. In order to achieve this, you have to be well aware of the latest technical developments and you have to nurture a good relationship with the owners of bandwidth who are going to carry out all this fancy work. We want to prevent the situation in which you have to go to big corporate players if you want to put television on the Net. We feel that these things too should be readily available to the greatest number, so that any private person can start some web-TV at home.*"

183

Je kunt hier het café in, of eerst de handleiding bekijken.
Hoofd-entree van dit café: Sportplein.

'Amice, doe mij nog een wijntje...'

Café-Bar Society is de ideale ontmoetings- en gespreksplaats voor de

This technical innovation does not square well with a large number of users' growing expectations regarding content, and the quality of public discussions. In the early phase of the DDS, there was the idea that the (digital) city was some kind of empty shell that would be filled up by users and customers, without very much intervention from the DDS staff. But that formula resulted in a very static system. However, not very much has changed in the content structure of the DDS over the past few years. Some people feel that the users' creativity should be better rewarded. After all, that's what keeps the whole social structure going (the DDS does 'reward' outstanding home-page developers with extra bandwidth and technical facilitation, but they must be pretty spectacular achievers). And it is still not clear whether the Net is really a good place to conduct a meaningful, in-depth discussion. The first hurdle is of course the question of moderation, yes or no? Or to put it differently: is the Net a medium like others with editors who organise and edit (and hence, censor) the discussion, or is it some kind of digital remake of the Hyde Park Corner soap box?

One format that attempts to put some more structure and coherence into the system is the 'newspaper', with a line of 'supplements' which you can choose to receive (or not). This makes it an interesting address to which people may send contributions, which are then filtered by an editorial board. That is already the case with the 'best house' contest for which one has to register beforehand. This is a mixed format whereby the content is being co-produced by the users. In addition, 'webring' technology is being used, whereby sites are automatically linked and visitors are taken on a kind of organised tour by the editors. As usual, two models

are competing, one that might be called anarchistic, where sites were presented randomly, if ever, and a more organised one, with editors surfing through the DDS on the look-out for the really interesting sites. A webring can be a nice compromise between the two.

The truth is that the perfectly open, public forum has not crystallised yet. Who is going to take care of that in the future? Political parties seem to be prepared to invest a lot of money in making their viewpoints available on-line. But that does not create a public, independent platform. A successor to the public broadcasting system is called for. For all practical purposes, the DDS has been saddled with that task, since SALTO, the local television and radio body, is clueless as to what they should do with the Internet. A lot is going to depend on the actual and shifting ownership of the cable, and on current and future legislation, and what people, whether or not (directly) connected to the DDS, will be able to achieve with regard to the design and maintenance of a (new) public domain in Cyberspace. One thing is clear: It doesn't make sense to wait for government and corporations to provide the kind of 'on-line services" they have in mind.

The last question addresses the much vaunted urban metaphor of the Digital city: will it ever disappear, its emancipatory task having been achieved? And what about its strictly local role: will that dwindle into insignificance also? Already no more than a quarter of the 'inhabitants' live in Amsterdam. But the DDS remains a Dutch-language site. The management still maintains that upholding our own (Dutch) language is a legitimate aim. Many people find it difficult to express themselves in English. But it is not crucial to the system itself to be local or not. That is something the users decide. We have already seen that successful home-pages usually have an international exposure. At the same time the Internet is increasingly being used in a very local or regional context: one can now go on-line to check out the programme of one's culture-club next door. By the time computers and access terminals will be readily available on a neighbourhood level, the

need for and appeal of a city-wide set-up will decrease, with consequences for the DDS project. At a more basic level, how long will there be a role for 'houses' and for the 'post office', to take a few characteristic DDS features? Fortunately, the DDS never did try to impose its own metaphor onto users. So the fact that new formulas are bound to appear in time is not problematic. It turns out that it is mainly outsiders, non-DDS users, who take the name all too literally, in order to criticise it. The DDS offers a lot of information not directly (or not at all) related to Amsterdam, yet many people think that this is the case.

"*The city metaphor stands for diversity, not for a town in particular. What we have in mind are all those different 'places' and localities that are possible in a real as well as in a virtual city. The Internet is a very cosmopolitan sort of place. And the world wide web is surely the kind of environment where you can settle for a time, and go on the look-out for neighbours. They may be actually living in the USA, but it might also be quite cool to be able to meet for real, and that happens all the time. And so you could be getting off the train in Groningen (200 km North of Amsterdam) one day, and the platform is crowded with people sporting 'DDS Metro Meeting' buttons..."*

Visit the Amsterdam Digital City at <http://www.dds.nl>. You can register as an 'inhabitant' (it is free, but you must have an Internet account) by telnetting into DDS <telnet dds.nl> and filling out a questionnaire, which is usually processed within 24 hours.

Endnotes
[1] This article was written by Geert Lovink <geert@xs4all.nl> in Dutch to be published by the Society for Old and New Media in Amsterdam <www.waag.org>, with the title 'The Monkey's Tail (that's the Dutch word for @!) – An Alternative View on the Internet'. It was translated by Patrice Riemens <patrice@dds.nl>.
[2] This article is mainly based on an interview with Nina Meilof, the editor of 'The Digital Citizen', the 'newspaper' of the DDS. All the following quotes are taken from this interview.
[3] A few years ago, Amsterdam introduced the hitherto politically tricky concept of 'corrective referendum' in matters of local decisions by the municipal council. It has not really taken off, while City Hall restricted its scope and upped its threshold at the same time.

CONTE

THE CITY AS A TERRAIN

STED

6

TITLE

THE CITY AS A CONTESTED TERRAIN

WRITTEN BY | CHRISTIAN SCHMID
TRANSLATION | BARBARA STINER

CHAPTER

6.1

The specificity of cities and urban life has been the subject of long and controversial debate. Among the most prominent positions in this debate have been: a politically autonomous entity with clearly defined boundaries (Max Weber), a specific mode of production (Karl Marx), or a specific way of life associated with places that have a large, dense and heterogeneous population (Louis Wirth). However, the intensification of global urbanisation and the emergence of large-scale, polycentric urban regions in many parts of the world have rendered such definitions obsolete. Nevertheless, the question of the specificity of cities and urban life remains crucial.

The French philosopher Henri Levebvre, one of the founders of contemporary critical urban research, defines the city as a social, political and economic centre, a place in which power as well as the material and immaterial wealth of a society are concentrated. The concrete role and meaning of cities changes according to their social and historical context. According to Levebvre, with the consolidation of a global system of production and exchange, particular cities assume new roles as global centres of power, decision-making and control. As a result of this process, an ever larger part of these cities' population is excluded from their opportunities and wealth. On this basis, in his book *Le droit à la ville* (1968, Anthropos, Paris), Levebvre demanded a 'right to the city' as a constitutional right. Since this time, many social movements in different cities have been fighting for exactly this 'right'.

These movements, however, are not just fighting for access to the city; frequently they themselves create the social wealth of a city: diversity, the possibility for surprising and un-expected encounters and cultural, social and economic innovations. In this way, these movements themselves become important actors in a production process through which the city is redefined and reconstructed.

Saskia Sassen founds her work on a similar approach: according to her analyses, the control of the global economy is not an abstract entity but a concrete production process which takes place in specific places. These places are the 'global cities', strategic junctions in the global network of production systems. In Saskia Sassen's view, global cities are defined by a distinct duality. On the one hand, they contain a highly qualified sector connected to the control and command functions of the world economy. On the other hand, they contain a low-wage sector comprising activities directly or indirectly required for the maintenance and reproduction of the highly qualified sector. A disproportionate number of the people working in this low wage sector are women, ethnic minorities and immigrants from the poor regions of the world.

In the centres of the global economy, a 'new frontier' has been formed where the social contradictions of the new world order abruptly clash. Therefore, global cities are not just the places in which these contradictions become visible, but are also themselves 'contested terrain'. If global cities are strategic sites for global capital, they also provide the strategic conditions for the political mobilisation of the low-wage sector upon which global capital depends. Since the global economy plays a crucial role in many cities, this frontier is to be found in the most divergent places of the world.

Public space is of utmost importance in these conflicts. It is here that the social, cultural and economic oppositions within the city come to light, it is here that social conflicts are fought and it is here that lines of access are opened and closed. In many cases, being shut

out of public space also means being ostracised in public life. Public space, in particular in city centres, is fiercely contested. It represents an important resource both for the privileged as well as the underprivileged population: it is a place of luxury consumption and the representation of affluence and power for the former and a place of encounter, interaction, and social wealth for the latter. It is here, therefore, that the most intense struggles for control over public space occur. An example of this kind of struggle is the Inner!City!Action! campaign which took place in June 1997 in different German and Swiss cities. The contributions by Ute Lehrer and Britta Grell, Jens Sambale and Dominik Veith deal with the question of how public space is socially constructed. They report on the control and privatisation of public space, and analyse the various forms of its reappropriation.

The reappropriation of public space is embedded in a long history of struggles for the city. The contributions on Italy, Zurich and Medellín delineate this history since 1968. In particular, they elucidate the relationship of social movements to the 'urban question', showing clear differences but also amazing parallels. In each of these cases the roots of these struggles can be found in the resistance to post-war forms of social modernisation, the climax of which was the revolt of 1968. These movements originally focused on general social conditions and the exploitation of the labour force. Soon enough, however, new questions became predominant: problems of everyday life, of culture, and the social position of women, including all aspects of social reproduction. These social movements also started to confront questions of the built environment, the neighbourhood and the city.

"Take back the city" was the slogan of Italian social movements of the early seventies. From this period to the 'movimento 1977' and 'centri sociali' of the eighties and nineties, these movements have engaged in intensive debates regarding questions of everyday reproduction, social needs and public space. As Marvi Maggio and Alessandra Romano demonstrate, the conquest and maintenance of autonomous social centres played an important role in these movements, as bases of collective self-help and of social organisation, as places of social interaction and cultural production, and as archipelagos of a self-determined public space.

The slogan "We want the whole city" resonated throughout Zurich in 1980. This was the motto of an 'urban revolt' which lasted nearly two years and which fundamentally transformed the social and cultural milieu of this provincial metropolis. As Richard Wolff's and Christian Schmid's papers demonstrate, here too, autonomous cultural spaces played central roles: as meeting places, as counter public spheres and as centres of struggles to create a different city. The result of these struggles was the transformation of Zurich into a much more open and urbane metropolis. At the same time, the oppositional culture itself became

an economic resource, a source of innovation and a key locational factor for Zurich in the world economy. By demanding and creating this hitherto neglected cultural sector, the urban movement itself became a constitutive element of global city formation. From this point of view, the consolidation of Zurich as a global city can be seen as the product of a dialectical interaction between the development of the 'headquarter economy' and the struggles of urban social movements.

In yet another social, political and economic context, that of the Columbian city of Medellin, a similar trajectory of urban social conflict can be analysed. As Angela Stienen shows, during the course of the seventies local social movements articulated the notion that the city itself had to be conquered in order to preserve community spaces of resistance against the modernisation process. Or, in the words of a resident of Medellin: "Streets and street corners, stores, bars, soccer fields were the places where really something could be changed in the city." With the process of globalisation and the development of Medellin into a 'narco-metropolis' new economic and social ruptures occurred which gave a new meaning and urgency to the demand for the "right to the city".

The trajectories of urban social struggle reconstructed in these contributions not only reflect different historical contexts but also different ways in which the city is produced and appropriated. These contributions also demonstrate that the production of the city is a contradictionary process conditioned by incessantly changing alliances and coalitions. The city is not a universal but an historical category. It is an historical and geographical ensemble of social practices and representations, of experiences and imaginations: the 'city' and the 'urban' are continuously being created anew.

THE CITY: STRATEGIC SITE/ NEW FRONTIER

WRITTEN BY | SASKIA SASSEN

CHAPTER

6.2

What I would like to present in this contribution is the question of how globlization connects to cities, particularly cities as sites for contestation, as places for political struggles. Globlization is generally understood as the formation of global capital and the changing relationship between national states and global capital. If we simply think of this as a powerful transnational force, it can immobilize us. Is it possible to localize it? Is it really as global as the language suggests? And if it is localized, where is it? How do we recognize it? How do we detect this power and then think about political struggles that can engage that global actor? In order to think politically, in order to think about how the micropolitics of many activist groups are or are not connecting to that engagement with global capital, my premise is that we can detect aspects of the

system that are in a necessary connection to places and hence to the people in those places. If we keep thinking about global capital as this enormous thing that is out there, that operates in-between national territories, that is forever hypermobile – the struggle is going to be a very different kind of struggle, one where local struggles don't matter.

This is a schema that in my reading creates room for understanding how the particular kinds of activity that many activist groups are engaged in, that may have very particular and local focuses, that may have a temporality that is very short, a particular action, how these can be seen as also being part of a much broader movement. This is a new kind of politics, not broad front politics as we used to think about it, where we have a common front, but a fragmented politics if you want. But in fact, it is a politics rather than just fragmented localized actions. This is a global politics centered on local actions that resonate with each other across the globe – each fighting specific local materialization of a global power system.

Let me then share with you my thinking about how we can construct an analysis that shows why place matters to global capital.

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL CONTROL

Each phase in the long history of the world economy raises specific questions about the particular conditions that make it possible. One of the key properties of the current phase is the ascendance of information technologies, the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capital, and the resulting decline in the capacities of national states to regulate key sectors of their economies. This is well illustrated by the case of the leading information industries, finance and the advanced corporate services; these industries tend to have a space economy that is transnational, and to have outputs that are hypermobile, moving instantaneously around the globe.

The master images in the currently dominant account of economic globalization emphasize precisely these aspects: hypermobility, global communications, the neutralization of place and distance. There is a tendency in that account to take the existence of a global economic system as a given, a function of the power of transnational corporations and global communications. But the capabilities for global operation, co-ordination and control contained in the new information technologies and in the power of transnational corporations need to be produced. By focusing on the production of these capabilities we add a neglected dimension to the familiar issue of the power of large corporations and the new technologies. The emphasis shifts to the practices that constitute what we call economic globalization and global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance, both under conditions of economic concentration.

A focus on practices draws the categories of place and production process into the analysis of economic globalization. These are two categories easily overlooked in accounts centered on the hypermobility of capital and the power of transnationals. Developing categories such as place and production process does not negate the centrality of hypermobility and power. Rather, it brings to the fore the fact that many of the resources necessary for global economic activities are not hypermobile and are, indeed, deeply embedded in place, notably places such as global cities and export processing zones.

Further, by emphasizing the fact that global processes are at least partly embedded in national territories, such a focus introduces new variables in current conceptions about economic globalization and the shrinking regulatory role of the state. That is to say, the space economy for major new transnational economic processes diverges in significant ways from the duality global/national presupposed in much analysis of the global economy. The duality, national versus global, suggests two mutually exclusive spaces-where one begins the other ends. One of the main purposes of this paper is to show that this is fundamentally incorrect, that the global materializes by necessity in specific places and institutional arrangements, a good number of which, if not most, are located in national territories.

Recapturing the geography of places involved in globalization allows us to recapture people, workers, communities, and more specifically, the many different work cultures, besides the corporate culture, involved in the work of globalization.

PLACE AND PRODUCTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Globalization can be deconstructed in terms of the strategic sites where global processes materialize and the linkages that bind them. Among these sites are export processing zones, off-shore banking centers, and, on a far more complex level, global cities. This produces a specific geography of globalization and underlines the extent to which it is not a planetary event encompassing all of the world [1]. It is, furthermore, a changing geography, one that has changed over the last few centuries and over the last few decades. (And, most recently, has come to include electronic space).[2]

This geography of globalization contains both a dynamic of dispersal and of centralization, a condition that is only now beginning to receive recognition (see Sassen 1991: chapter 1). The massive trends towards the spatial dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national and global level which we associate with globalization have contributed to a demand for new forms of territorial centralization of top-level management and control operations. The spatial dispersal of economic activity made

possible by telematics contributes to an expansion of central functions if this dispersal is to take place under the continuing concentration in control, ownership and profit appropriation that characterizes the current economic system.[3]

National and global markets, as well as globally integrated organizations, require central places where the work of globalization gets done [4]. Further, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentration of facilities; we need to distinguish between the capacity for global transmission/communication and the material conditions that make this possible. Finally, even the most advanced information industries have a production process that is at least partly place-bound because of the combination of resources it requires, even when the outputs are hypermobile.

One of the central concerns of my work has been to look at cities as production sites for the leading information industries of our time and to recover the infrastructure of activities, firms and jobs, that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy [5]. These industries are typically conceptualized in terms of the hypermobility of their outputs and the high levels of expertise of their professionals, rather than in terms of the production process involved and the requisite infrastructure of facilities and non-expert jobs that are also part of these industries. A detailed analysis of service-based urban economies shows that there is considerable articulation of firms, sectors, and workers who may appear as though they have little connection to an urban economy dominated by finance and specialized services, but in fact fulfill a series of functions that are an integral part of that economy. They do so, however, under conditions of sharp social, earning, and often racial/ethnic segmentation.[6]

In the day-to-day work of the leading services complex dominated by finance, a large share of the jobs involved are lowly paid and manual, many held by women and immigrants. Although these types of workers and jobs are never represented as part of the global economy, they are in fact part of the infrastructure of jobs involved in running and implementing the global economic system, including such an advanced form of it as is international finance [7]. The top end of the corporate economy – the corporate towers that project engineering expertise, precision, 'techne'– is far easier to mark as necessary for an advanced economic system than are truckers and other industrial service workers, even though these are a necessary ingredient [8]. We see here at work a dynamic of valorization that has sharply increased the distance between the devalorized and the valorized, indeed overvalorized, sectors of the economy.

A NEW GEOGRAPHY OF CENTERS AND MARGINS

The ascendance of information industries and the growth of a global economy, both inextricably linked, have contributed to a new geography of centrality and marginality. This new geography partly reproduces existing inequalities but also is the outcome of a dynamic specific to the current forms of economic growth. It assumes many forms and operates in many arenas, from the distribution of telecommunications facilities to the structure of the economy and of employment. Global cities accumulate immense concentrations of economic power while cities that were once major manufacturing centers suffer inordinate declines; the downtowns of cities and business centers in metropolitan areas receive massive investments in real estate and telecommunications while low-income urban and metropolitan areas are starved of resources; highly educated workers in the corporate sector see their incomes rise to unusually high levels while low- or medium-skilled workers see theirs sink. Financial services produce superprofits while industrial services barely survive.

The most powerful of these new geographies of centrality at the global level bind the major international financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, Hong Kong, among others. But this geography now also includes cities such as Bangkok, Taipei, Sao Paulo and Mexico City. The intensity of transactions among these cities, particularly through the financial markets, trade in services, and investment has increased sharply, and so have the orders of magnitude involved (e.g. Noyelle and Dutka, 1988; Knox 1995) [9]. At the same time, there has been a sharpening inequality in the concentration of strategic resources and activities between each of these cities and others in the same country.[10]

Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities, is a vast territory that has become increasingly peripheral, increasingly excluded from the major economic processes that are seen as fueling economic growth in the new global economy. Formerly important manufacturing centers and port cities have lost functions and are in decline, not only in the less developed countries but also in the most advanced economies. Similarly in the valuation of labor inputs: the overvalorization of specialized services and professional workers has marked many of the 'other' types of economic activities and workers as unnecessary or irrelevant to an advanced economy.

There are other forms of this segmented marking of what is and what is not an instance of the new global economy. For instance, the mainstream account about globalization recognizes that there is an international professional class of workers and highly internationalized business environments due to the presence of foreign firms and personnel. What has not been recognized is the possibility that we are seeing an internationalized labor market

for low-wage manual and service workers and internationalized business environments in immigrant communities. These processes continue to be couched in terms of immigration, a narrative rooted in an earlier historical period.

This signals that there are representations of the global or the transnational which have not been recognized as such, or are contested representations. Among these is the question of immigration, as well as the multiplicity of work environments it contributes in large cities, often subsumed under the notion of the ethnic economy and the informal economy. Much of what we still narrate in the language of immigration and ethnicity I would argue is actually a series of processes having to do with:

(a) the globalization of economic activity, of cultural activity, of identity formation; and, (b) the increasingly marked racialization of labor market segmentation so that the components of the production process in the advanced global information economy taking place in immigrant work environments are components not recognized as part of that global information economy. Immigration and ethnicity are constituted as otherness. Understanding them as a set of processes whereby global elements are localized, international labor markets are constituted, and cultures from all over the world are de- and re-territorialized, puts them right there at the center along with the internationalization of capital as a fundamental aspect of globalization.[11]

How have these new processes of valorization and devalorization and the inequalities they produce come about? This is the subject addressed in the next section.

THE GLOBAL CITY: A NEXUS FOR NEW POLITICO-ECONOMIC ALIGNMENTS

The implantation of global processes and markets in major cities has meant that the internationalized sector of the economy has expanded sharply and has imposed a new set of criteria for valuing or pricing various economic activities and outcomes. This has had devastating effects on large sectors of the urban economy. It is not simply a quantitative transformation; we see here the elements for a new economic regime.

These tendencies towards polarization assume distinct forms in: (a) the spatial organization of the urban economy; (b) the structures for social reproduction; and, (c) the organization of the labor process. In these trends towards multiple forms of polarization lie conditions for the creation of employment-centered urban poverty and marginality, and for new class formations.

The ascendance of the specialized services-led economy, particularly the new finance and services complex, engenders what may be regarded as a new economic regime because, although this sector may account for only a fraction of the economy of a city,

it imposes itself on that larger economy. One of these pressures is towards polarization, as is the case with the possibility for super-profits in finance which contributes to devalorize manufacturing and low-value added services insofar as these sectors cannot generate the superprofits typical in much financial activity.

The super-profit making capacity of many of the leading industries is embedded in a complex combination of new trends: technologies that make possible the hypermobility of capital at a global scale and the deregulation of multiple markets that allows for implementing that hypermobility; financial inventions such as securitization which liquify hitherto unliquid capital and allow it to circulate and hence make additional profits; the growing demand for services in all industries along with the increasing complexity and specialization of many of these inputs which has contributed to their valorization and often over-valorization, as illustrated in the unusually high salary increases beginning in the 1980s for top level professionals and CEOs [12]. Globalization further adds to the complexity of these services, their strategic character, their glamour and therewith to their overvalorization.

The presence of a critical mass of firms with extremely high profit-making capabilities contributes to bid up the prices of commercial space, industrial services, and other business needs, and thereby make survival for firms with moderate profit-making capabilities increasingly precarious. And while the latter are essential to the operation of the urban economy and the daily needs of residents, their economic viability is threatened in a situation where finance and specialized services can earn super-profits. High prices and profit levels in the internationalized sector and its ancillary activities, such as top-of-the-line restaurants and hotels, make it increasingly difficult for other sectors to compete for space and investments. Many of these other sectors have experienced considerable downgrading and/or displacement, for example, the replacement of neighborhood shops tailored to local needs by upscale boutiques and restaurants catering for new high income urban elites.

Inequality in the profit-making capabilities of different sectors of the economy has always existed. But what we see happening today takes place on another order of magnitude and is engendering massive distortions in the operations of various markets, from housing to labor. For instance, the polarization among firms and households and in the spatial organization of the economy contribute, in my reading, towards the informalization of a growing array of economic activities in advanced urban economies. When firms with low or modest profit-making capacities experience an ongoing if not increasing demand for their goods and services from households and other firms, in a context where a significant sector of the economy makes super-profits, they often cannot compete even though there is an effective demand for what they produce. Operating informally is often one of the few ways in which

such firms can survive: for example, using spaces not zoned for commercial or manufacturing uses, such as basements in residential areas, or space that is not up to code in terms of health, fire and other such standards. Similarly, new firms in low-profit industries entering a strong market for their goods and services may only be able to do so informally. Another option for firms with limited profit-making capabilities is to subcontract part of their work to informal operations.[13]

The recomposition of the sources of growth and of profit-making entailed by these transformations also contribute to a reorganization of some components of social reproduction or consumption. While the middle strata still constitute the majority, the conditions that contributed to their expansion and politico-economic power in the post-war decades – the centrality of mass production and mass consumption in economic growth and profit realization – have been displaced by new sources of growth.

The rapid growth of industries with a strong concentration of high and low income jobs has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure, which in turn has a feedback effect on the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. The expansion of the high-income work force in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms have led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers.

In good part, the consumption needs of the low-income population in large cities are met by manufacturing and retail establishments which are small, rely on family labor, and often fall below minimum safety and health standards. Cheap, locally produced sweatshop garments, for example, can compete with low-cost Asian imports. A growing range of products and services, from low-cost furniture made in basements to 'gypsy cabs' and family daycare is available to meet the demand for the growing low-income population.

One way of conceptualizing informalization in advanced urban economies today is to posit it as the systemic equivalent of what we call deregulation at the top of the economy (see Sassen 1994b). Both the deregulation of a growing number of leading information industries and the informalization of a growing number of sectors with low-profit making capacities can be conceptualized as adjustments under conditions where new economic developments and old regulations enter in growing tension [14]. 'Regulatory fractures' is one concept I have used to capture this condition.

We can think of these developments as constituting new geographies of centrality and marginality that cut across the old divide poor/rich countries, and new geographies of marginality that have become increasingly evident not only in the less developed world but inside highly developed countries. Inside major cities in both the developed and developing world we see a new geography of centers and margins that not only contributes to strengthen existing inequalities but sets in motion a whole series of new dynamics of inequality.

Large cities around the world are the terrain where a multiplicity of globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms. These localized forms are, in good part, what globalization is about. If we consider, further, that large cities also concentrate a growing share of disadvantaged populations – immigrants in Europe and the United States, African-Americans and Latinos in the United States, masses of shanty dwellers in the megacities of the developing world – then we can see that cities have become a strategic terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions.

We can then think of cities also as one of the sites for the contradictions of the globalization of capital. On one hand they concentrate a disproportionate share of corporate power and are one of the key sites for the overvalorization of the corporate economy; on the other, they concentrate a disproportionate share of the disadvantaged and are one of the key sites for their devalorization.

Why are these cities also new frontiers? It is in these places that these disadvantaged workers can gain a certain kind of presence, a certain type of visibility: They are to some extent a necessary labour force, i.e. according to the situation where these are necessary jobs. So there is a real ideological battle that also happens. One way of describing this is the demographic embeddedness of this sharp transformation in the valuing of certain kinds of jobs. The devaluing of jobs that remain necessary to the economic system, is facilitated by the availability of traditionally disadvantaged workers. This is what I mean by demographic embeddedness. For the city of New York a majority of resident workers are women, and the majority of resident workers in New York are also either immigrant groups or African Americans and Puerto Ricans. The irony, the dialectics of power and politics is centered in the fact that they are necessary workers who are devalued. They don't have easy access to more traditional forms of politics, for example, union politics, and hence they become the agents for a new kind of politics [15]. Strictly speaking, what is happening here is a combination of three elements: A creation of necessary jobs that are devalued, a demographic embeddedness of transformations in the labour markets (immigrants and women) and a lack of access to more traditional forms of politics.

So you have de facto the possibility of a multiplicity of new kinds of politics. Politics in the case of some places like New York or Los Angeles or Frankfurt or Berlin have very much been caught up in questions of identity, of culture, of protection of immigrant rights etc., and they can be seen according to certain schemata as being a fragmentation of the political. But on the other hand, I think that we have arrived at the point, especially in these kinds of cities, where a new politic is called for. And that's where I see the fit of a lot of particular actions, initiatives, and social movements. For

me, these kinds of cities contain within them the strategic structures that valorize global capital, but also the strategic conditions for the valorization of the political power that these disadvantaged people represent. The joint presences of corporate power and of disadvantaged people have made cities a contested terrain.

The global city concentrates diversity. Its spaces are inscribed with the dominant corporate culture but also with a multiplicity of other cultures and identities, notably through immigration. The slippage is evident: the dominant culture can encompass only part of the city. And while corporate power inscribes non-corporate cultures and identities with 'otherness', thereby devaluing them, they are present everywhere. The immigrant communities and informal economy in cities such as New York and Los Angeles are only two instances.

The fact that these immigrants and refugees are all concentrated in these cities and are often the demographic agent of part of this process of economic restructuring, signals the notion that the postcolonial struggle is not only happening in the ex-colonial territories, it is also happening in cities like Paris and Berlin. I think, with this broader historical sweep, we can see that these little battles and struggles and acts of contestation that are happening all over the place in these large cities, are also the microconstituents of a much broader struggle which is the postcolonial struggle that has relocated itself partly to the metropolitan centers. [16]

Today's global cities are in part the spaces of postcolonialism and indeed contain conditions for the formation of a postcolonialist discourse (see Hall, 1991; King, 1990) [17]. Globalization is a contradictory space; it is characterized by contestation, internal differentiation, continuous border crossings.

Endnotes

[1] Cf. Robertson's notion of the world as a single place, or the 'global human condition.' I would say that globalization is also a process that produces differentiation, only the alignment of differences is of a very different kind from that associated with such differentiating notions as national character, national culture, national society. For example, the corporate world today has a global geography, but it isn't everywhere in the world: in fact it has highly defined and structured spaces; secondly, it also is increasingly sharply differentiated from non-corporate segments in the economies of the particular locations (a city such as New York) or countries where it operates. There is homogenization along certain lines that cross national boundaries and sharp differentiation inside these boundaries.

[2] We need to recognize the specific historical conditions for different conceptions of the international or the global. There is a tendency to see the internationalization of the economy as a process operating at the center, embedded in the power of the multinational corporations today and colonial enterprises in the past. One could note that the economies of many peripheral countries are thoroughly internationalized due to high levels of foreign investments in all economic sectors, and of heavy dependence on world markets for 'hard' currency. What center countries have is strategic concentrations of firms and markets that operate globally, the capability for global control and coordination, and power. This is a very different form of the international from that which we find in peripheral countries.

[3] More conceptually, we can ask whether an economic system with strong tendencies towards such concentration can have a space economy that lacks points of physical agglomeration. That is to say, does power, in this case economic power, have spatial correlates?

[4] I see the producer services, and most especially finance and advanced corporate services, as industries producing the organizational commodities necessary for the implementation and management of global economic systems (Sassen, 1991: chapters 2-5). Producer services are intermediate outputs, that is, services bought by firms. They cover financial, legal, and general management matters, innovation, development, design, administration, personnel, production technology, maintenance, transport, communications, wholesale distribution, advertising, cleaning services for firms, security, and storage. Central components of the producer services category are a range of industries with mixed business and consumer markets; they are insurance, banking, financial services, real estate, legal services, accounting, and professional associations.

[5] Methodologically speaking, this is one way of addressing the question of the unit of analysis in studies of contemporary economic processes. 'National economy' is a problematic category when there are high levels of internationalization. And 'world economy' is a problematic category because of the impossibility of engaging in detailed empirical study at that scale. Highly internationalized cities such as New York or London offer the possibility of examining globalization processes in great detail, within a bounded setting, and with all their multiple, often contradictory aspects. It would begin to address some of the questions raised by King about the need of a differentiated notion of culture, but also of the international and the global (King, 1990).

[6] For me as a political economist, addressing these issues has meant working in several systems of representation and constructing spaces of intersection. There are analytic moments when two systems of representation intersect. Such analytic moments are easily experienced as spaces of silence, of absence. One challenge is to see what happens in those spaces, what operations (analytic, of power, of meaning) take place there.
One version of these spaces of intersection is what I have called analytic borderlands. Why borderlands? Because they are spaces that are constituted in terms of discontinuities; in them discontinuities are given a terrain rather than reduced to a dividing line. Much of my work on economic globalization and cities has focused on these discontinuities and has sought to reconstitute them analytically as borderlands rather than dividing lines. This produces a terrain within which these discontinuities can be reconstituted in terms of economic operations whose properties are not merely a function of the spaces on each side (i.e., a reduction to the condition of dividing line) but also, and most centrally, of the discontinuity itself, the argument being that discontinuities are an integral part, a component, of the economic system.

197

[7] A methodological tool I find useful for this type of examination is what I call circuits for the distribution and installation of economic operations. These circuits allow me to follow economic activities into terrains that escape the increasingly narrow borders of mainstream representations of 'the advanced economy' and to negotiate the crossing of socio-culturally discontinuous spaces.

[8] This is illustrated by the following event. When the first acute stock market crisis happened in 1987 after years of enormous growth, there were numerous press reports about the sudden and massive unemployment crisis among high-income professionals on Wall Street. The other unemployment crises on Wall Street, affecting secretaries and blue collar workers was never noticed nor reported upon. And yet, the stock market crash created a very concentrated unemployment crisis, for instance, in the Dominican immigrant community in Northern Manhattan where a lot of the Wall Street cleaners live.

[9] Whether this has contributed to the formation of transnational urban systems is subject to debate. The growth of global markets for finance and specialized services, the need for transnational servicing networks due to sharp increases in international investment, the reduced role of the government in the regulation of international economic activity and the corresponding ascendance of other institutional arenas, notably global markets and corporate headquarters – all these point to the existence of transnational economic arrangements with locations in more than one country. These cities are not merely competing with each other for market share as is often asserted or assumed; there is a division of labor which incorporates cities of multiple countries, and in this regard we can speak of a global system (e.g. in finance) as opposed to simply an international system (see Sassen 1991: chapters 1–4, 7). We can see here the formation, at least incipient, of a transnational urban system.

[10] Further, the pronounced orientation to the world markets evident in such cities raises questions about the articulation with their nation-states, their regions, and the larger economic and social structure in such cities. Cities have typically been deeply embedded in the economies of their region, indeed often reflecting the characteristics of the latter; and they still do. But cities that are strategic sites in the global economy tend, in part, to disconnect from their region. This conflicts with a key proposition in traditional scholarship about urban systems, namely, that these systems promote the territorial integration of regional and national economies.

[11] Elsewhere I have tried to argue that the current post-1945 period has distinct conditions for the formation and continuation of international flows of immigrants and refugees. I have sought to show that the specific forms of internationalization of capital we see over this period have contributed to mobilize people into migration streams and build bridges between countries of origin and the US. The implantation of western development strategies, from the replacement of small-holder agriculture with export-oriented commercial agriculture to the westernization of educational systems, has contributed to mobilize people into migration streams – regional, national, transnational. At the same time the administrative commercial and development networks of the former European empires and the newer forms these networks assumed under the Pax Americana (international direct foreign investment, export processing zones, wars for democracy) have not only created bridges for the flow of capital, information and high level personnel from the center to the periphery but, I argue, also for the flow of migrants (Sassen, 1988). See also Hall's account of the post-war influx of people from the Commonwealth into Britain and his description of how England and Englishness were so present in his native Jamaica as to make people feel that London was the capital where they were all headed to sooner or later (1991). This way of narrating the migration events of the post war era captures the ongoing weight of colonialism and post-colonial forms of empire on major processes of globalization today, and specifically those binding emigration and immigration countries. The major immigration countries are not innocent bystanders; the specific genesis and contents of their responsibility will vary from case to case and period to period.

[12] The high profit making capability of the new growth sectors also rests partly on speculative activity. The extent of this dependence on speculation can be seen in the crisis of the 1990s that followed the unusually high profits in finance and real estate in the 1980s. The real estate and financial crisis, however, seems to have left the basic dynamic of the sector untouched. The crisis can thus be seen as an adjustment to more reasonable, i.e. less speculative profit levels. The overall dynamic of polarization in profit levels in the urban economy remains in place, as do the distortions in many markets.

[13] More generally, we are seeing the formation of new types of labor market segmentation. Two characteristics stand out. One is the weakening role of the firm in structuring the employment relation. More is left to the market. A second form in this restructuring of the labor market is what could be described as the shift of labor market functions to the household or community.

[14] Linking informalization and growth takes the analysis beyond the notion that the emergence of informal sectors in cities like New York and Los Angeles is caused by the presence of immigrants and their propensities to replicate survival strategies typical of Third World countries. Linking informalization and growth also takes the analysis beyond the notion that unemployment and recession generally may be the key factors promoting informalization in the current phase of highly industrialized economies. It may point to characteristics of advanced capitalism that are not typically noted. For an excellent collection of recent work focusing on the informal economy in many different countries see Komlosy et al. (1997).

[15] I must say that we see some change in the big cities in the United States where Trade Unions have finally understood that they have got to organize the unemployed, that they have got to organize women and immigrants whether they are documented or not, and that they have got to organize in communities and not only in workplaces. So we are just beginning to see a slight transformation.

[16] There are many examples. Global mass culture homogenizes and is capable of absorbing an immense variety of local cultural elements. But this process is never complete. My analysis of data on electronic manufacturing shows that employment in lead sectors no longer inevitably constitutes membership in a labor aristocracy. Thus Third World women working in Export Processing Zones are not empowered; capitalism can work through difference. Yet another case is that of 'illegal' immigrants; here we see that national boundaries have the effect of creating and criminalizing difference. These kinds of differentiations are central to the formation of a world economic system (Wallerstein, 1990).

[17] An interesting question concerns the nature of internationalization today in ex-colonial cities. King's (1990:78) analysis about the distinctive historical and unequal conditions in which the notion of the 'international' was constructed is extremely important. King shows us how during the time of empire, some of the major old colonial centers were far more internationalized than the metropolitan centers. Internationalization as used today is assumed to be rooted in the experience of the center. This brings up a parallel contemporary blindspot well captured in Hall's observation that contemporary post-colonial and post-imperialist critiques have emerged in the former centers of empires and they are silent about a range of conditions evident today in ex-colonial cities or countries. Yet another such blindspot is the idea that the international migrations now directed largely to the center from former colonial territories, and neo-colonial territories in the case of the US, and most recently Japan (1994), might be the correlate of the internationalization of capital that began with colonialism.

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199

IS THERE STILL ROOM FOR PUBLIC SPACE? GLOBALIZING CITIES AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE PUBLIC REALM

WRITTEN BY | UTE ANGELIKA LEHRER

PHOTOS BY | UTE ANGELIKA LEHRER,

ROGER KEIL ('INFO-BOX')

CHAPTER

6.3

Is public space in global cities different than in 'non-global cities'? What are the differences between a European and a North American 'model' of public space? Where are the places and localities of social movements? These were the questions that stood at the beginning of this contribution. The more I got into the subject matter, the more I started to question the importance of an analysis of differences between Europe and North America in terms of public space.[1]

European public space: Piazza San Marco, Venice (1994)

Public street and signs, Parc la Villette in the background, Paris (June 1996)

American public space: Venice Beach, California (1995)

What became more relevant to me, was the fact that public space in both North America and Europe, is undergoing major changes. I want to argue here that these changes have less to do with the specificities of actual places but more with the impact of a global economy onto the articulation of public space. Despite cultural, social and political differences, spatial relations get redefined in a way that constitutes a new relation between public and private. This redefinition of the urban landscape is played out in the built and social environment. The images of this redefinition of public space are more or less the same both in Europe and North America: an increased (real or symbolic) privatization of public space, while, at the same time, the local state retreats more and more from investment in public spaces and sells off public goods to private corporations. This privatization of public space is supported by traditional and new forms of control mechanisms of a physical-technological and regulatory nature. At the same time, the privatization of space also increases the displacement and marginalization of certain groups of people. Examples of physical and non-physical control mechanisms of public spaces are found in many variations such as; divided benches in order to prevent people from using them as a bed; sprinkler systems in public parks that go off occasionally during the night in order to discourage people from spending the night there; video cameras for the control of public spaces; by-laws that tell the potential users of public spaces what they are not allowed to do; the control of public space by police and more and more private security police. Examples of marginalized groups include economically, socially and/or culturally disadvantaged groups such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, the homeless, drug users, mentally disabled people as well as people that deliberately choose a different lifestyle such as squatters and inhabitants of *Wagenburgen* (see the contribution by Renate Berg, in this book).

Control and regulation of public space is nothing new (Cranz 1982; Foucault 1979; Weisman 1994). In every society there are sets of rules and regulations that the individual members of that society are expected to follow. These sets of rules and regulations change over time, and differ from place to place. Certain societies rely more on the self-control of their members, others hand over the control to authorities or institutions, such as the police or private security. In addition, the level of control varies from society to society.

The current round of these control and regulatory mechanisms follows a relatively short period of less than three decades, during which some changes occured in the social control of, and the cultural practices in, using public space both in Europe and North America. During that time, public space increasingly became

looked at and treated as a common good to which every man and woman theoretically has access to, regardless of day- or night-time, of the sexual preferences of the individual, or of the ethnic and/or class background of that person. (A quick look into the tabloid press, however, shows that this right of access to public space of every human being is often being neglected in the reality of daily practices).

Our understanding of the new round of control and regulatory mechanisms in public space have only just begun. This paper, therefore, is a first attempt to come to a better understanding of the term 'public space'.

Transformation of public space: abandoned West Side Highway in New York City becomes an urban 'adventure park' (1988)

Control of public space: Cinco de Mayo celebration, downtown Los Angeles (May 1988)

THREE WAYS OF DEFINING PUBLIC SPACE

When I started working on this paper, my body was in Los Angeles, my mind in Berlin and my heart in Toronto. Just as personal space can be defined through multiple points of references, public space is constituted on various levels: (a) physical public space, (b) social public space, and (c) symbolic public space. The first reading of public space looks at its material existence, the second reading is about practices and social relations within space and the third reading is about remembrance and the 'aura' of places, both objective and subjective. Every public space can be analyzed by one or more of these definitions, i.e. the meaning and the notion of public space is changing the way that we look at it. Let me point out that although I will look at the three ways of defining public space as if they are three different types, every public space incorporates one or more of these types.

(Over-)designed public space: Parc la Villette, Paris (1996)

Control of public space:
large-scale ticket control at
Kottbusser Tor, Berlin
(July 1997)

Physical public space is the most obvious, and may be the most romanticized, type: streets, plazas, picnic areas, beaches etc. are the images that come to people's mind when they are asked to describe public space. In this understanding of public space, the Italian Piazza filled with people seems to works as the archetypical form of public space. Interestingly, this romanticized view of public space is shared by both Europe and North America.

As a prolific example of trying to create physical public space we can think here of the Piazza d'Italia (1975-1978), a plaza in New Orleans designed by the American architect Charles Moore. The plaza, which is an allegory to an Italian Piazza, was built as the first part of a larger revitalization project in a declining neighborhood. This urban design feature never became the new meeting point and outdoor space as it was planned, but instead was exposed to vandalism and deteriorated within a relatively short period of time.

The point that I want to make here is not about good versus bad public design (in the professional world, the urban design of Piazza d'Italia received a lot of recognition). The point is that, just because public spaces in North American cities usually don't follow urban design schemes of Italian (i.e. European) cities, one should not conclude that there are no ('good') public spaces. Public spaces in North American cities do not necessarily take the form of people crowding a piazza and walking up and down the streets, but the form of different practices of using and producing public space. Many of these practices are oriented toward the use of car. In addition, the example of the Piazza d'Italia demonstrates the limitation of design as an incubator of urban revitalization.

Physical public space is defined through the type of ownership, and is articulated in the built and 'natural' environment [2]. In other words: urban design creates physical public space. It is no surprise that, therefore, many architects, planners and city officials argue that by creating a well designed built environment, you also receive a well functioning public space (and hence, as a result, a civilized behavior of people in public places). While I don't want to challenge the importance of well designed places – the more interesting the design, the better for the users of that public space – I want to point to the fact that urban design can create physical, and also psychological, barriers around public spaces. Therefore, by integrating fences, divided benches, video cameras, as well as expensive looking materials and fancy looking design features, public space becomes a place of control, regulation and exclusion to certain groups of people.

This brings me to the second type of public space: the social public space. Social public space is created through practices. These practices are taking place not only in locations owned by the public (i.e. the park, the plaza, the street, the beach etc.) but also in locations that belong to individuals or corporations. The variety of these places can range from coffee houses, restaurants, and bars, to the letter-to-the-editor-section of newspapers and other forms of media as well as communication (e.g. the Internet), to private homes.

Transformation of public space:
West Side Highway in New York City (1988)

204

Functionalistic public space:
Kalinin Prospekt, Moscow (1998)

Social public space is the most interesting form of all three types, because it has the potential to transform and redefine ownership and can give new meanings to urban space. Social public space is in a constant redefinition through which the conflict between use-value and exchange-value are played out over real places.

The third type can be described as symbolic public space, or as Lefebvre would call it, *espace vécu* (Lefebvre 1991). It is created by the practices as well as the collective memory of people. This form of defining public space is more difficult to pin down to 'real' places because, in contrast to the material existence of physical public space, this type is both real and imagined. It is a space of remembrance and of imagination.

An example of symbolic public space the repeated destruction of windows at Zurich's major banks and upmarket shops in the most prestigious Bahnhofstrasse during the 1980s. For some people these practices were just insane vandalism in the heart of Zurich's financial district. For others, particularly those who lived through this experience as participants, the neat and clean

Bahnhofstrasse never looked the same again. This part of Zurich became one of the symbolic places of the movement of 1980; it brought the 'other' side of Switzerland's largest city to the front pages of national and international newspapers (for more detail on the history of the movement of 1980 see Schmid, in this book). A more classical example is the rise and fall of the *Commune* in Paris and the construction of Sacré-Coeur on the spot where Eugène Varlin was executed (Harvey, 1989, pp.200-208).

These two examples, however, show that symbolic public space is a short lived experience in most cases and limited to certain groups of people. If symbolic public space is becoming part of common history – as in the case of the *Commune* or the assasination of JFK or of Martin Luther King – the symbolic public space is exposed to a transformation in which the meaning and the relevance of this space is set into relation with the current dominant way of a historical approach, i.e. pupils learn the official version of the history of, for example, the Civil Rights Movement.

These three ways of defining public space lead me to some general statements:

First, it would be wrong to believe that there is actually a public space that belongs to a public which includes everybody. The question should be asked: Who is that public? Are there different forms of public spaces? Which public uses which space? And further, who has the right, the means and the power to articulate him-/herself in the public realm?

Second, public space is controlled and regulated by the hegemonic forces. This leads to an exclusion of some people from public spaces, and usually also to their marginalization within society.

Third, under the impact of globalization and urban restructuring, public space becomes privatized in new forms; i.e. the border line between public and private space is less and less readable.

Fourth, public space is constantly produced and reconstituted. Because of this constant redefinition of public space, it is here where radical urban politics and social movements should and can intervene and push forward for social change.

THE PLACES AND LOCALITIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ACTION GROUPS

Public space in all three different articulations is the site of social movements and action groups. Through their practices these social groups make use of and create public space: A meeting of the committee of a demonstration at an activist's home turns this particular private space into a semi-public/public space for the time of the meeting; a performance on a privately owned plaza is transforming this piece of land into a public space for a limited time and will be remembered by the activists, some spectators and the

intervening police in different ways; the mass demonstration in a city sets symbolic moments in the history of this particular city.

In recent years I have witnessed a number of interesting examples of the transformation of public and private space. Besides the already mentioned movement of 1980 in Zurich where the youth, and other social actors, were claiming the right to the city by using different kinds of actions, ranging from street theater to street fight, there were a number of less violent but nevertheless publicly noticable attempts at creating political consciousness by transforming public space.

The body on the street

The demonstration against Proposition 187, a law that will take away a number of social services from undocumented immigrants, and that was accepted in the Fall 1994 by the voting population of California, is an example of marginalized and so-called invisibles making themselves visible in the streets of Los Angeles by marching in downtown and in neighborhoods, and by having public rallies in school yards (Lehrer 1997). During these weeks in the Fall of 1994, the predominantly Latino population transformed the urban public space by their demonstrations, rallies and actions of claiming the right for education and health care for everybody.

Socialism of the heart

In Toronto, social movements got a push when the conservative Harris government came into power in 1995 (see Stefan Kipfer, in this book). Ever since this government took charge, there has been a constant flow of social mobilization, demonstrations, strikes and so on. In particular, the fights against the amalgamation of Toronto and five other cities into one big city of 2.4 million inhabitants lead to a strong movement against the political restructuring of the city of Toronto, with the 'Citizen for Local Democracy' as the main group organizing against amalgamation. The places and localities where this group makes itself heard range from street demonstrations, to weekly town meetings in a church, to being present at all the major meetings of the legislative, to distributing information in a newsletter and on the Internet.

No peace of mind

My final example is the Inner!City!Action! which took place in several German and Swiss cities during one particular week in early June 1996. During this specific week, various actions were held in cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Zurich and Bern. The common goal was to point to the transformation and the increased privatization of public space, and to argue against racism and the marginalization of people. Its uniqueness was that the focus of this event was not a single issue topic – it was looking at repression on different levels and at different places and that it created social (and to a certain extent also symbolic) public space in several places at the same time (for more detail on Berlin, see Grell, Sambale and Veith, in this book).

CONCLUSION

All these examples have one thing in common: they use physical public space (such as the streets), as a sort of container of their actions. They also create social public space by their practices (such as having meetings in semi-public and private spaces or rallies in school yards). And finally, they show that symbolic public space is produced by the collective memory of mass demonstrations, of small performances (such as 'controlling' riders of public transportation as in the case of Inner!City!Action! in Berlin), etc.

To come back to the question in the title of this paper: Yes, there is still room for public space in cities. This is true despite increased privatization of public space (which often comes in the form of a Disneyfication of the built environment), and despite the marginalization and criminalization of certain parts of the population. Since the global economy plays a relevant role in many cities, and since globalization processes are taking place also in cities that are not major control hubs of the world economy, this argument holds true for many (if not all) cities. Along the same lines, I want to point out that it doesn't help for the analysis of the most recent transformation of public space, to differentiate between a North American and an European model of public space.

Public space *per se* is meaningless. It is always defined by practices, regulations, memory. As I have tried to argue in the previous pages, public space is not only constituted by its physical appearance but it is mainly defined by social practices: A park that the public does not have access to cannot be called a public space (regardless of the status of its ownership). Only spaces that the public has access to – or where the public claims the right to access – can be called public spaces. This means that public space does not necessarily have to be a park, a street or a plaza but can be anything from a restaurant, the Internet, to a privately owned home. Another important character of public space is that it changes its meaning over time. While certain forms of public space are short lived (such as the private home: as soon as the public meeting is over, it becomes a private place again) others last for longer. But it is the interplay between the practices of people, and the control and regulatory mechanisms, that defines the quality of public space. If control and regulatory mechanisms are changing – as they seem to do at the end of this century – the social practices have to change accordingly in order to be effective in the production of public space.

Endnotes

[1] It also has to be pointed out that there ist not one single European model of public space but several. We can identify at least two: one that I want to call the Italian model (with piazzi and fountains) and the other one the Dutch model (following a more prosaic planning rationale). While the former is mostly built in Southern Europe, the latter one can be found in Middle and Northern Europe and in North America. (I wish to thank Werner Sewing for being a tough debater on questions of public space).

[2] The term 'natural' here is used in the context of a designed nature; i.e. this notion of natural environment is not the same as pristine nature; yet nature untouched by human-kind hardly exist either in North America or in Europe (see Lipietz 1995 for the latter, and the fights over land claims of the First Nations in British Columbia for the former).

Inner!City!Action! Alexanderplatz, Berlin (June 1997): "I bite for the BVG (Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe)"

207

Student demonstrations, May 1996: "We've come to complain" – creation of public space in the privately run 'Info-Box' at Potsdamer Platz, Berlin

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INNER! CITY! ACTION! — CROWD CONTROL, INTERDICTORY SPACE AND THE FIGHT FOR SOCIO-SPATIAL JUSTICE

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PHOTOS BY | KATJA EYDEL

CHAPTER

6.4

In June 1997 an alliance of activist groups in several German and Swiss cities organised the Inner!City!Action! week as a reaction against the hegemonic policies of socio-spatial exclusion now prevalent in most inner cities [1]. This article discusses the (much debated) focus on the inner city, touching on the crucial role of public space. We begin with a retrospective glance at the emergence of the new social movements and their focus on (urban) daily life in order to question whether it still makes sense to concentrate exclusively on the sphere of reproduction and residential areas. Then we present Berlin as the new German ´capital of repression´ and move on to sketch the project Inner!City!Action!. Finally we conclude with some remarks about the possibilities and limits of this type of politics.

THE FIGHT AGAINST FORDIST STANDARDISATION OF DAILY LIFE IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS

Historically, the 'discovery' of the sphere of reproduction by the New Social Movements as crucial for the stability of capitalism led to a shift in the political agenda. Instead of the traditional emphasis on working conditions (i.e., spatially and politically, the factory), feminist and subculture-orientated groups stressed the repressive impact of standardisation processes in daily life even outside the world of work. This sparked off various forms of resistance, with even supposedly private aspects of life (e.g. family and gender relations) becoming open to public discussion. The importance of consumption, unpaid housework, housing conditions etc. was central to a stable Fordist society, a fact already recognised by Ford himself (Ford 1922). However these Fordist lifestyles and forms of production were at their peak – at least in West Germany – when the new social movements emerged. They, conversely, were able to take some advantage of the standardisation of daily life in addressing alienating aspects shared by large parts of the population. The significance of the inherent limits of Fordism are not discussed here, but have been elaborated by Hitz, Schmid and Wolff (1995).

In particular the residential areas adjacent to downtown Berlin (West) became the prime site for anti-hegemonic movements [2]. They offered opportunities for lifestyles opposed to the standardised modern way of life, since the traditional floor plan scheme of the apartments permitted other living arrangements than the core family with its rigid division of labour, and allowed a mix of work and leisure, rather than the strict Fordist patterns of functional and spatial division of work, consumption, recreation and culture. Furthermore the lower rents in these neighbourhoods attracted low income populations and made cultural and work experiments possible. The huge urban renewal programmes also contributed to the resistance movements. These developments were aimed at modernising allegedly outdated housing conditions and represented a strategy to dissolve disturbing political and social structures. However in a process of mutual reinforcement, they acted as one of the triggers for the urban revolt which reached its climax in 1980/81, when more than 200 previously empty houses were squatted (Bodenschatz et al.1983: 48). In view of the fact that one in every eight Berliners was affected by the city's huge urban renewal programme, which eventually destroyed more building stock than World War II (Ziegs 1981: 230), a powerful movement emerged, able to gain support from large parts of the population.

However, the movement was more than a squatting revolt against the authoritarian urban renewal policies of the (local) state. The goal was also to experiment with, and to establish, living, housing, and earning alternatives to the Fordist standardisation of life (Cf. Bodenschatz et al. 1983; Nitsche 1981). The (rather implicit) territorial concept was to defend the occupied space – houses or even certain neighbourhoods – rather than expand to 'hostile' areas such as prosperous neighbourhoods and the inner city. The inner city indeed was enemy territory, visited only for occasional demonstrations and clandestine petit-bourgeois shopping orgies: it was not a place to be concerned about, let alone to be fought for.

In view of today's high levels of unemployment, polarisation of lifestyles and the permanent exclusion of some of the population, opposition against standardisation of life has lost some of its appeal (this aspect is discussed again below). This is not to imply that there is necessarily more room for anti-hegemonic lifestyles, since they have come under increased pressure since the Wall came down and the decision to make the city the capital of a unified Germany. However, given the prevailing ideology of pluralisation, we would assert that they no longer have the same explosive power. This also applies to political visions of urbanism which ruling elites were (partly) able to use to legitimate exclusionist policies (see 'Crowd Control' below). Today, even the ruling elites would not dare to defend the modern (Fordist) city any longer. In this context we suggest that anti-hegemonic politics has to consider the historical limitations to the struggles of housing areas and other spheres of reproduction.

WHY DOES THE INNER CITY MATTER?

It was not a matter of coincidence or mere preference that recent actions focused on the inner city (as some critiques supposed, for example Uncker 1997a; b). We will argue that the inner city has become more important for different reasons (Innen!Stadt!Aktion! 1997):

– It became attractive for investment by banks, insurance, real estate and other companies who are increasingly interested in Central Business District-real estate (Harvey 1987).
– It became important as a show-case for the myth of the 'clean' urban service society for local policies of competition.
– Last but not least, the inner city is the most important place for the growing population of marginalised people. They need the inner city as working site (prostitution, street vending, panhandling and so forth), as meeting place due to the lack of other opportunities, and as recreation area or living space (homeless persons). An important part of the social-service facilities some of these people rely on is located there.

These groups are subjected to new (and old) forms of exclusionist policies which we will address in the following sections. We then sketch the project Inner!City!Action! and conclude with some remarks about its possibilities and limits.

But before we discuss the Berlin example we want to suggest that these exclusionist policies cannot be conceived simply as a measure to keep particular persons out of some areas, where they allegedly might ruin the environment and reduce profits. While it is clear that conflicts around inner city space have intensified, we have to avoid the notion that public space was once a place of encounter and is only threatened by current developments. This liberal idea of public space assumes that the possibility of encounter is a positive aspect in terms of confronting prejudices and inducing communication and learning processes. Yet, even if hierarchies and obstacles within these processes are acknowledged, such a view ultimately reduces the perception of public space as a container for social behaviour (cf. Lehrer, in this book, who demonstrates various ways of defining public space). In contrast, following Massey (1992) and Ruddick (1996a; b), we would assert that public space was always constituted through the specific exclusion of certain groups [3] and would suggest that public space should be conceived as being directly related to the construction of identities – of the self and of others (Veith/Sambale 1997). Thus an everyday encounter in public space is able to reinforce, rather than challenge stereotypes of marginalised groups (depending on their own bias, the media coverage, local politics etc.) [4]. The constitution of a new citizenship regime, which we have been witnessing for several years, essentially happens at the local level using public space as a medium for social processes – and this is one major scene (Smith 1993) in which counteracting politics can interfere.

CROWD CONTROL

In summer '96 Berlin seemed to have become the German capital of repression in both psychological and political terms. All over the city we were witnessing evictions of squats and so called 'Wagenburgen'[5], attacks on homeless people and other 'undesirables' and the harassment of migrants, refugees and ethnic minorities on an escalating scale. In order to manufacture local consent at times of severe austerity, representatives of the local elites, media and security forces have united to pathologise and stigmatise 'deviant' behaviour, and alternative housing arrangements as criminal and a threat to the city's competitiveness. The leitmotif of the current growth strategy is 'capital capability', aimed at isolating all phenomena that could be irritating to the behavioural standards of middle class inhabitants, tourists and the

business community. The strategy of social and ethnic cleansing is not only applied to inner city shopping areas but also to other spatial entities such as the traditional inner city migrant and working class housing districts. At the end of this century whole communities are under siege by residential and commercial gentrification, by the loss of public housing and massive unemployment. In some districts such as the immigrant area of Kreuzberg, unemployment is up to 30 percent mainly due to the loss of more than 350.000 manufacturing jobs in the last ten years in both West and East Berlin.

In October 1996, the Senate for Urban Development of the Berlin local government launched a planning offensive called 'Planwerk Innenstadt'. This declared the creation of inner city prime space and prime land-use (luxury consumption, high class services, capital functions) as one of its main goals. This space-invasion was primarily directed against the architectural remains of the socialist city in East Berlin, but can be also interpreted as a massive threat to low-income residents and land uses that are not considered appropriate for an attractive city centre. While the local government cannibalises its budget and focuses resources on world-class reconstruction, services for the poor, the homeless, youth, migrants and drug users are severely cut. It is therefore not surprising that more and more marginalised groups flock into the inner city for survival, work, shelter and food. Crowd control is the order of the day and interdictory space [6] the key to it.

INTERDICTORY SPACE

Like many other cities in Western Europe, Berlin has developed an amazing array of flexible means, and means flexibility, in order to control, manage and define 'proper' behaviour in prime spaces. The privatisation of public spaces, the banning of certain groups from public squares and public transportation infrastructure and the abandonment by the police of the homeless, drug users and youth on the outskirts of the city, are all common. There are tens of thousands of bans each year placed and carried out by a number of co-operating security agencies. The public transportation agency alone placed 160.000 bans in only 12 months (*Spiegel*, 24, 1997, p. 49). This does not mean that 160.000 persons were expelled and then forbidden to re-enter the stations, but represents repeated action against the same people in their everyday struggle for their living and work places. Panhandlers, prostitutes or homeless newspaper sellers vitally depend on places with large flows of potential customers and therefore will return to such places even if they risk severe repression. At the same time, the Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) and the local businesses have similar interests in the several hundred thousand people using the stations every day. Thus all major stations have already been transformed into what DB-chief Heinz Dürr terms 'department stores with tracks' or are still experiencing expensive reconstructions. But the most advanced tool for territorialising behavioural standards in Berlin is the declaration of 30 'dangerous zones' across the city which are based

on local (state) police law. While patrolling these arbitrarily constructed spaces of deviance, a single police officer can repeal basic civil rights and frisk people on the spot if their behaviour is regarded as disturbing to public order. Furthermore, across inner city Berlin there are security zones ('Bannmeilen'), which restrict public access around many government (local and national) buildings and where no public meetings, rallies or marches may be held. These represent only some of the instruments of controlling public spaces, as local elites continue to push the borders of these restricted spaces even further.

Policing the poor, evicting squatters and deporting homeless persons and immigrants to the local and global periphery are local modes of regulating poverty and socio-spatial polarisation. But this mode of regulation is not yet coherent for at least two reasons: First, the enormous number of bans indicates that people are not willing, or able, to leave the central areas. People tend to come back and reclaim public spaces because they critically depend not only on the inner city service structure but also on the inner city spaces as places for income (panhandling, street-trading etc.) and communication. Around most trainstations social service providers for people living in the streets have managed to negotiate territorial compromises. They are allowed to stay in the area if they render themselves 'invisible' by siting the services behind the train stations to separate them from travellers, commuters and shoppers. Second, there is a growing number of people who are

starting to question (socio-spatial) apartheid in their city. Reducing the right to the city to selected consumers provokes various forms of open and hidden resistance and increases demands for socio-spatial justice.

INNER!CITY!ACTION! AND THE FIGHT FOR SOCIO-SPATIAL JUSTICE

In order to confront the dominant forms of urbanisation described above, more than a hundred leftists from the remnants of the (West) German and Swiss urban social movements, with a critical arts background, gathered in late 1996 in Berlin to discuss ways of contesting and fighting against the new apartheid in the inner cities. The two day conference created mutual understanding. One major issue in the debate was the question of whether the inner city should be the focus of anti-hegemonic politics. In the partly successful struggle to defend proclaimed free spaces (squatted houses, social centres, low income neighbourhoods etc.) against gentrification, the inner-city had become a distant place with little relevance for most leftists (see introduction). The abandonment and harassment of homeless people and raids against immigrants were regularly highlighted by service providers and anti-racist groups, but the potential of inner city conflicts for framing broader contradictions of globalised urbanisation and capitalist restructuring was rarely recognised. We would suggest that the question is still not answered: Should we keep on concentrating on our neighbourhoods and our own (left-wing and alternative life-style) infrastructure (the common strategy in the 80s amongst local and anarchist groups) or does Inner!City!Action! offer

a new chance for radical coalition building and jumping the scale of struggles (cf. Smith 1993)?

A second meeting in Frankfurt on the Main in January 1997 served to support a broader understanding of recent urban change and the clarification of organisational questions. Papers addressed subjects like urbanisation, dominant discourses of crime, inner security, drugs and racism and problems of representation and identity-politics. The conference decided to prepare for an Inner!City!Action!-week at the beginning of June (2-8) 1997 to focus on the privatisation of public spaces, safety mania and exclusion. (This was the slogan for all activities in Berlin at the time: 'Gegen Privatisierung, Sicherheitswahn und Ausgrenzung'). One of the central goals could be described as identifying and contesting the barriers and restrictions of 'access to material and immaterial resources such as public spaces and urban cultures' and rendering already existing anti-hegemonic uses and counter-definitions of public space more visible.

Perceiving and organising ourselves as a loose network of action-oriented groups we agreed on the common use of the title Inner!City!Action! (Innen!Stadt!Aktion!), the production of a common supplement for different publications in Germany and Switzerland (comprising articles from A for Actions to Z for Zurich inner city) and of video-clips that were shown in movie theatres with the commercials [7]. Apart from this, every local group was responsible for its own further activities and their funding.

Amazingly enough, most of the groups from about 15 cities managed to fill a week in June with different actions which ranged from traditional rallies directed against police brutality and harassment of the homeless, to creative forms of agitprop including open theatre performances and dance events to reclaim the streets at night. The Berlin group co-ordinated some of the inter-regional tasks, i. e. editing the supplement and shooting the video-clips. In Berlin there were at least four special editions of magazines dealing with our action-week including the two homeless magazines (*Motz* and *Straßenfeger*).

The local calendar in Berlin included 14 events plus several more that had no public announcement. Activities ranged from public meetings discussing common interests of different groups (e. g. professional health workers, organisations of anti-racists, migrants and homeless people), to the symbolic reclaiming of spaces that have been turned into private property. The character of our local action can be illustrated by two of these spatial 'appropriation processes': 'Picnic in Los Angeles' and 'Rave Against the Machine'.

212

PICNIC IN L.A.

At the centre of West Berlin's inner city, close to the Kurfürsten-damm, the Los Angeles Square used to be a small public park where, during the summer, office-workers having lunch would mingle with local residents, tourists, the homeless and young people hanging out. This public square (named after the official sister city of West Berlin) was far from being a highly contested place – like for example the Tompkins Square Park in New York City. A year ago it was sold to a company running the car park underneath. Today the privatised L.A. Square is frequently patrolled by private security guards who openly and fiercely 'defend' the square against unwanted groups like punks and drug users and who make sure that the following activities are not carried out: eating, drinking, feeding birds, walking dogs and entering the park after dark. While privately-owned parks are common in North-American cities, the privatisation of formerly public spaces is a relatively new phenomenon in Berlin. Aware that the media as well as some local politicians and residents are not in favour of these processes of 'Americanisation', the Inner!City!Action! chose the park as a (symbolic) contested place. One sunny afternoon more than a hundred people, including a theatre group – well equipped with food and drinks, picnic baskets, ball games and blankets – took over the park to have a good time and do all the things that are usually prohibited. Despite the fact that a large number of police officers were ready to arrest us for not respecting private property, the owner of the park decided to tolerate our illegal picnic to avoid more negative media coverage. While the symbolic squatting continued, about 500 people gathered at the square to use it as a starting point for a demonstration through the inner city. They held rallies in front of one the main police stations (addressing issues of police brutality and harassment) and in front of a hotel where the annual meeting of the AG City West (an influential lobby-group of the local business community demanding an 'attractive' and 'clean' shopping area) took place, confronting the participants with our ideas of socio-spatial justice.

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE

Another form of collective action took place in a room that is usually reserved for special customers: a bank, or more precisely, the entrance hall of a bank furnished with lots of cash-points [8]. While in the age of de-industrialisation more and more places like former factory and production halls are used for commercial purposes, Inner!City!Action! chose a bank in the middle of a gentrified inner city area in East Berlin (Spandauer Vorstadt) for a special night-time event, the 'Rave Against the Machine'. For more than an hour a large crowd of people squatted the entrance hall of a local bank using it for fun and dancing. When the police – obviously irritated by that kind of public disorder – arrived, nobody could be arrested as no one knew who was responsible for a party which had in the meantime attracted local residents, tourists and gate-crashers. This in itself opened up new forms of communication and the idea of redefining the use of spaces that are usually clearly restricted to business purposes.

OUTLOOK

It is always difficult to assess whether a campaign like the Inner!City!Action! has been successful. At least in Berlin the media covered the event, even if the inter-regional context and the connection between the particular actions was often overlooked. Generally, we faced the problem of explaining a complex issue which on the one hand cannot easily be converted into political claims [9] and on the other proved to be very contradictory. Thus while most of the actions turned out to be fun for the participants and provoked reaction, they have not always been fully understood by the wider public (such as 'Rave against the Machine').

We also have to recognise the limitations of campaigns that are mainly focused on symbolic action. 'Picnic in L. A.' and 'Rave Against the Machine' were ways of demonstrating that, for a short period of time, privatised places can be reclaimed for collective action; that socio-spatial injustice is a highly political issue; and that the fear private companies and local decision makers have of a 'tarnished image' can be used effectively in local politics.

The identification and denunciation of the negative consequences of exclusionist forms of urbanisation can today serve as 'first steps' in resisting certain images of our inner cities.

However we are still a long way from creating a powerful urban movement with clearly defined demands and strategies. This is not only because of the novelty of the issue and a general weakness of anti-hegemonic politics: within the New Social Movements, Inner!City!Action! is still criticised by approaches that focus on one's 'own' neighbourhood (cf. the debate at the workshop 'The City as Contested Terrain', part of the INURA 97 conference). Moreover, Inner!City!Action! basically offers an opportunity for participation by local residents, alternative youth culture (graffiti artists and skate boarders), homeless people, migrant and community organisations, but, despite all the effort, the goal to co-operate with these groups was only partly achieved. This is related to the fundamental and often debated question of organising with, and speaking for, others. To name other groups and individuals can make them more visible but bears the danger of labelling and reinforcing some common perceptions and de-emphasising the heterogeneity within, or the contradictions between, groups. We are also confronted with the problem that coalition-building with marginalised groups implies hierarchies that depend on the different situations and resources relied upon. This is all related to the question of majority- and minority identity-building as it was put in a rather severe critique of the Inner!City!Action! (Steyerl 1997). While we embrace some aspects of this criticism, we would still assert that it remains necessary to deal with the tension between identity-politics (only speaking for oneself), advocacy politics (speaking for others, who – for various reasons – are not in the position to make their voice heard) and social work (supporting others and providing them with resources, neglecting one's own political aims) – if we do not want to run the risk of paralysing ourselves (and maybe others).

The next campaign of Inner!City!Action!, in June 1998, will deal with issues related to the privatisation of the public transport system, especially with regard to the changing role and function of stations. This will be an opportunity to prove whether we will be able to relate our action and theory to the often unnoticed daily struggles of marginalised people that are going on in all our inner cities.

Endnotes

[1] 'Inner city' in this context stands for what is considered to be the city's central business district – 'downtown' (in contrast, for example, to residential inner city neighbourhoods). Of course, it is impossible to draw a clear line, either in physical or in social terms. Hence the Inner!City!Action! did not exclusively focus on the CBD, but depended on the particular local conditions and traditions the different alliances of every city has to deal with. Though this contribution is mainly based on the experiences of the Berlin co-ordination group (even if it does not represent the 'official' viewpoint of the group), reports from more than 20 cities across Western Germany and Switzerland that have been exchanged at several inter-regional meetings refer to similar structural problems.

[2] This is not to say that the movement confined itself to residential neighbourhoods (see Schmid, in this book).

[3] For example, the relegation of women to private space which was crucial to the emergence of public space.

[4] Ronneberger (1997), for example, shows the crucial significance of public space in constructing the picture of 'the alien drug dealer' as a menace to society. Additionally cf. Jahn/Lanz/Ronneberger 1998.

[5] 'Wagenburgen', or the less defensive term 'Wagendörfer', are hard to translate. Literally it means laager or defensive circle of wagons; alternatively it may be translated as carriage strongholds, vehiculary housed communities or encampments. But all these translations fail to describe the singularity of the Wagenburgen as collective living arrangements that are based on choice, not on need (cf. Renate Berg, in this volume).

[6] For details see Flusty 1994 or 'The Concise Oxford Dictionary' (1978): "interdict: sentence debarring person or (esp.) place from ecclesiastical functions or privileges, forbid use of."

[7] 'Innen!Stadt!Aktion', the supplement (8 pages) in the newspapers 'scheinschlag', 'tageszeitung' (both Germany), 'WochenZeitung' and 'Berner Tagwacht' (both Switzerland) had an overall circulation of almost 150.000. The 10 videoclips ran in 100 copies in Germany and Switzerland in commercial and non-commercial movie theatres around the Inner!City!Action!-week in June. Additionally, there were several copies circulating through community centres, youth clubs, leftist hangouts etc.

[8] The spread of these un(wo)manned cash-points started a couple of years ago in Berlin. They not only offer a rationalisation opportunity and a 24-hours access to customers but were also used as shelter by homeless persons. Surprised by this unforeseen positive acceptance amongst non-customers, the banks equipped these halls with doors which could only be opened by credit- and cashcards. As a reaction to this one of the major homeless magazines launched an offensive demanding people to leave their old cards (void but still usable to open these doors) to homeless people. This campaign turned out to be quite successful. Now the banks also use less sophisticated modes of space control like patrolling security services.

[9] Of course, we would not be opposed to a claim for the right of everybody to use public space but would nevertheless consider this too defensive and insufficient. As discussed at the very beginning of the article, our ideas do not concur with this liberal conception of public space since it neglects a crucial function of public space as a medium for exclusionary processes, even if there is no obvious limit to access.

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215

THE DIALECTICS OF URBANISATION IN ZURICH: GLOBAL CITY FORMATION AND URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

WRITTEN BY CHRISTIAN SCHMID

PHOTOS BY ANDREAS HOFER

CHAPTER

6.5

In the last two decades, Zurich has become one of the major financial centres of Europe and has been transformed into what is well known as the label of 'global city' (see Saskia Sassen, in this book).

Global city formation in Zurich was a double-edged process: On the one hand, it was dominated by the rise of the headquarter economy, i.e. that part of the economy which produces the capacity to control global production processes (for a detailed analysis of this process in Zurich see Hitz/Schmid/Wolff 1995a, 1996, Kipfer 1995). On the other hand, it was accompanied and reinforced by a fundamental social and cultural transformation which was driven mainly by urban social movements.

MODERNISATION AND TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE

For more than a century, urban development in Switzerland was conditioned by a deep-rooted anti-urban policy. Even today, significant parts of the Swiss population view large cities and urban life as a disturbance to the carefully negotiated balance of local and regional interests, and even as a threat to the basis of Swiss society (see Andreas Hofer's article, in this book, and Marco et al. 1997).

The impact of these anti-urban policies on urban development in Zurich was particularly visible during the post-war period. While Zurich developed into the dominant urban centre of the Swiss economy, the local population and authorities attempted at once to limit the geographical expansion of the city and to protect its small-town character. As a consequence, urbanisation was shifted to the periphery of the city. The development of Zurich in the post-war period was thus influenced by a model of urbanisation characterised by a process of diffuse suburbanisation.

It was not until much later that a comprehensive and powerful growth coalition formed with the intention of making Zurich into a 'modern Metropolis'. In the late 1960s, the public authorities of the municipality and the canton of Zurich launched a coherent strategy of modernisation, based on a wide range of projects: a dense network of streets and inner-city motorways, an underground and metropolitan railway system, and a scheme for a huge extension of the central business district: It was planned to create a kind of Swiss Manhattan along the river Sihl in district 4 (Blanc 1993, Hitz/ Schmid/Wolff 1995a). If realised, this strategy of modernisation would have meant the surrender of large parts of Zurich's inner-city neighbourhoods to office developments and gentrification.

But these plans were introduced too late: Once they entered the stage of realisation, they were shattered by the new social and political realities.

The movement of 1968 and the urban question

The protest movement of 1968 caused a fundamental change in the meaning of the 'urban'. An important aspect of this movement in Switzerland – as in other European countries – was the struggle against repressive social control experienced in almost all aspects of everyday life and the dramatic lack of non-commercial meeting places and cultural venues.

Another important aspect, challenged by the movement of 1968, was the modernisation process and its inherent tendency to transform cities into 'reproduction machines' which had devastating impacts on the social fabric of inner-city neighbourhoods and the quality of public space (Hitz/Schmid/Wolff 1995b). Already, in the mid-1960s, the 'urban crisis' was strongly resented and criticised by urban intellectuals. But this criticism was not strong enough to triumph over the hegemonic Fordist block. It was the protest movement of 1968 that finally placed the 'urban question' (Castells 1972) on the political agenda. A spectacular example of the 'reconquest of the city', the re-transformation of inner-city public space into an 'urban space', was provided in the events of May '68 in Paris (see Lefebvre 1970). In Zurich, too, 'a different city' was a central demand of the movement of 1968. The fiercest street rioting since the 1930s occurred on the premises of the empty 'Globus' department store in the heart of the city. Protesters claimed this building as an autonomous youth centre. Two years later, activists of the movement squatted an empty bunker, and, for some months, ran the first autonomous youth centre of Zurich, called the 'autonomous republic bunker'.

But protest against the post-war model of social and urban development was expressed not only in the streets. Owing to the political system of direct democracy in Switzerland, the widespread

217

feeling of dissatisfaction and the critique of urban modernisation were translated almost immediately into institutional politics. Between 1970 and 1974, almost all projects for new streets, parking lots, and development schemes, were defeated at the ballot box or were even withdrawn before the vote. The 'battle of Waterloo' for the modernisation strategy came in 1973, with the referendum on the construction of a new underground and metropolitan railway system. The project was rejected by a clear majority of voters both on the municipal and on the cantonal level. The modernisation strategy had collapsed, and the growth coalition had fallen apart.

The territorial compromise

The early 1970s were thus marked by a significant break in the trajectory of Zurich's urban development. As a consequence of widespread resistance against all forms of modernisation, Zurich's government was forced to change course. As a new slogan for urban development, it chose 'stabilisation'.

Nevertheless, a stabilisation of urban development was never really attempted. With the beginning of global city formation in the mid-1970s, the political situation changed yet again. The widespread helplessness with respect to the strategy of urbanisation led to the development of two opposite political alliances: On the one hand, the previous growth coalition re-emerged, now consisting of right-wing parties and the growth-oriented sections of the trade unions. On the other hand, a heterogeneous and fragile 'stabilisation coalition' arose, composed of left-wing parties and various action groups and neighbourhood organisations. This coalition had its social basis in green and socially oriented sections of the middle classes and in the growing urban-cultural milieu. It was occasionally joined by conservatives who were concerned to preserve their neighbourhoods and who mistrusted modernisation.

Thus the forces which allied to promote a stabilisation of urban development did not compose a unified interest group. A closer examination indicates that the concept of 'stabilisation' was interpreted in a variety of very different ways (see Kipfer 1995). For some, it was a rallying cry against the demands of the headquarter economy and a vision for reshaping the inner-city into a space of sociality. For others, it meant residential quality, less traffic and growth control. And finally, in the conservative interpretation, it stood for the preservation of small-scale and coherent neighbourhoods, and thus became synonymous with order and social control.

In the end, neither the stabilisation alliance nor the growth coalition succeeded. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, Zurich's urban development has been, in fact, determined by a precarious

political stalemate. By causing delay and continuous re-evaluation, the stabilisation coalition could slow down, but not stop, the restructuring of the inner-city. One example of the success of the stabilisation coalition is a law prohibiting the construction of high-rise buildings in the inner-city, approved in 1982. Another example is 'Eurogate', a huge development project to be built on a deck above the tracks of Zurich's main railway station, launched in the early 1980s by some of the most powerful companies in the city. As a result of widespread and obstinate resistance, the Eurogate project still has yet to be realised.

On the other hand, attempts to challenge the process of 'urban renewal' and to preserve affordable housing failed. Although residents of inner-city neighbourhoods were protected, at least in part, against the menace of expanding office space, they faced the threat of being squeezed out by gentrification.

The result of the conflict between the growth coalition and the stabilisation alliance can be interpreted as a kind of 'territorial compromise' (DuPasquier/Marco 1991, Schmid 1996) based upon a renunciation of the modernisation strategies designed in the 1960s, without radically questioning the global city formation of Zurich and the dynamics of urbanisation.

Urban periphery and urban region

The territorial compromise did not slow down global city formation, but it had considerable effects on the pattern of urbanisation. It resulted in a model of urban development which is in certain aspects clearly different from that of other global cities.

On the one hand, the restructuring of inner-city neighbourhoods was severely delayed. Had it not been for territorial compromise, large parts of the inner-city would probably have fallen victim to

modernisation and would have been transformed into pure shopping and office areas. Since the mid-1970s, unnoticed at first, a new kind of inhabitant – predominantly young, politically and culturally active, and frequently residing in collective housing – began to move into old houses which had been left empty as a result of the relocation of parts of the working class from the urban centre to suburbia. During the following years, some inner-city neighbourhoods – especially those situated in districts 4 and 5 – became a kind of urban refuge with its typical meeting points and social fabric.

On the other hand, global city formation shifted to the urban periphery. As the possibilities for central business district expansion were limited, companies began to relocate their offices to various other sites: first, to former industrial areas inside the city, and subsequently, to various new business districts located in suburban municipalities. In the 1980s, these satellites of Zurich's headquarter economy began mushrooming on meadows and vacant lots in the urban periphery, in particular north of the city, in close proximity to the international airport (Hitz/Schmid/Wolff 1995a). A polycentric urban region emerged, representing a new configuration of the urban, characterised by the regionalisation of the urban economy and urban society.

GLOBAL CITY FORMATION AND URBAN REVOLT

In addition to the controversies regarding urban development, global city formation in Zurich was shaped by another axis of struggles focused on the problematic of urban culture and everyday life in the city.

In the 1970s, processes of globalisation stood in sharp contrast to a rather provincial political and cultural climate, a homespun narrow-mindedness, and a profound lack of an urban life-style. For many years, Zurich's establishment attempted desperately to repress the unavoidable social and cultural consequences of the ongoing process of global city formation, opposing every attempt to open new sites for cultural interaction. The 1970s were marked by a rather inconspicuous but very efficient policy of eliminating sub-cultural venues. The restaurants and meeting points of the subcultural milieu were closed down by official order, usually under the pretext of illicit drug consumption. This policy of exclusion finally triggered the movement of 1980, which almost immediately turned into an urban revolt.

The movement of 1980 was often labelled as the 'youth movement'. But this labelling fails to take into account the wide variety of groups and people involved in this movement. Among others, the following groups and scenes participated – in one way or another – in the movement: a heterogeneous group of more or less established artists and cultural workers demanding new cultural venues and subsidies; political activists who had already participated in the struggles of the early 1970s, and/or in the campaign against anti-nuclear power stations of the late 1970s;

a group of young people demanding a youth centre (previously, this group had squatted an old villa and had used it as a provisional youth centre for a few months); and – the most important and powerful group – the group 'Rock als Revolte' (rock as revolt) which attacked the obvious lack of places for non-commercial rock and punk concerts.

On May 30, 1980, this latter group organised a demonstration in front of the opera house. The immediate cause for this demonstration was a referendum on a bill demanding 60 million SFr. for the refurbishment of the opera, which was seen by many people as a blatant provocation. The subsequent forceful intervention by the police triggered the so-called opera house riots.

These riots were the beginning of the urban revolt in Zurich. For two years, Zurich was convulsed by street rioting fought with a fierceness hitherto unknown. With demonstrations, happenings and all sorts of actions, the movement of '80 demanded the fulfilment of the 'urban promise' which was linked to Zurich's rise to global city status (Lüscher/Makropoulos 1984). The radicality of this revolt, its reappropriation of public space, its creativity in all media of expression, ranging from happenings and graffiti to visual design and video, all aimed at the very core of daily life. For a short while, the street became the very stage of public life, of urban politics and culture. "We want the whole city" was one of the main slogans of the movement. The urban movement of 1980 thus claimed exactly what Lefebvre (1968) had termed the 'right to the city'.

The offensive character of immediate action contrasted with an ultimately defensive strategy, the struggle for spaces and subsidies, for autonomous islands in the globalised city. The consequences of this strategy were most clearly exposed after the long struggle for the autonomous youth centre (AJZ), the movement's greatest victory and also its most bitter defeat. At the end of June 1980, the city government – to whom the riots had come as a complete

surprise – succumbed to the demands of the movement and offered a factory building behind the main railway station along with financial support for refurbishment. The AJZ was the base and focus of the movement. It was not only the stage for agitated and tumultuous plenary meetings, for legendary moments of ecstasy and despair, but also a spectre for the bourgeois public. In September 1980, the AJZ was closed by official order but opened again in April 1981, under the pressure of heavy demonstrations. For a short summer, it was possible to reanimate the AJZ until – drowning in agony and drug misery – it finally collapsed and was given up by the movement itself as a result of insurmountable problems arising from within and without: the AJZ had become a territorial trap. In March 1982, the public authorities announced the building's demolition.

The consequences of the movement: cultural and social openings

The repressive response of the authorities to the movement was not different from the responses which were given to similar events happening at the same time in other European cities, such as Amsterdam or Berlin. This policy based on repressive power was rewarded in the local elections of 1982, in which the right-wing parties extended their majority.

But in the following years, the consequences of the urban revolt became evident: The movement had changed Zurich's everyday life, its cultural sphere as well as its public spaces. The strength of the movement, its rootedness in many sections of the population, and especially its devastating impact on the image of Zurich as a secure haven for financial transactions, forced the city government

to calm the situation and to prevent further clashes. After the suppression of the revolt, it pursued a quite successful policy of integration, particularly by granting quite generous and annually increasing subsidies to alternative culture.

In the following decade, a large variety of cultural venues were established: The cultural centre Rote Fabrik had already opened in the autumn of 1980 (see the article by Richard Wolff, in this book), followed by the international theatre festival on the shores of the lake, a municipal cinema, a community centre in district 4, a theatre for independent productions, a jazz club and a whole range of small theatres, discotheques, clubs and other kinds of cultural and urban projects. It must be stressed however, that not all of these venues and projects are subsidised by the city. Many of them are run and maintained on a private basis, depending on the active participation of activists and the solidarity of the users. These became possible only because of the cultural and social openings and the social networks produced by the movement of 1980.

The transformation of public space

Another important change induced by the movement was the transformation of public space. The actions and happenings of the movement clearly indicated that public space could serve other interests than those of transportation and shopping – such as games, pleasure, encounters. The movement brought Zurich's 'other side', which had long been banned to the underground, directly into the public sphere; it became visible and tangible, changing everyday practice through new forms of lived experience. In a sense, a 'mediterranean' everyday culture had begun to emerge in puritanical Zurich.

The parks located along the lake provide a clear illustration of this transformation of public space. Before 1980, their use had been strictly regulated. These parks were, above all, places for boring Sunday walks for people wearing uncomfortable Sunday clothes, through which 'intact' families presented themselves in the public sphere. Today these parks have acquired a completely different meaning. They have become places in which many activities and situations are possible. In summer it is one of the most urbane places in Zurich, a place of encounter for a wide variety of people.

These parks illustrate in a paradigmatic way what it means to appropriate space, or to produce a different urban space (see Lefebvre 1974). The physical elements of this space – the trees, the shore, the lawn – remain unchanged. However, other transformations have occurred. First, the spatial practices through which these parks are used have been transformed. Second, understandings of this space and the social order associated with it have been reconfigured – including the sense of the permissible and the forbidden, the visible and the concealed. Third, the meaning of this place and the social order it expresses have been transformed: what was once the clearly defined, monofunctional and isotopic space of a disciplinary society has now become the open, heterotopic and differential space of an urban society.

The culture of the global city

There is an other aspect of this cultural opening: In the course of the 1980s, 'oppositional' or 'alternative' culture became easily digestible and nowadays also caters to the demands of the employees of headquarter economy. They too, enjoy the excitement of illegal discos or the vanguard concerts which convey a brief moment of New York groove. The cultural opening – demanded and realised by the movement of 1980 – has helped transform Zurich into a cosmopolitan metropolis and has become an important factor of Zurich's locational advantage.

At the same time, the movement of 1980 laid the ground for the formation of a partly informal economic sector of 'cultural production', including design, marketing, image production, cultural events etc. (see the article by Philipp Klaus, in this book). This economic sector today plays a key role in the global competition between cities.

Thus, in demanding and realising the hitherto neglected cultural sector, the urban movement itself became a constitutive element of global city formation. From this point of view, Zurich's global city formation can be seen as the result of a dialectical interaction between the development of the headquarter economy and the struggles of urban social movements.

LIVING IN THE GLOBAL CITY

In the nineties, the social and economic situation of Zurich changed dramatically: economic crisis, budget cuts in public spending, and the implementation of neo-liberal policies on both the national and regional levels became major political issues. Moreover, the contradictions of global city formation and of the development of a fragmented urban region became visible. The cultural and social fissures and divisions which began to emerge during the course of the 1980s as a consequence of increased economic polarisation and segmentation could no longer be hidden. A previously concealed social impoverishment surfaced on the streets of Zurich. For the first time since the 1930s, Zurich was confronted with considerable unemployment and visible poverty. And – as in many places throughout Europe – right-wing populism, xenophobia and racism spread. Studies of similar developments in Frankfurt indicate that the rise of right-wing populism is, to some extent, directly linked with the urbanisation process and the development of economically divided and socially fragmented urban regions (Ronneberger/Keil 1995).

Under these circumstances, in 1990, a left-wing (red-green) alliance gained a majority in local elections for the first time since the 1930s. This victory resulted from various local and national factors. However, under the transformed social and economic conditions, the new majority found itself in an extremely difficult position. It may be seen as an irony of history that the red-green majority – under the pressure of massive political and financial constraints – implemented an about-face turn toward a less liberal, less communal, more repressive, sometimes even xenophobic policy.

This shift of political majorities had the immediate effect of closing ranks between all parties of the centre and the right. Right wing hard-liners took the lead in an increasingly aggressive political front against the red-green alliance, and against the legacy of the cultural and social opening of the 1980s. As a first target, they chose the community centre 'Kanzlei' in district 4, opened in 1984 in the wake of the movement of 1980, and which had been at the time the most important meeting point for ethnic minorities and political activists in Zurich. After an agitated and polemical

campaign, the voters of Zurich denied further support for the community centre, which was forced to close at the end of 1991.

Drug policy and internal security

The victorious right-wing forces then turned their focus to the drug problem. They campaigned against the drug scene on Platzspitz, the park just behind the main railway station, which had become Europe's largest open drug market, at the time known world-wide as 'needle park'. Supported by a large section of the media, and by cantonal and national policies, this concerted campaign succeeded in consolidating a climate of hate and fear. Under political and popular pressure the city government was forced to adopt a repressive drug policy. In 1992, it ordered the eviction of the junkies from Platzspitz. This action was decided and carried out quickly, without any coherent alternative strategy, and with practically no help or support for the evicted. As a result, junkies and dealers spilled into the adjacent residential neighbourhoods of districts 5 and 4.

The consequences of this policy for the neighbourhoods and the political and social climate of Zurich were major. Many residents and local shop-owners experienced the presence of junkies and dealers – in front of their buildings, in staircases and courtyards – as a threat. However, the repressive measures adopted to combat the drug scene were hardly less threatening, as exemplified by the installation of barbed-wire and barricades and the proliferation of

222

police patrols and private security guards. In the tabloids, the neighbourhoods concerned were frequently stylised into symbols of an 'urban nightmare' and compared to the conditions in Chicago in the 1930s.

The red-green government, which found itself increasingly cornered, accused 'illegal immigrants' and 'criminal refugees' of being responsible for the drug problem in Zurich. This fostered a racist discourse which eventually extended into the urban-cultural milieu and even onto the national level. In 1994 the Swiss government used the drug problem in Zurich as a justification for introducing an exclusionary national campaign for 'internal security' (see Stern 1994). In the following years, a new system of repression was created, which ranged from new national laws directed against illegal immigrants to the construction of a series of new prisons and camps for 'dealers, illegal immigrants and junkies'. In the neighbourhoods concerned, various forms of police surveillance and intervention became common – including indiscriminate arrests and humiliating public body searches, often carried out based on ethnic criteria (for an ongoing documentation of such police activities, see the bulletin of 'augenauf' ['open your eyes!']).

On the other hand, the city government, with the support of national authorities, was able to implement a whole range of supportive measures for junkies, such as a medical heroin programme. This combination of repression and support eventually permitted the regulation of the drug scene.

The struggle for public space

In the wake of the campaign against the drug scene, the quality of public space changed considerably, particularly in districts 4 and 5. The banishment of junkies and dealers from public space was only the beginning of a policy which strives to reserve public space in the inner-city for the 'integrated part' of the population. It followed a cascade of attempts to exclude ever more sections of the population from public space: certain categories of immigrants, women working in the sex business (many of them are 'illegal' immigrants), 'clochards', and other groups.

This policy is supported – or at least tolerated – even by parts of the urban cultural scene (see Innen!Stadt!Aktion! 1997). Many of the entrenched social networks, which once offered a certain social cohesion or at least mutual respect to diverse social groups, have subsequently been fragmented. The inner-city neighbourhoods which long opposed the process of gentrification are now open to the strategy of 'urban renewal' pursued by the city government and private investors. This strategy is consistent with the various activities which have been developed to enhance the position of Zurich in international competition.

As a consequence of global city formation the social contradictions within Zurich shifted: During the 1970s and 1980s, a predominantly Swiss, economically secure, sector of the population struggled against a disciplinary social order in favour of a 'different city' which would be more lively, socially and culturally tolerant, cosmopolitan and urbane. The 1990s, however, are marked by increasing economic polarisation and social as well as cultural fragmentation. In this context, it would appear that the cultural and social transformation which was achieved by the urban movements has indeed lead to a more cosmopolitan city, but not to a more tolerant and open urban society.

The forms of 'urban culture' or 'urbanity' which were achieved by the urban movements have today not only become respectable, but constitute a central locational factor within Zurich's economy. At the same time, however, they also conceal the fact that many weaker social and economic groups are currently being isolated, stigmatised and marginalized. Their range of action is narrowed, and they are increasingly excluded from public space and thus from public life. This process fits into the logic of global city formation insofar as a deprived and marginalised population sector is an important component of the economy of a global city (see Saskia Sassen, in this book).

It is important to mention that similar processes have become major issues in many European cities. This fact became clearly visible in the Inner!City!Action! campaign, organised simultaneously in 14 German and Swiss cities, Zurich among them (see the article by Britta Grell, Jens Sambale and Dominik Veith, in this book). This campaign has focused not only upon exclusionary policies, but has explored various strategies to interlink diverse social milieus and groups both within and between the cities involved.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the past decades, it becomes clear that the global city formation in Zurich was not simply the result of a hegemonic strategy, but of turbulent and controversial processes, of conflicts between precarious and fragile coalitions trapped between the headquarter economy and everyday life, between globalisation and urban revolt, between resistance and reform.

According to Henri Lefebvre (1970), today's cities are the product of two conflicting urban strategies: On the one hand, the strategy to transform cities into centres of decision making and control. On the other hand, the strategy to make a city into a place, where all the wealth, creativity and possibilities of urban society come together and can be used and appropriated by people.

However, there is no clear-cut frontier between these two strategies. "We want the whole city": this slogan of the movement of 1980 has lost much of its meaning. It is no longer possible to define a 'we', to find an overarching, common aim, a uniform social definition of the city or the urban. It is no longer possible to conceive of or to reconstruct a city as a 'whole', as a clearly defined entity. The form and the content of the urban have changed: Today's cities are polarised and fragmented on economic, social, cultural, and political levels.

In the words of Saskia Sassen (1994), the city has to be seen as a contested terrain: In the centres of the global economy, a 'new frontier' has been formed where the social contradictions of the new world order abruptly clash. However, considering the case of Zurich, the dialectics of urbanisation are not only determined by the conflict between the (global) 'headquarter economy' and the

(global) 'underclass', between the privileged and the disadvantaged sections of the population working in the economic complex of the global city. Perhaps it is the interstitial zone between these two economic spaces that is most crucial.

As David Harvey (1996) states, the contemporary model of urban development creates multiple interstitial spaces, in which various liberating and emancipatory urban projects can flourish. But the different interstitial spaces hardly cohere, even if they are often side by side – they form isolated, ephemeral islands in a fragmented urban region.

The crucial problem is how to link these spaces, and how to create a new, interlinked urban space.

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225

A STAR IS BORN — ROTE FABRIK CULTURAL CENTRE

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CHAPTER

6.6

Beautifully located in an abandoned silk factory, on the shores of Lake Zurich, Rote Fabrik today is one of Europe's largest, most diverse, and longest-standing alternative cultural centres. Every year, about 200,000 people come to one or more of the 300 events, the restaurant, the schools, or the exhibition hall. More than 200 musicians, actors and artists work, study and rehearse in the many studios of the old factory. Rote Fabrik offers about 80 permanent jobs. A further 100 to 200 people are involved as free-lance contributors in one of the autonomous working groups (for rock music, jazz music, theatre, children's theatre, literature, political debates, movies and videos, women's programme, discos etc.), responsible for the programme, finances, and cultural politics.

Since its inception in 1980, Rote Fabrik has become one of Switzerland's most influential centres for the young, the avant-garde and political culture.

What all started as a protest movement has produced one of Zurich's largest cultural institutions, fifth in terms of subsidies, sixth in terms of visitors. Its legal status is the same as that of the opera. Today's solid and rather comfortable situation shows hardly any traces of the long and violent struggles that were required to obtain this emancipatory space.

Many obstacles and everyday difficulties had to be overcome during the construction of a counter-world, from its chaotic beginnings to an established institution. The story of Rote Fabrik also reflects the creative power that lies in movements and initiatives with an autonomous political culture. This article paints a somewhat impressionistic picture of the fundamental controversies between two different political cultures and the problems that accompany the establishment of a new life style.

FROM BIRTH TO COMING OF AGE (1980 – 1987)

For centuries, in Zurich, culture meant 'high' or elitist culture. In the official cultural policy there was no room for youth culture, no alternative culture and hardly any avant-garde culture. Not even the uprising of 1968 could change this attitude. The stance of official culture towards non-established culture was brought to a point by Zurich's mayor who publicly declared that he doubted that rock music was culture. The systematic neglect of a generation's cultural needs led to frustration, despair and boredom. After a number of meeting points for the younger generation, restaurants, clubs and bars, had been closed by the police, in the late seventies, under the pretext of illegal drug consumption, the situation became very tense.

The spark that actually lit the powder barrel was a referendum on the renovation of the opera. 60 million francs were going to be spent on the opera, the symbol of established culture, whereas alternative culture – as it was called at the time – was totally neglected and discredited. What started as a peaceful demonstration, on May 30, 1980, in front of the opera against this sort of cultural policy suddenly evolved into heavy street rioting, which was to dominate Zurich's streets for the following year, and which was to bring about a sea-change in Zurich's cultural life. The post-68 generation demanded the fulfilment of the urban promise, i.e. political and cultural liberties, which for many years had been suppressed by a very conservative government. In the years 1980 and 1981, Zurich experienced a cultural revolution.

The two most concrete demands of Switzerland's strongest post-war movement were for an Autonomous Youth Centre (AJZ)

and to bring life into Rote Fabrik [1]. Whereas the Autonomous Youth Centre initially absorbed many expectations of street protesters, but then collapsed under the combined pressure of street demands and political obstruction (Schmid, in this book), Rote Fabrik was able to develop relatively undisturbed.

A number of activists, with almost unlimited stamina and enthusiasm, started the adventure of creating a cultural-political centre in the abandoned factory. It was an almost impossible task trying to satisfy the many different ideals and cultural ambitions that had been raised in the street movement. It was equally difficult to channel the spirit of a little structured political-cultural movement into practical working structures.

Right from its beginning, Rote Fabrik, too, had its share of struggles with Zurich's authorities. The first controversial issue, after the principal agreement to open Rote Fabrik as a cultural centre, was that the state demanded a legally defined partner to negotiate with. The activists, however, coming from a rather un-structured, anarchic street movement refused to accept such formal requirements. For some protesters it was thus considered treason when some of the activists, impatient to take hold of the cultural centre, agreed to form a statutory body. In June 1980, the association 'Interessengemeinschaft Rote Fabrik' was founded as the legal body to run the cultural centre. Another concession that had to be accepted was that Rote Fabrik could only be rented from the municipality and that not the entire premises would be under the control of the newly formed association. Also, rent contracts and subsidies were only assured for a limited time [2]. Time and again, both the municipal government and the city parliament threatened to cancel the contracts if Rote Fabrik wouldn't stick to the rules.

Despite these handicaps, it was possible to create a flourishing and widely accepted cultural centre which in this form was unique for Zurich. This was only possible because of continuous political pressure by the self-confident cultural activists, which in turn was nourished by a strong sense of belonging to the cultural pioneers.

227

Left to right, Cypress Hill (11.95), Cesaria Evora (3.94), Taraf de Haïdouks (5.95), Ali Farka Touré (6.94).

The first seven years of provisional licences (1980-1987) were a particularly stressful time for guiding the new centre through a wild jungle of contradictory interests. Politicians, the media, and visitors all had different claims on Rote Fabrik, and the activists had to define and defend their autonomous course from the start. For instance, when subsidies were granted by the city government as a sort of political recognition of Rote Fabrik, leftist critics immediately accused Rote Fabrik of selling out their ideals to the bourgeois state. But not only the left tried to harness Rote Fabrik into their political ambitions. Even the conservative mayor of Zurich used it in his electoral campaign. He proudly presented the achievements of Rote Fabrik as a result of his political leadership. This image was corrected when he was forced to withdraw extra subsidies to Rote Fabrik for a festival against apartheid, under pressure from a large Swiss Bank very active in the gold business with South Africa.

All the time, there were some sort of skirmishes between Rote Fabrik and the local authorities. With diminishing political pressure both from the streets and from partisans, the authorities tried to gain more control of the headquarters of counter-culture. One example is the ordinance on noise levels which became so tough that today it is hardly possible to conduct open air events on the attractive shores of Lake Zurich any more. Another example is the lake police who also have an eye on Rote Fabrik. In a covert night action, a swimming pool for children built by workers of Rote Fabrik, was hijacked. This act of piracy was never officially registered or investigated. Obstruction came from all sides. Until recently, Zurich had almost medieval closing hours for bars and restaurants, which ran totally against the interests of most of the guests at Rote Fabrik. Fines, fines, fines were the result of this clash of interests. To end this long list of problems stemming from official politics and policies, suffice it to mention the endless attempts made by the local parliament to censor Rote Fabrik's monthly journal and to cut its subsidies.

MATURITY (1987 – 1996)

In 1987, before the public referendum, which was necessary to give the cultural centre a permanent status after seven years of provisional licences, Rote Fabrik had to confront a new series of attacks. A number of politicians tried to take advantage of the uncertain situation and demanded concessions in exchange for their political support. In exchange for a permanent recognition of the legitimate rights of existence of Rote Fabrik and the granting of annual subsidies, they demanded political neutrality and that Rote Fabrik renounce all further claims, especially those regarding the integral management of the entire factory.

Even though Rote Fabrik's possibilities of political intervention were somewhat limited, the internal political culture of self-administration and independence remained untouched. Rote Fabrik was able to secure its autonomy in the most delicate realms of finance, personnel and programming. At the end of the day, one can conclude that it has been possible to establish and safeguard Rote Fabrik as an alternative, independent cultural centre.

Thus, on the organisational level, it has been possible to develop a structural model which is equally efficient and able to adapt to changing situations. The members of the working groups have a very high degree of freedom to produce and present the kind of culture they cherish. Rote Fabrik is a basic-democratically organised institution, where employees work fully self-reliantly and without hierarchy but in direct relation with the audience and culture.

Compared to the hectic times of the pioneering phase much has changed: Events are publicised widely and in good time, e.g. in the *FabrikZeitung*, which is published monthly on a fixed day. Nowadays, one can be assured that advertised events will really take place, not only on time but also with perfection. Everything is organised down to the last detail: the box office, admissions, catering, lighting, sound engineering, the 250 sqm stage, the 300 sqm spectator ranks. Everything works. Artists are well attended to, all the venues are properly cleaned, 500 chairs are in place, the bar opens on time, everyone is paid, even the taxman. A neat job.

Left to right, Fugees (4.94), Negu Gorriak with Wemean (9.95), Cypress Hill (11.95), Baaba Mal (2.95).

In the lobby of the Aktionshalle, Rote Fabrik's largest concert hall.

MID-LIFE CRISIS (1996 – 1998)

Despite the routine which has gained ground, and which has won Rote Fabrik the label of being an alternative dinosaur, Rote Fabrik has retained much of its flexibility and its ability for self-reflection. The currently ongoing internal process of repositioning Rote Fabrik in an ever-faster changing cultural and political landscape is proof of this. While critical reflection has been a constant feature since Rote Fabrik opened its gates in 1980, the current phase of fundamental reappraisal contains some new elements.

Serious and high level debates concerning the future of Rote Fabrik have been triggered by a crisis of motivation on the side of its employees, differing opinions regarding the relative importance of various programmes, an increasing internal and external competition for resources and dates, and financial problems.

Members of the board, the working groups and full-time employees assemble once every two or three months in the 'Fabrikrat' (Factory Council) for intense discussions which last up to 5 hours each. All participants have equal rights and all issues are discussed *in extenso* and decided on democratically.

It is still not clear whether there will be a change of course and what direction Rote Fabrik might take in the future. Even radical solutions are possible. One such proposal sees the future of Rote Fabrik as totally deregulated and re-organised: a fragmentation of the strong united structure into 15 independent organisations (corresponding to the currently existing working groups), each one responsible only for its specific cultural sector. Each one of these

15 organisations would be in charge of its own finances, its own equipment and its own staff. Each enterprise would be a profit centre, operating at individual risk. This 'progressive flexibilisation' would mean a change of paradigmatic dimensions. Therefore one can envisage many more Factory Council sessions on this issue.

PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS AFTER 18 YEARS

Before launching a new phase, a provisional conclusion can shed some light on the achievements and shortcomings in Rote Fabrik's turbulent history.

The struggle was well worthwhile. Zurich's political and cultural life has been vastly enriched by the cultural centre Rote Fabrik. Despite the many and various points of criticism, over the years Rote Fabrik has remained an attractive and successful venue for the production and presentation of culture. It is still a place where cultural and political initiatives are being launched.

Rote Fabrik has shown that it is both possible and necessary to communicate culture and politics in a different way. It is not only the cultural expression visible on stage that says something about the quality of the culture but the entire process of production, that which happens behind the curtains and before the presentation. Even though these aspects remain largely hidden to the audience, the media, and politics, they are nevertheless an important and integrated part of culture.

Basic democracy is a cultural value in itself. In Rote Fabrik all employees decide together and on equal terms all issues of work relations, cultural values, working hours and breaks, the internal distribution of resources and responsibilities etc. This mode of functioning *is* culture as are proper personal relations: who talks with whom, who honours whom, who trusts whom, who is picking on whom etc.

After 18 years of co-existence and dialogue, there are still fundamental differences between the political culture of autonomy and the cultural policy of the state. To a certain, but only limited extent, something like a mutual understanding and a common language of negotiation has been developed. Thus, minor differences can be bridged temporarily and pragmatically, whereas it

229

Rote Fabrik's restaurant, Ziegel au Lac, as seen from the lake.

is still often surprising if not frustrating to see that the official acceptance and tolerance is superficial and fragile. Despite its status as one of Zurich's important cultural institutions, Rote Fabrik is still often a target of political and ideological attacks. Rote Fabrik is like the unwanted and unloved child of Zurich's official culture.

In spite of what is often said about inefficient and non-transparent autonomous structures, I would like to claim that, on the contrary: The political culture of autonomy is efficient. Because of – not in spite of – self-defined autonomous structures, during 18 years, it has been possible to achieve and keep up a varied and high-standard programme. Because the responsibilities are shared and all decisions are taken after scrupulous debates, major catastrophes have been avoided. The high degree of identification and participation of employees can be seen as the most important reason why it has been possible to retain such a high level of achievement with the limited resources available. An indicator of this identification is that employees forego high wages, paid overtime, and extra pay for night and Sunday shifts.[3]

The political culture of autonomy is flexible. Against many odds Rote Fabrik has survived the pioneering phase of the first years; the end of the cultural and political trends of the rebellious eighties, the doubling of the number of employees and a major refurbishment of the building. Of course there have been many personal and structural crises on the way. Fluctuation was very high, anyone who stayed for more than 2 years was considered an old-timer. Much of the original enthusiasm, much of the original creativity and political radicalism have faded. Many endeavours have been frustrated.

It is noteworthy, however, that a cultural initiative with self-determined structures and an autonomous decision process has been able to adapt to ever new and unpredictable challenges. In a way, it is rather surprising to see how a large group of individuals are able to jointly develop efficient management concepts and organisational structures, which allow the non-hierarchical involvement of up to 200 full-time and freelance workers. This process has entirely evolved from below, without expert advice, without any hierarchic decisions. The activists themselves have (I am tempted to say 'instinctively') developed a system of 'checks and balances' and an intricate democratic decision taking process. Not chaos – as expected by many foes and friends – but responsibility, continuity, flexibility and professionalism are the result.

Rote Fabrik is not only a venue for the production and presentation of art and political expression, it is also a social venue, a meeting point. Restaurant, kindergarten, cultural events, studios, sailing school, dance school, art school, bicycle repair shop, free-climbing, etc., offer entertainment, moments of reflection, education, social integration, etc.

The production and mediation of culture is not only of political and cultural interest, it is also an – often underestimated – economic factor. Wages for employees and artists, commissions for printers, type-setters, graphic artists, helpers of all kinds, the purchase of equipment and material all run into millions of francs. The restaurant 'Ziegel oh Lac' for example is among Zurich's largest beer outlets. Various independent research studies have shown that for every Franc, Dollar or Pound invested in the cultural sector, three to four times that amount is turned over [4]. In this sense money given to cultural institutions should not be considered as subsidies but as investments or compensations [5]. Thus, investments into cultural centres are good value for money.

Last but not least: Rote Fabrik is an invaluable asset for Zurich. Since the cultural-political (punk) revolution of the 1980s, Zurich has become a different city. There has been a paradigmatic shift in atmosphere. In terms of urban quality of life the city has gained enormously. Hundreds of people got involved in community

aRote Fabrik, as seen from the main Road.

projects and grassroots initiatives of all sorts and have created new networks and opened up new opportunities.

This new (or added) quality of life has been an important plug against the cultural brain drain, against the emigration of the most creative and innovative minds and spirits to London, Paris, Berlin and New York.

The cultural-political life that has evolved since the 1980's has given strong impulses to local culture and thus identity, pride, self-esteem, rootedness. This new spirit is also invaluable for the image of the city of Zurich as a whole, formerly viewed as rather antiquated, old-fashioned, boring, traditional, conservative and as a seat of gnomes, bankers, and money launderers.

Political and cultural free spaces like Rote Fabrik are important (see also Klaus, in this book). With their independent political culture they contribute to socially necessary innovations and to the search for new solutions to contemporary problems of society.

Endnotes

[1] 'Leben in die Tote Fabrik' ('Life to the Dead Factory') was a slogan of the protesters of May 1980 demanding the opening of the Red Factory as a cultural centre.

[2] However, activists could always refer themselves to the result of a referendum held in 1977 which required that Rote Fabrik be used as a cultural centre.

[3] Which is the reason why Rote Fabrik's employees are not organised in a trade union.

[4] Hans-Werner Holub and Veronika Eberharter: 'Beleben Kulturausgaben die Wirtschaft?' in Neue ZürcherZeitung 23./24.7.1994, p. 23; and Marlies Hummer and Manfred Berger: 'Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung von Kunst und Kultur: Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesministers des Innern, 'Berlin/München 1988 (Ifo-Studie), p. 21, quoted in Rudolf Schilling: 'Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung des sogenannten Schönen,' Neue Zürcher Zeitung 28./29.5.1994).

[5] These theses are expressed by, e.g. August Everding, president of the Deutscher Bühnenverband, and Peter J. Betts, head of the department of culture in the city of Berne, quoted by Schilling 'Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung des sogenannten Schönen,' Neue Zürcher Zeitung 28./29.5.1994.

Social movements in Italian towns from the 1970s to the 90s, demonstrate different models for the use of public spaces. The issue of sociality appeared in the 1970s, and later became increasingly important in the context of a territory that has become more and more transformed into a commodity. In towns oriented to market themselves in an international competition it has been difficult to maintain use values connected to an alternative way to socialise.

The fight against the commodification of spaces and of social relations, and the battle for a different way to socialise, has taken the form of self-managed spaces squatted for sociality and culture. These places are built outside and against the exchange of the capitalistic market and its social relations, and imply certain values and a specific view of the world. Sometimes they are also places of individual and social prospects and transformation. They are a way of giving meaning and defining individual and collective identities.

From a balcony of the squatted circle of proletarian youth 'cangaceiros'

Popular resistance to the breaking of social ties and the forces that have sought to rebuild those ties – based on the values of self-management, inclusion, solidarity, social engagement and social transformation – could become an important focus for class struggle.

TAKING BACK THE CITY

At the beginning of the 1970s, groups of the extreme left based their political intervention in the workplace, particularly the factory, and focused their activities on the working class. The identities, needs and objectives of other actors in the class conflict, such as students, the youth, and women in their reproductive role, had a minor and subordinate role.

However, in 1971 'Lotta Continua' ('Continuous fight', which was one of the biggest groups of the extreme left in Italy, but collapsed in 1976) became particularly concerned with social issues, formulating the slogan "take back the city". In the first part of the 1970s the workers and students movements squatted houses and schools, claimed social services for the neighbourhood, and sought to transform the streets, the squares, the public spaces, into places for identity, places for meeting and discussion, places of decision and argument. The physical and territorial structures, and the network of relations and solidarity of a communist way of life, formed part of a struggle for comprehensive social transformation. The aim was to focus on the territory, at the same time fighting the loneliness, unhappiness and despair produced by exploitation, with a concern for all the proletariat, not only the workers.

THE MOVEMENT OF 1977

The movement of 1977 was born in a period of economic restructuring. The factory as a place of conflict and identity became less and less important on account of the reduced power of workers, and growing unemployment. In the second half of the 1970s, the extreme left became conscious of its incapacity to challenge the economic and political system; a fact made clear by the defeat in the elections of 1976, in which the *Christian Democrats* (DC) regained power. The prospect of a radical transformation became unlikely.

The organisations of the extreme left gradually collapsed. The youth and women who had become involved in the struggle realised that the working class had become an unlikely force for building a new society. They recognised the crisis in the leftist groups and began questioning the central significance of the working class and the work ethic; they were also challenging traditional attitudes of gender and power roles in political initiatives. They sought a new place of political engagement, squatting empty spaces to turn them into places for meeting, socialising, discussing and planning political initiatives, calling them the 'circoli del proletariato giovanile' (circles of proletarian youth). These circles were present in all major Italian cities: Rome, Turin, Milan, and in university towns like Bologna and Padova. Between 1975 and 1977 there were 37 of these circles in Milan. Each circle could have 70-80 activists and 200-300 persons using it. Squatting enabled reappropriation of spaces to build social structures, outside the logic of capitalist exchange. Often the squatted buildings were owned by the state, which reduced the risk of eviction, but in some cases squatters occupied private property left empty for speculative reasons. Every circle had its own character, each bringing together different subjects and projects.

Move from your own needs

Abandoning the work ethic as an issue, the movement of 1977 demanded an end to the sacrifices made to government and sought quality of life and free time to be spent in the neighbourhood, in places where the proletarian youth could meet, where it would be possible to self-manage the production of culture. Politics became a pleasure because it was an answer to everyone's needs.

The leading idea of the movement of 1977 was 'to move from your own needs' to improve the quality of life and 'claim back life'. The central objective was to fight the isolation that characterised the urban neighbourhood and to produce social structures and relations free from power rules, and reappropriate expressive and artistic communication. The movement of 1977 engaged in demonstrations, denounced heroin dealing in the neighbourhood, and challenged the high prices of cinemas and music concerts. It affirmed that politics has to be fun and used irony as a weapon. The movement used big discussion meetings and gatherings, but also street shows and concerts, flyers, posters, and free radio broadcasts to arrange demonstrations as well as debate.

233

1977 – Entrance of the squatted building
of the cangaceiros circle of proletarian youth

This type of politics was aimed at answering their own immediate needs, it was not a fight for power. The movement was far from the values of the historical left, and rejected the system of representation in parties and institutions. Because of the radical ideas it expressed, it was strongly repressed by the state, which claimed it was associated with terrorism. The Communist Party, engaged in the historical compromise with the Christian Democrats, left the movement to itself and declared that it was an expression of marginal social groups and violent people. For a long time, it was not possible to write the history of the movement of 1977, it was a case for the Court of Justice instead.

Nevertheless, the political activities of the movement of 1977 stimulated the creative vanguard and brought into life a little media revolution: 1977 saw the creation of free radio stations, neo-Dadaist magazines, visual arts and video tape, all used for political communication. While the political engagement of the circles declined, the centres for communication in Bologna, Rome, Padova, Florence and Milan survived.

234

THE SOCIAL CENTRES

In Italy today there are 150 squatted and self-managed social centres. Most of them were established in the second half of the 1980s. Some of them, like Leoncavallo in Milan, represent a transformation of existing circles of the 1977 movement, while others were first squatted by the movement of anarchist punks at the beginning of the 1980s. The centres are mainly located in buildings owned by the state or in decayed industrial estates, both in the peripheries and the centres of metropolitan areas, but are found even in medium sized and small towns. Some are in marginal territories, which lack places for sociality and production of culture. The social centres offer sociality and culture at very low prices and are very popular. In Milan, 20,000 people a month come to the centres, and the self-managed assembly of the social centre in Milan is made up of 600-700 people.

Sociality, production of culture and political action are present in different degrees in all the social centres. Their central aim, rather than to create some big utopia, is to promote the development of

sociality; to support the building of autonomous identity outside of commodified social relations; and to produce and exchange culture outside the capitalistic market. Some of them, like the Leoncavallo, want to organise interests and define culture in relation to a different way of organising urban space, work and free time. The centres located in marginal areas, e.g. some in Rome, tend more towards social solidarity work. Others are involved in political engagement, advocating new rights, and some centres focus on communication and artistic expression.

The social issue and the production of culture are the main concerns and activities of the social centres. Activities include: music concerts, exhibitions, theatre, dance, music, video, film, workshops, playgrounds, after school groups for children, consulting centres, information offices about work and welfare, free legal offices, Italian courses for foreigners, spaces to practise and record music, restaurants and pubs, congresses of movements (for example about work and refusal to work, and third sector initiatives), courses in ecological economics on the urban ecosystem and courses on critical consumption. Moreover, the centres contain publishing enterprises, book stores, editing of reviews, and self managed enterprises. Some of the social services are offered in the neighbourhood and seek a relationship with local residents. Many social centres fight against racism and some of them help immigrants. For example a centre in Padova accommodated Bosnian refugees until the state could offer a camp.

Culture and identities

The social centres, squatted and self-managed, have developed at a time of fundamental change in the structures of production and regulation. Big concentrations of workers have disappeared and the places of traditional formation of experience – family, school, party, factory – have been weakened. The territory has become the place for new productive relations.

The social centres find themselves responding more and more to a quest for a culture rich in meanings and to the strong need for sociality (Guarnieri,1996:9), a sociality that appears widely denied and destroyed by the profound productive changes that no

longer give identity or solidarity to the social actors. The social centres reflect changes in the productive process, and the social fragmentation that has changed Italy in the last 20 years. The social centres are not only shop-windows for the new social composition, but also laboratories of different cultures, life-styles, behaviours, and new forms of political action. Action on the cultural side is central for the social centre, because communication concerns all practices within a space in which there are shared values, aims and expectations: an horizon inside which action gains meaning and value. Communication involves acquisition of competence, and reflection upon the collective self and identity.

In towns lacking public spaces, where social life inhibits opportunities for collective action, the social centres are places of education. An education which, in the view of some of those involved, is acquired also through the emotional processes that music, theatre and other forms of expression help to stimulate, and not only from social and economic conditions or from ideological beliefs. The cultural dimension expresses itself by an emotional communication typical of the expressive forms giving meaning to one's own action, and everyone contributes to the forming of identities. From the point of view of Leoncavallo, the social centres "are spaces of self education, of cultural and political autonomy in which to try out forms of social co-operation not reduced to commodities" (Centro Sociale Leoncavallo, 1996:95).

Sometimes, without being aware of it, the anarchist punks and the social centres have adopted practices from the movement of 1977: demonstrations with music, shows in the streets, irony as an instrument of political action, the use of radio for debate, as well as meetings. Some of the so called 'free radios', born in 1977, became managed by the social centres and new ones have started; while reviews, magazines and leaflets have proliferated.

Self-production and 'social' globalisation

An international network of relations, of which the anarchist punks were among the originators at the beginning of the 1980s, characterised the social centres from the second half of that decade. This network of solidarity and exchange of shows,

concerts, and self produced goods uses an international circuit that the circle of 1977 did not have.

New technology permits the production of records, CDs, video cassettes and reviews of a quality comparable with market production. The social centres and other places outside the capitalist exchange spread across Europe and America, establishing a sort of parallel market of self produced goods, in opposition to the idea of making a commodity out of everything, utilising mail-order catalogues and shops in the self-managed centres.

Relations with the market

In Milan and elsewhere, the social dynamic of social centres has transformed the form of youth aggregation and its political representation "innovating it, modernising it and at least in part pulling it away from the entertainment business and from the organisations of the political parties" (Guarnieri,1996:11). Nevertheless, the creative abilities born from antagonism, international connections and the exchange of cultures, and the use of new technologies, have probably made some of these artistic expressions attractive to the capitalist market. The capitalist record industry has absorbed some of the groups developed in social centres, and some night-clubs have imitated the particular environment of the concert spaces of the centres.

In the second half of the 1990s commercial spaces have been opened which tend to interpret the needs of the new emerging subjects, middle class and non-union workers, as providing the innovative production expressed by the self-managed social centres. There you can hear many music groups which developed in the centres. On the other hand, the social centres have, in their music, theatrical and literary work, manifestations that are already recognised by the official structures. The need to finance the social centres, for example, makes them promote music groups who are a big attraction and are often already inside the record industry. This sometimes gives rise to contradictions, even if some people consider this a justified reappropriation of the official circuit.

It has been claimed by some that there is a risk of a separation between the political aims of the social centres, and the fluctuating mass of users who are looking mainly for entertainment and company. We have to stress that the refusal of politics by the users does not express a lack of will to take action, but a separateness from the places where politics are expressed. Moreover, the kind of sociality that the centres produce is not comparable or exchangeable with the sociality of political parties or of churches, clubs, discotheques or pubs. It involves specific aims and desires which correspond to a particular form of expression and of social formation, different views of the world and symbolic universes. The element that is not absorbed by the capitalist market is the provision of places where there is giving and receiving outside the commodity system, in which sociality is based on values other than those of profit and competition: inclusion instead of exclusion; solidarity; equality; the overcoming of imposed roles and of hierarchies.

Centro Sociale Leoncavallo.

235

Social centres in theoretical discourse

The social centres have been explained by some on the left as an answer to the crisis of the production of identities, linked to the restructuring and reinvention of the form of organising production which affects everyday life (Centro sociale Cox18, 1996:149). The social centres are, together with other social phenomena, interpreted as a form of resistance against the destructive effects of economic restructuring processes. At the same time, the aim is to release energies (in terms of culture, consciousness, but also availability of time) for alternative sociality, co-operation, and self organisation "to transfer the increase of social productivity of capital to the resocialisation of daily life" (Revelli, 1996). The social centres, even if they represent a minority action, are laboratory spaces outside the dominant circles.

Another complementary interpretation of the social centres stresses their ability to put together the development of productive enterprises with political action. And this makes them really different from the movements of 1968 and 1977. The social centres are not only places for political aggregation, but also places for self-production that build a network of social co-operation outside the welfare state, and free from the intermediation of money, to produce what they need in harmony with nature. Some centres consist of small social-productive units, with egalitarian management and low environmental impact, immersed in a com-munication network on a world-wide scale (Sullo, 1994:2).

The social co-operation that develops in the social centres is the same, according to Vecchi, as that which operates for all the working forces in the capitalist network enterprise. Theirs is not a marginal production. The disposition to change and the centrality of culture and knowledge that the activists of the centres are experimenting with are, nowadays, a condition which can be applied to all working forces, employed or not, part time or irregular (Vecchi, 1994:IV). These experiences have been developed in the social centres through self management, self-production, and socially useful work. "The rap music groups or the myriad of small publishing houses started in the social centres are like nodes – productive elements of the network of capitalistic enterprise" (Vecchi, 1994:IV).

THE PROSPECTS THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM PAST EXPERIENCE

The movements analysed have realised the centrality of public spaces, and of a socialisation not reduced to a commodity, to improve the quality of life. Sociality is a fundamental need and difficult to find in a period in which the processes of industrial restructuring have destroyed any sense of belonging. The subjects of these movements, motivated by a plurality of individual and

A demonstration with guitars in the neigbourhood by the cangaceiros squatters

collective reasons, are unified by the need of sociality, by social engagement, sometimes by the prospect of transformation and ultimately by values different from the dominant ones. The practice of illegal squatting makes them clash with the logic of the economic valorisation of cities, in competition through globalisation, and makes them take part of the conflict between use value and exchange value.

Saskia Sassen affirms that the global cities exhibit concen-trations of diversity: their spaces are marked by the dominant business culture, but also by a multiplicity of cultures and identities. The dominant culture could represent only a part of the city (Sassen, 1994:157). The different cultures, even the ones founded on a location or around a specific ethnic group, are marked by a confrontation with the existing power relations and by an attempt to find recognition and representation in the political and social arenas.

The issue is to distinguish between social and political projects that allow discussion and living together, and the ones that tend to impose their authority and their point of view on others, often giving an inferior role to a specific ethnic group or to women. Not all the cultures, behaviours or political systems attribute dignity and equal rights to all of the people and are ready for coexistence; thus not all of them are acceptable.

Coexistence of different identities

Sociality has specific characteristics according to the values to which it refers, to the objectives and desires that cause it. The kind of socialisation proposed by the social centres is characterised by the refusal to turn spaces and social relations into commodities. The social centres give meaning and value to their actions and build identities through common activity and the production of self-managed culture and communication founded on values, ends and expectations.

Some kinds of 'community' and identity tend to define boundaries and construct an exclusive and oppressive social form. Contrary to these, the aggregation and the sociality proposed by the movements are built from common projects and from the collective production of a culture full of meaning. Aggregation and sociality are based on the values of self-management, sharing, discussion, social engagement, and social transformation that tend to include a variety of subjects, instead of excluding them, in relation to the sharing of general objectives. A characteristic, both of the circles of 1977 and of social centres, is the coexistence of different subjects establishing a common ground for action in the sharing of self-managed space, without defining a hierarchy of values among them.

Nevertheless, while some social centres have been able to open themselves up to the neighbourhood in which they are located, to relate to the inhabitants, to create forms of sociality founded on solidarity and sometimes to offer social services, others have excluded those who do not belong to their enclave. Moreover, the practice of the social centres does not answer the demand for free spaces by social subjects not represented fully in the social centres. Some groups, such as women, have obtained similar places for their specific needs, but others have not been able to secure such places for their needs.

The public space as a place of conflict

The defence of the public space is central in a situation in which the land rent and the real estate market have gained a determining role in the economy; and in which citizens are transformed into consumers.

The public space is in Marxist terms the sphere of the widened reproduction of capital. In this ambit are born environmentalism, feminism and the urban movements struggling against speculation, and among which there are the social centres that struggle against consumptive atomisation and the reduction of space into a commodity. The people's resistance to the destruction of social ties, and the experiences that tend to recreate those ties, beginning from values of self-management, inclusion, solidarity, social engagement and transformation, could be the crucial front of the class struggle (Sullo, 1994:II) and could reconnect with struggles concerning reproduction.

Reproduction

Reproduction is potentially a strategic place for social conflict: the production of culture, meaning and values that it is part of, involving the crucial issues of building society and of social life in the public space. The ambit of reproduction has a strong impact on the quality of life, not least in relation to the form of doing productive work. Also, it is a place of the menial working activities essential for survival, unpaid and assigned on the grounds of gender – issues not by chance introduced into the political debate by the women's movement. The question of the unpaid work of managing a household, the work of care and of emotional support inside the family – assigned with ideological justification to the women on the grounds of gender – will have to be solved through political struggle. Collectives promoting a rethinking of the organisation of reproductive work, or the offer of new and specific social services to accomplish it socially, or the reduction of paid work-time so as to redistribute between all, men and women, the burden of the 'domestic' activities, are only a few examples of solutions to this issue.

The question of reproduction raised by feminists and the circles of proletarian youth, but not fully developed by the social centres, is stressed in the slogan 'the personal is political'. It embraces fundamental questions of social change: production of culture, of identities, of meanings, production of life, work of care and support, socialisation and sociality. And these issues need to become the basis for proposals and demands of the left alongside demands relating to 'productive' paid work.

Endnote

[1] Sociality: the tendency to associate with one's fellows or to form social groups (cf. "Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language")

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237

LIBERATED SPACES — POSSIBILITIES FOR LIBERATING EVERYDAY LIFE[1]

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CHAPTER
6.8

CENTRO SOCIALE FORTE PRENESTINO

The *Centro Sociale occupato e autogestito Forte Prenestino* is a squatted self-managed social centre on the outskirts of Rome. This occupation began on 1 May 1986 after a big event, the 4th 'No Work Party', which was organised in the park outside the Forte Prenestino.

The groups who organised the event had been involved in political and social activities in the area for many years. They had achieved presence through different kinds of local action including marches, the distribution of counter-information, the production of newspapers, etc. They were originally based in an office which soon became too small for all the projects that began to develop.

There had been some previous attempts in Rome to take over disused buildings for social activities and there was a fairly strong housing movement as a result of the struggles of the 1970s (see Marvi Maggio, in this book). There were whole areas at the periphery where buildings were squatted as housing, predominantly by families. The basic principles which inspired the occupations were a result of the cultural and political movements that took place in Italy and in Europe during the 1970s. They produced an incredible variety of subversive ideas, practices and struggles.

In contrast, the early 1980s in Italy were characterised by the violent repression of any sign of social unrest by the state. The obvious aim was to control the 'explosion of freedom' that happened in the 1970s. Any exchange of counter-information or political activity was firmly curtailed by official intervention. Renewed attempts to occupy disused buildings such as old schools, deserted factories and other empty public and private buildings are signs of life returning to this beaten, antagonistic movement.

At first, the squatted centres provided refuge. They were 'ghettos' where radical ideas and activities could 'happen'. This was not their only role; the underlying project was more complex and articulated. The idea that came straight out of the 1970s was that all aspects of daily life should be assessed for a collective and political solution. So many real social needs and desires remain unfulfilled for most of society. Self-help within a collective seemed like the most logical option. If we need public space to organise social activities, and there are buildings which are lying empty and disused, then we should occupy them. If the law tends to protect privilege, then there are good reasons to break it. 'Illegality' could thus be interpreted as a more advanced concept of 'public interest'.

Struggles involved with private property, the lack or privatisation of public space, repression of social and cultural needs or their reduction to the rigidity of the market economy, have brought about hundreds of squatted centres in Italy. They are spread across the whole country, although most are in the large cities and there are more in the north and central areas than in the south. The political background of the squatters is varied and includes those from the 'Autonomia' groups of the 1970s, to anarchists, punks, and later, other political movements.

All these occupations are illegal, so one of the first problems that has to be dealt with is the relationship with the local administration. The centres use different approaches depending on the political background of the squatters and the attitude of local government and the police. This conflict is a priority issue and it is frequently discussed in 'squatted self-managed social centre' meetings in Italy.

Attitudes range from those who avoid all confrontation, to others who develop skilled negotiations with the local administration. The centres demand that the value and contribution of the activities that they programme in the run-down areas of cities should be recognised, and they campaign for the social uses and autonomy in these public and private spaces. Obviously confrontation is only avoidable if the authorities have the sense to value dialogue over the 'military approach' and they do not reduce the whole issue of squatted centres and housing to a problem of public order.

The centres stand for freedom; for the right to exist and to experiment with different ways of providing for basic needs. They offer the opportunity to people who are vulnerable or unconventional to meet and express themselves within their own lifestyles.

The right to exist and to let other people see that you exist is essential. Visibility is seen as a threat by the establishment. These are real examples that 'break the rules'. They show that this self-managed alternative lifestyle is possible, useful and often good fun! The centres are seeking new social models which will bring them closer to the real needs and desires of people, which will respect diversity, 'all equal all different'. These aims are not compatible with the market economy.

Forte Prenestino is a real fort, built as a medieval castle. During the war it was used as a military depot. Today it stands in an almost abandoned park on the periphery of the city. At the time of the occupation there were two others in Rome and more in the North of Italy in Torino and Milan. Renovation was soon started and the structure of the organisation was set up. New groups joined the first squatters. *Forte Prenestino* is well known both in Rome and in Italy for the unusual internal heterogeneity of its members. Because of its size and the open minds of the original squatters the *Forte* has always been a place with a wide political spectrum.

People from different backgrounds who might be in conflict in the rest of Italy, manage to co-exist. It was, in fact, intentional to bring together people from different political and cultural backgrounds and to get more out of this 'rich mix'. In practice this caused some considerable problems, but the principle was never in doubt.

From the beginning the squatters all worked on a programme of renovation, along with new activities which were gradually introduced. Money was raised from the sale of tickets at events and from other sources. Soon the *Forte* was recognised by young people locally, and from the rest of the city, as a venue for concerts, films, book and magazine launches and other political and cultural events. The studios, the audio-room, the recording room, the gym, infoshop, restaurant, and cafe were all in daily use.

The production of culture is a basic requirement. We need to search for new values, criticise existing social models, fight prejudice and stereotypes, create original viewpoints and individual perspectives, look at things differently. Culture is essential nourishment for the mind.

The logical result of the fight for freedom of expression without censorship, and for the free circulation of ideas is the independent production and financing of newspapers, tapes, CDs and videos; non-profit self-production versus the commercial cultural market; no-copyright versus privatisation of knowledge. The independent production and distribution of this kind of material creates a lot of problems. The centres have tried to respond with different approaches with different results. This issue and the copyright debate are major points on the centre's agenda.

The real experience in the *Forte* is a social aggregate of politics, culture and everyday activities like eating together and dancing. It is difficult to say which comes first. To agree new rules on how to live together, how to take decisions, how to achieve inclusive discussion, to survive 'eternal' meetings, to organise tasks and share work. These points are continuously discussed; they are difficult but fascinating. There are specific discussion groups, but decisions have always been taken in general assemblies.

Division of work inside the *Forte* is still a problem, as well as sharing knowledge and roles. Sometimes we reproduce stereotypes and the status quo rather than the better circulation of information or job rotation. Practice is more difficult than theory as anyone who has been involved would know. The goals are clear, but real democracy on any scale has to tackle substantial and real inequalities which are beyond the scope of a single centre.

This was clearly apparent with the role of women, and with the *Forte's* reaction to the first 'extracommunitarian' immigrants taking part in the squat. Each individual has to become responsible and overcome their own difficulties and prejudices. There are generational problems as well; most of the first squatters are not in the centre any more. This sometimes creates a tension between innovation and continuity and the ideas and practice within the group.

There is currently an attempt to include on the agenda a radical revision of some basic principles of the *Forte*. These include discussion and decision-making models, participation at collective meetings, the sharing of basic tasks and expertise, and the rotation of roles. All of these are being vigorously debated.

The problems around income are emerging more and more clearly, especially those related to the management of the *Forte*. Everyone in the *Forte*, every day, has to cope with a job or the lack of a job. They are continuously making an effort to solve money problems, to refuse exploitation, or to deal with increasing unemployment. The most widespread experience is that of hanging around in part-time temporary low-paid insecure employment, along with a continuous and stressful absence of any guarantees and an enormous waste of time and energy, purely to survive. On the other hand, so-called full-time jobs are difficult to find, and to combine with any consistent involvement in other activities.

This raises the question of what is the meaning of 'work' and 'political activity' and does any of it make sense? Is a totally unpaid, voluntary activity, like many in the *Forte*, viable? Who can afford to do this in the long term? How could money be generated for the functions that are carried out in the *Forte*?

On a wider level, looking beyond this single example, it is obvious that this approach brings people together to fight to achieve basic fights for everyone. Given the fact that everyone has a right to exist, to fight for their whole being, not just the right to survive, there needs to be a re-examination of the nature of work and its real use to society. What is the role of the so-called regular jobs; do they contribute to the well-being of people? What is their importance apart from the fact that someone has the money to pay for them?

It is said that the Centri Sociali are emerging from a phase of resistance; that they are moving towards expansion, into new territories, new frontiers that have not been faced before. There are definitely more issues on the agenda than simply creating 'free spaces' and possibilities of intervention in the city. We now need to liberate 'time', the whole extent of our life-time, not just what remains of it after days spent in waged work and lost energy.

We have to continue discussing the role of the Centro Sociale in the territory, its visibility in the city, and the importance of its function in the urban context and in all the different aspects of social life.

This is a work in progress and these are just some notes to help you to imagine the future development.

Endnote
[1] **Spazi liberati, possibilità di liberare i tempi di vita.**

241

WELCOME TO MEDELLIN — THE CAPITAL OF THE 21st CENTURY

WRITTEN BY	ANGELA STIENEN
PHOTOS BY	ANGELA STIENEN

CHAPTER

6.9

How does globalization connect to so-called Third World cities?
Are theorists like Appadurai [2] right when they stress that the
changes in the world economy and the complexity of the global
(cultural) flows now taking place cast doubt on the continuing
usefulness of exclusive centre-periphery models, and bring urban
forms all over the world closer together? The present contribution
partially tries to answer this question. It looks at the case of
Medellin, the main industrial city of Colombia, internationally
known as the headquarters of a globally operating drug Mafia, the
Medellin Cartel, and also known because of narcoterrorism, the
extreme violence the city suffered when the *Cartel* declared war
on the State in the late eighties. By focusing on strategic planning
as an instrument which pretends to regulate the urban crisis and
to bring forth a new metropolitan model, I shall represent another
dimension of Medellin, one that places this city in the landscapes
of *Possible Urban Worlds*.

Medellin, the capital of Antioquia, a province situated at the
north-east of Colombia and bordering Panamá and the Caribbean
Sea, is considered to have always been the most dynamic indus-
trial, commercial and financial centre in Colombia. The city is
located in the valley of the Medellin river and, together with its
metropolitan area, includes ten municipalities, with a population
of about three million [3]. In the context of the import substitution
development model of the fifties and sixties, industry specialised
in the production of consumer and intermediate goods for the
national market, principally of textiles. The city became the
headquarters of one of the most important economic groups
of Colombia and Latin America: the *Antioquian Syndicate*,
a stronghold of multi-sectorial companies. During the industrial
boom between 1951 and 1973, the population quadrupled due
to immigration from the countryside and smaller towns, reaching
a population of 1.5 million in 1973. [4]

In the seventies the ongoing process of de-industrialisation,
characterising the world-wide transition to a new flexibilized accu-
mulation model, led to a deep crisis in the city and to an accelera-
ting process of urban decay. Nevertheless, the growth of the global
drug economy in the eighties and the fact that Medellin became
the headquarters of the Colombian drug Mafia, temporarily helped
to attenuate the economic crisis, creating employment and a huge
influx of money. This money was largely invested in real estate
and construction activities, as well as in conspicuous consumption.
Due to this development, the growth of the real GDP rate in
Antioquia during this period was higher than in Colombia as
a whole. [5]

*"At the end of the seventies, together with my husband,
I started producing sausages and hamburgers. We sold them
on the street, in the stadium and in bars. We had no licence and
produced illegally. But business was not too bad. Then, in the
eighties, with the narcos the construction boom began. This was
incredible! Everywhere in Medellin and the metropolitan area you
could find large construction sites with more than a thousand
workers. We were the first who discovered this market for cold
meat and sold directly to the workers. And this was an incredible
opportunity for us. We had to diversify and to get a licence and
we were no longer able to distribute to the whole market. People
came to us by motorcycle and started to distribute our products
in areas all over the city, as intermediaries. The construction boom
was a real gold mine for us. Then we perceived the growth of
Mafia capitals in small industries and became aware that meat
was being smuggled from Venezuela and the USA. Very large
containers of meat entered Medellin and the meat industry was
booming. A lot of small businesses got large amounts of capital
overnight and imported machinery. Meat prices were falling.
We were offered a lot of money to constitute a holding, but we
refused; we have children and we didn't want problems".*
(Analía, decaying inner city district, 1997)

243

Mafia activities involved, directly and indirectly, a great number of people from the 'underclass' sector. A particular feature of the *Medellin Cartel* is that it emerged from the underclass and culturally has never been accepted by the traditional elite of the city. It was tolerated as long as it 'oxygenated' the local economy. The political legitimisation of the *Cartel* came from the underclass sectors where the *Cartel* invested a lot of money in housing and infrastructural works, for instance in public lighting and the construction of football pitches.

The most far-reaching impact of de-industrialisation and the simultaneous spread of the drug economy in Medellin is therefore cultural as well as spatial. It sharpened the contradictions of the existing structure of the city: the unevenness between economic and socio-cultural globalization processes. This unevenness has its origin in the way Medellin developed as a modern metropolis during the past three decades.

REPRESENTING MODERNISATION I

Industry and the urban fabric were unable to absorb the uncontrolled immigration of the fifties and sixties. The result was, what is known as a dual socio-spatial pattern of urban development, which is characteristic of almost all Third World cities: on the one hand a space of power – the formal, privileged and protagonistic city, assisted by the state; and on the other hand, a poor 'peripheral city', with a high rate of informality and exclusion. In Medellin the 'peripheral city' expanded to the north and climbed the eastern and western slopes of the valley, constituting two huge districts called *comunas*. Already in the seventies more than half of the inhabitants of Medellin lived in the *comunas*.[6]

But during the fifties, the Taylorization of the most important enterprises, especially of the textile industry, and the introduction of Fordism, diversified this dual pattern, for it divided the working-class into an integrated part (integrated into the main enterprises of the city), and an excluded one [7]. As Fordism combines the restructuring of the production process with the constitution of a welfare system to increase productivity, the 'integrated' workers got an increase in their salaries and access to an organised system of social and educational services, offered by the enterprises in co-operation with church and public institutions. While up to the fifties the majority of textile workers were young unmarried women, Fordism exclusively aimed to strengthen the (nuclear) family: only male, married workers and their families had access to the social services and to the social housing programmes, built in the sixties with governmental credits. The *comunas* are constituted by this simultaneity of different forms of social and economic integration, the spatial outcome of which is a regular pattern of planned serial

244

social housing alongside a rather chaotic pattern of illegal settle-ments, and also so-called 'pirate' housing, promoted by private urban development agents who legally or illegally sell plots [8].

This uneven but combined development might be considered as a local variety of Fordism or the expression of a peripheral Fordism that also had a far-reaching socio-cultural and political impact on the city.

REPRESENTING MODERNISATION II

The new technological paradigm, aiming at creating a 'new mentality' in Medellin, not only changed the family structures, but also displaced the formerly rigid social control of the Catholic Church among the Antioquian working-class [9]. Although it was based on a strengthening of Christian principles, it nevertheless accelerated the privatisation and even secularisation of religious practices. Moreover, it increased the traditional reputation of the Antioquian entrepreneur-class for being audacious and pragmatic hard workers and – in Colombia – the most visionary, and cleverest in business. And, in spite of being the cradle of a very conservative Catholicism with a strong devotion to 'the Virgin Mary', in Antioquia a kind of 'Protestant ethic' developed: moral values like working hard, saving money, being honest and abstaining from all kinds of mundane enjoyments became the 'leitmotiv' of the Antioquian bourgeoisie [10]. This reputation turned into an important element for self-definition and self-representation of the Antioquians, or *Raza Paisa* (the race of the paisa) [11], as they are calling them-selves. This sense of an (imagined) community led to regional chauvinism and even to autonomist tendencies. This image, called *Antioqueñidad*, today is re-created and strategically used in the process of constructing a new metropolitan model.

"O liberty that perfume the mountains of my territory, let my sons inhale your fragrance..."
(Hymn of Antioquia, introducing all public events)

REPRESENTING MODERNISATION III

The industrial boom in Medellin relied on very good public services, *(Empresas Públicas de Medellín)*, almost unique in Latin America and the so-called Third World. Since 1920, *Empresas Públicas*, a financially independent and decentralised institution, without any relationship with other entities of the public adminis-tration, has become the most profitable public entity of Colombia and has extended its services (energy, water supply, sewage, tele-phone and garbage collection), to the whole metropolitan area, making Medellin the first city in the country where it has been common, since the thirties, to use electric household machines and where water is potable.[12]

Empresas Públicas stands for the cleanness, hygiene and order of the city and symbolises progress and the superiority of Medellin; to echo a high official of the planning office, *"...that's because the Paisas have a spirit of leadership, a competitive spirit, they always improve themselves."* Debates about privatising

Empresas Públicas and the offers of foreign investors like the Japanese, were met in 1996 with a wide mobilisation of regionalist sentiments: *"for the honour of Antioquia, don't give away our Empresas Públicas, the pride of our city"* was the advertisement, found everywhere in Medellin during the negotiations. Finally there was no privatisation, but only a restructuring.

Another symbol of the *modern spirit* of the city is the *metro*, an air-rail train (sky-train). Planned in the sixties, the *metro* was built in the eighties and inaugurated in 1996.

"I'm very proud to live in the only Colombian city that has a metro. And even if they say that the Germans and Spaniards have stolen a lot of money with this work and that the government now charge it to us, the metro is marvellous. They told us that the metro will bring us a new culture and a new mentality and that's really true, in the metro everybody respects the norms and that's real progress, the metro civilised us, and even if for us here in this comuna it is useless, it changed the whole city and I feel like living in a modern metropolis".
(Rosana, comuna noroccidental, 1997)

"The metro made a great scar in the city," said a leading urbanist at the Round Table of Territory and Space, *"but this restructuring of the urban space symbolises the transition of Medellin from the twentieth to the twenty-first century."*

"The main characteristic of the built environment in Medellin is its non-permanence; the real kings of this city are the engineers and construction firms." [13]

THE MODERN URBAN REVOLT

During the seventies and early eighties, in the context of de-industrialisation and generalised economic crises, a lot of com-bative grassroots-organisations emerged in the *comunas*, sup-ported by radical political parties and armed organisations of the Left, as well as by the radicalised wing of the Catholic Church. The repressive interventions of the State could neither control the restless underclass districts nor prevent further illegal settlements; and large civil mobilisations calling for an improvement of public services like education, health care and public transport in the *comunas* again and again paralysed great parts of the metropolitan area.

These mobilisations didn't emerge spontaneously, but never-theless they got their own dynamic:

"The inhabitants of the comunas quickly developed a reputation for combativeness and that was the reason why finally all political groups of the Left moved to the comunas. At the time Colombia was under a state of siege but nevertheless you could see women with their children coming from the comunas to the centre of the city and lying down on the main roads during the rush hour to block the traffic".
(Jaime, executive member of a local NGO, 1997)

During these years all political action of the Left was radically directed against the state, the city was something like a scene where the industrial workers, dogmatically considered *"the most combative social class"*, were supposed to act towards the destruction of the old state. In the middle of the eighties, in the context of the peace negotiations between the Colombian state and the armed Left and the beginning of the decentralisation process, the position of the Left changed:

"We came to perceive the city. First we got aware of the importance of space for political action and second that the city consists of a variety of microspaces that produce and are produced by very different forms of communication and culture; and then the work in the popular neighbourhoods became an end in itself. We thought that microspaces, the streets and street-corners, the stores, bars and soccer-grounds in the neighbourhoods were the only places where really something could be changed in the city, and that these changes had to be created at once and not after the construction of a new state; and we also became aware that all transformations of the immediate environment depended on the degree of appropriation and identification with it and on the construction of a local identity as inhabitants of a neighbourhood; therefore we started to promote the urban popular culture in the neighbourhoods".
(Juán, executive member of a local NGO, 1997)

By idealising the 'popular culture' and its territorial base, the Left was reproducing the dual perception of the city, typical for the modernising elite. The urban project of the Left was a modernisation project, but nevertheless the Left remained ambiguous towards modernisation; it considered the 'bounded spaces' of the 'popular culture' as a 'community space of resistance', against a modernisation process which it couldn't co-determine and control. But this 'community', in fact, was more imagined than real. When, at the end of the eighties, due to the pressure of the civil movement, in Medellin, problems like housing, public services and public transport had more or less been resolved by the municipality, the fragmentation of the popular sectors became obvious, and newly emerging, unexpected claims produced deep tensions between the urban project of the Left and the expectations of the urban underclass sectors. By the start of the nineties, 99% of the population of Medellin and the metropolitan area had guaranteed electric power, 98% had a potable water supply, 95% had sewerage, 97% garbage collection and 90% street cleaning [14]. In all underclass districts public telephones are free, as they are subsidised by upper-class districts. The problem that has to be resolved now, is the question: who does the city belong to?

THE POST-MODERN URBAN REVOLT

"The only positive thing we can do for Medellin is to combat the Antioqueñidad; we really have to get rid of this worse of all ancestral defects." [15]

During the eighties in the *comunas* a new generation was growing up, an urban generation, born in the city as the second or even third generation of the former rural immigrants. A generation who no longer corresponded to the cultural stereotype of a 'popular culture' marked more by rural than urban values and behavioural forms, a stereotype still widespread, even among the Left. This generation was growing up with the experience of another kind of informality and exclusion: spatial informality, because a great number of the illegal settlements never have been legalised; the families had a house, public services and transport but no property titles that guaranteed their right to stay; and economic exclusion, because at the end of the eighties unemployment officially exceeded 16% in the metropolitan area and 36% in the comunas, and youth unemployment exceeded 60% [16]; together with political exclusion, because possibilities of formal political participation didn't exist; and, finally, cultural exclusion, because there were no economic opportunities, nor spatial conditions for cultural and educational activities.

"I really love the streets of my neighbourhood; here I have lived the best moments of my life. This street here is a main street with a lot of traffic, isn't it? But we simply close it, we block the traffic and play football or other things. That's super. And we have no other choice, there are no other spaces. We like to fight alone for what we want; if we like to clean all this junk off this street , o.k. we do it because afterwards everything looks very nice; if we like to organise a Miniteque in one of the houses and dance the whole night, we do it; or we go and play the whole day with the children. We have no money because nobody supports us, but we don't like to receive help from anybody because afterwards they try to manipulate us. That's what happens with the social workers, they like to force us to make projects for them, but then they steal our ideas and our money because they only need our projects to continue working and receiving their salaries and for us there's nothing left".
(Jessica, youth group member, decaying inner city district, 1996)

The possibility of being directly or indirectly integrated into Mafia activities opened new perspectives for this generation and changed the city. To get a lot of money in a very short time meant to get sudden access to the variety of new goods entering the country legally or by smuggling, in the context of the neo-liberal economic opening. Consequently, the marginalized and newly excluded (such as the former industrial workers) rapidly got included into the globalized consumer and shopping-centre culture spreading across Medellin. Many of the poor households went through an accelerated modernisation process, for money was invested in

246

all kinds of household appliances (automatic washing machines, microwave ovens, etc.), in sumptuous renovations of houses, as well as in luxury goods, and those households got a lot of prestige in their neighbourhood.

"A teenager in Medellin was a paid killer or he was dead."

Intimately related to this point is the constitution of armed youth gangs in the comunas at the end of the eighties. They consisted on the one hand of paid killers *(sicarios)*, working for the Mafia, and on the other hand of *milicias*, constituted by the armed organisations of the Left and charged with socially purging the neighbourhoods. These gangs recruit male teenagers between 13 and 25, (the *milicias* also recruit a few girls). They kill in the name of a more or less diffuse morality, as is the case of the *milicias*, or simply for money:

"Money opens the world of fashion, of cool trademarks, of big motorbikes; with money it's easy to have a girl-friend; and with money I can help my mother. It's all the same to me which son of a bitch is my father, but my mother is the most holy person in the world; if my mother is fine, I can die in peace." [17]

"Mata, que Diós perdona…", "Kill, God will absolve you…"
(Chorus of a Salsa, famous in Medellin)

Violence finally gave birth to a new metropolitan model. The armed youth gangs also got access to the globalized value market of an unlimited consumer culture, where life is a permanent celebration, where everything is accessible with money, where neither past nor future exist, and discontinuity is the dominant feeling. *"Vivir a lo pelicula"* – the gang members say, *"life is a videoclip"*, a rapid sequence of fragments.

"Life has to be enjoyed all the time, after death it's too late…"
(Chorus of a Salsa, famous in Medellin)

Even death is a fiesta, the funerals converted into a carnival, with loud music (salsa or local rock), drugs, alcohol and the pictures everybody takes with the dead. Rituality is important: decontextualised Catholic rituals. And the gang members ritualise their vanity, showing their bodies, their clothes, their weapons, their dogs. It is still a demonstration of male power. But at the same time a new ideal is emerging, represented above all among the girls: the androgyne, that is, the 'hybrid', as an expression of a post-modern aesthetic.[18]

The youth gangs therefore challenged the values of the *Antioqueñidad* that once supported the modernisation process in the city, imposing new values by force of the weapon. And even the *milicias*, being constituted to replace the absent state in the underclass districts, looking after law and order, subverted this 'modern ideology' – in this case its Left version – and got an autonomous dynamic which today is not very different from that of the gangs. But lastly this violence is also reproducing the *Antioqueñidad*, though in an inverse version.

"Antioquians are very enterprising, even in crime, and their vanity makes them think that they are nearly perfect. If in a mirror they look ugly, it is because of the mirror; that's why they hate me so much when I'm criticising them." [19]

247

"Militias get out of here!
Military, welcome to Picachito!"

'GLOCALISED' SPACE [20]

When at the beginning of the nineties the State tried to definitely cut the power of the *Medellin Cartel*, the *Cartel* declared war on the State, planting bombs in the establishments of political, security and justice organisations, and thereby creating an acute paranoia among the citizens. The violence of common and organised delinquency, *milicias*, private and paramilitary justice groups, together with the narcoterrorism, led to a further fragmentation of the former dual socio-spatial pattern of the city, a process already initiated by speculative real estate investments. New upper and middle class settlements appeared like spots in the urban landscape. These large, newly built apartment houses, fenced in and tightly controlled by private security forces, best express the new kind of space appropriation in Medellin: while the upper and middle classes drew back from public space, enclosing themselves or privatising the spaces they like to have access to, the 'dangerous classes' [21] invaded the public space, appropriating the streets, the public squares, the inner city. Depending on the perspective from which the city is watched, there is always a changing pattern of white spots: what is the no (wo)man's land of one is the controlled territory of another and vice versa. Moreover a process of expansion and restriction of the appropriated space developed: restriction, because the territorial fragmentation of nearly all underclass districts into controlled territories of hostile gangs had become a spatial trap for its inhabitants. They risked being killed when they crossed the frontiers. Young men still now only leave their 'territory' when they are obliged to do so.

But on the other hand there is also an expansion of the appropriated space because of intensified international migration. Globalization and the drug economy extended the relationships between Medellin and 'global cities' like New York or Tokyo, and a lot of men and women of the under and middle classes are 'on the move' between Medellin and New York (above all, male migration) and Medellin and Tokyo (above all, female migration).[22]

"The map isn't the territory; when do we understand that the territory of the kids of the comunas is New York?"
(Dario Ruiz, Colombian writer at the Forum for negotiation of the Strategic Plan, 1997)

WHO DOES THE CITY BELONG TO?

"... City: not everything is lost, you are still inhabited by laughter; as you see, an ardent song is resonating from all your corners."
(Grupo pasajeros; graffiti found in Medellin in 1996)

"... and because we continued living in Medellin during these years of narcoterrorism, we are considered to be survivors."
(Eliza, civil leader in a decaying inner city district, 1996)

"In 1991 narcoterrorism reached such an intensity that everybody, the underclass sectors as well as the elite and the political class, got aware that the city was going to be destroyed; and at this very moment we decided to do something for the future of the city, and to do it together, orchestrating all the different points of view. 1991 was the year of the new constitution of Colombia that opened up new possibilities for participation because of its main pillars: decentralisation, pluralism, multiculturalism and participation; on this base the Round Tables were created in this city, by the municipality, as spaces of negotiation. All these processes – the intensity of the urban crisis and the new democratic spaces – strengthened civil society in Medellin, much more than in other Colombian cities, and that pushed us towards a new pedagogic process: the negotiation of a Strategic Plan for Medellin, as a mechanism to regulate the impact of globalization and to rebuild the city."
(Official of the Strategic Plan, 1997)

How can one plan for diversity in a heterogeneous, deeply divided and highly conflictual city? And how can one build spaces of difference without reproducing the different patterns of segregation and exclusion?

The Strategic Plan of Medellin pretends to have found an answer to these questions. Many progressive intellectuals and former Left wing activists, today occupy important positions in governmental institutions, local and international NGO's and universities, and

248

Fortified enclaves.

have become the main opinion leaders in this *"new space of negoti-ation between the public and the private sector and civil society"* . Strategic planning is considered to be a pedagogic process, because by bringing together different points of view the participat-ing actors are supposed to get transformed and thereby construct citizenship. *"To rebuild this city means to strengthen the existing social tissue and through it change the physical urban space"*. Due to this process, Medellin today is one of the Latin America cities where urban development is most discussed. Many civil organisa-tions, the Round Tables, nearly all the local NGO's, the universities and parts of the still sceptical private sector are elaborating and publicly discussing projects of *"the metropolis of the future – the Medellin we really want"*.

But how is planning possible in a city where indeterminacy, inconsistency and a hedonistic consumerism are on the rise? Where it is not at all clear if the 'bounded spaces', i.e. the controlled urban territories, represent an empowerment of diversity, or powerlessness and exclusion, since power simply means to have a weapon and to make use of it; and where violence still is an impor-tant means of conflict resolution? The Strategic Plan wants to build a 'common vision' that reintegrates all the different actors and at the same time is able to attract capital, transmitting the image of Medellin of being *"an important business valley"*; *"a huge shopping centre, that surprises even the most demanding visitors"*; *"a first rate financial market and centre for congresses and conventions"*; in short: it strategically rebuilds the old image (and chauvinism), of Medellin being *"the leading city of the north-east of Latin America"* .[23]

This ambition creates a lot of contradictions and ambiguities that can best be illustrated with the debates about public space. There are two opposite terrains public space is debated in: a discur-sive terrain and a non-discursive one. The discursive terrain is highly globalized, it is identical with the global reformulation of space and power that arose from the critique of the 'cultural malaise' of the 'modern city', which is considered a functionally segmented and inhospitable city, where diversity is disturbing and fought; and from the critique of the modernist ideology of 'progress at any cost'.

"Today the urban question is of quality, quality of production and consumption, spatial quality, humanisation, enjoyment, aesthetics, the play, the spectacle. The city today is something

"Educate for a new society."

"Medellín makes decisions."

HAGAMOS DE MEDELLIN LA CIUDAD LIDER!

"Let's transform Medellin into the leading city."

To win back a democratic urban public space is the generalised claim in the city. But to win it back from whom and for whom? From the hundreds of street-sellers and the homeless bothering car drivers and pedestrians? From the traffic that permanently puts in danger street-sellers and pedestrians? Or from the strict regulations the Metro imposes on the public space and its security forces who consider everybody a suspect and a delinquent? Must it be won back for the upper class sectors that for a long time avoided public space and especially the inner city? Or for those who for a long time have occupied it, identified with it, ameliorated and cleaned it; like the Civil Committees of the central inner city district. Recently they also cleaned it socially, being permanently in contact with the authorities, informing about any suspicious movement...

A planning strategy is *"a military strategy"*, says a high official of the planning office, *"because a great part of the population of this city is in a border line situation between honesty and delinquency. This situation has a very concrete territorial expression: the urban interstitial spaces which belong to nobody; they can easily be controlled by any hostile group"*. He therefore imposed the creation of *new centralities*, that is, new public spaces in the peripheries, to be appropriated and shaped by all the citizens, as meeting points, places of education and recreation, shopping centres..., *"spaces*

eminently subversive, it smashes all the overcome modernist values, concepts and ideals.".
(Viviescas, leading urbanist at the Round Table of Territory and Space, 1996)

On the non-discursive terrain, by contrast, space and power are reconstructed, confronting exactly the subversive dimension of the city: chaos, anarchy, violence, and an infinitely expanding informality. The claim is security as a public good.
"Thank God that the Metro exists, it puts a reglementation on the public space, which otherwise would have been lost; permissivity only increases this incredible chaos."
(Margarita, member of a local NGO, Round Table of Territory and Space, 1996)

The Metro.

NO DEBEMOS OLVIDAR QUE MAS DE 45.000 JOVENES HAN TENIDO QUE MORIR PARA QUE SE DECLARARA LA EMERGENCIA SOCIAL EN MEDELLIN, Y EL ESTADO SE ACORDARA DE INVERTIR EN ESTAS COMUNIDADES LO QUE DEJO DE HACER POR MUCHO TIEMPO.

por eso decimos que

nuestro centro de barrio

tiene sudor comunitario y

sangre juvenil.

O. I. C.

"We should not forget that more than 45,000 young people had to get killed before the state declared Medellín a social emergency area and decided at last to invest in these neighborhoods. That's why we say that our community center was built with the sweat of the community and the blood of the young people." (Centro Integral Comunitario – A new centrality in the periphery)

251

New public spaces in the peripheries.

that allow people to become actors, to get a real sense of belonging". But the creation of *new centralities* can also mean keeping undesired people out of the central inner city district and the new shopping-centres, designated to become the 'showcase' of the city.

And the strategy might also be part of the ongoing *"war against informality"* [24], for the expansion of informality ironically is interpreted as a privatisation of the public space, and therefore as a process of exclusion. In a city with an informal sector of 60%, a controlled and *"dignifying informality"* should be possible; as the Round Tables claim, *"informality gives the city an exotic touch, this is a bazaar city"*. The debate about informality finally is a debate about which of the rights determined by the new constitution of Colombia are to be prioritised. Most people want to prioritise the right to the public space as being a collective right – not the right to work and equal opportunities, the individual right, that the informal street-sellers and homeless want to claim. But today

everybody is aware that Medellin is the capital of the province with the highest number of people recently displaced by violence. Those people migrate to the city and infinitely increase informality here.

"But at least we have learnt to perceive the city in a different way. That's the most important thing. The metro has contributed a lot to this. It has dignified us because it makes us save time. The good organisation of the metro and the free time makes us walk more and this gives us the possibility to contemplate the city, to really perceive its forms, colours, smells and all its negative aspects. This has changed our perspective on the city and little by little we are becoming new citizens because we become aware of what to criticise, and how to claim our civil rights."
(Fernando, Round Table of Territory and Space, 1996)

CONCLUSION: MEDELLIN AS A LESSON?

The case of Medellin illustrates that globalization brings closer together the urban forms of the North and of the South. But globalization processes are partial, not only in the sense that King points out when he stresses that they affect some regions and social groups and sectors more or less than others [25]; but principally in the sense of Appadurai [26] who emphasises the disjunctures between the different global flows, and the fluid and irregular way they are shaped when contextualised, or 'glocalised' [27]; articulating with specific local conditions, and with one another. States and other institutions, agencies and interest groups are attempting to manipulate, close or open up the cultural boundaries of others (and themselves) to these flows, with varying degrees of success, depending on their power resources.[28]

Looking at Medellin from this perspective, new democratic viewpoints have been opened due to the institutional permeability to what Appadurai calls 'ideoscapes': global flows of images, ideas, discourses and concepts, locally shaped by a new progressive urban middle class, being constituted together with these new ideas and controlling them. The outcome is principally a discursive democracy.

But what is the relation between the discursive democracy and the violent way the marginalized and excluded claim their 'right to the city'?

The extreme violence accompanying the globalization process in Medellin has less to do with a generalised exclusion than with the social gap opened by the promise of the city to generalise the desirable achievements of modernisation among the underclass – a promise going back to the emergence of Fordism and strengthened by the ideology of the *Antioqueñidad* – and the structural impossibility of really fulfilling this promise. This gap, the growing tension created by the fragmentation of the working-class sectors and the included and excluded alongside each other, became the battleground of the Left, but finally was closed by the Mafia and drug economy, at a time when the influence of the Left

was weakening. But the Mafia created a new dynamic of inclusion and exclusion since the new consumers couldn't achieve cultural and political recognition in the city. Here we could find parallels with the riots during this decade in such a dynamic 'first-world' city as Los Angeles, which were principally the outcome of the great proximity of winners and losers among the underclass sectors of promising urban transformations.[29]

The tensions produced by the unevenness of the globalization processes are best expressed by the ambiguity of the new urban middle class. Many intellectuals and former Left wing activists are 'discursive cosmopolitans' but in their attitudes, proposals and decisions, they remain metropolitan locals [30], culturally encapsulated in the *Antioqueñidad*. This has to do with their ambiguity towards modernisation. Their critique of modernisation was expressed on the one hand through an idealisation of the apparently anti-modernist 'lifeworld' of the 'popular culture', and on the other hand by the (discursive) adoption of the critique of the bureaucratic welfare state and of Fordism even though modernisation was experienced in the context of a largely absent state and a very precarious equilibrium of order and 'moving chaos' [31]. But nevertheless now they push the 'project of modernity' to its fulfilment, since decentralisation has strengthened the local state and its possibilities of intervention. The globalization of the underclass sectors is permanently challenging this project, but violence had also a strong cohesive effect in the city, and is pushing the city towards the development of innovative projects. It would be premature to predict the outcome of the strategic planning process, but what Medellin illustrates is how attempts are being made to manage the conflicts created by discontinuity and ambiguity, the simultaneity of integration and dissolution, of the imaginary and the real. In this sense Medellin is a lesson and a capital of the 21st century.

Endnotes

[1] In: PRIMED/CORVIDE – Integral Program of Subnormal District Improvement in Medellin, (1996), p.10. All further quotations are based on my own interviews. The names have been changed, except those of public persons.

[2] A. Appadurai, 1996, 'Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization,' (University of Minnesota Press).

[3] PRIMED/CORVIDE, (see note 1).

[4] H. Mejía V. et al., 1994, 'La Juventud de Medellín y la Construcción de la Democracia,' (Universidad Bolivariana, Medellín,), p.48.

[5] The incrementation of the real GDP rate during the period 1980-89: national GDP 3,37 ; GDP of Antioquia 3,23; GDP of Antioquia without industry 3,49; H. Mejía V. et al., (see note 4), p.38.

[6] PRIMED/CORVIDE, (see note 1).

[7] L.G. Arango, 1996, 'Las obreras en la industria textil 1950-1970,' in J. O. Melo, (Ed.), Historia de Medellín II, (Suramericana de Seguros, Medellín), pp. 487-498; and S. Betancur, La Reconversión Industrial en Colombia y sus Efectos sobre los Trabajadores, (Mimeo, IPC, Medellín 1995).

[8] F. Coupé, 1993, 'Las urbanizaciones piratas en Medellín,' (CEHAP, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Medellín).

[9] See L.G. Arango, (see note 7); and J.O. Melo, (Ed.), Historia de Medellín II, (Suramericana de Seguros, Medellín, 1996).

[10] A. Mayor M., Etica, 1990, 'Trabajo y Productividad en Antioquia,' (Ed. Tercer Mundo, Bogotá, 1989); and M. Arango J., Los Funerales de Antioquia la Grande, (Ed. Arango, Medellin).

[11] 'Paisa' comes from the Spanish word 'Paisanos' which refers to people with a common territorial origin.

[12] C. Toro, Los servicios públicos en Medellín 1920-1990, in J.O. Melo, (Ed.), (see note 9), pp. 531-541.

[13] F. Botero, 1996, 'Medellín 1890-1950. Historia urbana y juegos de intereses,' p.193. (Ed. Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín)

[14] Arte y Ciudad, (Plan Estratégico para Medellín, 1997), p. 20.

[15] H. A. Faciolince, in Arte y Ciudad, (see note 14), p.15.

[16] H. Mejía V. et al, (see note 4).

[17] These and the following statements are based on my own interviews and on A. Salazar, 1994, 'No nacimos pa' semilla,' pp. 185-211. (CINEP, Bogotá)

[18] See note 17; and A. Salazar, 1993, 'Mujeres de Fuego,' (Corporación Región, Medellín)

[19] H. A. Faciolince, (see note 15).

[20] Robertson introduces the terms 'glocal' and 'glocalization' which, according to the Oxford Dictionary of New Words, are 'formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend', to emphasise that the global-local issue does not involve polarity but close interrelationship. R. Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, in M. Featherstone et al., Global Modernities, (SAGE, 1995), pp.28-32.

[21] S. Ruddick, 1994, 'Sub-Liminal Los Angeles: The Case of Rodney King and the Socio-Spatial Re-Construction of the Dangerous Classes,' in B.-P. Lange, H.-P. Rodenberg (ed.), 'Die neue Metropole: Los Angeles-London.' (Argument, Hamburg/Berlin).

[22] Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda (DANE, october 1993); and my own interviews with migrants.

[23] Antioquia Business Profile, Foreign Investor's Guide, (Cámara de Comercio de Medellín, 1996).

[24] This is an expression of the commerciants of the central inner city district.

[25] A. King, 1990, 'Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture,' in M. Featherstone, (Ed.) 'Global Culture, Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity,' (Sage Publications), p. 407.

[26] Appadurai, (see note 2), pp.33-43.

[27] See note 20.

[28] M. Featherstone, Global Culture: An Introduction, in: M. Featherstone (Ed.), (see note 25), p.7.

[29] The anger of the excluded black community was not directed against the actors of urban transformations which increase their exclusion, but against the Asian immigrants who were perceived as winners of this process; see e.g. M. Davies, 1990, 'City of Quartz. Excavating the Future in Los Angeles,' (Verso, New York).

[30] U. Hannerz, 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,' in M. Featherstone (Ed.), (see note 25), pp.237-253.

[31] For this concept see M. Berman, 1982, 'All that is solid melts into air. The experience of modernity,' (Simon and Schuster, New York), Chapter 3.

253

HORIZON

U R

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OF

POSSIBLE

B A N

WORLDS

7

HORIZONS OF POSSIBLE URBAN WORLDS

FINAL PANEL DISCUSSION OF THE 7th INURA CONFERENCE,
JUNE 18, 1997, ROTE FABRIK, ZURICH. CHAIRED BY FRED ROBINSON,
TRANSCRIBED AND EDITED BY MARIA KUNZ AND RICHARD WOLFF

CHAPTER

7

INTRODUCTION

Fred Robinson：   This panel discussion comes at the end
of the INURA Conference and will pick up the themes we have
been looking at over the last three days. I would first like to
summarise some of the issues we have discussed.
The title of the conference is 'Possible Urban Worlds'. We have
explored some possibilities, we have been looking at all kinds
of responses to contemporary life and the difficulties of
contemporary urban life, and we have heard a very wide range
of responses – very rich and varied responses to the various
kinds of problems and issues people are coping with. Some of
those are very pragmatic responses; some quite powerfully
utopian. All of them are positive and proactive responses to

a whole range of situations. We have looked at many different types of initiative, mostly at the local scale: some to do with housing; some to do with reaching out to marginalized groups of people; some concerned with culture and centred on cultural initiatives; some about planning strategies, and so on. We have also considered a wide range of different approaches, some of which stressed their separateness – their movement away from the horror of urban life – and some of which are to do with a more direct engagement with it.

A further issue relates to a whole set of questions and thoughts about making connections. INURA itself is about making connections. This is something that we've been committed to over the last seven years. We have stressed the importance of networking between, particularly local, initiatives.

One has the sense of not just the richness and the diversity at the grassroots, but also the sense of a movement, a movement waiting to happen, connections often waiting to be made.

I was particularly impressed by one phrase I heard over the course of the conference, which was the need to establish places where the powerless can become visible. Indeed, power and visibility, I think, are both central questions which continue to concern us and have concerned the INURA network right from the start.

The final area I would like to keep alive in the debate, wherever else we might go, is something about the whole issue of social exclusion. This seems to me to be an essential theme. I know it's Euro-speak, this 'social exclusion', but I use this term for want of anything better at the moment. This term contains a set of relationships, difficulties, issues – and perhaps within that, a whole series of opportunities and related strategies around it. Social exclusion seems to me to be of central concern to all of us in thinking about the nature of initiatives and what's possible.

THE PARTICIPANTS

Fred Robinson: I am a researcher and lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Durham, UK. Over the past twenty years I have undertaken many research projects examining aspects of economic and social change in North East England, with particular reference to the role of government policy. My publications include: *Post-Industrial Tyneside* (1988), *The Great North* (1990), *More Than Bricks and Mortar, a study of the region's Urban Development Corporations* (1993), *Who Runs the North? a study of Quangos in the North* (1994); and evaluations of Newcastle and Stockton City Challenges (1997, 1998). I have also undertaken evaluations of mental health care services in the Durham prisons and advocacy projects in the Cleveland area. I've been with INURA from the beginning.

Alessandra Romano: I live in Rome, in the squatted place I talked about in my presentation this morning (Forte Prenestino). I've been there practically since the beginning. I decided to participate in this conference because I thought it could be interesting to explore practical experiences, struggles, innovative experiences, and take part in an attempt towards a theoretical analysis of that. I decided to come here for me personally, but also for my place, because in a way every kind of connection to Rome is important. Rome is a bit far from the rest of Europe, in a physical sense and also in other senses. We don't like to be so separated from the rest of Europe, and we're interested in establishing connections.

257

Saskia Sassen: I'm Saskia Sassen. I'm mostly in New York. I need to come to meetings like these where I get to hear you talk. I was extremely interested in the focus this year on direct action groups. There aren't books written about you; in ten years there might be. So I think of these kinds of gatherings as necessary encounters, certainly for people like myself.

Peti Buchel: I'm Peti Buchel, from the Gilde van Werkgebouwen. I represent 18 squatted industrial buildings in the harbour of Amsterdam. It was all very exciting here at the conference. What I found most exciting about it, is what I heard about the identity of the city as an 'international airport'. Every modern city looks exactly the same, but what happens under the surface is a plenitude of all kinds of small, positive initiatives, and they are all here, from Rome, from Luton etc. It's great, it's fantastic.

Roger Keil: My name is Roger Keil. I'm from Toronto where I'm at the Faculty for Environmental Studies. I've been with INURA from the beginning, and this has certainly been the most exciting of our conferences. When you read the newspapers

and you see the national news, there is a lot of talk about globalization and the way globalization is being described to us is, most of the time, as if it were one coherent big process which equalises all of us and makes us all alike and makes us victims of this process. I think we have established, over the past couple of days, that this is not so and that there are lots of differences, still – and on the other hand there is lots of unity and solidarity among those who allegedly have become victimised by globalization. Those people who are proposing globalization as one way of solving capitalism's problems should not be so sure that this will go on without resistance.

Margit Mayer: I'm Margit Mayer. I teach politics at the Free University, Berlin. I work on social movements and also on urban politics. I go to a lot of conferences on social movements, but rarely do I have the opportunity to meet the so-called 'objects' (audience laughs) of social movement researchers, because they are rarely present at the conferences of social movement researchers. Obviously, our conference showed that it's not very easy to combine academic agendas with the interests and needs of the actors in social movements, but I was thrilled that such a conference could be held. And, even though it was only a selection of all the various movements that are active out there, it was fascinating, especially because it was an international selection of movements.

David Harvey: I'm David Harvey, an academic (audience laughs), generally therefore described as useless (audience laughs), but he (points at Glenn Jenkins) is helping me out a lot, and I think that says everything about the tone of this conference. It's been great. The only other comment I'd make: You know, before INURA came along, I used to think the only thing you would find in Zurich were bankers and bourgeois, but I have now found out that there is even resistance, and if there is resistance here, you should be able to find it anywhere! It's a delight to be in an environment of this kind, in a city of this kind, talking the kind of language that we're talking. I think it's been a wonderful experience for me.

Glenn Jenkins: My name is Glenn Jenkins. I'm an ´object´ (audience laughs). I'm speaking on behalf of the Exodus Collective; there are another six members of the collective in the audience. I come from the other end of this equation, of the INURA equation, the end which is about activities. These are activities we take part in because we must – because it has to do with our lives, it creates our lives. When you occupy buildings in front of you that you see laying wasted and you

have nowhere to go – whether it be to dance, to sleep, or to live – it is not as a result of any academic research; it's through our life. When you come here and you find that there are not only similar projects, but also some sort of international support, awareness and recognition of the type of thing that you do, it gives you a tremendous feeling of confidence that it's right. You didn't come to it through books – but the books say that it's all right, if you know what I mean (laughs). It gives you, it gives us, a tremendous feeling of assurance and confidence.

DIRECT ACTION

Nancy, Exodus: Do we agree that direct action works and that it is effective? Little groups doing the little things that we do might make some impact. But globally there is such a powerful force stopping us. How can the intellectuals help us get through the legal system, maybe to find loopholes, so that we can be supported and enable us to do more action? Because we are ready to put ourselves on the line.

Saskia Sassen: Yes. Direct action works, but I do think that we now need a politics of enormous diversity. There was a time when broad-front politics worked better than it works today. There may have been a time when direct action had more of an impact, because it was sort of centre-stage. There were times in the last few decades when direct action was connected to performance art. It was a whole conglomerate of its own. But I do think that we need direct action. We also need different types of politics. One of the things that strikes me is that the challenge is not how do we create a broad front and how do we homogenise, but how do we 'agglutinate' such a diversity of politics?
Amsterdam (March in Amsterdam during the Euro-Summit, June 1997) was important on Sunday, Monday and on Tuesday, because it brought many direct action groups, and many different kinds of politics, together. It made them visible to each other; it made them visible to the top; it made them visible to the media. I do think that this question of powerlessness is a real fact among a lot of these kinds of politics. What are the instruments we have available? One of them is to 'agglutinate', and I say 'agglutinate' because I am really trying to think of a term that would not suggest homogenise, but create broad fronts, create alliances, that has some sort of an impact while maintaining all this specificity. I mean sticking together without losing your specificity, without having to agree on all strategies. I do think that there are these different stages, some that start in very individualised, particular, invisible projects.
Yes, direct action works, but I don't think it is enough. But we need it, because it takes a certain kind of courage.

Dave Featherstone, The Land Is Ours: I had that sense on that march in Amsterdam that it was a presence, but there was something disempowering about that presence, from the point of view that one felt that even if the government had actually decided to sit down and invite a delegation to come to them and to talk to them, one had that sense that there would never have been a delegation from it that would have had any legitimacy to speak on behalf of those people. That's not necessarily a bad thing in terms of representation, but it's just how to get something to go from being a presence to articulating something. What's very important is stressing how to link direct action with the battle of ideas. That's, perhaps, what crucially I felt was missing at the march in Amsterdam.

Roger Keil: Most of the struggles that suddenly occur have been prepared by hundreds of thousands of people in long ebbs of social struggle. This didn't happen out of nowhere, so people had a programme, had an organisation, and if they had been asked to help decide they would have been prepared to do so. It's a difficult step from presence to articulation, to having an agenda and a programme. In order to have presence, people have to work a long time. My experience from my research in Los Angeles is that the Latino working-classes and the African American working-classes, and the women, have been treated like victims for a long, long time – and treated like people who don't have a voice and as if they were just cheap labour and were too afraid to get together to form unions. But what has been disregarded is the high degree of organisation in these communities.
The kinds of organisations David Harvey talked about on the first day, the IAF (Industrial Area Foundation) organisations, have been around for a long time in the United States, organising these people, but not in a visible kind of a way. When their presence was felt, it was already the result of hundreds and hundreds of meetings in churches and community halls that created this presence. This is a politically created presence. It doesn't just happen naturally. The globalization process and the marginalisation process are not natural occurrences. In order to have presence, you have to make it be felt, in order to make it be felt, you have to work for it. This goes back to the question of direct action. It's a long process, it's a process that needs to be sustained by theory building and a lot of patience and a lot of pain.

Margit Mayer: To conclude with a contribution that a theorist could make: Alberto Melucci, who worked with different kinds of movements active in Milan over a couple of years, observed two scientific words that are very important to understand the dynamic of these kinds of movements: latency and visibility. He observed the movement through different phases, a phase of latency, when their activity was more submerged and not so visible in the press or the media or even to the general public – which didn't mean that they were dormant, they were working hard in the ways that Roger was describing, working on consciousness raising and doing all the various kinds of things that you are engaged in. But only under certain conditions, triggered by certain events that are not always under our control, this latent network of submerged activity would turn into visible action that would suddenly then reach much larger circles of people. In order for that to happen, though, you have to know who your potential coalition partners in your respective city are, so you can prepare for such conditions.

DO THINGS RIGHT

Alessandra Romano: I believe in direct action, because sometimes it is the only way you can know if something works or not. We could have spent years thinking about squatted places, but people just took action, and then after that we noticed that it really worked. I think the important thing is just to be a bit clever in doing things, to think a bit before and not just go and do all kinds of stupid things. Don't repeat mistakes, because a lot of times people just repeat the same kind of things that did not work, without ideas about how to change them.

Fred Robinson: I'm reminded of that phrase which says we must not just do the right thing, but do things right. We can learn about a process as well as being committed to what we are trying to do.

David Harvey: Something that has to be recognised is that most proactive, direct action originates with a reaction to something. So when you say: "Is it successful?" you haven't brought capitalism down yet (laughs), but what you did was to react.
I mean, just to take your example, i.e. you reacted to a condition of structural unemployment and you reacted to a condition of commercialisation of culture. Out of those reactions you produced something that was positive. It was turning what was a mere action into something positive. I think all of the groups here began with reacting to something. The difficulty

259

then comes of being proactive, not simply in the sense of constructing an alternative to what you are reacting against, but then seeing how your proactive activities can link with the proactive activities of many others.

I was hit when I read the following piece of data in the International Labour Organisation´s annual report on world employment. They pointed out that the 358 richest people in the world, the billionaires club, own in wealth and have in income the equivalent of 45% of the world's poorest population. 358 people have assets and incomes which are equivalent to the assets and incomes of something like 2.3 billion people. Now, we've been promised that free market capitalism would deliver the goods. Well, it's delivering the goods to some people (laughs). What brings us together is the clear recognition that it is not delivering the goods to a lot of people.

Therefore, the proactive at some point or another has to both be continuous with what it is reacting to – because that is what you're doing and that is what you're about – but then somehow or other the function of conferences of this kind is to say: "Well, how can some of these proactive, direct actions start to gain a broader purchase on the more general problem, which is the obscenity of that figure I just quoted to you."

Peti Buchel: Direct action is very important, because we are doing something, we are giving people a sense of worth. I think globalization, as they call it, of the industries, of commerce, but also of governments, and I´m talking of course of the EU, NAFTA etc., takes away the feeling of worth from the people who are at the bottom of society. We have to start on a small scale, we have to start somewhere, but if some of the people who are at the bottom of society feel power and feel that they are worth something and become strong, it will affect other people. They will hear about it somehow, and that way we will grow. But I also think that everybody has to do it in his or her own way. We can't dictate or say: "Our way is good, you should do it exactly like we do, and you'll be successful."

Roger Keil: I wouldn't support direct action deteriorating to ´something-is-happeningism´. Not just in principle would I think that isn't a good idea but also in practical terms, because what I have learned is that you need a lot of stamina, you need a lot of power and energy, and you need to sustain a certain level of activity over quite a long period of time, in order for that direct action to be successful. You can do little operations and set little fires somewhere, but somebody needs to make sure that the fires keep burning. In order for the fire to keep burning you need something like theory, you need something that makes the connections and helps you explain things. I think we have to learn to develop some theoretical connections and to build this type of learning into our direct actions and struggle.

A GLOBAL CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT?

Tony Gosling, The Land Is Ours: I would like to ask the panel: Are we (INURA) part, do you think, of a global civil rights movement against the pressures of globalization?

Saskia Sassen: When I look at the world today, I see three types of normativities at work. One is the one embedded in the national state: the welfare state, supposedly the well-being of the citizens, the project of the state, always an imperfect project. The second one is the one of the global capital market: new liberal policies, IMF conditionality. Countries, in order to have good, sound economic policy, have to follow certain precepts, and we know what it is, anti-inflation, even if it kills jobs etc. The third: the narrowest way to describe it is the international human rights regime, but I do think that one of the things the normativity of the human rights regime signals is the centrality of the body of the individual as a site for rights. I think some kind of normativity is embedded in many different types of struggles. There is something that unites us, though we may have different names for it. Perhaps ´global civil rights movement´ is one way of naming it, perhaps ´international human rights´ regime is by now too technical a term. There is not necessarily a shared name for this. It is partial and in movement. I do think that a lot of the politics that might unite very different groups on what the purposes of political action are, is some version of civil rights or human rights. But again, as in my answer to direct action, it is important, it isn't enough.

Again, when I look at the world, what I see as one of the ironies of today is some sort of triangulation. A strong global economic system, which, for me materialises in very particular structures, places etc.; a losing of power by national states; and an ascending of subnational entities, or cross-boarder entities, that do not encompass all national territories. There is a real refiguring of national territory. That means that the local does assume a presence. Tomas Maldonato said: "la coscienza municipale"; we see today an ascendance of a municipal conscience. This is not necessarily all good, by the way, but there is something about the local in the context of globalization, that the language of globalization does not necessarily present as such, but that is happening.

Roger Keil: There are two kinds of dangers I see in the current debate on globalization. One is painting globalization as a kind of demon that wipes us all out. The other danger is the opposite: not to take it seriously.

MAKE POSSIBLE URBAN WORLDS

Geraint Ellis, INURA London： What do the members of the panel think is the one single thing we can do to make 'possible urban worlds' even more possible?

Glenn Jenkins： When we try to contrast what we do with what other people do, I see the movement as cutting all the way across this table: it's a movement of positive people, it's a movement of people who care about each other rather than caring about money first, it doesn't matter if you got a little bit of it or a lot of it, it's just about what you value. When we make criticisms of power structures, as people who are deemed to be anarchists, it's not so much that we don't feel there needs to be some sort of organisational structure, like time to make sure the bus gets there etc.
It depends on what you do, it's not so much the structure that is wrong, it's that a lot of people within the structure are doing things for themselves, for the kingdom, the power, and the glory of it. In these possible future urban worlds we should maybe look at people's motivations for what they do, just as much as at what they are actually doing.

Margit Mayer： There are obviously some iron laws of movement development, such as institutionalisation and so on, where a lot of movements, in the course of their development, have lost track of their original goal. But I don't think it is very helpful to us to look at these general, abstract laws governing the development of social movements. What seems to me much more helpful is an analysis of the concrete situation in which the movements and action groups find themselves today. Even though the social movements in every city have really come to cover quite a wide spectrum, my answer to the question of what we should do when we go home really has to do with reaching out and checking out your own city and all the movements and groups that are active there. It has been very stimulating, I'm sure, to hear about internationally active other groups, but your work happens in your city. You will have to find coalition partners right there.

David Harvey： We're always being told that capitalism is a sort of social economic system, and the market in particular is a very efficient way to allocate resources, that it is also rational in how those resources get allocated, and we are given the argument that Adam Smith made two centuries ago, which says that individual greed, when it is monitored through the market, leads to a kind of world which is better for everybody.

One of the things that struck me a lot in the presentations in this conference, is the immense waste that this system is generating. It's wasting resources, it's wasting land, it's creating wastelands where there were none before, it's wasting talents. This is one of the most inefficient, irrational systems that you could imagine.
One of the things that has happened ideologically is that we've often accepted the notion that somehow or other they have understood what rationality and efficiency is all about and that, therefore, our only form of reaction to them is to say: "I'm going to be irrational and do crazy things."
It seems to me that one of the things I would want to work on when I get back is to try to say: "This system is so irrational, it is so inefficient that what we have to do is to define some alternative notion of rationality and efficiency", and say: "We can make a society that works for everyone."

Margit Mayer： My sense is that they know that their system is inefficient, that's nothing new. They are in it because it is extremely profitable for them, not because it's efficient for anybody. I rather worry about the strategies I see them taking, because they are aware that it is inefficient and that this problem poses certain dangers, even for the cohesion and the continuous functioning of the system.
We have the president of the United States encouraging a big summit on volunteerism, because there are a lot of problems with the poverty population in the United States that is totally dropping by the wayside, so they are trying to stimulate the self-activity of volunteer community organisations, to take care of all of those problems, which the efficient market system is not taking care of. They are not doing so because of their generous hearts, but rather because if they don't, there is the threat of the cohesion of the city breaking apart.
The question I would like to ask is: whether the groups present here – and many other similar groups concerned with and active around the employment problems and housing problems of those people who are not being taken care of by the mechanisms of the market – aren't mending the problems that would otherwise threaten the stability and cohesion of the system which allows it to continue to function?

URBAN STRATEGIES

Carolien Feldbrugge, Gilde van Werkgebouwen： What strikes me right now, and what strikes me all the time, is that most people talk about 'the system', but who said there was just one system?
It looks like everybody has become a patient in society.
The market system does not provide for billions of people. Now, we're sitting here with some action groups or practical groups,

and it shows that so many people think: "Well, the system, whatever system we are living in, does not work for me, so I work for myself." That shows that the system doesn't cover the roots of people, of the soil, of the buildings. The system has a responsibility on another level, on several abstract levels, but down on the earth you have to manage your own surroundings. The evidence is given by all the action groups present here.

Christian Schmid, INURA Zurich: You said we have to make it on our own. Here, we are talking about possible urban worlds and not about islands in an urban world, which makes a difference. What I learned from this conference is that there are many initiatives, many projects, and many action groups working. But what are the effects of these action groups on the society?

Society means, today as before, that people have something to do with each other. If we want to have a different society, it means that we have to respect one old-fashioned principle, which is the principle of solidarity, and this also means mutual help. My fear is that the tendency we have today leads to a situation in which a whole range of small islands struggle alone against the world. The only way to get out of this is not only to meet each other, but to connect these different projects, and also to connect these projects to society.

Saskia Sassen: I have a political map in my head, but like David Harvey I'm an academic, and I don't know how far it goes. First, a network of cities as strategic places for the valorization of global capital. Get away from the image of this diffuse global market which we can't get our teeth into: we can. Second, the amount of organisational apparatus, which means materiality to this power. There are vulnerabilities, but it will take some homework, to understand what they are. It took homework for global capital, to get where they are. They had, of course, the resources to employ battalions of brilliant legal experts, battalions of brilliant accounting experts, battalions of brilliant financiers etc., but it took work. It will take work for us as well, but this is not a monster that floats in a condition of hypermobility. It is hypermobile, but it is implanted. In a network of strategic places there is a possibility for organising. I want to emphasise again, this is just part of an animal, because we're all dealing with national economies, regional economies, local economies that have their own ways, their own machineries to produce inequality, to disempower. Third, there is an enormous concern with keeping this machinery going at the top – I'm talking just about the top now – a concern with keeping order, with creating standards, with making the thing work. Those who are in it at the top know that it isn't just a market, there is much more to it; there is anxiety. You hear more and more in global corporate elite circles, and there are

several of them, a concern with the limits of the market. You also hear the notion: 'we need government', because government represents a machinery for creating order and legitimating a certain type of order.

The government is part of the story, different governments in different ways. Third world countries are forced to accept IMF conditionality. The state is part of it, so how do we find the strategic sites where we – because we have access to our states, to our own national states, we as citizens in different countries – how do we find the particular locations in our national states, which can become arenas for political practice, where we, going through our national states, can achieve something that has to do with this transnational animal. In this map, that still leaves protected arenas of a privatised new global order, it is going to take other kinds of actions (laughs). Wild ideas come to my mind: the notion that the global corporate elite meets once a year in Davos, where *The Magic Mountain* by Thomas Mann was written, and for entertainment they trot in prime ministers, presidents, central bankers, stock brokers. Now, what kind of a setting is that? Anyhow, there are enormous sites for action potentially, but it is going to take a different kind of political map. We need a combination of extremely specialised focuses of activity. Like the environmental focus, certain aspects of the environment, judiciary struggles around certain legal questions that are happening, and one that combines specialised focus with the transnational space for activity. Globalization, as instituted by global capital, has created transnational geographies for their activities. Well, can we step into them? NAFTA created a lot of organising energy in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. NAFTA is not some vague regulatory framework, it is also a set of very concrete sites, where action is possible by global capital, yes, but perhaps also by us. But again, we have to invent, we have to think.

So, direct action, yes, and all kinds of other things. The courts are sites for struggles, factories are sites, so it's a big collective project.

Roger Keil: I would like to build on that and the question of solidarity but also the question of an urban strategy; Urban worlds, rather than local worlds. I couldn't agree more that the world economy exists in strategic sites. Many of us who are here live in such strategic sites. We live in these places, we know these places, we struggle in these places.

There is something I have seen happening in Toronto over the past years, maybe only the last half a year. On the one hand, there has been this immense explosion of citizens' action on

a metropolitan level. In a referendum on March 3rd of 1997, 12 weeks ago, 70% of people voted against the amalgamation of their six cities into one city, an immense outpouring of support for a grassroots movement, which started in a church with Monday night meetings, meeting Monday after Monday, in the midst of winter snow storms, an incredible movement, an incredible outpouring. The streets were yellow with posters and signs of protest.

On the other hand, at the same time, the entire waterfront of Toronto has been completely re-thought and redesigned by some of the city's most powerful place entrepreneurs, together with some of the most powerful investors, particularly from Hong Kong. There has been a process of creating a new development on the waterfront in Toronto, which parallels only perhaps the Potsdammer-Platz in Berlin in size. This entire process has gone on without any intervention by the urbanist critical public. Zillions of dollars have been poured into zillions of tons of concrete without any public participation, and at the same time we've been taking to the streets of the city. That is something which is completely inexplicable to me at this point.

I think there is a split between civil society and global economy, to a certain degree, which goes back to the question of the global citizens' rights. There are certain rights that are given to us now, and others have been taken away from us. The question of what we can ask for and where we can apply our urbanist strategies, is a very central one to me.

Peti Buchel: The harbour development in Toronto is very interesting for Amsterdam. I am very interested in what Roger Keil just said about nobody reacting to the development of this harbour. This relates to politics in Amsterdam and harbour developments. From the beginning, the city of Amsterdam has been extremely interested in the harbour developments of Toronto and Baltimore. We have been bombarded by the city, by every party, the green party, all the left wing parties on how fantastic the development was in Toronto. We have been trying to get politicians interested in our ideas on harbour development in Amsterdam, small scale harbour developments that create work and living places, cultural and mixed places. We have been trying to convince them. First, we invited politicians from the green party I vote for. The only response was: "Money! Money! This is about money. What you offer has no value in money, and we need money. Keep your ambitions low, we have high ambitions. We want a very commercial development here." So, we went to other parties, we asked all parties what they thought about it. Every party we spoke to gave the same answer, no matter which colour they had, it was so frustrating. We really had the feeling at the end: Fuck the politics, they're just not interested in the common citizen anymore. What are we going to do? We are all alone, we are

going to fight all on our own and won't have anything to do with politics anymore, unless we really need them.

What our action group wants is that a certain level of this democracy, of this responsibility is given back to the ordinary citizen. Let them decide what happens in their neighbourhood, let them decide without the intervention of the city, except of course the law. The law has to be respected, I think. I'm a squatter, I don't always respect the law. But to a certain extent, keep a few rules.

THE QUESTION OF VALUES

Stefan Kipfer, INURA Toronto: I would say the presence of everyday resistance is everywhere, not just in alternative projects, but in a lot of TV commercials, in a lot of what goes for normal culture. It's filled with everyday resistance, in a work place, in everyday stuff that we don't normally recognize as political action.

What kind of theory, what do we need to make some of the connections that we need to make? What are some of the things we need to do, to think about the similarities and differences that we've heard about in this conference? What do we need to build solidarity? What do we need to take back home, to work on the basis of what we've heard in this conference? Do we need theory for this? If yes, what kind of theory, and even more important for me, do we need an urban theory, to engage in all those projects of making connections?

David Harvey: There is a lot of direct action which is being taken by the right wing. One of the things it does seem to me that we haven't really mentioned is a certain communality of values, a certain communality of respect, which was also mentioned, a certain politics which, for lack of a better word, I have to call a form of class politics, because it's about trying to find forms of solidarity between all of those people who for a variety of reasons have been marginalized by their situation in society. Trying to build some kind of movement of betterment, rather than protection of privilege, because there is plenty of direct action going on in terms of protection of privilege. I don't think we should make the assumption that just because it's direct action it's good, because a lot of it is terrible. In my own city, the rich folk are very good at it.

Margit Mayer: It's not just the rich and the fascists that also engage in direct action and social movements, but also nice, middle-class-based neighbourhoods. For example in Berlin, when one of the Wagenburgen that had emerged in the centre of town where the wall used to be, was cleaned out, an attempt

was made by the city to place it in Spandau, a district at the edge of the city, but the people there organised, demonstrated, and signed petitions, and mobilised in a very effective way, because they didn't want to have that 'scum' and the problems of the city in their own backyard.

David Harvey: It sometimes seems to me we're not quite explicit enough about the nature of the values – it's not a theory we're talking about here, it's really about the nature of what our project is. What would be a possible city for us? Presumably, it would be one in which we could all enjoy Exodus rave parties, if we cared to, at the same time as we could do many other things. It does seem to me that we need to be a little bit more specific about those communalities, because otherwise we'll get into this very abstract notion that any direct action is OK, and that includes the Neo-fascists and includes anybody. At that point you can say: "No, that's not what my direct action is about. That's not what we're talking about, what we're talking about is a broad communality of purpose." I think sometimes we're a little afraid to try to spell it out too much, because then we'll get into an argument: What do you mean by values, what do I mean by values? Well, we might have some sort of differences, so we might get into an argument, so we sort of tend to back off and leave it alone.

It seems to me, there is a common sense of incredible social injustice that exists in society, and it has to be rectified, and something has to be done, attention has to be paid to all of the wastes, attention has to be paid to the ways discrimination is operating.

In a way, we could if we really wanted to, try to pin down: What are the values which could form the basis of solidarity amongst a vaster array of different people doing different things in different places? I don't think the idea of communality of values says we all have to do the same thing, or we all have to behave the same way. I think we have to think about a broad alliance of interests along these lines and maybe spell them out a little bit more explicitly. I think we waltz around this one a little bit, because we maybe don't want to get into too big an argument with each other. It does seem to me we've acquired enough friendliness that we should be able to say these things and say: "OK, I think you're wrong, let's have a little argument" and then say: "All right, let's find the communality in all of us."

Louanne Tranchell, INURA London: In this conference, the obvious thing of meeting and mixing with such a range of people is one of the most powerful witnesses that you get. Being in this building (Rote Fabrik) has been an extra, because it suggests not just the fact that direct action won it, but that

it has been managed for many years. As we walk about it, there are many jobs taking place inside it. There is much opportunity to have any sort of relationship, any sort of discussion. It seems, in fact, to really embody the worthwhile aspects of struggle. It is on a very small level. It is a small island, but it must be part of a continent.

The real thing that people in this room are probably capable of is recording all these small struggles.

David Harvey spoke of waste. I, at my age, am very conscious of a waste of effort. So frequently, so many people's effort is wasted, because it isn't recorded well, because it doesn't become the theme of photographs or of some sort of record which will last and which can then be added to the next people's effort. This can give the opportunity for anybody at all to choose a theme for their researches, for their produce, whatever they're going to produce. They can reflect this possible world that we have talked about, and they can also record it and make sure that the nature of the values that we've been discussing and promoting, together and which emanate from a building and a community like this, will be noticed. We can also tempt the next generation to change their ways.

There is a poet in England called Adrian Mitchell. We've had some discussions about what is 'we' and what is 'they'. Adrian Mitchell takes it that 'we' are elephants, and we drink milk. 'They' are flies, and they drink acid. They put their feet on the table, and they ask for another slice of elephant meat. Now, we must remember that it takes a lot of elephants to move in one direction, and we must keep our shoulder there. But it also requires that we have the courage and tenacity of elephants, to record what we do. (Audience applauds).

BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS AND EDITORS

Renate Berg, born 1966 in Kreuztal/ Westfalen (FRG), started to study architecture at Kassel University in 1988. She worked in Weimar (GDR) in 1990/91, lived in a squatted house. In 1991, she moved to a wagon in Kassel. Having received her architectural diploma in 1995, she moved to Berlin with her wagon. Since then she has lived in a Wagenburg in Berlin/Kreuzberg and worked as an architect in Berlin.

Peti Buchel is co-author of *The Turning Tide*, a book about alternative ways of creating an urban environment and she is also active in the Handbag Revolution. She earns her living by visualising during brainstorm sessions on policy development.

Bob Colenutt is an urban geographer who had worked for community groups in London and Docklands between 1972 and 1995, including two years with the Greater London Council. He was a councillor for the London Borough of Lambeth between 1986 and 1990. He is presently head of urban regeneration at the London Borough of Haringey.

Exodus is a unique urban phenomenon which does not simply confront, but intelligently challenges, society's assumptions and values. They offer working, viable solutions to many of society's stated ills; poverty, crime, drugs, unemployment and the break down of community. Exodus blend a volatile mixture of rastafarianism, new-age punk and street smart politics. 'We are not drop outs but force outs.'

The Luton based Exodus Collective came into existence in 1992 as part of the growing DIY culture which arose in response to unemployment, poverty and frustration amongst young people. They organised free 'rave' parties, renovated derelict homes, set up a community farm and now plan to open a community centre. Some of their activities border on illegality but they are entirely peaceful. Exodus has a huge following amongst local people. Their philosophy has a strong spiritual strand, appealing to notions of community and natural justice in its struggle for survival and renewal. However, their utopian project presents a challenge to the status quo and has met with powerful opposition.

Dave Featherstone is a writer and musician who has studied and been involved with direct action politics. He is currently studying at the Open University, UK.

Carolien Feldbrugge is one of the initiators of the IJ Industrial Buildings Guild and the brain behind the Handbag Revolution, a revolution to give back the responsibility for the development and management of the urban environment to the people who live and work there. She earns her daily bread by visualising during brainstorm sessions on policy development.

Beatriz García Peralta is a researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of the Universidad Autónoma de México, UNAM. She studied architecture and urban development; coordinated research groups on housing policy in Mexico and on the impact of economic deregulation on the housing construction industry. She teaches housing policy in the faculty of architecture at the UNAM. Her research topics focus on housing: the use of collective land (ejidos) for social housing; the real estate market for housing; housing policies in Mexico.

Britta Grell is a political scientist and participated as an activist in the Inner!City!Action!–week 1997 in Berlin.

Bernd Hamm, born 1945, received his lic.rer.pol. and Dr.rer.pol. degrees in sociology from the University of Berne, Switzerland, and a honorary doctorate in economics from the Economic University of Katowice, Poland. He teaches sociology at

the University of Trier, holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies and is founder and director of the Center for European Studies. His main research interests are in global sustainable development and the role of the rich countries in this process.

David Harvey, geographer, philosopher and marxist, is a professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. He inspired generations of urban researchers with books like *Social Justice and the City* (1973), *The Limits to Capital* (1982), *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989).

Hansruedi Hitz, geographer and organiser of events in the cultural centre BOA, Lucerne, is a founding member of INURA and the Ssenter for Applied Urbanism (SAU), Zurich.

Andreas Hofer works as an architect and urban planner in Zurich. He does research work at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich). The topics of his work are: sustainable city development, social change, and the influence these themes have on the form and the conditions of production of architecture. He engages in different local activist groups, is a co-founder of the alternative housing project KraftWerk1 and has published in different journals about these projects.

Bert Hogervorst is an egyptologist and classicist. Her activities vary from writing books about ancient Egyptian death customs, magic and religion to compiling reports for the Dutch Ministry of Transport. She is also the co-author of *The Turning Tide* which investigates the role of the user in the redevelopment of dockland warehouses in North-West Europe.

Roger Keil is an Associate Professor of Environmental Studies and Political Science at York University, Toronto. He has done most of his research over the past years on politics in world cities, mostly on Los Angeles and Frankfurt and recently on Toronto and Berlin. He is a founding member of INURA and a participant in a variety of urban and ecological activities. His most recent

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Stefan Kipfer is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at York University, Toronto. Besides researching the work of Henri Lefebvre, he is currently involved in a number of political struggles in Toronto.

Philipp Klaus, born 1961, is a geographer and violinist. He lives with his family in Hinteregg near Zurich. His thoughts and actions are about quality of life, culture, the future, abandoned industrial areas, regional and urban policy. After several years as a researcher in a programme of Technology Assessment he tried to make understandable sociological, economical and political issues to postgraduate planning students at the Institute for National, Regional and Local Planning at the ETH Zurich from 1993 to 1998. Member of INURA Zurich.

Ute Angelika Lehrer is ABD at the Department of Urban Planning, UCLA, and is a founding member of INURA. She has been working on globalization and the built environment, economic restructuring and urban form, as well as on immigration and cities. Among her most recent publications is, co-authored with John Friedmann: *Urban Policy Responses to Foreign In-Migration: The Case of Frankfurt-am-Main* in M. Douglass and J. Friedmann, *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*, Chichester: John Wiley, 1998.

Geert Lovink is a media theoretician, Internet activist, and editor of nettime <www.factory.org/nettime>. He was one of the founding members of the Amsterdam

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p.m. has been living in Zurich for 30 years. He's been using his pseudonym (meaning Peter or Paul Müller or Meier) since his first novel of science fiction, *Weltgeist Superstar* (1980). His work comprises utopian essays (*bolo'bolo*, 1983), games (*demono*, 1984), plays and numerous articles on social renewal, urbanistics, alternative economics. Currently he's preparing the third volume of his novel *The Terrors of the Year 1000* (Rotpunktverlag, Zurich).

Marvi Maggio, architect, Ph.D. in Physical and Urban Planning from the Department of Physical and Urban Planning, University of Rome 'La Sapienza', in 1992. At present she is a scholarship holder at the University of Rome 'La Sapienza'. She has been a consultant for several research projects for the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, the University of Rome and the Polytechnical University of Turin. She has worked as a research scholarship holder at the universities of Amsterdam, Toronto and Prague. She has published many articles on the decision making process for complex urban transformations with attention to conflicts of interest, urban planning tools, participation of inhabitants, and social equity.

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Margit Mayer teaches Comparative and North American politics at the Free University of Berlin. Among her research fields are urban politics and social movements. She also engages actively in the local movement scene by collaborating with groups in Berlin and, when the opportunity arises, in North American cities. She has published *Das neue Gesicht der Städte. Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Befunde* (together with S.Krätke, R.Borst, R.Roth and F.Schmoll, Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1990); *Politik in europäischen Städten: Fallstudien zur*

Bedeutung lokaler Politik (together with H.Heinelt, Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1993); and *The German Greens: Paradox between Movement and Party* (together with J.Ely, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). She is currently working on a book on urban social movements to be published by Blackwell.

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Richard Wolff, born in the year of the Sputnik, raised between the Alps and the Andes, travelled the seven seas, is a devoted 'house-man' and father, a researcher and a political and cultural activist. He has been working as an environmental campaigner, a planning consultant, and as an organiser of political and cultural events. He is currently employed by the Department of Geography of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) as a research assistant, working on his PhD on popular planning in King's Cross, London. He is a founding member of INURA and of the Ssenter for Applied Urbanism (SAU), Zurich. His remaining spare time is spent as free-lance collaborator of the cultural centre Rote Fabrik.

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AS YET, IN TEN YEARS THERE MIGHT BE"
(SASKIA SASSEN).

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